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POLITICAL ANALYSIS.**

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**THE LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA:
A POLITICAL ANALYSIS**

A Thesis

**Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

by

Samuel Peter Regenstreif

January, 1963

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Samuel Peter Regenstreif was born in Montreal, Canada on September 9, 1936. He is a Canadian citizen. He attended high school in Montreal and subsequently enrolled at McGill University where he received his B.A. (First Class Honours in Economics and Political Science) in 1957. While he was an undergraduate he served in the Canadian Army and presently holds the rank of Lieutenant (Supplementary Reserve).

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"Some Aspects of National Party Support in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIX (February, 1963).

"How Canada May Vote," Series of twelve articles on the Canadian Election of 1962 in The Montreal Star, May 9 - June 16, 1962, passim.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking facts of Canadian politics for the last sixty years is the overwhelming dominance of one party. From 1896 until 1957, the Liberal Party was out of office in Ottawa for only fifteen years. What is almost equally striking, at least to the political scientist, is the absence of any study, historical or political, of this obviously very successful institution. It is evident that this lack of insight about a political party leaves a gap in knowledge concerning Canadian parties in particular and Canadian politics in general.

Friedrich has defined a political party as "...a group of human beings, stably organized, with the objective of securing or maintaining for its leaders the control of government, and with the further objective of giving to members of the party through such control, ideal and material benefits and advantages."¹ While this study accepts this interpretation, it is evident that the definition leaves a great deal unsaid, as it seems to overemphasize the institutional aspects of parties while underplaying the social and

1. Footnotes to Chapter I appear on page 11.

behavioral. In the construct which sees parties as the link between society and its instrument of power, the state, this definition overlooks the sometimes more important party functions of opinion formation, representation and policy formulation. For the past two centuries, political observers have analyzed the nature and function of political parties from various points of view: Burke viewed them as bodies of men brought together by common philosophy; Marx recognized them merely as instruments of warring classes; and Duverger sees them characterized most significantly by their organization. In a sense, the formulations of these three commentators are peculiarly representative of phases of political and social development in the western world: From the commercial age, through the years of rapid industrialization, to the modern period of mass democracy.

Since no study of the Liberal Party exists, there is no denying that, with the above as background, a simple historical-descriptive account of the party beginning with the time of Confederation would represent a significant advance. However, while the purely historical approach would be useful, it might also obscure some important tendencies in the development and operation of parties which observers have noted in other countries. Not only is it important that the Liberal Party of Canada (like all parties) is influenced by the country's geography, economic and social peculiarities, political institutions and voting traditions, it is equally significant that a study of the party can also provide an extraordinary instrument for the application of the methods of comparative analysis. In this connection, Canadian politics, containing

as it does a mixture of British and American influences, is an especially fruitful field for study. The combination of a federal structure with the British system of Cabinet government; the many traditions held in common; the existence of a strongly self-conscious minority, the French, together with a proliferation of other ethnic groups; a diversity of economic and regional interests which, along with some ethnic groups, are often concentrated within specific provincial boundaries; the continuation of the tradition of the frontier and its emphasis on patronage and political spoils; the revolution in mass communications; rapid and dislocating industrialization --- all these have had their impact on the Liberal Party.

The confluence of British and American practices is particularly noticeable with regard to the subject of leadership. McKenzie's statements about the "emergence of the leader" in the British Conservative Party² are not entirely applicable to the Canadian parties because of American influences such as the use of the Convention method to choose a leader and the operation of an indigenous Canadian concept of "availability". The role and powers of the party leader in Canada are also somewhat different than in Great Britain. Not only has the political style of the United States greatly influenced the operations of the imported British institutions of Cabinet government, but the Canadian environment has also taken its toll. A most noteworthy factor, in connection with the Liberal Party at least, is the importance of that ever-present self-conscious minority, the French Canadians, which can be used by a leader so inclined as an effective device for controlling a

recalcitrant party. At the same time, the federal structure of the country might lead to the assumption that the leader of a national party in Canada is as constrained as an American president in enforcing his will in such matters as the selection of the party's candidates. However, the operations of the parliamentary system serves as an important factor in enforcing control. Finally, the organization of the party itself is an element that affects the leader's role.

As far as the question of distribution of power within political parties is concerned, there are two well-known works which are relevant to this study. At the turn of this century, Ostrogorski gloomily predicted that the development of mass democracy would, through the growth of the party organizations outside Parliament, destroy the best features of the British parliamentary system. He feared that the individual M.P.s and the parliamentary parties would be controlled by the constituency party machines.³ As R.T. McKenzie points out, this has not come to pass in Great Britain and "by the turn of the century the leaders of both parties had shackled the monster they had created."⁴ However, in Canada the problem seems not to have arisen until recently and like their British counterparts, Liberal parliamentary politicians have not been slow in recognizing in this development the inherent threat to their prerogatives. The reasons for this comparatively late occurrence in Canadian politics, at least in the Liberal Party, will be explored in the sections dealing with organization.

The other relevant work is Michels' Political Parties⁵ which first appeared a decade after Ostrogorski's compendium. In an

analysis based mainly upon his observations of the German Social Democratic Party and the German Trade Unions, Michels formulated his well-known "Iron law of oligarchy": Having already dismissed the claims of democracy of Conservative parties as meaningless a priori, he was now forced after a lengthy analysis, to come to a similar conclusion about the claims of socialist parties, for while the leaders of these parties were not entirely free to ignore the wishes of the party rank-and-file, they were, nevertheless, subject to little more than remote and negative control. Michels elaborated two categories of reasons, "technical" and "psychological", for these oligarchic tendencies which he found to be inherent to all large organizations. The "technical" causes refer to the inevitable division of labor entailed to every complex organization. A small number of individuals acquire exclusive knowledge and develop special skills so that by reason of expertise alone they must be deferred to; the "psychological" reasons refer to the need and demand for guidance on the part of party followers. Over time, an organization tends to produce a special internal "political class", to employ, as Michels does, Mosca's phrase. This coterie is not necessarily devoted solely to the interests of the organization. Instead, considerations of personal power consolidation take increasing precedence. In many respects, this very brief restatement of Michels' theories is the story of the Liberal Party in the final decade of its long reign.

In the section following those on organization and leadership an attempt is made to analyze the social composition and

extent of participation of the supporters of the party. There are some comparisons with the supporters of the Progressive Conservative and CCF (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, the Socialist Party) parties as well. The material in this chapter is based primarily upon a questionnaire mailed to a national sample of 3000 party supporters, 1000 from each of the three parties.⁶

While it was the original intention of this study to confine discussion of the results of the questionnaire to the Liberal Party, this soon proved to be unwise, lest the impression be given that, in terms of its support, the party was unique in the Canadian political system. An analysis of the patterns emerging from the data on all the parties demonstrates that this is not always the case. For comparative purposes, then, some of the material on the Conservatives and CCF is also included. As well, the use of the information from the questionnaire is not entirely confined to this one chapter but is used to substantiate other statements regarding organization and ideology.

Finally, this study attempts to answer the question: "Is there a Liberal Ideology?" While the material in this section is based on the public utterances as well as public policies of the Party, it rests heavily in addition, as do the other sections, upon the extensive interviewing and personal observation which were carried out for over four years.⁷ Perhaps an attempt to pin down an ideology of a Canadian national party is a futile exercise in intellectualizing. Folklore has it that there are no differences in the philosophies of the Liberals and Conservatives, the only two parties which have ever held power federally. This deduction is based

on the premise that to be successful in Canadian political life, which in this instance means to gain and to hold power, a party must attempt to be all things to all men. Nevertheless, while this is hardly the place to adumbrate an entire theory of ideology, the chapter on this subject is written with the assumption that long years of common association in the quest for power, prestige and spoils have given Canadian Liberals if not a common perspective, then at least a distinctive political style or tone.

One last remark is particularly relevant here. Throughout this preamble, the emphasis, aside from the political, has been heavily sociological, if such a separation can ever be made. This is undoubtedly as it should be for political parties are social agglomerations although admittedly of a special kind. However, it might be well to inject a note of caution here lest the impression be given that the elaboration of a few theories of political science and political sociology will serve to see the observer through to the end of an analysis of the behavior of political parties in general and the Canadian Liberal Party in particular. This would constitute a rather simplistic approach. In connection with the subject of leadership especially, nothing fascinates the student of the Liberal Party more thoroughly than the weird manifestations of personality and the potent force of personal influence. In discussing this important ingredient of a political situation, many choose to fall back upon the use of terminology such as the "x" factor, charisma and other such nomenclature whenever the necessity arises of having to progress beyond a conception of a

leader as simply the possessor of skills or as an institutionalized role-player. Whatever term may be used, it would still be difficult to explain the powerful attraction exerted, for instance, by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, without taking this element into account. A considerable part of the strength of the other two Quebec federal leaders of this century, Ernest Lapointe and Louis St. Laurent, must be attributed to their immense personal appeal. On the other hand, an understanding of the career of W.L. Mackenzie King, who according to all accounts lacked the personal appeal of his predecessor, may well be impossible without familiarity with the internal workings of the party itself, to say nothing of the general social climate and political events of his time, both in Canada and abroad.

* * * *

This study sees the operation of the Liberal Party in terms of three basic relationships: Between the party and the pattern of government; between the leader and his followers, both in Parliament and in the country; and between the party and the social structure of Canada.⁸ However, this analysis does not give equal weight to these three factors. As mentioned earlier, the Liberal Party has been the party in power in Canada for this century. It seems most fruitful therefore to emphasize the aspects of leadership and organization of the party, for the mechanics of winning and holding power can reveal more about a party than a discourse

on policy or public opinion, subjects about which conjectural statements are often the only ones that may be made.⁹ This does not mean to imply that party organization is a more important factor than the program or social basis of a party. Indeed, the latter is probably the most significant element in the long run, especially in a country where diverse and often differing groups make the achievement of a national consensus so difficult. However, it must be emphasized that little has been written on the subject of the social structure of Canadian society.¹⁰ Even the casual observer is struck by the relative absence of any references to class or group by either of the two major political parties, much in the same way that such references are avoided in this country. Whereas this area has for a long time been an important subject of academic investigation here, such work is now just beginning in Canada. The major sources of references to such matters in Canada are, as might be expected, the various discontented regional and economic groups and the political parties emanating from them. The fact that one party has so effectively dominated the national scene for a full generation, thereby avoiding the revealing dislocations inherent in any changeover, renders the task of analysis that much more difficult. Traditions of cabinet secrecy and party discipline are other complicating factors. For these reasons, many of the observations made throughout this study may have to be taken, at least in part, on faith.

Finally, although this is an essentially contemporary study, the history of the party is not to be entirely neglected. It is

impossible to make many statements about the Liberal Party today without reference to such factors as the changing economic and social structure of Canada, its growing population, and the increasing influence of American political and social life on its institutions. Nevertheless, it is in the organization of the party that the special conditions governing the workings of Canadian politics seem most apparent. It is the hope of the author that the following study, as outlined above, will not only provide much needed material about the general operation of the relatively unknown Canadian political process but will also add to our store of knowledge about the parliamentary system as it functions in a non-British environment.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. C.J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950), 419.
2. See R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1955), 21-55; 297-384.
3. M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1902).
4. R.T. McKenzie, Op. Cit., 9.
5. R. Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Dover Publications, 1959).
6. See Appendix for the questionnaire, the accompanying covering letter, and some remarks on returns and methodology.
7. See the bibliographical note for a review of the materials and sources used.
8. See C.J. Friedrich, Op. Cit., 410-424 for a general discussion of parties in these three terms.
9. The assumptions underlying this approach are stated by M. Duverger in Political Parties (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1955): "For present-day parties are distinguished less by their programme or the class of their members than by the nature of their organization. A party is a community with a particular structure. Modern parties are characterized primarily by their anatomy." xv.
10. B. Blishen et. al., Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961) is just a beginning as the editors themselves state.

CHAPTER II: THE SETTING

It is impossible to set the background for a dynamic study of any political party in Canada without emphasizing the great changes in the country's social, geographic and economic structure that have taken place since Confederation in 1867. When the British North America Act was proclaimed, the Dominion of Canada consisted of four provinces, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, with a population of approximately 3 1/3 million. In 1871, when the first census was taken, 60% of the population was British, 30% French and the remainder was of European continental origin. With over 85% of its people living in rural areas, Canada's economy was basically agricultural. There was some primary industry which was concentrated in the areas of fishing and forestry. Already the pattern of foreign trade was established, however, for imports were annually exceeding exports with disheartening regularity.

The transformations which the country experienced in the following eighty years were substantial: Six new provinces were added to the original four and Canada became fully self-governing. By 1951,¹ the population had climbed past the 14 million mark.

1. Footnotes to Chapter II appear on pp. 104-116.

The distribution, when compared with that of the 1870's, is particularly noteworthy; for while the French segment was holding its own at 30%, the percentage of those of British origin had declined to 47. Twenty-three percent were of other ethnic backgrounds, reflecting the heavy immigration of the previous half-century. Although as late as 1921, the population was still slightly weighted toward the rural areas, by 1956, fully two-thirds could be classified as urban.²

Even more significant is the fact that, occupationally, Canada had ceased to be a preponderantly agricultural country. At the beginning of this century, out of a labor force of 1 3/4 million, 41% were engaged in agriculture, 23% in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits, 14% in services and barely 4% were clerical workers. Fifty years later, in a labor force which had expanded to just over 5 million, only 16% were in agriculture, 19% were in manufacturing, 18% were employed in services and the clerical sector had leaped to 15% of the working force. With preliminary surveys indicating a total population of over 18 million for 1961, there is every reason to expect an accentuation of these demographic trends.

As the figures indicate, Canada, in the course of a century, grew from an agricultural and rural country to an urban and industrial one. It would naturally seem to follow that the character of its political life would have changed along with it and that political ideology and party organization would have altered to meet the circumstances of a new era. This would not be an

entirely accurate assumption. Despite the rural and agricultural atmosphere of nineteenth century Canada, the country's commercial class, though small, was inordinately influential politically, as might be expected from its strategic economic position. A similar judgment would be in order today. This does not mean to imply that nothing has changed. However, it does underline the fact that even with such a different demographic base today from the situation of a century before, Canada is just beginning to experience the injection of industrial mass democracy in its political system that has been characteristic of this century in other western countries.

It must not be inferred from these remarks about industrialization that this development is being experienced uniformly across the country. There are many rural pockets still remaining but these are generally in two areas: the Maritime provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, chronically depressed areas which seem destined to remain far behind Central Canada in the achievement of the latter's relatively high living standards; and some sections of the west, notably in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and parts of Alberta. Of course, there are other rural strongholds throughout the rest of the country but the processes of industrialization have already begun so that these areas do not appear likely to hold out indefinitely.

Some subsidiary features of the Canadian scene deserve emphasis. Although Canada is the largest geographical entity on the North American continent, considerable portions of its land area are, for all practical purposes, uninhabitable because of

extremely cold and lengthy winters. The physical distribution of its population is along a two-hundred mile band extending across the breadth of the continent just north of the American border with approximately 65% concentrated in the central provinces of Quebec and Ontario. Especially during the last three decades, however, the northern areas, with their huge mineral, forest and water power resources, have been made accessible and productive. While this development has increased the shift toward industrialization in the country, it has not caused any appreciable northward dispersal of the population.

A second feature is one that hardly needs much elaboration any more. The existence of an extremely self-conscious French speaking Roman Catholic minority centered mainly in Quebec is probably the best-known facet of Canadian society. The obstacle to national unity presented by the existence of this obdurate unassimilatable minority underlies much of the country's political maneuvering and by itself could easily constitute a framework for a study of Liberal Party politics for it was the Liberals who elevated the notion of the Canadian nation as a partnership of Anglo-Saxon and French "races" to a matter of the highest principle. The analogy between the place of the French in Canadian political life and the South in American politics and between the Canadian Liberal Party and the Democrats in the United States has often been made. Both sections are seen as irreconcilable and both parties viewed as "peacemakers" in their respective political systems. And to the extent that these parties fail in their task of

maintaining a tenuous national consensus, the continued existence of their respective nations is in jeopardy.

This matter of the French in Canada can be so exaggerated that the other factors tending to place a premium upon the achievement of even a modicum of consensus are often overlooked. The French are not the sole obstacle to national unity in Canada. The difficulty of assimilating the new citizens resulting from continuous immigration that is only now being cut down and the absence of any real communication among the sparse population, distributed over a wide area so close to the American border, are also contributing forces. In fact, the very existence of the United States is an impediment. While the figures presented above tend to concentrate upon the growth of Canada's population since 1867, they omit the element of emigration. For instance, if Canada had retained all the persons born in the country or coming to it as immigrants in the period 1881-1901, there would have been in 1901 a population of close to eight million --- which instead was the ultimate head-count two decades later. Instead, in 1901, Canada's population was 5 $\frac{1}{3}$ million. Well over two million had been lost to the United States.³ The Dominion Bureau of Statistics has estimated that over the years about as many people have left Canada as have entered it.⁴ These figures⁵ underline the insecure quality of the nation and emphasize the fact that communication among Canadians does not coincide with the East-West distribution of the population, but runs North-South with the latter end in the United

States. Montrealers and Torontonians have more in common with east-coast Americans than they do with residents of Winnipeg.

The problem of communication is exacerbated by the existence of at least four geographic sections which are economically and socially distinct. The Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario and the West have been knit together by common factors of history, geography and economics --- and all that these imply. If, in the past, generalizations about Canada were difficult to make, they have been rendered even more troublesome by the continuing development of the country. The addition of Newfoundland and the industrial advance of British Columbia and Alberta are two such complicating factors.

Finally, the federal structure of government is yet another significant divisive influence. While serving to fulfill some requirements of representation, it also induces local and sectional interests to accentuate their economic and social differences from the rest of the country and, in gaining power in the provincial fields, to use these strongholds against federal attempts at compromise and "peace-making".

* . . . *

It is evident from the foregoing that the necessity of overcoming the obstacles presented by cultural differentiation, economic diversity, geographical impediments and the federal structure has been the chief task of Canadian national politics. The party which

succeeds best in this assignment is, by definition, slated for a long period of tenure. In fact, the course of the country's politics has not seen two parties alternating in power, each with an equal chance to form the next government in a forthcoming election. Instead, in any one period, only one party has been able to create a winning combination and has thereby been able to hold power virtually unchallenged.

The electoral record shows that the Liberal Party has been more successful than its Conservative counterpart in creating and maintaining the synthesis of groups requisite to the attainment of national dominance. However, before attempting any analyses, it will be useful to review some of the trends of electoral and political disposition as they affected the party during the past century.

The history of the Liberal Party falls neatly into two parts: Before 1896, it was the party of opposition; from that date on, it dominated the Canadian scene --- so much so that by the 1940's and 1950's, it had assumed a monopoly position in federal politics. In the account that follows, the important features of these two periods will be outlined.

I. Thirty Years in the Wilderness

The roots of the two major political parties go deep into the colonial period of Canadian history and it is no exaggeration to claim that by the time of Confederation the pattern of Canadian politics had been set. Instead of a system in which two parties

each with an equal chance of forming a government vied for national power, a single coalition, established by the use of now-traditional methods of bargaining and compromise, was firmly in office under the leadership of John A. Macdonald, the first Prime Minister of the new Dominion. This coalition of disparate groups was styled Liberal-Conservative and had taken shape in the 1850's in the joint legislature of Canada East (now Quebec) and Canada West (Ontario).⁶

It brought four separate elements together: the French-Canadian Roman Catholics loyal to the Church; the minority Quebec English who controlled a disproportionate share of the country's business and with whom the Roman Catholic Church was invariably associated; in Ontario, a moderate "reform" group, at one time part of what was later to be the nucleus of the Liberal power, but now hungry for the spoils of office; and, finally, the die-hard "tories", descendants of the United Empire Loyalists who had fled the United States during the Revolutionary War.⁷

In opposition to this broad-based coalition were two groups, the nucleus of what was soon to be the Liberal Party: In Ontario, there were the agrarian radicals, the "Grits", who looked for guidance to George Brown, the editor of The Globe of Toronto;⁸ in Quebec, there were the anti-clerical French (le Parti Rouge) whose political philosophy had the stamp of revolutionary Paris of 1848. This group was led by Antoine Aimé Dorian and by reason of its republican and democratic ideas gained for itself the undying enmity of the Church and Montreal business.⁹ These two components did not have much more in common than a

dislike for Macdonald and, at first, formed little more than an alliance.

The achievement of Macdonald and his party in holding power for close to thirty years until 1896¹⁰ except for a five-year interim in the 1870's is a tribute both to Macdonald's ingenuity and to the hide-bound rural ideology of the Liberal opposition.

Recognizing that large doses of government intervention in the economy were necessary and that the country required that more than lip-service be paid to the needs of national unity, he embarked upon a dual policy of economic nationalism and railroad construction. Under Macdonald, the Liberal-Conservative Party --- popularly known simply as the Conservative Party --- was a Hamiltonian Federalist party. Almost as soon as he assumed office, he pressed the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway which made possible the westward expansion of the country. At the same time, the government made large tracts of land available for western settlement and helped set off the land rush which began the settlement of the prairies. After the short period of Liberal government in the 1870's, the Conservatives embarked upon an economic program, the "national policy" as it soon came to be called, intended to promote domestic industries by means of a protective tariff. While protecting home industry, Macdonald arranged to ingratiate his party with the urban working classes. In 1872, a strike by a Toronto local of the Typographical Union for a shorter working day provoked Grit leader George Brown, whose personal interests were at stake, to denounce the strike in his Globe as the

work of "foreign agitators". Macdonald saw his chance to deliver this segment of the electorate into his hands and in June of that year passed a Trades Union Act freeing Canadian unions from common-law restrictions as combinations in restraint of trade.¹¹

Macdonald's diverse approach was the product of no particular philosophy beyond that of securing and maintaining the viability of the new country. However, his political methodology set the pattern for future prime ministers and party leaders to emulate if they wished to succeed. Macdonald's policies and political style appealed to key groups in Canadian society. For the ever-powerful business interests, his government created an atmosphere favorable to rapid development. To English Canadians, he offered loyalty to the Empire --- a theme, together with its variations, that Conservatives throughout Canada's history have been able to play without any fear that it would not strike a responsive chord. His easy-going attitude toward the "wets" in the Ontario liquor question, while the righteously Protestant Liberals tended to support temperance movements brought important segments of the electorate and valuable campaign money to his doors. Finally, the French were, at first, attracted by his scrupulous attention to their peculiar demands.

Macdonald accepted the notion that the maintenance of Confederation rested upon an alliance between French and English by his early partnership with George Etienne Cartier, leader of the moderate French-Canadians. This alliance was impaired in 1873 by the death of his close friend and while Macdonald did everything

he could to maintain this French-English partnership within the party, he was unable to find a successor to Cartier. In fact, the cracks in the Conservative coalition first appeared within this sector of support.

Patronage and personality were the binding ingredients in this recipe for political dominance. For instance, Irish Catholics might normally have been expected to vote Liberal in reaction to the natural Conservative predilection to wave the British flag at every opportunity. However, by cultivating the Catholic hierarchy with special favors, Macdonald was able to weaken this group's Liberal allegiances. The outlying provinces of Manitoba and British Columbia, on the other hand, were kept in the Conservative fold because of the party's association with the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway.¹² In reallocating the seats of the House of Commons, Macdonald always made certain that these provinces received more than their share. The results were gratifying. From 1872 until 1896 the Conservatives won every one of the six seats in each of the six federal elections in British Columbia and 18 out of 27 in Manitoba over the same period.¹³ Patronage in the form of railway construction was also instrumental in keeping rebellious elements in Eastern Quebec and the Maritimes placated. These methods attest to Macdonald's lax political morality and his disposition to compromise. Finally, the fact that Macdonald was personally acquainted with many supporters in every constituency, which was possible in those early days of sparse population, did him and his party no harm either.¹⁴

The Liberals could offer little to the country in the way of a plausible alternative to the Conservatives during these years. Both the Ontario and Quebec wings of the federal party were discredited from the start. Even in the decades before Confederation, the Rouge Party in Quebec had placed itself outside the mainstream of respectable opinion by its anti-clerical stance and its espousal of democratic ideas. In Ontario, the Grits advocated low tariffs verging on free trade and, aside from appealing through The Globe to "the intelligent yeomanry of Upper Canada",¹⁵ seemed to display a fondness for such Americanisms as elective institutions and representation by population.¹⁶ It required little imagination for the Tories of that period to label Grits as traitors and republicans, particularly since George Brown had migrated from Scotland to Upper Canada via New York City. These epithets were to remain with them for a long time even though under Brown the group's orientation became distinctly British and stayed that way.¹⁷

As far as a large segment of Quebec was concerned, Brown and his reform-minded group were tainted for other reasons. Brown was continuously complaining about Church interference in politics, believing strongly, as did his followers, in the complete separation of Church and State. It is unfair to ascribe Brown's diatribes against the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec solely to his Scots Protestantism. He wanted the Protestant churches out of politics in Upper Canada too and led the fight in his own area to accomplish this end.¹⁸ More important for the political implications,

however, he resented the Roman Catholic hierarchy's alliance with Montreal big business which always seemed able to swing the balance of power in favor of high tariffs forcing western Ontario to buy from Montreal instead of in the United States more cheaply. The corrupt involvement of this element in the dubious transactions surrounding the railway building of that era was scored heavily as well. 19

At Confederation, the hard core of the Liberal Party was centered in Ontario and there were two constitutional points upon which it stood. To Liberals, the new system meant strict provincial autonomy in local affairs and a strong legislature to resist the inevitable concentration of power in the hands of the executive which was inherent in the British form of cabinet government. In these two concepts, the Liberals reflected the influence of the American Whig tradition upon them. They recognized that the cabinet system placed tremendous powers in the hands of an executive which was involved, as the Conservatives were, in the construction of railways and public works. This stand against strong federal government with business connections by the Ontario Liberals demonstrates better than anything else that their support was based in the rural areas. The Grits never succeeded in capturing as their own any one of the urban centers and one can hear a Jeffersonian echo in their boast that politics in the country was conducted on a much higher level than in the corrupt and corrupting cities. 20

It is in this connection that the Liberals could best be charged with Americanism. In fact, in 1864 at the Quebec Conference, during the discussions which lay the groundwork for the new country, Brown went so far as to propose a constitution embodying the American system of checks and balances for Ontario.²¹

It is easy to conclude that while the Conservatives wallowed in "interest" politics, Liberals merely talked of the purity of their morals and of abstract principles of representation, economy in government and provincial rights. It might be said with some justification that the Liberals, particularly those of Ontario, were using constitutional arguments to cloak their own interests. While they proclaimed the inviolability of provincial affairs from federal interference, they were quick to use provincial platforms to urge action on the federal government. For example, when the Riel-led Métis murdered Thomas Scott in the rebellion at the Red River in 1870, Liberals in the Ontario provincial legislature passed a resolution calling for the apprehension of the insurgents. They also denounced Macdonald in Ottawa for intervening on behalf of his party in the Ontario provincial elections, but this did not deter Liberal Premier Oliver Mowat from adjourning the Ontario legislature and stumping the province for the federal Liberals in the election of 1872. Finally, in the question of Dominion-Provincial financial relations, the Ontario Liberals were against federal allotment of a special relief grant to Nova Scotia which was in dire financial straits in 1869. This opposition

was supported by their well-known dislike of federal encroachment in provincial matters. In large part, however, their position was founded upon the fact that Ontario, being the richest province, was paying the largest share of taxes. Thus, or so the Liberals charged, it was chiefly with Ontario taxes that Macdonald was bribing the other provinces and thereby gaining important electoral support.²²

One would expect from this catalogue of events that a Liberal government would be just as opportunistic as a Conservative one. Surprisingly, when the Liberals finally did attain power in Ottawa, they tried to practice what they had preached. The results were disastrous.

The Liberals received their big opportunity in 1873. Disclosure that the contractors building the Canadian Pacific Railway had contributed heavily to the Conservative Party through Cartier and Macdonald himself in the election campaign of 1872 overthrew the government. But the Liberals were unable to take advantage of their position. Although they captured 133 seats to the Conservative 73 in the election of 1874, this majority was more a reflection of public disgust with the railway scandal than a positive vote of support for the Liberals. Their new Prime Minister, Alexander Mackenzie, was hampered by a lack of good cabinet material. Many elements within the party were never reconciled to his leadership, preferring Edward Blake, and his own personal qualities were against him. According to contemporary accounts,²³ he spent too much time on his own departmental matters in the

Ministry of Public Works and in debates in the House and not enough time on the vital task of building a united party. However, the party's immobility in such matters as railway building, patronage and trade were equally significant.

As part of the arrangement bringing British Columbia into Confederation in 1871, the Conservatives who were then in power agreed that a railway linking the province with central Canada would be built within ten years. It was a fantastic undertaking prompted equally by Macdonald's vision of a Canada stretching from Atlantic to Pacific and his materialistic realization that here was a chance to strengthen his party and reward his friends. The Liberals objected to the scheme on the grounds that the proposed route was impossible and, if this was not so, then it was too expensive for the country at that stage of its development. When the Liberals formed the government, Mackenzie immediately set about to modify the agreement with British Columbia. Eventually, a compromise was achieved whereby the route was changed and an extension of ten years until 1891 for the railway's completion was agreed to.²⁴

Mackenzie's compromise was based on his desire to honor an agreement no matter how unwise. However, the settlement was reached in the teeth of strong opposition from many quarters in the party which would have been willing to have the federal government unilaterally repudiate the deal. The attitude of these elements was naturally the result of an individualistic ideology and aside from incurring the wrath of British Columbia, the Liberals also conveyed

to the country that, compared to the Conservatives, they were a stingy lot. Mackenzie's own followers soon came to share this impression because of his steadfast refusal to loosen the purse-strings of patronage or to oust Conservatives from the ranks of the civil service and replace them with deserving Liberals.

At precisely the same time that the Liberals took power in Ottawa, the country found itself in the throes of a depression. While it continued unabated throughout the Liberal tenure, it is impossible to blame the party for it. However, the economic downturn had the effect of further discrediting the party, which did itself little good by clinging to its doctrinaire low tariff notions. A reciprocity pact with the United States failed to get by the Senate Committee to which it was assigned in 1873. A successful agreement might have bolstered Liberal prestige and a flagging economy. Failure served instead to discredit the regime; and in spite of the resolve not to adopt a protectionist policy, the Mackenzie government was compelled to raise the tariff from 15 to 17½ per cent for revenue purposes in 1874 and was almost forced to raise it again to 20% just two years later.²⁵ This ineffective half-way measure annoyed the rural areas and failed to placate those clamoring to the government for protection.

It is safe to conclude that, in terms of widespread popular support, the Liberal Party was no match for the Macdonald-led Conservatives. The fight for responsible government had long ago been won and charges of political corruption against the Tories fell on deaf ears. The experience of the Mackenzie administration

demonstrated that doctrinaire laissez-faire was a failure as a rationale for policy in an undeveloped country where the necessary vast and expensive projects would have to be carried out either by the state itself or by private enterprise with active government support. It also underlined the fact that a narrow and rigid approach would never succeed in keeping divergent economic, sectional, religious and ethnic interests together within one party. Mackenzie's successor as leader, Edward Blake, was likewise a failure and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who followed him, was unable to create a broadly-based party until the death of Macdonald and a number of political crises left a path clear for him to do so.

II. Sixty Years of Dominance

While the outlook for the Liberals for the first thirty years of Confederation was bleak, it was not entirely hopeless. By the middle of the 1880's, there were three provinces in which the party had become firmly entrenched and a fourth where the Conservatives were on the run. In Ontario, the Liberals came to power in 1871 and were not displaced until 1905²⁶ when scandal and inefficiency, rather than the appeal of the Conservatives dethroned them. In Quebec, the break-up of the Conservative ascendancy, hitherto unchallenged since 1867, was foreshadowed by the election of the French-Nationalist administration led by Honoré Mercier early in 1887. Mercier, while not a Liberal, was instrumental in

disrupting the provincial Conservative party, badly split over the hanging of Riel by Macdonald's federal government.²⁷

In Nova Scotia, where the Conservatives were destined to administer the province for a scant twelve years between 1867 and 1956, the Liberals began a forty-three year period in office in 1882.²⁸ At approximately the same time, the party began to gather strength as part of a coalition government in New Brunswick.²⁹ The leader of that coalition, A.G. Blair, became a member of Laurier's first cabinet as Minister of Railways and Canals in 1896. He was joined in the Laurier administration by Premiers Oliver Mowat and W.S. Fielding, of Ontario and Nova Scotia respectively.

This movement from the provincial to federal fields emphasizes that, at the time, there was little difference between allegiance to the federal party on the one hand and the various provincial groups on the other. The coincidence often went further than simple political affiliation. While it seemed logical to assume that the voters should support the same party in both federal and provincial realms, this had organizational implications as well. It was easy for politicians to use the same organization for federal and provincial elections. The connection between federal and provincial sections of the parties was based on more than political convenience. It was also a reflection of a common political policy. For example, the Liberal Party could invoke the traditional principles of British Liberalism to defend the cause of provincial rights. Naturally enough, Liberals in the various provinces were more than willing to defend provincial rights and on

the federal scene the long years of Opposition logically led the Liberals to oppose Macdonald's policies of a powerful central government.

The identity of provincial and federal sections of the party could not continue indefinitely. With the Liberals in power in Ottawa beginning with 1896, the old shibboleth of provincial rights was soon rendered untenable. Moreover, the requirements of holding federal office forced the Liberals to follow the Hamiltonian practices of the preceding Conservative administration.³⁰ And while Laurier still indulged his party's Jeffersonian and English Liberal proclivities in his pronouncements, his policies did not. For fifteen years until 1911, when they were finally beaten, the Liberals' major modification of the Conservative formula was that they underlined the country's coming of age by emphasizing that Canada could try to follow an independent course in foreign affairs and still remain "loyal" to the British connection. Otherwise the pattern was the same: Another transcontinental railway was built amid scandal and corruption; a program of immigration and western expansion under the management of Sir Clifford Sifton, Laurier's Minister of the Interior, settled the prairie provinces with much-needed manpower; and, although the party had through its history made much of its belief in the principle of free trade, there was little reduction of the tariff.

Instead, Laurier fell upon the device of the "British Preference" in 1897. This was the label applied to a commercial policy that introduced the principle of minimum and maximum

tariffs, gave preferential treatment to British products and lowered or abolished duties on such items as iron, steel, wire, twine, corn, flour, sugar and farm implements.³¹ To the agrarian hinterlands, this was represented as a signal advance from protection to free trade; since Canadian manufacturers and producers were not materially affected, these groups soon came to realize that they had little to fear from a Liberal administration. Meanwhile, the vociferous pro-British element was mollified by the favoritism toward the "mother country" implicit in the legislation which, for a time, removed the anti-British stigma from the party.

The group support upon which the party could rely was, in essence, not much different from that which had been the mainstay of the Conservatives. There were the usual industrialists and manufacturers, the old rural Grit supporters and, finally, French-Canada, driven out of the Tory fold by a variety of circumstances which will be discussed later. For fifteen years of power which saw Liberal administrations returned in four successive general elections, the Laurier electoral coalition rested upon the traditionally Liberal-minded areas of the Maritimes, particularly Nova Scotia, and Western and Northern Ontario plus two crucially significant additions: Quebec and a large part of the prairies.

These areas were to form the basis for Liberal supremacy in the first half of the twentieth century. However, it was Quebec, Laurier's personal preserve, that was the keystone of

the colation, providing the party with its margin of victory virtually unaided. In the successive victories of 1896, 1900, 1904 and 1908 in which the party's overall seat majority was, respectively, 21, 42, 64 and 45, Quebec produced majorities of 33, 50, 43 and 42 seats. The election of 1904 was the only one in which that province was not the major determinant of the outcome. In that year, the party reached its highest level of popularity, capturing its largest total of seats with 139 and in the process winning all those available in the provinces of Nova Scotia and British Columbia. The importance of Quebec is emphasized in Tables I and II which present the extent and geographic origin of Laurier's majorities. ³²

Table I: Dominion-wide distribution of House of Commons Seats
By Parties in Federal Elections from 1896 to 1908

	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Conservatives</u>	<u>Others</u>
<u>Election:</u> 1896	117	89	7
1900	128	78	8
1904	139	75	-
1908	133	85	3

In 1911, Laurier, prodded by obvious signs of organizational decay within the party and by a discontented Middle West that was not sharing in the good economic fortune of Central Canada, attempted to achieve a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States. Events rapidly proved this tactic to be a grave miscalculation. The issue of Reciprocity drove Conservatives, shrieking their

Table II: Regional Distribution of House of Commons Seats by Parties in Federal Elections from 1896 to 1908.

		<u>Maritimes</u>		
		<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Conservatives</u>	<u>Others</u>
<u>Election:</u>	1896	17	22	-
	1900	27	12	-
	1904	26	9	-
	1908	26	9	-
		<u>Quebec</u>		
	1896	49	16	-
	1900	57	7	1
	1904	54	11	-
	1908	53	11	1
		<u>Ontario</u>		
	1896	43	44	5
	1900	35	54	3
	1904	38	48	-
	1908	36	48	2
		<u>The West</u>		
	1896	9	7	1
	1900	9	5	3
	1904	21	6	-
	1908	17	17	-

usual anti-American and pro-British slogans, disaffected Liberals and sundry manufacturers and industrialists, fearful of the threat to their interests from a break in the system of protection, and French-Canadian nationalists, angry with Laurier for his policy of a Canadian navy which they feared would ultimately involve the country in British international entanglements, into each others' arms. This strange conglomeration, united on this one issue,

defeated the Laurier administration in the election of 1911 and the Conservatives, with Robert Borden as Prime Minister, began a ten year term of office.

The Liberals learned a permanent lesson from this traumatic event. In spite of their popular reputation as the low tariff party, they never again attempted to enact a comprehensive downward revision of the tariff so abruptly. The pressures to do so were often insistent, but if they succumbed at all, it was only by degrees.

If the Reciprocity debacle taught a lesson to the Liberals, the mis-handling of French Canada by the Conservative government during the First World War was an education that conditioned an already prepared subject. Since the late 1880's, with the hanging of Riel, the breakdown of the Conservative Party in Quebec and the accession of Laurier to the leadership of the Liberal Party, the province of Quebec had been an essential part of the Liberal electoral coalition. The action of the Conservative government in imposing conscription in order to gain more manpower to maintain the country's level of participation in the war in 1917 alienated the isolationist-inclined French, reinforced Quebec's Liberal tendencies and for two generations made French Canada's Liberal allegiance a seemingly permanent feature of the federal electoral landscape. Borden's success late in the War in forming a coalition or "Union" government with those Liberals willing to cooperate with him dangerously split the Liberal Party and, in the general election of 1917, in effect reduced the Liberals

to the status of a French pressure group, leaving the party with 62 out of its meagre 82 seat total from Quebec. Thereafter, the Liberal Party was always wary of a repetition of this catastrophe, forever attempting to counter-balance the almost automatic support accruing to them from the French with backing elsewhere in the country.

Laurier died in 1919 and was succeeded as party leader by W.L. Mackenzie King whose legendary success at this balancing act has already become an integral part of national political folklore. Despite the fact that he fell heir to a faction-ridden party, a legacy of the war, and that he had to contend with the rise of the Progressives in the West, he nevertheless managed to lead the Liberals to victory in the 1931 election. In 1925 and 1926, he held off the Conservatives virtually single-handedly. The depression election of 1930 was won by the R.B. Bennett-led Conservatives, and was the only blemish on a spectacular electoral record. In 1935 the Liberals began a string of five straight victories that kept them in power for twenty-two years, ending in 1957. During this period the party survived the aftermath of the great depression of the 1930's, led the country through a war with little of the social conflict that resulted from the first, managed a change in leadership, exchanging King for Louis St. Laurent in 1948, and rode the crest of a spectacular post-war boom.

As in the days of Laurier, the province of Quebec continued to provide overwhelming majorities for the party. However, Quebec was no longer the sole reason for Liberal success. Allegiance to

the party on the part of the electorate was so thoroughgoing that, during the twenty-two year stretch in office, heavy majorities were also produced in the Maritimes and, except for 1945, in Ontario as well.

The situation in the west was complicated by the existence of third and fourth parties, the CCF and Social Credit, the two successor groups of the western revolt of the early 1920's and the result of the ravages of depression on the region. The Liberals dominated this area also, but not to the same extent as elsewhere. Indeed, in 1945, the party was not even the strongest of all its competitors in the area, for in that year the CCF won a plurality of the seats available.

The distribution of the popular vote and the number of House of Commons seats among the Liberals, Conservatives and CCF since 1935 is presented in Tables III and IV. The results of the 1962 vote are also included to emphasize the remarkable instability in electoral behavior.³³

Table III: Dominion-wide distribution of House of Commons seats and popular vote by percentages in federal elections, 1935-1962.

<u>Election</u>	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Conservatives</u>	<u>CCF-NDP</u>	<u>Others*</u>
1935	171 (47.6%)	39 (31.2%)	7 (8.4%)	28 (12.8%)
1940	184 (53.8%)	39 (31.6%)	8 (8.1%)	14 (6.5%)
1945	125 (39.6%)	67 (27.4%)	28 (15.6%)	25 (17.4%)
1949	193 (49.9%)	41 (29.6%)	13 (12.1%)	15 (8.4%)
1953	171 (48.0%)	50 (31.5%)	23 (11.5%)	21 (9.0%)
1957	104 (42.3%)	112 (39.1%)	25 (10.7%)	24 (7.9%)
1958	49 (33.6%)	208 (53.6%)	8 (9.6%)	-- (3.2%)
1962	100 (37.4%)	116 (37.3%)	19 (13.5%)	30 (11.8%)

*"Others" includes Social Credit, Labor-Progressive (Communist), Independent Liberals, Independent Conservatives, Bloc Populaire and Independents. All those elected in 1962 were Social Crediters.

Table IV: Regional distribution of House of Commons seats and popular vote by percentages in federal elections, 1935-1962.

<u>Atlantic Provinces*</u>				
<u>Election</u>	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Conservatives</u>	<u>CCF-NDP</u>	<u>Others</u>
1935	25 (54.7%)	1 (32.8%)	---	-- (12.5%)
1940	19 (54.8%)	6 (41.6%)	1 (3.6%)	--
1945	18 (47.5%)	7 (38.5%)	1 (12.1%)	-- (2.0%)
1949	25 (55.8%)	7 (37.7%)	1 (6.1%)	-- (0.4%)
1953	27 (54.2%)	5 (39.8%)	1 (4.6%)	-- (1.4%)
1957	12 (48.0%)	21 (48.6%)	- (2.7%)	-- (0.7%)
1958	8 (42.6%)	25 (53.5%)	- (2.5%)	-- (1.4%)
1962	14 (45.9%)	18 (45.4%)	1 (7.2%)	-- (1.5%)

*Before 1949 these figures are for the Maritime provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. Newfoundland, newly joined to Canada in 1949, voted with the rest of the country in the election of that year and is included in the calculations thereafter.

<u>Quebec</u>				
1935	55 (59.9%)	5 (28.0%)	- (0.6%)	5 (11.4%)
1940	61 (74.2%)	0 (19.8%)	- (0.6%)	4 (5.4%)
1945	54 (51.1%)	1 (9.8%)	- (2.4%)	10 (36.7%)
1949	66 (61.6%)	2 (25.0%)	- (1.1%)	5 (12.3%)
1953	66 (60.8%)	4 (29.9%)	- (1.6%)	6 (7.7%)
1957	62 (62.3%)	8 (31.5%)	- (1.8%)	5 (4.6%)
1958	25 (45.7%)	50 (49.3%)	- (2.4%)	- (2.6%)
1962	35 (39.7%)	14 (29.7%)	- (4.4%)	26 (26.5%)**

**Social Credit Obtained 26 seats and 25.9% of the vote in Quebec in 1962.

<u>Ontario</u>				
1935	56 (42.8%)	25 (35.7%)	- (8.0%)	1 (13.4%)
1940	55 (51.5%)	25 (43.0%)	- (3.8%)	2 (1.6%)
1945	34 (41.1%)	48 (41.7%)	- (14.4%)	- (2.9%)
1949	56 (46.0%)	25 (37.5%)	1 (15.1%)	- (1.4%)
1953	51 (46.1%)	32 (40.6%)	1 (11.5%)	- (1.8%)
1957	20 (37.3%)	61 (48.8%)	3 (12.1%)	- (1.8%)
1958	15 (31.9%)	67 (56.8%)	3 (10.9%)	- (0.4%)
1962	44 (41.8%)	35 (39.3%)	6 (16.9%)	- (2.0%)

<u>The West***</u>				
1935	35 (34.8%)	8 (22.1%)	7 (21.5%)	18 (21.6%)
1940	49 (41.5%)	7 (21.3%)	7 (23.1%)	14 (14.0%)
1945	19 (29.8%)	10 (23.5%)	27 (31.8%)	14 (14.9%)
1949	42 (40.3%)	7 (20.7%)	12 (27.6%)	11 (11.4%)
1953	25 (34.6%)	9 (17.0%)	21 (24.9%)	15 (23.5%)
1957	8 (25.7%)	21 (30.0%)	22 (21.7%)	19 (22.6%)
1958	- (17.4%)	65 (54.0%)	5 (19.4%)	- (9.2%)
1962	6 (25.2%)	48 (38.9%)	12 (21.2%)	4 (14.3%)

*** For The West, "Others" refers mainly to the Social Credit Party.

There are legitimate objections to be raised at this point that it is an oversimplification to indiscriminately lump together sixty years of party history as if the Liberal Party and its sources of support have remained constant and unchanged during this span of time. Certainly in a setting in which the durable sources of faction are based not only on the Madisonian foundation of the natural conflict between debtors and creditors, but also on ethnic ties, religious affiliation, geographic loyalties and tradition one should expect that the coalition sustaining the party under Laurier through St. Laurent could not possibly have remained intact.

In fact, it might be more convenient to mark off three specific periods of federal politics since 1867. These would correspond to epochs in which a stable national consensus under the guardianship of one or the other of the two national parties existed. The first such era begins with the election of 1878 through which Conservative John A. Macdonald was returned to power to begin his "national policy" one year later. This period of stability ends approximately in 1891 with the death of the "old chieftain", when the Tories became involved in difficulties of leadership in Ottawa, religion in Manitoba, and organization in Quebec. The second period coincides with the fifteen years of the Laurier administration beginning in 1896 when the Liberals took office and ending in 1911 with the electoral defeat of the party over reciprocity. The third such era was almost a quarter of a century in coming. It begins in 1935 when Mackenzie King led the Liberals to

the first of their unprecedented string of election victories. This period ends in 1957 when the Conservative Party, led by John Diefenbaker, upset all predictions and obtained enough seats to form a minority government. The turn-over was completed in 1958 with the Diefenbaker forces capturing 54% of the popular vote and a record-breaking 208 of the 265 seats in the House. While it is still too early to be certain, it is possible that the 1958 election presages a fourth epoch-making coalition.³⁴ It might therefore be useful to claim that just as the United States has had its "critical elections"³⁵ signalling the emergence of a new balance of important groups, so Canada has had its own similar contests.

There is no denying that this approach provides a useful frame of reference. However, it may also have the effect of suggesting, particularly in connection with the era beginning in 1935, that the Liberal Party of that period was the product of forces in Canada similar to those which brought Franklin D. Roosevelt and his party to power in 1932 in the United States. This is not the case. It is true that the decade between 1939 and 1949 saw a program of comprehensive social legislation enacted by Liberal administrations. Featured were such items as a nation-wide system of unemployment insurance covering most wage and salary earners; a scheme of family allowances under which the government makes monthly payments for each dependent child in a family; annual grants to the provinces for health services; an extensive system of pensions and rehabilitation allowances for war veterans; and national legislation to facilitate the construction of low rental

housing. Nevertheless, the pressures for such legislation did not necessarily come from specifically identifiable new groups within the party. These programs were, rather, the result of a recognition by each administration that they were expected by the public. Probably, the existence of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) a farmer-labor party founded on Fabian Socialist principles, was an important spur to action as well. Whatever the case, this program of legislation was not accompanied by slogans or the display of emblems or indeed by anything resembling the intensity of discussion and, even conflict, that was so evident in Canada's neighbor to the south.

The support of the Democratic Party on the part of the trade unions was an important factor in the Roosevelt "New Deal" coalition. In Canada, no such development was evident in connection with the Liberal Party. The relatively low level of industrialization was emphasized by the absence of a trade union movement of any real significance in the 1930's. At the outbreak of War in 1939, out of a labor force of approximately 4½ million, only 358,967,³⁶ or 8% were unionized. The growth of unions was (and still is) hampered by the cleavage between French and English. When heavy industry came to Canada, a substantial portion came to Quebec, where it found no labor organization to speak of. That which it did find was well under the sway of the Roman Catholic Church which had large holdings of industrial securities and which are still involved in its age-old ideological alliance with the English big-business community. Thus, imposed upon the

division between French and English in the national labor movement there was (is) a further split within the ranks of one of the groups. Even today, French labor is still divided between those who still respond to the call of "race" and religion exemplified in the appeal of the Catholic Unions and those who are drawn, by the pull of economic interest, toward "international" unionism.

Latest statistics reveal that close to 30% of the national non-agricultural labor force is unionized. However, while the union movement was coming of age, it accumulated in the process a long list of grievances against the Liberals, particularly against provincial administrations. Liberal anti-labor activities over the course of the last two decades ranged from Ontario Premier Mitchell Hepburn's brutal smashing of an auto workers' strike in Oshawa in 1937, the Adélard Godbout government's sponsorship of legislation calling for compulsory arbitration and the banning of strikes in public utilities in the Quebec provincial legislature in 1944, to Premier Joey Smallwood's more recent use of all the not-inconsiderable resources at his disposal to prevent the organization of the lumber industry by the IWA in Newfoundland in 1960. It is therefore not surprising that the labor movement has felt that the Liberal Party presents a somewhat uncongenial environment.

The Liberals could have easily brought labor into the fold. However, under the leadership of Mackenzie King, who had an abhorrence of anything remotely associated with "class" politics, the party tried to appeal to the country as a whole. From his

experience in the Department of Labor in the early part of the century and as a labor negotiator with the Rockefeller interests during World War I, King had developed a theory of the harmony of interests of all classes, economic and social, in society. The strategy underlying the party's social legislation was that it would appeal to the middle and lower economic classes without invoking the charge that the Liberals were not a "national" party because they appealed to certain "classes" in Canadian society instead of "all the people."

Of course, the party's social legislation was an important factor in maintaining it in office and appealed, among others, to the same segment of the electorate that would have been attracted had the party been directly involved with the unions. While this aspect of the party concerns questions of ideology which had best be left for later, it might be pointed out here that the presence in the cabinet of such men as C.D. Howe since 1935, whose poor techniques of labor relations and anti-union bias were recognized by King himself, was a formidable obstacle to anything approaching the rapprochement existing in this country between the Democrats and the unions.

The failure of the Liberals to appeal to the trade union movement is undoubtedly one of the major reasons underlying the close union CCF support at least at the official level in some parts of the country, notably in Cape Breton Island, Northern Ontario and British Columbia. Liberal chances to secure even semi-official union support appear hopeless at present with the

founding of the New Democratic Party in Ottawa in August, 1961. The new party, the successor to the CCF, has made constitutional provisions for direct union affiliation at the local level and while there can be no guarantee of union rank-and-file support, this action underlines the fact that the unions have been without a political home.

Finally, the approach which presents the Liberal Party of the post-1935 period as the leader of a new consensus may also succeed in obscuring persistent long term factors which must still be considered in any assessment of political allegiances as they affect the party. Two such elements, the attachment of French Canada to the party, one of the lasting contributions of Laurier; and the development of multi-partism in the west, a legacy of the country's peculiar economic and geographic structure and the great depression, have already been alluded to. Both of these features might well be seen as part of another noteworthy development. The course of Canadian politics from the 1920's until 1957 has witnessed the domination of the Liberal Party at the federal level. But at the same time, there has been a tendency for voters to elect provincial administrations differing in party affiliation from the party in power in Ottawa. However, these three factors were operative before the Liberals began their twenty-two year period of domination. There is but one special quality of the King-St. Laurent Liberal Party distinguishing it from its Conservative opponents and from its predecessors: the tendency of the party to rely on the growing federal bureaucracy and its close association

with the expanding corporate world. Each of these points will be discussed in turn.

1. The Allegiance of Quebec

It is difficult to argue with Underhill's remark that "Quebec politicians have never been either Liberal or Conservative, they have always been simply and whole-heartedly French."³⁷ French behavior can be presented as a classic example of pressure politics and group accommodation within the framework of the North-American "two-party" system. While this is not the place to dwell at length upon the history and social structure of French Canada, certain salient points are worth reviewing.

The self-image of a conquered and maltreated minority held by French-Canadians begins with 1763 when the British gained control from France over most of the territory called Canada. Almost from the first, the Colonial authorities made no attempt to interfere with the habits and practices of their new subjects. Instead, the British, heavily outnumbered, dealt with French Canada through the Roman Catholic Church, the only remaining focus of recognized authority in the area. Despite the fact that the British North America Act firmly and irrevocably guaranteed to the French (concentrated mainly in the province of Quebec), now a minority, their own religion, school system and code of law, and established both French and English as the "official" languages of the country in 1867 (thus confirming what had been operative since the 1770's), the French seem never to have

lost their conviction that they were in constant danger of having their culture submerged and their autonomy revoked by the ever-present pernicious English influences. It is not for this brief resumé to demonstrate whether this feeling is based upon fact or fancy. It is sufficient to state that it is a mixture of both. However, isolation from the rest of the country, religious and cultural differences and the self-consciousness of their intellectuals, small in number but intense in conviction, have fed one upon the other - the process aided by the semi-feudal structure of the society and by the preachings of the Roman Catholic Church, conscious always of its position.³⁸

From 1867 until 1891, when Quebec voted Liberal for the first time, the province was solidly in the Conservative camp. The reasons are not hard to find. The French were led into Confederation by one of their own, George Etienne Cartier, a Conservative both in philosophy and in political affiliation, who had the backing of the Church. A representative of Montreal commercial interests, Cartier was Macdonald's close associate in his first administration. Cartier's death in 1873 deprived the French of a federal leader of national stature and also left a gap in Macdonald's subsequent administrations. This could not be adequately filled in spite of his efforts even though there were many candidates for the position, most notably Sir Hector Langevin and Joseph Chapleau. The absence of a representative of Cartier's stature did not especially hamper the Conservative cause at first. As mentioned previously, the program of the radical or "Rouge"

element of the Liberal party was sufficient to make of the Church an implacable foe. With this all-pervasive institution consistently advocating adherence to the Conservative party, most of the French never strayed from the Tory fold.

The beginning of the end for the Conservative hold on the French was marked by the Macdonald administration's hanging of Louis Riel, the French half-breed who led the rebellion of Métis in the Northwest Territories in 1885. This is not to imply that the Conservative Party (or the Liberals, for that matter) was as one on the issue. Both parties split on practically straight ethnic lines when the matter came to a vote in the House. Nevertheless, to the French it was a Conservative decision and served to identify the Tories with the rampant anti-French and anti-Catholic cries of revenge heard in Protestant Ontario. Finally, the failure of the Conservative administration to solve the question of separate schools for the French Catholics in the province of Manitoba further alienated Quebec whose sentiments on the matter were aroused, as they were destined to continue to be in all such matters, by the French "nationalists" of the period, to say nothing about the Church, the self-appointed guardian of French cultural autonomy.

At precisely this time, Wilfrid Laurier, the new leader of the Liberals and himself a "Rouge" in his youth, had managed to rid his party of its radical tinge, thus appearing as a moderate to the Church. By so doing, he forestalled similar attempts by Conservative Joseph Chapleau who was fighting hard to find a

common ground upon which all Frenchmen in Quebec could stand --- of course, under the banner of the Conservative Party and under his leadership. From the early 1870's, the Conservatives had been plagued by an ultra-montane clerical wing within the party. While Chapleau undoubtedly helped prevent the Conservative Party from becoming a narrow Roman Catholic one, he could not establish his ascendance in the province against the powerful appeal of Laurier.³⁹

It should be emphasized that the Riel issue did not automatically mean a switch in French party affiliations. Two years after the event, in the federal elections of 1887, Quebec returned 33 Conservatives to 32 Liberals. The importance of Riel is in the fact that it presented Honoré Mercier and his nationalist Parti Nationale an opportunity for agitation in Quebec provincial politics. Mercier became premier of the province in 1887 and was ousted on charges of corruption after winning again in the elections of 1890. However, during that period he was effective in countering the rabid Conservative anti-Catholic Ontario faction led by Dalton McCarthy and the Orange Order. In effect, this was the first time since Confederation that the opponents of the Conservatives in Quebec had played the role of defenders of the interests of French-Canada. While Mercier was not nominally connected with the Liberal Party, "...he had nonetheless broken the Conservative monopoly as 'defenders of the faith' and had made Laurier's political dominance of Quebec possible."⁴⁰

Another opportunity to act as "defenders of the faith" was provided for the party in 1905 in the Acts to create the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan out of part of the Northwest Territories. The first draft of the bills would have established a school system similar to that of Quebec, where Catholics and Protestants each have their own separate establishments. The usual denunciations were forthcoming from the Protestants. Only the threat of many cabinet defections (Clifford Sifton quit the administration, ostensibly over the issue) forced an amendment which established a school system similar to that in Manitoba, which had an arrangement combining national public schools with minority privileges. While the episode may have harmed Laurier and his party in staunchly Protestant sections, it certainly did the Liberals little harm in Quebec and among Catholics.

The Conservatives did themselves no good as far as Quebec was concerned when they instituted conscription in 1917 to continue fighting a war that could only be viewed as a British concern. This action further served to identify the Conservative Party with English "majority" rule. This was aggravated when the Conservative government in Ontario decided to amend the provincial education regulations which laid down the use of both French and English in the schools. Investigation revealed that in the French sections of the province, English was being taught badly or hardly at all. In order to rectify a situation in which some sections of the province were rapidly becoming replications of the Quebec countryside, the government of Ontario proposed to make English the principal

language of instruction while allowing only for subsidiary use of French. The furor raised by the French in reaction was, as might have been expected, intense.

It is not surprising, therefore, that by the 1920's (and continuing into the 1950's) a great deal of social disapprobation accompanied a French-Canadian's disclosure that he had voted Conservative in an election. So evident was this factor even to the Conservatives themselves, that, in the federal election campaign of 1925, the Tories permitted their federal leader in the province of Quebec, E.L. Patenaude, to try to cut all links with the party and campaign at the head of an independent Conservative group. Patenaude hoped thereby to disassociate the campaign in the province from the federal organization and particularly from the taint of Arthur Meighen, leader of the federal Conservative Party and considered by provincial Conservatives as the chief hindrance to their success. Meighen was responsible, at least to the French, for bringing on the much-hated conscription of the war. To the Montreal business community, ideologically committed to nineteenth century laissez-faire, he was also guilty of the heinous crime of nationalizing the Grand Trunk Railway. This attempt by the provincial Conservatives to repudiate their national leader was a failure.⁴¹ This failure is particularly interesting because the Liberals, in the course of attempting to cushion the effects of the latest version of Prairie agrarian radicalism in the guise of the Progressive Party, had given comfort to the west with intimations of a comprehensive tariff reduction. Quebec, traditionally

protectionist --- more as a result of a general conservative and nationalist disposition than from economic logic --- should naturally have been reluctant to maintain its old allegiance. Mere economics, however, could not overcome the ultimate question of ethnic survival. In the ensuing election, the Liberals continued their winning ways, capturing 60 out of the 65 seats available, a total that was 60 per cent of their contingent returned to the House from the entire nation.

Early in the century the Conservative Party had lost the great bulk of its honestly conservative support to the frankly business oriented provincial administration of the Liberal Party led by Sir Lomer Gouin, who reigned as premier of Quebec from 1905 until 1920. The administrations of his successor, L.A. Taschereau, extending until 1936, did not deviate from these practices except to the extent of being less efficient. Thus the line between Liberals and Conservatives in provincial politics was quite badly blurred. Meanwhile, the Liberals had little difficulty appealing to the industrial and commercial interests of the province in federal politics. Laurier's conversion of his party from its former radicalism was emphasized by the presence of moderate William Fielding in his cabinet as Minister of Finance, a position he was to hold for the duration of Laurier's tenure as Prime Minister.

Meanwhile, Sir Richard Cartwright, a hold-over from the Mackenzie cabinet and a rabid exponent of free-trade, was relegated to the relatively secondary Ministry of Trade and Commerce. From

Quebec, the presence of Joseph Israel Tarte, erstwhile Conservative and now Laurier's chief lieutenant in matters of Liberal organization in the province, in the cabinet as Minister of Public Works was also reassuring. Rodolphe Lemieux, who held various cabinet posts from 1906 until 1911, and Raoul Dandurand, Speaker of the Senate, were also important after Tarte broke with Laurier in 1902. Mackenzie King followed Laurier's example and lifted Gouin from the provincial field, esconcing this representative of the Montreal business community in his first administration as Minister of Justice in 1921. Gouin was joined by two others of similar inclinations and connections --- Senator Dandurand who became Minister without Portfolio, and J.A. Robb who began as Minister of Trade and Commerce, succeeding Fielding as Minister of Finance in 1925. Another aspirant, Rodolphe Lemieux, had to be satisfied with the post of Speaker of the House.⁴² Gouin left early in 1924 but Robb and Dandurand continued until 1930 when the Conservatives won the election.

The affinity of Quebec for the Liberals over the years has been acknowledged by the party at its highest levels. Liberal leadership has invariably been presented to the public as a French-English partnership. Of course, Macdonald of the Conservatives had instituted the practice when Cartier served as his right-hand, symbolizing the historic duality of the new nation. Laurier, being French, naturally had no need of another from Quebec. Indeed, the status of Laurier's lieutenants emphasized how important a role

Quebec played in Liberal fortunes in the early part of this century. If Laurier could be said to have had any close partner, it was his Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton who quit the administration, although not the party, in 1905. It was Mackenzie King who restored the concept of partnership to an explicit practice. Ernest Lapointe began as Minister of Marine and Fisheries and, from 1924 until his death in 1941, served with King as the recognized leader of Quebec. Like Laurier, St. Laurent needed no one else from the province although his leadership was of a different order from Sir Wilfrid's. However, C.D. Howe, Minister of both Trade and Commerce and of Defense Production for the duration of St. Laurent's administration, was acknowledged as the second-in-command. Closely allied to this is the Liberal tradition of alternating leadership between French and English, another device emphasizing the role of French Canada.

Quebec's Liberal inclinations have not gone unnoticed in the rest of the country. The major effect of the connection between French Canada and the Liberals is to establish what to this date is one of the few known correlates of voting in Canada. In a preliminary survey of the relationship between religious affiliation and electoral behavior in Kingston, Ontario, in 1953, John Meisel confirmed what politicians had long suspected, namely, that Roman Catholics outside the province of Quebec tend to lean heavily toward the Liberals. Meisel reported that 83% of the Roman Catholics questioned expressed an intention to support the Liberals while only 2% said they would support the Conservatives.⁴³ Voting patterns

in the province of New Brunswick display similar features with the Acadians and Irish Catholics (usually) firmly committed to the Liberal cause. ⁴⁴

A corollary of this Catholic and French-speaking Liberal voting tendency is the noticeable anti-French or anti-Catholic sentiment underlying the voting motivations of Protestants. In the course of the aforementioned study, Meisel discovered that 25% of the Protestant respondents supporting the Conservative Party cited an anti-Catholic or anti-French reason in explaining their decision. ⁴⁵

The Liberal Party's policies have often been attacked on the grounds that they were designed primarily with an eye to Quebec. The system of Family Allowances is a good example. Opponents of the scheme have claimed that this is a thinly disguised political plum and cite the high French-Canadian birth-rate as the reason underlying the Liberal government's enactment of the measure. During the 1920's, opinion on the Prairies, while strongly anti-Conservative, was often fearful of the Liberals in power in Ottawa. The general tenor of these remarks is expressed in such statements as : "We are in for five years of Quebec domination" and "Canada is to have a period of French Rule and she won't stand for it." ⁴⁶

Seldom has anti-French sentiment in peace-time reached the peak of virulence in the Saskatchewan provincial election of 1929 (an occasion in which the French or Catholicism, at least ostensibly, were not involved) when the Conservatives

were making a concerted bid to defeat the Liberal government headed by James G. Gardiner.⁴⁷ Of course, during the two world wars, anti-French feeling has run rampant. But these are periods of extreme stress.

In spite of the fact that Quebec was solidly Liberal from 1891 until 1958, a stretch of seventeen consecutive general elections, the Liberal Party did not have everything its own way during this period. The forces of French-Canadian nationalism on both federal and provincial levels could not always be contained. The first movement of this type of direct significance to the party was Mercier's Parti Nationale which achieved power provincially on the wave of indignation over Riel. The Liberals in Ottawa could not plead the cause of French Canada as rabidly as Mercier's group for fear of alienating its not inconsiderable Protestant and English support in Ontario. Mercier soon passed from the scene, driven from office by charges of corruption in 1891. However, even out of office, he posed enough of a problem for the party, its national aspirations on the verge of being realized, that Laurier is reputed to have requested that Mercier be absent from the national convention of 1893.⁴⁸

Canada's involvement in the South African War initiated an eruption in Quebec that was eventually to help bring defeat to the Liberals in 1911 and to plague them for at least another decade. Tragically enough, the leader of this instance of French particularism was a protege of Laurier, the brilliant but

volatile Henri Bourassa. The Liberal government was under intense pressure from the ever-present "imperialists" in English Canada to rally all-out to Britain's side. The government compromised by undertaking to equip and transport up to 1000 volunteers instead of authorizing an official contingent. Ultimately, 7300 men were sent to South Africa.⁴⁹ Quebec was unmoved by the wave of British sentiment sweeping Ontario at the time and the independent La Presse, in a few words, expressed the fundamental French Canadian attitude toward foreign wars:

"We French Canadians belong to one country, Canada; Canada is for us the whole world; but the English Canadians have two countries, one here and one across the sea."⁵⁰

Bourassa broke with Laurier over the issue, was reconciled in 1902, and was finally expelled from the party in 1906 when he opposed an official Liberal candidate in a by-election. During the next two decades, he oscillated back and forth from federal to Quebec provincial politics, the leading exponent of French nationalist aspirations. Bourassa, who founded the nationalist newspaper Le Devoir in 1910, did not want to sever the tie with Great Britain, but his opposition to imperialism made him a hero to young anglophobic French Canadian students. The latter envisaged the formation of a new French Canadian party which would not make concessions to imperialism as both the Conservatives and Liberals had done. As Laurier's success eclipsed the Conservative Party in Quebec, Bourassa became the leader of a whole generation

of French Canadians who found the leader of the Liberals too ready to compromise with the English.⁵¹ The flames of French nationalistic fears were fanned by the increasing immigration of the period which was non-French-speaking and therefore, at least to the "lunatic fringe", part of a plot to create a Canada that was English-speaking and in which Quebec would have little voice or importance. There were also the undoubted attacks on French minorities in Manitoba and Ontario.

The election of 1911, fought in the rest of the country over the issue of reciprocity, was decided in Quebec on the matter of a permanent navy for Canada. As mentioned before, Bourassa and his group viewed with dismay any Canadian involvement in external affairs not directly of concern to the country. Laurier's Naval Service Bill meant this, and ultimately, conscription (i.e. coercion by the English majority) to the nationalists. Convinced that Laurier had become a traitor to his people, Bourassa negotiated an alliance with the Conservatives who, besides railing against reciprocity, were critical of the government's naval policy on precisely the opposite grounds that it was not sufficient to support the British. The results of the election reduced the Liberal majority in Quebec from 43 to 11, easily the lowest it was ever to reach between 1896 and 1958.

With a Conservative government in power, it was not long before the nationalists realized how little their influence had now become. The conscription imposed by the Conservatives in 1917 only served to confirm the suspicions of French Canadians that

the Tories were indeed the instrument of the English majority.

During the inter-war period, the Liberal Party was so successful in capturing the middle-of-the-road, both in provincial and federal politics, that it was left to the nationalists to bear the burden of opposition in the province. The 1920's saw the development of a narrow nationalism based on the cult of the French language, folk-hero worship, Catholicism as a unifying force, corporatism, and anti-semitism. Under the intellectual leadership of Abbé Lionel Groulx, this movement, entitled L'Action Française, petered out before the end of the decade but a pronounced residue remained.⁵² The impact of the increasing industrialization and the depression of the 1930's heightened the self-consciousness of French Canada and cries against English domination were taken up by two groups: The Conservatives led by Camillien Houde, mayor of Montreal and Arthur Sauvé's successor as leader of the party; and later by Paul Gouin, head of the Action Libérale Nationale movement, who tried to reform the corrupt Taschereau Liberal régime from inside the party. Just as the old Rouge element had, at the time of Confederation, accused Cartier of selling out to the English capitalists, so Houde, Sauvé and Gouin levelled similar charges at the Liberal Party and Taschereau. The difference between the two epochs was in the absence, this time, of even the flavor of anti-clericalism.⁵³

The dominance of the Liberals in both federal and provincial fields kept the nationalists in the Quebec provincial Conservative Party. After Sauvé's period of leadership, characterized

by moderation (he subsequently held the position of Postmaster General in R.B. Bennett's Federal Conservative administration between 1930 and 1935) and three defeats at the polls, Houde's brand of leadership, dynamic and vitriolic though it was, likewise ended in failure. Houde relinquished the leadership of the party in 1932 and returned to his Montreal bailiwick where he was again elected mayor two years later. Maurice Duplessis took over as leader of the Conservatives in 1932 and he and Gouin, who was unable to reform the Liberals, concluded an alliance just before the provincial election of 1935. The Liberals won again but Taschereau was soon forced to resign when rumors of corruption were proved against him in 1936. Adélard Godbout attempted to carry on at the head of a Liberal government but an election was forced upon him within a few months. Meanwhile, Duplessis and Gouin had fallen out and, in that 1936 election, Duplessis led the newly formed Union Nationale to victory, marking the end of the Conservative Party as a factor in provincial politics.

The Union Nationale was defeated at the polls by the Liberals and Godbout in 1939 but only with the all-out support of the federal Liberal cabinet contingent from the province, led by Ernest Lapointe, P.J.A. Cardin and C.G. Power. Two weeks after the outbreak of the Second World War, Duplessis had declared that a vote for him would be a vote against conscription, participation in foreign wars, and would ensure French liberties and rights. The Liberal Party, fearful of a repetition of a split in the country on the purely French-English lines of 1917, pledged that

conscription for foreign wars would never be imposed by a Liberal government and fought the Quebec election for Godbout with everything at its disposal. French appraisal of their position, their fear of isolation and the undoubtedly extravagant and anti-labor policies of Duplessis combined to give Godbout 69 out of the 86 seats in the legislature.

The federal government's promises not to impose conscription plagued it throughout the war. In 1940, under the ^Mational Resources Mobilization Act, all persons were required to register to place themselves, their services and property at the disposal of the country for home defense. Even this preliminary step was sufficient to evoke charges of coercion from nationalist elements and resulted in the internment for the duration of the war of Montreal's Mayor Houde, who had advised his constituents not to register. Although from the outset the Catholic hierarchy supported the measure and urged compliance with it, agitation by the ultra-nationalist Bloc Populaire Canadien, whose program of isolation and corporatism had strong fascist overtones, presaged things to come.

Events in Europe and pressure from English Canada soon compelled the government to attempt to squirm out of its "non-conscription" pledge to the electorate. In 1942, a national plebiscite was held to give the government a free hand to impose conscription should the need arise. The results were instructive. While 80% of English Canada voted acceptance of the government's proposal, Quebec, harangued by the Bloc Populaire and other such

elements, could not negate its historic isolationism. Seventy-two percent in the province voted "no". The schism of the First War seemed imminent.

It did not develop. Conscription for overseas service, dreaded alike by Quebec and the federal Liberal leadership, was not announced until late in 1944 and then only 13,000 men were used under the plan.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the Union Nationale had been returned to power in Quebec earlier that same year in an election that provided a safety valve for the pent-up emotions of resentment and irritation against the war. While the Bloc Populaire was able to poll approximately one-third of the vote of the Union Nationale and Liberals, who each obtained 36%, it returned only four members to the legislature while the other two major parties won 45 and 37 respectively. The relative lack of success of the Bloc was due to its extremism and to the fact that its leadership was an unknown quantity. The Liberal Party, aside from the disadvantage of its federal connection, had alienated the traditionally "conservative" element with its expropriation of the Montreal Light, Heat and Power Company during the last stages of the Godbout administration.

Duplessis' Union Nationale struck a middle ground between the extremes of right and left --- between the Bloc Populaire on the one hand and the Liberal Party and the growing splinter groups --- the CCF and Labor-Progressives (Communist), on the other.⁵⁵ Like most provinces Quebec was (and still is) heavily gerrymandered in favor of the rural areas. The Union Nationale concentrated its

efforts there, leaving Montreal and the lesser urban areas to the Liberals, a pattern that was followed throughout its subsequent sixteen years of office in the province.

The 1945 federal election, held just after the end of the European war, permanently terminated the development of a federal nationalist party on purely French Canadian ethnic lines. Despite attempts by the Bloc Populaire, now joined by Houde, just out of prison and posing as a martyr for the "cause," disaffected Liberals, anxious to make personal capital out of the conscription crisis, and various splinter parties, the Liberals succeeded in winning 54 out of the 65 seats available in the province despite obtaining only 45% of the popular vote. Henceforth, with the Liberals firmly in power in Ottawa, the Union Nationale pre-empted the provincial field sounding the call of French "rights" and provincial autonomy. And if the electoral success of the Union Nationale was not the effective impediment to violent nationalism, increasing prosperity of the post-war boom in the province was.

In spite of its obvious nationalism, the Union Nationale did not deviate from the practices of previous federal governments. Duplessis' administration was characterized by a strong business and anti-labor orientation and a scarcely concealed corruption.⁵⁶ However, its potential for electoral mischief in federal politics was sufficiently great for informal non-interference agreements to be concluded with the federal Liberals under which the party promised to refrain from campaigning in federal politics in return for abstention by the Liberals in the provincial field.

In the light of the foregoing, one might expect the French to support the Liberals indefinitely. It should therefore be difficult to account for the remarkable electoral turn-over of the 1958 federal election in which the forces of John Diefenbaker returned with 50 of the 75 seats, gaining 49.5% of the popular vote. The most obvious conclusion would be that the French joined the Conservative "band-wagon" in order to be in line for the spoils that inevitably accrue to the winning side, since it seemed obvious to them that the Tories were going to win.⁵⁷ On the surface, this leaves the French open to a charge of traitorous behavior, at least from the perspective of the Liberal Party.

However, the results of that election are blunt testimony to the accuracy of Underhill's aphorism. French attitudes toward democracy and their self-conscious appraisal of their "minority" position in the nation underly the 1958 reversal. As a form of government, democracy is suspect in the eyes of many French-Canadians to whom its meaning has become the rule of the majority against the minority --- the preponderance of numbers against rights. To Quebec, whose cherished rights of religion, language and education were acquired before the advent of universal suffrage and a democratic form of government, democracy has tended to imply organized injustice. Many of the French feel sincerely that it can result in abuses and infringements upon their rights. One method of preventing this development is to join the victorious party (i.e., the majority), avoid the isolation and minority

status that would otherwise be their lot and thereby forestall any possible incursions by the "majority" against them. With Diefenbaker certain to form a government without their backing, they supported the Conservatives in order to avoid the dreaded isolation they were certain was in store for them had they remained faithful to the party of Laurier. The studied indifference of Diefenbaker, who restricted himself to a short tour of the province, and who made no specific commitments to the area, served only to intensify Quebec's uneasiness.⁵⁸

There were, naturally, other less compelling and more immediate reasons: St. Laurent was no longer leading the Liberals; Diefenbaker's championing of his "new Canadianism" made sound political sense in a province where investment is heavily American and where the Catholic hierarchy has been strongly deploring the break-down in morals which it attributed to the influence of American television, movies and press, avidly consumed by the French. The process of industrialization and urbanization has also brought the French into closer contact with the English and, as a result, may have made them less suspicious of the Conservatives. Finally, the work of the Union Nationale organization, anxious to retaliate against the Liberals for the federal party's "interference" in the provincial elections of 1956, helped make the difference particularly in narrow Conservative victories in areas in Quebec City and in the rural constituencies along the south shore of the St. Lawrence River.

The assessment that Quebec remains strongly oriented in

favor of the Liberal Party may be maintained, nevertheless. The failure of the Diefenbaker government to make any explicit overtures to the province, the absence of a Conservative of the stature of Laurier, Lapointe or St. Laurent in the federal cabinet, and the recent collapse of the Union Nationale are important elements affecting French political allegiances. The last-mentioned factor is particularly significant. With the death of Duplessis in September, 1959 and the untimely demise five months later of Paul Sauvé, his immediate successor, the Union Nationale was plunged into a state of disarray so profound as to permit the Liberals to win a majority of seven in the provincial elections of June, 1960.

The victory of the Liberals under the leadership of Jean Lesage, newly transferred from the federal arena (he had served in the St. Laurent cabinet as Minister of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources), has both immediate and long-range consequences. The immediate effect is the obvious organizational one, but this is a topic that will be discussed under another heading and is not especially germane here. The more far-reaching consequences arise out of the realization on the part of the provincial Liberal Party that it is unrealistic to regard French Canadian nationalism as a single body of thought and action. There are at least two sides to the movement. One tends toward clericalism, authoritarianism, and anti-capitalism; the other is anti-clerical, democratic in inclination and anti-capitalist.⁵⁹ The Union Nationale was impelled forward largely by the first form while the "democratic"

form of nationalism, mainly because of its anti-clericalism, has been without a political home. The only quality shared by both is an anti-capitalism which is essentially an outgrowth of French recognition that the economic resources of the country and the province are in the hands of the English.

The Liberals attained power in the province on a program of social reform giving evidence that the facts of life of an urban and industrial society had made a deep impression, not only on political platforms, but on the electorate as well. The Liberals, like the Union Nationale before them, could not respond to the anti-capitalist nationalist sentiment. However, while eschewing to the best of its ability an anti-clerical course, the party succeeded in gaining the support of the urban body of French Canadian opinion which has given voice to widespread aspirations for government-sponsored programs of hospitalization, education, cultural development and conservation of natural resources. Where Duplessis blocked Quebec participation in various national programs such as the Trans-Canada Highway and University Grants on grounds that provincial autonomy would be compromised (while at the same time permitting private interests unimpeded access to provincial timber, mineral and water resources), the Liberals in Quebec devised methods of circumventing such objections and, although still mouthing autonomist principles, implemented these policies. The fact that these programs were presented and enacted under the aegis of a Liberal administration provides one strong reason for caution in anticipating the development of long-term and wide-spread

Conservative party allegiances in federal politics.

However, the return of an era of Liberal federal dominance may also be remote. The Liberals expected that fully 60 out of the 75 seats would fall to them in the federal election of 1962 because of the recognized Conservative failures. But this expectation did not take account of the growing unhappiness with the status quo in the rural areas of the province and the industrial centers outside Montreal. This disaffection had been at least partially responsible for the defection of most of these areas to Diefenbaker in 1958. The experiment with Conservative voting had failed; but there was little incentive to return to the Liberals who had concentrated their appeal to the urban population.

The 1962 election saw the appearance of Social Credit in a province where the party had previously been a nonentity. Twenty-six seats fell to the Creditistes, just nine less than the number accruing to the Liberals. The Social Credit predecessor in the province, the Union des Electeurs, had in all the years of its existence elected only one member to the House of Commons. That was in 1946 in a by-election. The member's name was R al Caouette who sat until 1949 for the northern constituency of Pontiac.

It was this same Caouette who, leading his Ralliement des Creditistes and who later became Deputy Leader of the federal Social Credit Party, began a weekly series of rural television broadcasts just two and a half years prior to the election. By voting day, he had spent half-a-million dollars collected from his membership of about 14,000 on this medium alone. He ignored

newspaper and other forms of advertising and stayed away from the Montreal area where his audience would, by definition, be more discriminating and where he would have had to cope with considerable competition from other sources of information.

Caouette emphasized the monetary aspects of his party's program (which will be elaborated in the following section on the West), promising a culturally deprived population that it had nothing to lose by supporting his movement. Under the impact of the breakdown of traditional French-Canadian society, with the loss of influence of the family, the Church and the legal and commercial elites as effective sources of leadership and authority, to say nothing of the increased mobility and the revolution in the mass media of communication, rural Quebec was in ferment. A composite picture of the typical Creditiste would be that he or she earned less than \$3000 yearly, had no higher than a public school education, if that, and was in either the white collar or unskilled-labor occupational groups. Essentially, these people, over 500,000 of whom voted Socred, really had nothing to lose although they certainly did not understand the philosophy which they were supporting for the first time.

It seems clear then, that unless the federal Liberals drastically re-orient their appeal to the rural electorate, Quebec can no longer be automatically counted upon to provide the party with the solid support that traditionally was forthcoming.

2. Revolt in the West

If the French Canadians have been until very recently

consistent in remaining within the confines of the two major parties in federal politics, the people of the prairie provinces have not. One of the noteworthy features of national politics in western Canada since the First World War has been the persistence of third and fourth parties.⁶⁰ The phenomena of the Progressive, CCF and Social Credit parties have appeared in spite of political blandishments in the form of special policies and leadership especially by the Liberal Party and the institutional barriers of cabinet government coupled with an electoral system of the plurality, single-member constituency.

The dissimilarity in political dispositions can be traced directly to differences in the economic and social structures of the two areas: Where Quebec's economy is mixed and, especially in recent years, heavily industrialized, the prairie economy is a farm one dominated by one commodity --- wheat. While both sectors are similar in their isolation from the rest of the country, Quebec by reason of religion, language and tradition and the Prairies by obstacles of communications and economics, they are unlike in that, in Quebec the institutional elite, the Church and professional and commercial groups, saw their interests best protected in supporting one or the other of the national parties in federal politics. This allegiance was naturally reflected in their respective "constituencies". On the other hand, in the west, in an area where repeated challenges and crises, the result of a one-crop economy, forced the farmer to create many more community institutions (such as cooperatives and economic pressure groups) than

would ordinarily be the case in more stable areas, these institutions provided a structural basis for political action in critical situations.⁶¹

The Progressive and CCF parties came to prominence strongly supported by the leaders of these various rural organizations and by the class and community leaders of the rural populace. In Quebec, the leadership used reference group appeals (essentially ethnic in content) to maintain political allegiances; on the Prairies, changes in political affiliation were incited by institutional leaders of farmer occupational groups on the basis of economic self-interest. Of course, not a small part of the appeal to political action beyond the pale of the two-party system is the result of the western population's self-image of separateness. This factor is important in the assessment of the development of all three parties, not only the Progressive and the CCF.

I

At the beginning of this century, the Prairies, especially that section which in 1905 became the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta, provided the Liberal Party with a congenial environment for support. Throughout its fifteen years of power in Ottawa, the Laurier administration pursued a vigorous immigration policy. Attracted by the promises and concessions of the Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton, and his ingenious immigration agents, settlers from the United Kingdom, the United States and Eastern Europe poured into the West. By 1911, they had swelled the population of the area by close to 850,000.⁶² Their political allegiances

were not entirely Liberal. Those from the United Kingdom invariably brought their previous political tendencies with them.⁶³ Settling in ethnic enclaves, many new arrivals automatically adopted the outlook of their own group, but the large number of settlers from Eastern Europe, of whom Sifton spoke approvingly as "good quality" in applying the sobriquet "the peasants in sheepskin coats"⁶⁴ to them, could be expected to express their gratitude to their new country by supporting the Liberal cause. In many areas, the influence of the railways was the prime determinant of political affiliation, especially in territorial days. Constituencies within the orbit of the CPR were likely to be Conservative; those which hoped for the construction of another trans-continental line were Liberal. Thus in Alberta, Calgary was a recognized stronghold of Conservatism while Edmonton was just as reliably in the other camp.⁶⁵

While Manitoba remained in the hands of the Conservatives under R.P. Roblin until 1915, the Liberals were in power in the legislatures of Alberta and Saskatchewan beginning in 1905. Both governments were the creation of Laurier's government in Ottawa. The Lieutenants-Governor of these provinces chose Liberals, Alexander Rutherford and Walter Scott in Alberta and Saskatchewan respectively, to form cabinets before the first provincial elections were called. Thus, in both areas, the Liberals campaigned in support of the Acts creating the two provinces, thereby placing the Conservatives in the disadvantageous position of criticizing the Autonomy Bills. The Liberals remained in power in Alberta

until 1921 and in Saskatchewan until 1929. This unchecked tenure belies the economic conditions and events which were manifested by unrest in the federal arena.

The early years of the century did not fulfill the expectations aroused by Sifton's immigration propaganda. The movement west in Canada was prompted by the same yearnings for a new start, economic gain, open spaces and religious individualism that characterized the similar American movements a generation previously. In many respects the hopes of the new arrivals were not fulfilled. The unpredictability and instability of the weather and world grain markets, the power of the grain companies, the railways and the banks over the individual farmer, and the high prices of agricultural implements and commodities combined to engender a feeling of helplessness and dependence in the entire region. The Americans, who were heavily represented in the population influx, carried with them experience of the Grange Movement and Populism of the previous generation in their own country, and together with the settlers of British stock, took a lead in canalizing the unrest by means of special farm organizations in the form of Grain Growers' Associations. The provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta each had their own organizations in 1905, while a Territorial Grain Growers' Association had been set up four years before. The farmers also set up their own marketing agencies. The leaders prominent in these institutions, such as E.A. Partridge, W.R. Motherwell, T.A. Crerar, C.A. Dunning and Henry Wise Wood, were to dominate prairie politics for the next

twenty-five years.

Laurier had recognized the difficulties which the west was going to pose for his party during a western tour made in 1910, when he was confronted at almost every whistle-stop by farm groups whose needs in the form of inexpensive transportation, control of grain elevators and cheaper farm implements had not been met by his government. The farmers' sense of isolation from the rest of the country was underlined to them by the fact that this was the first visit to the area by the Prime Minister since his accession to power. Reciprocity with the United States was first impressed upon Laurier during that tour by the Grain Growers' Associations,⁶⁶ to whose demands Laurier was especially susceptible because he realized that the next census, to be taken in the summer of the following year, would call for a redistribution which would increase considerably the number of House of Commons seats allocated to the Prairies. Besides, Laurier was personally sympathetic to the matter. Early in his career as leader of the Liberals he had advocated reciprocity with the United States and was stymied only by his defeat in the election of 1891, which was partially contested on this issue, and the threat of a serious split within the party.

The cry for reciprocity fell upon willing ears that belonged to many in both political camps. The Liberals, despite their recently acquired support by the manufacturing and commercial interests of Central Canada, were historically the low-tariff party. Almost equally important, the notion of reciprocity (even when restricted to a specific list of goods) recalled another era when

a similar agreement with the United States in the 1850's and 1860's brought prosperity to the country. In fact, when Minister of Finance Fielding laid the agreement before the House in February, 1911, Western Conservative members joined government supporters in applause while the rest of the opposition was reportedly stunned into silence by this seemingly unopposable measure.⁶⁷

By the time the agreement had passed both Houses of Congress and received Presidential assent at the end of July of that year, the unanimity over reciprocity, so apparent at the outset in Canada, had completely disappeared. The proposal aroused too much political and economic opposition in sections other than the West and Laurier went down to defeat. However, the episode served the purpose of confirming western suspicions that the rigid discipline of the two-party system of parliamentary government which the more affluent Central provinces, with their larger populations and resources were able to manipulate to their own advantage, would never provide the West with a suitable vehicle for the solution of its problems. Although the war distracted the West from its economic concerns, it also injected the issue of conscription into the political atmosphere and helped truncate party allegiances further.

Robert Borden's plan to bring Laurier and his party into a coalition with the Conservatives and carry on the war effort by imposing conscription in 1917 was not accepted by the ageing Liberal leader in spite of intense pressures from within his own party. Laurier, realizing the depth of opposition to the measure in

Quebec, proposed that a national plebiscite be held on the issue. When this tactic proved unacceptable to the Conservatives, Laurier was unable to prevent ten Liberals, four of them influential party leaders from the West, from joining Borden's Union Government Cabinet. The Liberal Party's difficulties over the issue were further complicated by the fact that, on the provincial level, the three Liberal premiers of the provinces of Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Sifton, Norris and Martin, respectively, also supported the Union Government scheme.

With the end of the war, economic considerations, especially in the form of the tariff, once again dominated the western scene. The death of Laurier early in 1919 helped bring matters to a head for the West. Both the Unionist Liberals and the Grain Growers' Associations awaited the outcome of the Liberal Party Convention of that year. The Western Liberals looked to the convention to help smooth over the intensity of feeling engendered by the recent experiences of the war. The farmers, along with many in the western section of the party, impatiently looked forward to a free-trade plank and a repudiation of protection in the party platform. Both groups were disappointed in their expectations. With the arrangements and machinery of the convention firmly in the hands of die-hard Laurier Liberals, the reconciliation of the Unionists with the party was not achieved. Mackenzie King, a relatively unknown figure whose major claim to consideration was that he had stood by Laurier in 1917 (and detractors have cast doubts about even this), was chosen as leader on the third ballot over W.S. Fielding who,

as Laurier's Minister of Finance, had introduced the Reciprocity Bill in 1911. Fielding was considered by many Westerners, most notably T.A. Crerar, to be the only man in the party who would reunite it.⁶⁸ When the convention produced a lukewarm resolution on the tariff and refrained from condemning protection as a principle of party fiscal policy, the farmers decided to take matters into their own hands and founded a new party. Organized as the National Progressive Party, the movement contested the 1921 general election in the Maritimes, Ontario and the West and succeeded in capturing 64 House of Commons seats, 39 in the West.

Even at its inception, the party was not unified. There were two basic tendencies vying for dominance within the movement. On the one hand, there was the wing led by Crerar and supported intellectually by John W. Daffoe as editor of the Sifton-owned Winnipeg Free Press. It was Crerar's belief that a realignment of political forces was necessary and that this should be accomplished by a national party system in which two parties faced each other in a battle resting on economic foundations. To this brand of Progressive, the party was created to force a situation in which one party, the Liberals, would stand for a program of a progressive decrease in the tariff, "...retrenchment in expenditures, a balanced budget, fiscal reform, national railways... the need for safeguarding bank depositors and the necessity of government inspection of banks for this purpose..."⁶⁹ The Conservative Party would accordingly be composed of those in the country who displayed a "...tenderness for property rights; opposition to public

ownership of utilities; dislike of forward labor policies and a general attitude in favor of the view to him that hath shall be given."⁷⁰

This desire for a rational alignment of parties into a neat dichotomy has been a persistent dream of Western politicians while the obvious impossibility of realizing this vision has been a constant spur to political rebellion in the region. The other wing of the Progressive movement was led by Henry Wise Wood, who strongly advocated a repudiation of the cabinet system of government together with all politics organized on the basis of political parties. Wood and his followers favored a system of guild socialism in which economic groups would have direct representation in the political process. Traditional parties would have no place in a society of organized economic interests which would, inevitably, be the sole representative in a cabinet of economic groups and classes.⁷¹ It was this doctrine, promptly nicknamed "group government", that was responsible for the charge emanating from respectable quarters that the entire Progressive movement was intent on changing the basis of Canadian politics by turning responsible government into a system of class warfare.

While the charge of radicalism was by no means misdirected when levelled at the followers of Henry Wise Wood, it had no meaning if applied to the main body of the Western Progressive Movement under Crerar and his successor Robert Forke. In one of the numerous notes concerning the western political situation which Dafoe sent to his employer, Clifford Sifton, throughout this period, there

is an accurate appraisal of the course that the Progressive revolt would follow. As early as 1920, it was apparent to Dafoe that if Crerar's views on the tariff would be met, he and his followers would have little difficulty in conforming with Liberal Party policy in other respects. He summed up this particular appraisal with the following estimate of Crerar himself: "The fact of the matter is Crerar is nothing more or less than a Liberal of the type with which you and I were quite familiar prior to 1896."⁷²

Within a few years, Dafoe's prophecy was fulfilled. Throughout the first half of the 1920's, one of Mackenzie King's major objectives was to bring Crerar-type Progressives into the Liberal fold. In 1920, preparatory to the election of 1921, King toured the West, alleging to all who would listen that his party and the Progressives stood for the same things. He continued in this vein while in office and by virtue of the resignation from the cabinet at the end of 1923 of Justice Minister Lomer Gouin who, to the Progressives, was the incarnation of nefarious Eastern Commercial power,⁷³ and the reductions of duties on farm implements and other imports for basic industry in the budget of 1924⁷⁴ the foundation for the party's disappearance was laid. Soon afterward, in July, 1924, six radical Progressives, all from Alberta (although later going to be joined by a few others from Manitoba and Ontario), and soon to be dubbed the "ginger group", bolted their party on the grounds that it had become similar to the two older parties in its parliamentary organization.⁷⁵

This split in Progressive ranks together with the modifications in Liberal policy and personnel marked the demise of the movement. In the elections of 1925 and 1926, the party could return only 24 and 13 members respectively. The virtual disappearance of the party (two Progressives were elected in 1930) was finally marked by the inclusion of Crerar in the Liberal cabinet in 1929.

At the provincial level, the Progressive spirit was manifested in different ways. In Saskatchewan, the Liberal Party, being in effect a farmers' party, was able to minimize the effects of the Progressive revolt. Liberal governments in Saskatchewan had the comparatively easy task of simply tailoring their administration and legislative program to the requirements of the organized farmers. In fact, so strong a liaison developed between the Liberals and the Grain Growers' Association that there was a constant stream of able men moving easily from the executive of the Association into the Liberal government in the 1920's.⁷⁶ The Liberals were, of course, fortunate in that the province was uniformly agrarian in interest and character and that in the absence of any real industrialization, the urban centers of Regina, Saskatoon, and Moose Jaw were no more than auxiliaries to the agrarian economy. The Liberals mastered the arts of farmer politics so successfully (through strong constituency organizations, large doses of patronage and accommodating policy) that the party was in office (with but a five year interlude from 1929 to 1934) from the beginnings of the province in 1905 until the advent of the CCF under T.C. Douglas in 1944.

In Manitoba, the Liberals were not as successful in withstanding the Progressives, mainly because the Manitoba setting was not as undifferentiated as it was in the neighboring province to the west. A pronounced urban-rural split between Winnipeg and the rest of the heavily agricultural province and a large discontented working class in that city complicated matters. The Liberal administration under T.C. Norris was considered by many farmers as being socialistically inclined because it appeared to be willing to negotiate with the urban-centered labor movement after the 1919 Winnipeg general strike⁷⁷ in which the city was paralyzed by a European-like work-stoppage supported by the Trades and Labor Council.

Political dispositions were further disrupted by the failure of the national Liberal convention of that same year to offer any hope to the West in the form of either leadership or program. Accordingly, in the wake of the Progressive successes in federal politics in 1921, the movement won the provincial election in the following year ousting an unstable Liberal administration without the benefit of either a leader or a platform significantly different from the government's.

The Progressive regime under John Bracken lasted for over twenty years but this period can by no means be considered as a radical one for the province. The most notable innovation was a propensity for coalition government. After a decade of electoral cooperation in various constituencies and mutual support in the legislature, the Liberals and Progressives fused their

provincial parties in 1932. Throughout the succeeding years until 1950, even with Liberal premier Stuart S. Garson at the head of the government in the middle 1940's, non-partisan administrations were standard practice.⁷⁸ This was acceptable to the electorate largely because of an attitude, one that is peculiarly western and not entirely confined to Manitoba, that matters normally dealt with at the provincial level are akin to those with which municipal councils are faced.⁷⁹ The analogy with municipal councils was one used by all parties over the years and, aside from the various grounds of emergency which were put forward at particular election dates as reason for coalition, is an important factor in loosening whatever party allegiances that existed.

The experiences of the province of Alberta with the Progressive revolt are more complex than those of its other western neighbors. While its relatively mixed economy and intense rivalry, not only between urban and rural interests, but between the major cities of Calgary in the south and Edmonton in the north, account for some of the internal political differences within all parties in the province, these ingredients do not seem to explain why independent political action in the form of third parties invariably take on a more radical tinge than similar manifestations elsewhere. In contrast to what had transpired in Saskatchewan where Liberals and farmers cooperated almost from the beginning, Alberta Liberal premier Charles Stewart failed to include any farmers in his administration in the early

1920's. Independent action was therefore virtually forced upon the farmers from the outset. The United Farmers of Alberta gained control of the provincial government in 1922 and were not dislodged until the advent of Social Credit thirteen years later.

II

The Depression of the 1930's generated the second and ultimately the more permanent of the Western revolts against a national two-party system. The dreadful economic conditions fostered two political approaches toward a solution of society's difficulties. The first was offered by the CCF in the more or less familiar form of an appeal based on Fabian-Socialist principles. The other was presented by Social Credit, originating in Alberta. The movement was led by preacher and evangelist William Aberhart, a faithful disciple of English engineer Major C.H. Douglas whose theories were skillfully used by Aberhart to play upon the not-always latent religious feelings of the numerous and diverse Protestant sects of the West.

Social Credit at first propounded a philosophy which found a convenient scapegoat in the banking and monetary system, which was considered to be a handy instrument of a select group for exploiting the common people of the country, especially the westerner. The doctrine interpreted international events in terms of a Judaic plot, working through international finance and the Masonic order to dominate the world. Its main economic tenet,

soon to be widely known as "funny money", was that there was not enough purchasing power in the economy to buy all the goods and services being produced. Therefore, depression was always imminent. The only solution was to put more money into circulation. This was to be done by the government simply giving each adult citizen a lump sum, ranging anywhere from \$25 to \$100, which he would then presumably spend and thereby redress the balance. This dividend sum was to be calculated on the imaginary total credit an individual was supposed to have in the country and was based on the assumption that any country is exactly similar to a corporation which has calculable assets which can be used as credit. Thus the term "social credit".

Both CCF and Social Credit movements attained only moderate success in the federal field beginning with their appearance in the election of 1935. Even taken together, their combined House of Commons total seats never equalled the number of Progressives returned in 1921. Social Credit was hampered by its obvious regional origins and dispositions. The CCF was successfully blocked by the doctrinal flexibility of the Liberal Party which, in the course of a decade, enacted a substantial part of the social reforms advocated by the socialists into law and thus successfully moved with the electorate in its shift to the "left", especially in the immediate post-war years. In the 1958 election, Social Credit federal representation was completely obliterated while CCF membership was reduced to a mere eight --- with only one in Saskatchewan and four in British Columbia.

Again it is on the provincial level that this western revolt has had its most lasting electoral significance. Social Credit was swept to power in Alberta over an aging UFA administration in 1935 and has formed the government there ever since. In British Columbia, the party displaced a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives and is still in power. CCF electoral successes were later in coming and have been confined to Saskatchewan. In that province, as well as throughout the agrarian sectors of the West, the ravages of the Depression left the farmers so dependent upon the federal Liberal government for relief that they had little inclination to attempt new political experiments. Under federal Minister of Agriculture James G. Gardiner, an extensive relief and rehabilitation program not only maintained Liberals in federal constituencies but, with the machinery of relief employed by the Liberals for party purposes as well, was also important in keeping the provincial party in power longer than might otherwise have been the case.

However, when the early 1940's brought rising prosperity to the region the general unhappiness with the provincial administration was canalized by the CCF using such tested institutions of the farm community as the farm organizations, the cooperatives and the marketing agencies in appealing to the public. CCF candidates and workers being prominent in local town and municipal councils formed a natural opinion leadership that was intent upon defeating the Liberals. This was accomplished in 1944 and, with such support, the T.C. Douglas-led socialists have had little trouble

with any opposition that the Liberals could offer.

It must be emphasized that both parties, particularly the Social Credit, have lost a great deal of their doctrinal élan in the course of governing their respective provinces. Since 1937 when the federal government disallowed Social Credit legislation regarding the monetary and banking system in Alberta,⁸⁰ the party has tried to present itself in that province as the only one which is truly wedded to a philosophy of free enterprise against the so-called "socialist solutions" of all the other parties (including the Conservatives) on the Canadian scene. In both British Columbia and Alberta, the Social Credit has done its utmost to present an image of respectability to the electorate. Even in the first flush of electoral success in Saskatchewan, the CCF under Douglas rejected the doctrinaire solutions in its approach to the problems of the province. While Saskatchewan has led the way in social legislation on the provincial level in the entire country, CCF success cannot be attributed wholly to such things as hospitalization plans and welfare schemes. Both Social Credit and CCF parties owe their long and uninterrupted tenures in office to the feelings on the part of their local provincial electorates that both parties are closest to their respective constituencies and are, therefore, the ones best able to adequately meet the demands of their areas. Seen against the background of the whole history of initial success and then ultimate failure of western protest in this century, this rejection of both Conservatives and Liberals is understandable, and the Diefenbaker sweep of 1958 appears to have

had little effect in changing provincial voting dispositions.

3. Opposition in the Provinces

As the foregoing remarks have indicated, the first half of this century has witnessed the virtual domination of the Liberal Party at the federal level of party politics. On any occasion that the Liberals have been displaced, this has been accomplished by the Conservative Party, i.e., the other party in what is invariably considered a two-party system. Finally, while the Liberals have governed in Ottawa, provincial politics in many parts of the country have been characterized by the appearance of parties of a sectional variety which have little or no hope of attaining power in their federal operations. There is one more point that must be added. When the Liberals began their twenty-two year tenure of office by winning the election of 1935, the party also held power in eight of the nine provincial legislatures (Alberta being the only exception with Social Credit at the head of its government). When they were finally defeated in 1957, they were in power in only three, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and Manitoba, and just barely in the latter, where the Conservatives were on the verge of defeating them.

The fact that the pattern of Canadian voting behavior has seen voters in provincial elections often backing parties other than those which they support in federal politics has been presented by many observers as a unique feature of the country's politics.⁸¹

There have been various attempts at analyzing this phenomenon, not all entirely satisfactory. F.H. Underhill has remarked that voters tend to use the ballot in provincial elections to express their displeasure with the party in power federally. Since one party (the Liberal Party in the twentieth century) is usually in power federally for a long stretch, the electorate realizes that there is no viable alternative to it on this level. The voters, therefore, take advantage of the opportunity at the provincial level to support another party for one reason or another (be it economic, ethnic or geographic) in a conscious expression of disapproval.⁸²

It has been suggested that there are two levels of Canadian politics, one federal and one provincial, in which the manifestations of the many interests and attachments of political life are displayed under differing conditions.⁸³ Finally, in a study comparing Canadian provincial and American state election statistics, Howard A. Scarrow concludes that he can find no simple formula to explain the motivation underlying this aspect of voting behavior.⁸⁴

The federal structure of the country and the parliamentary system of government can be considered as important factors conducive to the existence of these opposition parties in the provinces. From Confederation onward, the provinces and the central government have waged a constant war over financial arrangements. While this is not the place to present a detailed review of this matter, it must be pointed out that in 1867, the four original provinces of

the new country were deprived of revenue accruing from trade, which had been theirs under the old system. Instead, the Dominion granted subsidies to the provinces in order to compensate for this loss and in order to permit the provinces to carry out their diverse functions under the new arrangements. This settlement, supposedly a final one, was considered to be so important that it was detailed in the constitutional document itself. It proved to be anything but final and since 1869 when Nova Scotia succeeded in obtaining "better terms", there have been over 20 special revisions and three general revisions.⁸⁵ There has also been constant bickering over taxing arrangements which must of necessity be reviewed periodically. If nothing else, these factors alone provide ready ammunition for disgruntled provincial administrations, be they of the same party as the one in power in Ottawa or not.

The operations of the parliamentary system are often another cause of local discontent because in spite of the constitutional and traditional devices of representation, the demands of interests centered in the provinces can only be imperfectly satisfied. For example, the House of Commons does not represent the provinces. Seats are allocated among and within the provinces roughly on the basis of population. It is the Senate that is designed to represent the provinces and it does so by giving 24 seats each to the four areas of the country -- the West, Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes and six to Newfoundland. However, with the Senate long ago having been relegated to a decidedly secondary position in relation to the House, the representative function of an Upper House is by

virtue of this fact not really fulfilled.

The Cabinet, composed as it is on the basis of traditional and virtually unbreakable rules can provide some means of meeting regional demands for representation.⁸⁶ However, here the imperatives of the system of cabinet government and party lines based on the necessary rigid discipline in the House soon nullify this aspect of local representation too. No matter how pressing local allegiances and local issues may be, the individual cabinet minister concerned can scarcely press his point of view with much vigor.

In view of the disagreement as to the motivations of provincial electorates, there is little that can be ventured with any certainty regarding this matter. It seems apparent, however, that the federal structure of the country in which provincial boundaries conform to regional economic, social and religious interests presents readily accessible fields of operation to disaffected local and particularistic interests. This federal structure is, of course, combined with the parliamentary system which involves the holding of irregular elections both in Ottawa and in the provinces. It is therefore a relatively simple affair for voters to support different parties at the two levels. This system leads easily to a type of "ticket-splitting" and helps prevent voting allegiances from carrying over from one situation to the other. It can also be said that the attainment of power in provincial fields (in essentially different constituencies from the federal) by these groups, be they farmers on the prairies or French Canadian nationalists in Quebec, tends to induce intransigence both in the groups themselves and in their leaders. This

often has the effect of rendering the job of building a stable national consensus, one of the prime tasks of a party aspiring to national power, that much more difficult. On the other hand, it is possible to consider that the existence of these provincial fields of activity serve to siphon off purely local issues to the arena in which they belong. In this way, the federal structure can be portrayed as providing a safety valve without which the unity of the country could not exist for any sustained period of time.⁸⁷

Finally, there are federal electoral and general organizational factors that should not be overlooked. It is possible for a party to remain in opposition in Ottawa for many years and still be in a position to return to power because it has established strongholds in provincial politics. While the relationship between federal and provincial parties varies by province, by party, and by whether or not the party is in power, it is still not far-fetched to claim, for example, that the Conservatives might not have been ready to supplant the Liberals after twenty-two years in opposition in 1957 were it not for the fact that parties bearing the label "Conservative" were in power in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick and about to take power in Manitoba. Indeed, the fact that Conservatives formed the government in Ontario since 1943 might have been one of the major reasons for the party not disappearing altogether from the federal arena in the late 1940's when the Liberals were capturing approximately 50% of the vote and close to 75% of the seats in the House. A

similar statement can be made about the resurgence of the Liberal Party under Laurier in the 1890's. After more or less a generation of opposition to Macdonald's Conservatives on the national scene, the Liberals were in position to take advantage of the misfortunes which befell the Tories after the Old Chieftain's death because the party controlled the governments of five of the seven provinces. The Conservatives were on the way out in Quebec and the group in power in British Columbia did not designate itself as either Liberal or Conservative (national party labels did not appear in the British Columbia provincial politics until 1905). At present with the Liberals in opposition in Ottawa, the victory of the party in Quebec and New Brunswick provincial politics is considered by many as a sign of the prospective resurgence of the party federally. In effect, this process has two distinct manifestations. Electorally, public consciousness of the party is continued, and organizationally, the party machinery is maintained at some sort of operational level. This last effect has some bearing on the sections on organization which follow later in this study.

4. The Managerial Demiurge

The most generally accepted verdict that has been passed on the Liberal regime of the period beginning with 1935 is that it has been neither of the "right" nor of the "left". It has simply been "governmental" or "managerial".⁸⁸ By this, critics, friendly or otherwise, of the party in general and of the Mackenzie King brand of Liberalism in particular, seem to mean that the Liberal

Party of this period had so successfully encamped itself at the center of the Canadian political spectrum that it had removed most political issues from the realm of ideology and placed them under the heading of "administration". To the Liberal governments under King and his successor, St. Laurent, the supreme test of any program or policy seemed to be the pragmatic one and its initiation and acceptance depended mainly on its workability. This is certainly not surprising in view of the political culture in which all parties must operate in Canada. It is nevertheless noteworthy because, as was pointed out before, a great deal of social legislation was enacted by the government but this was accomplished without the sloganeering that accompanied the heyday of the Roosevelt administration in the United States. Perhaps this aspect of the party properly belongs in the category of "ideology". However, without wishing to side with critics of recent federal Liberal governments, the charge of "managerialism" in some of its aspects has more significance aside from matters ideological. The fact is that the Liberal Party did present an image of expertise and efficiency to the electorate and succeeded in fostering a myth that it alone of all the parties vying for power on the federal scene was capable of properly governing the country. Invariably, public perception of the party was expressed in these terms.

One important source of support for the party came from the large corporations. This, too, is not particularly abnormal for Canada. Contrary to the situation in this country where there is a strong anti-government ideology prevalent in the corporate world

--- an ideology that tends to drive most of "big business" into the arms of the Republican Party --- Canada has never developed a tradition of blind opposition to action on the part of the federal government except in the ranks of the advocates of provincial rights. There is no tradition of the "frontier" to underly any articulate individualist ideology in Canada as well. In fact, the country has experienced pronounced government intervention in the economy in one form or another from its inception. With the federal government playing an important if not paramount role in the economic affairs of the nation, it seems natural for the business world, dependent as it is upon government largesse in the form of contracts, subsidies, favorable tariffs and the like, to attach itself to the party that was so obviously going to form the government. That business interests should feel at home in the Liberal Party is not strange because, contrary to the pattern of group affiliation in this country, there was, as mentioned before, no powerful trade union movement to act as a countervailing force either within society, the political system or within the party. Thus government of every political stripe and business can easily cooperate. But this cooperation with the Liberals was made especially easy because of the Second World War and its aftermath. The growing system of military production and economic control made the economy a highly centralized and intricately managed machine. The need for this efficient war economy meant a concentration of executive and managerial ability in the service of the state and the war swept many of the corporate world into government controls. Almost by definition,

"...anyone (in the business community) who wanted to participate in national affairs --- because of many years of Liberal rule --- was inclined to be Liberal. If there was a tendency in this direction, then this was solidified... (However) I have no way of ascertaining whether the people involved with the government were inclined to be Liberals in the first place and therefore went into government during the war, or whether people felt an obligation to go in during the war and by association with the party became Liberals. No doubt there was a little of both." 89

Expanded government involvement in Canadian society increased the government's role as an employment agency toward which the better educated segments of the country were drawn. By virtue of the government's new and greater role, increasing reliance was placed upon the enlarged and well-staffed federal bureaucracy. So great was this reliance that some critics claim that what was advertised as the Liberal Programme during the party's years of power had not only the natural support of the Liberal politicians, but also the firm commitment of the higher civil service that helped formulate it.⁹⁰ This example of close affinity between civil servant and politician, the result not of normal political circumstance but of two decades of uninterrupted Liberal tenure, is usually seen from the point of view that a bureaucracy so committed lessens the probability of maintaining an impartial, non-political civil service.⁹¹ As it turned out, such fears were virtually groundless. Subsequent Conservative governments in Ottawa have had little or no trouble as a result of the supposed Liberal sympathies of the civil service, although it is certain that the relations between ministers and their departments is not as close as in the pre-1957 situation.

This problem has an opposite implication when seen from the standpoint of what happened to the Liberal Party. While the civil

service may not have been substantially affected in the performance of its tasks by the twenty-odd years of association with the Liberals, the party cannot be said to have been as fortunate. For after a score of years of dominating the federal scene, the only image the party was able to leave with the electorate was the one of ability and efficiency. From the aspect of political allegiances (aside from the purely traditional and historical), the electorate could only conceive of the Liberals in terms of the personalities, St. Laurent, Howe, Pearson, Douglas Abbott, Brooke Claxton, et.al., who had formed its government for so many years. And when tactical mistakes in political strategy were made by the cabinet in the final years, the epithet "arrogant" was nearly all that remained of that image of an expert team of managers.

This is not to imply that the upper echelons of the party appeared in this light solely because of an association with the civil service. There are valid grounds on which it can be claimed that the majority of the personnel the party saw fit to elevate to cabinet rank was strongly disposed this way even before arriving on the scene. The evidence appears to substantiate the charges laid by one bitter critic of the party that "indeed an atmosphere had developed in Ottawa in which election to Parliament was the least of a man's qualifications for office, while affiliation to the powerhouse of the bureaucracy was indispensable to progress in a political career."⁹² Another commentator, John Porter, notes:

"What emerged during the Liberal era was the separation of the parliamentary political life from cabinet leadership. This situation could perhaps be traced to the war

years and the march of administrators on Ottawa, or to Mackenzie King's philosophy of a paternalistic state run, not by politicians, but by brilliant administrators. What characterized the higher levels of the bureaucracy characterized also the cabinet, which might be one of the reasons why the two groups got along so well together." 93

The figures are revealing: Fifteen of the fifty-five ministers between 1940 and 1956 entered the cabinet with no previous political experience. Of this number, seven were previously in business or the professions, six were from the civil service and the remaining two were Senators, a position they had achieved from activities in private life. Nine more were lifted out of provincial politics and another eight achieved Cabinet rank before their second parliamentary term.⁹⁴ Previous to entering the cabinet, King was a civil servant, as were Pearson and Pickersgill. St. Laurent was a highly successful corporation lawyer before he received the call to succeed Ernest Lapointe. James McCann was a doctor, Norman Rogers a political science professor and C.D. Howe a construction engineer and the head of a thriving corporation. Abbott, Ralph Campney, Claxton, Norman McLarty, J.A. MacKinnon, George Prudham, J.L. Ralston and Robert Winters were scarcely in the House before getting into the cabinet.

Professor Porter completes his analysis by showing from their subsequent occupations that most of these men were non-political. In 1958, of the fifty-five ministers (excluding ten who died in office or soon after leaving it), ten went to the judiciary, ten went back to business or law, four into Public Service, one returned to provincial politics, one retired and ten dropped into the political limbo of the Senate.⁹⁵

There is also no doubt that another reason the bureaucratic, corporate and political elites got along so well together was their common background: Ethnically Anglo-Saxon, Protestant in religion, upper income, they shared similar educational and life experiences. One significant aspect of this "managerial" behavior may be observed in the manner in which the party approached the problem of gaining the support of immigrant groups that reached Canadian shores after the Second World War. In the ten year period 1945-1954, 1,135,095⁹⁶ "new Canadians" entered the country. While they entered under Liberal auspices the party made little effort to gain their support, forgetting that under the leadership of Laurier and his Immigration Minister, Clifford Sifton, the party had received a great deal of backing from the newly arrived immigrants and had consequently continued to obtain this support.

Disregard of the changing character of the country's population was demonstrated by the type of appointment made to high office:

"We begged them to appoint a Jew, a 'Uke', anybody to the Cabinet in 1955-1956. But while they were making up their minds, you couldn't budge them. Then he (Diefenbaker) went ahead. Now it will take another generation to get all those people we lost back. We'll probably get back in sooner than that but only because of their (the Conservatives') mistakes. ...Two things we begged them to do: a woman and an ethnic. We missed out on two things: A woman and an ethnic would have closed the doors on the Tories for as long as their name was Tory. We've heard too long this notion that the Anglo-Saxons and the Celts have everything."

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A glance at the list of names of cabinet personnel mentioned above seems to provide little to disprove the allegations that the Liberals represented but a limited segment of the population and thus ignored some of the representative functions of the cabinet. The

government even failed to bother reaching these people through the foreign language press (which the Conservatives did) as several letters and telegrams to the National Liberal Federation in the midst of the 1953 election campaign show.

In short, the charge of "managerialism" can be supported not merely with reference to the government's pragmatic approach to the problems of governing the country but to its social composition and its political style. According to many members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, especially toward the later years, members of the government seldom bothered to maintain even minimal relations with the press. The absence of a feeling for political realities was also apparent in the government's relations with the House. In 1955, the government's attempt to give Minister of Trade and Commerce and Defence Production Howe wide powers under the Defence Production Act was only halted by vigorous opposition protest. In 1956, the furor over the now-famous Trans-Canada Pipeline Bill in which the government succeeded in getting its way only by imposition of closure demonstrated that it had lost its touch. This general disregard of so many niceties of democratic politics seems very much part of this managerial syndrome, and it inevitably culminated in the upheaval of 1957-58.

* * * * *

There is little statistical material available regarding the sources of party support in Canada. Research on voting behavior similar to that done in this country by such institutions and men

as the Michigan Survey Center, Angus Campbell and his associates, Paul Lazarsfeld and many others has never been undertaken. Outside of the efforts of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll), no full scale national sampling of the public during an election has been attempted for public consumption, although local studies have been conducted. Recently, during the 1958 and 1962 election campaigns, the author made coast-to-coast surveys in attempts to replicate some of the efforts of Samuel Lubell in this country.⁹⁸ The results of these surveys provide barely an inkling into political behavior of generations past and lead to the conclusion that it is difficult to identify with any degree of certainty much more than some long-term tendencies which have appeared operative as determinants of party allegiances.

As the foregoing section has indicated, these factors are relatively few in number. If anything, Canadian voting behavior is particularly unstable over time and predictive judgments based on the expectation that these traditional tendencies will be maintained are virtually impossible and are doomed to failure.

The most notable of these historic tendencies revolve around regional factors (which underlines the absence of communication in the country---probably an important element undermining the growth of a national consensus): The area west of the Great Lakes has been characterized by the appearance of "third" and "fourth" parties, co-existing with the major parties both on provincial and federal levels. Except for a brief interlude in the early 1920's and the middle 1940's, Ontario has not deviated substantially from a two-party pattern. In 1919, the United Farmers of Ontario captured 44

seats in the provincial election but dropped to 17 four years later. The CCF has been the other minor party. It reached its highest level of support in 1943 when 34 constituencies returned socialist candidates. Two years later this number fell to eight and jumped again to 21 in 1948. Since then, the CCF total has not been higher than three seats in four successive elections. Federally, the best the party could do was to obtain three seats in both the 1957 and 1958 elections. In spite of all the fanfare about the NDP, the CCF successor was only able to double this number in 1962. Quebec's voting dispositions have been of a one-party nature federally (except for very recent developments) with Liberals and Nationalist elements vying for power on the provincial scene. Finally, the Atlantic Provinces have been true to the traditional parties to such an extent that both the Progressive and CCF (NDP) parties have been able to obtain only one seat apiece, in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia respectively.

After the regionalism of Canadian political dispositions has been pointed out, religious affiliation seems to be significant --- but mainly in this respect --- that Roman Catholics lean toward the Liberals. As well, until recently, the Liberals drew upon more varied ethnic and social support than the Conservatives, with minority ethnic groups tending heavily toward them. This left the Conservative Party with the allegiances of a British-oriented core of support, a core that the present party under Diefenbaker has tried to expand to include the new immigrant groups that have entered the country since the War. What analysis there is of the

1958 election is uniformly of the opinion that the Diefenbaker party obtained heavy "ethnic" support in sweeping to its astounding victory. This was not repeated four years later because these people were among the hardest hit of all groups by unemployment. There is also little to be gleaned from any breakdown on the basis of occupation and age. In 1949, with St. Laurent at the helm and at the peak of its successes at the polls, the Liberal Party captured close to 50% of the vote. According to a Canadian Institute of Public Opinion poll conducted during that campaign, support for the party from the occupational groups of business and professional, white collar, non-union labor, farm and all others did not vary by more than 3% from this figure. The same could be said for all the age groups. The unionized workers were the only ones not obeying the national trend. Only 42% (!) of this group supported the Liberals.⁹⁹

Finally, in terms of total support in the country, the record shows that the Liberal Party has never fallen below the 33% level in the popular vote. The Conservatives have dipped as low as 27%. It is on these grounds alone that a judgment could be ventured that the Liberals are the "majority" party in the Canadian system, much like the Democrats in the American.

The overriding fact of the five straight electoral successes obtained by the Liberals beginning with 1935 is that, to the public, there was no acceptable alternative to them for which to vote. In effect, the electorate had "nowhere else to go". This may be attributable to the magnificent array of talent available to the

government, to poor leadership in the Conservative Party, or to the fact that the opposition was spread among three parties. Whatever the reasons, this feeling, combined with the image of efficiency, is all that appeared to motivate the public and is all the party seems to have left with the electorate. In the absence of any strong, permanent group leanings (aside from the question of French Canada) this achievement by the party may turn out to be a substantial one. Canadians are accustomed to looking automatically and unhesitatingly to their federal government (the French Canadians may be exceptions) when social action is necessary. Should the Conservative government really prove inefficient in the public mind in carrying out the mundane tasks of governing the country, the image of Liberal competence may be all that is necessary to bring them back to their accustomed position of power in Ottawa.

Indeed, in the 1962 election, the belief held by close to a majority of the electorate that the Liberal Party was the one best able to govern the country was instrumental in reducing the Conservatives to the status of a minority government and more than doubling the Liberal representation in the House of Commons. Factors reinforcing this feeling were the high unemployment rate, balance-of-payments difficulties and large budget deficits which featured the period 1958-1962 and which brought unpleasant reminders to those old enough to remember that the last time the Tories were in office, they presided over the depression of the 'thirties.

One of the most interesting aspects of the election was the upper-middle and upper income defection from the Conservatives in favor of the Liberals. These groups were especially up in arms

over what they regarded as a record of poor management as manifested by the disgracefully high deficits run up by the government, contrasting these with the boom-budgets of the late 'forties and early 'fifties which saw the Liberals salting huge surpluses away. The higher the income, the more strident the criticism of the Conservatives, or so it seemed.

In traditional terms, this is truly a paradox and represents a reversal of roles. Historically, the Conservatives have been the party of the "rich", while the Liberals, with their social legislation under Mackenzie King, attempted to foster a public image that they were the party of the "common man". Recently, upper-middle and upper income groups are tending to look to the Liberals as the only "respectable" party on the scene. While a majority of the over-50 age segment of the lower-middle and lower income groups of the population continues to express its vote intentions in terms of this traditional dichotomy, this is not true of the post-war generation, especially with Diefenbaker devoting much of the efforts of his government toward social welfare policies which have brought, among other things, increases in old-age pensions and grants to the provinces.

It remains to be seen whether this reversal is a permanent one or is simply a transient development resting upon the momentary circumstances of one election.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. The most recent official census was taken in 1951 with another scheduled for 1961. Unless specified otherwise, the demographic percentages in this section are based upon this census: Ninth Census of Canada, 1951, Vol. I (Ottawa: Canadian Bureau of Statistics, Queen's Printer, 1953).
2. This is based upon figures in Census of Canada, 1956 (Ottawa: Canadian Bureau of Statistics, Queen's Printer, 1956), Bulletin 1-7.
3. A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation (Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1953), 404-405.
4. D.C. Corbett, Canada's Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 33-34.
5. Lower calls them "the disappointments of the census". Op. Cit., 404.
6. While Canada East and Canada West were the respective official names of the provinces now called Quebec and Ontario in the two decades preceding Confederation, the terms Lower Canada (Quebec) and Upper Canada (Ontario) were the ones in general use and have survived as the colonial labels to this day.
7. Frank H. Underhill, "The Development of National Political Parties in Canada," in In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1960), 21-43. This article, which first appeared in 1935 in the Canadian Historical Review, is the classic analysis of nineteenth-century party politics.
8. This group was the left-wing descendant of the Ontario Reform movement which had developed in colonial times in opposition to a privileged "establishment" which, by reason of Anglican religion or family and personal connections, held key social and political position and retained for itself the lion's share of patronage and government contracts. This element was nicknamed "The Family Compact" and had, as its counterpart, "The Chateau Clique" in Quebec. The exclusive position of "The Family Compact" was to a large extent the result of attempts by British governors and their secretaries of state to duplicate the English countryside in the "colonies".

In Upper Canada, the Anglican Church received special privileges in the use of "Clergy Reserves" (the lands set aside for the support of the Protestant churches) and in officiating at marriages and the like. It was only by dint of tenacious opposition by other Protestant groups that the Anglicans were denied a monopoly in higher education and access to the concomitant large public endowments. It is not surprising that the

reformers in Ontario were overwhelmingly Presbyterian and Methodist. Since the Anglicans could only justify their privileged status by their association with the British governors, it was easy for them to fall into the habit of extolling the British connection and the status quo at every opportunity. It was natural, too, that the other religious groups pressed for responsible government as a way out of their inferior situation. Even to this day in Ontario, it is a political aphorism (not proved, however) that Anglicans vote Conservative and Presbyterians and Methodists vote Liberal.

An early split in the reform camp was over means. The moderates were constitutionalists; the radicals hankered for the barricades. After the failure of rebellions in both Upper and Lower Canada in 1837, the moderates were left in charge. However, the reformers did not remain united. With the attainment of responsible government, a split again developed --- this time between those who were willing to partake of the spoils of office and those who wished to maintain their pristine non-involvement in the corrupt practices that seemed necessary to govern the country.

To chronicle the events of the years immediately preceding Confederation would require more than this footnote and is not especially relevant anyway. It is enough to state that one wing of the reform party joined Macdonald in 1867 and the Brown-led "Grits" stayed in opposition, although it was Brown's cooperation with Macdonald that made the scheme of Confederation possible in the first place.

It might be emphasized here that Brown was not one of the early radicals, that is, the original "Clear Grits" who were his opponents as he tried to steer a moderate reform course. However, one decade's radicalism is the next's conservatism and by the end of the 1850's, the "Grits" looked to Brown as their leader.

The origin of the title "Clear Grit" is obscure. While Brown's newspaper used these words as a term of disapprobation in 1849, the expression was fairly common a decade or so earlier and might be readily applied to any group of radicals in Upper Canada. J.M.S. Careless, Brown of the Globe, Vol. I (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1959), 109. In 1871, campaigning during the Ontario provincial election of that year, Alexander Mackenzie, soon to be the first leader of the federal Liberal Party, informed some rural constituents that he and his party were "clear grit in every sense of the word." He went on to explain: "Clear Grit is pure sand without a particle of dirt in it." Dale C. Thomson, Alexander Mackenzie, Clear Grit (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1960), 123. The remark points up the geographical roots of the party and recalls the sandy composition of the soil of the area east of Lake Huron.

9. Frank H. Underhill, Op. Cit., 31-33.
10. Macdonald died in 1891 after leading the Conservative Party to its fourth straight federal election victory since 1878. He was succeeded by four leaders, each less successful than his

respective predecessor, in the intervening five years until 1896, at which time the Liberals began the first phase of their long reign.

11. Bernard Ostry, "Conservatives, Liberals and Labour," Canadian Historical Review, XLI (June, 1960), 93-127. This does not mean to imply that Labor remained staunchly Conservative thereafter. The labor vote was ignored by both the Liberals and Conservatives as not being particularly significant in the 1878 election, an appraisal which was accurate in view of the ecological structure of the country at the time. Anyway, this group rapidly developed doubts about the Tories and these doubts were increased by Liberal overtures to labor later in the decade. This episode is mentioned primarily as an illustration of Macdonald's unique tactical abilities.
12. The West did not sell its support in return for any petty patronage favors but for a railway and nothing else. See E.M. Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada," Papers and Proceedings of the Canadian Political Science Association, IV (1932), 187-200.
13. E.P. Dean, "How Canada has Voted: 1867 to 1945," Canadian Historical Review, XXX (September, 1949), 239, 241.
14. D.G. Creighton's two volume study of Macdonald is, in spite of the author's biases in his subject's favor, the most useful analysis of the Conservative leader and one of the best Canadian political biographies. See John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1952), and John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1955).
15. Frank H. Underhill, "Some Aspects of Upper Canadian Radical Opinion in the Decade before Confederation," in In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1960), 46.
16. The system of government prevailing in Canada between 1841 and 1867 under the Act of Union provided for a legislature which gave equal representation to the two areas of the country, Canada East (Quebec) and Canada West (Ontario). Since Canada West had a larger population, the Grits objected to the arrangement on the philosophical grounds that the principle of representation by population was being ignored. Another grievance and by no means a secondary one was that the system gave the French of Quebec, and therefore the Roman Catholic Church, undue influence.
17. Frank H. Underhill, "Some Reflections on the Liberal Tradition in Canada," loc.cit., 14-15.
Lacking any home-grown political, social or economic philosophy, the Liberals had to look outside the country for inspiration. As a result of his sojourn in the United States, Brown

grew to dislike the unruly democracy practiced in the country to the south. His gaze naturally shifted back home and the coloration of his wing of the party soon took on the hue of the liberalism of Manchester. Cobden, Bright, Gladstone and John Stuart Mill were the political and intellectual heroes of Brown, his successor, Alexander Mackenzie, and the majority of Canadian Liberals. The holding of office and the necessity of meeting the demands of many interests clamoring for protection and government support watered down many of the party's ideological tendencies, particularly on the question of low tariffs. Serious attempts to implement the free trade aspects have invariably brought crisis to the party; the conditions of twentieth century industrial society have rendered a great section of the doctrine politically meaningless. Nevertheless, a nineteenth century English Liberal strain has remained with the party to this day.

18. The Globe of the 1850's made a point of featuring the question of Church and State in every election campaign. In 1861, the Grit platform was laid out in pyramid format:

NO RESERVES!

NO RECTORIES!

NO SECTARIAN SCHOOLS!

NO SECTARIAN MONEY GRANTS!

NO ECCLESIASTICAL CORPORATIONS!

NO RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES WHATEVER!

J.M.S. Careless, Op.Cit., 142.

19. Frank H. Underhill, "Some Aspects of Upper Canadian Radical Opinion in the Decade before Confederation," loc.cit., 44.
20. Ibid., 45.
21. Frank H. Underhill, "Political Ideas of the Upper Canada Reformers, 1867-78," loc.cit., 73.
22. Ibid., 72-74.

Aside from payments on provincial debts, annual grants to support provincial governments and legislatures and per capita grants, special grants have been allotted to the provinces by the federal government ever since Confederation for a wide variety of reasons. Some were given to justify legitimate claims; others in response to convenient grievances and pure political pressure. For example, as part of the Confederation agreement, New Brunswick received \$63,000 per year for ten years in order to balance the provincial budget. Nova Scotia agitated for better terms for joining Confederation in the late 1860's and received an increase in its debt allowance and over \$80,000 yearly for ten years. British Columbia received a grant of \$100,000 annually in perpetuity, nominally in compensation for land taken for the transcontinental railway but really in order to help the province meet its financial responsibilities. Saskatchewan and Alberta received huge grants in 1905 for entering

the Dominion ostensibly because the federal government retained the rights to the natural resources of the provinces. These rights were returned, however, and even then the payments continued. Finally, the Maritimes have, since 1932, received large additional subsidies as a result of long years of pressure, during which time the area asserted (and the claims are valid) that it was not sharing in the prosperity of the rest of the country. See R.M. Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), 122. This "bribery", as it has often been called, has been one of the permanent features of Canadian politics.

23. Sir Richard Cartwright, Reminiscences (Toronto: William Briggs, 1912), 120-127; and H.W. Ross, Getting into Parliament and After (Toronto: William Briggs, 1913), 130-133.
24. M.A. Ormsby, "Prime Minister Mackenzie, The Liberal Party and the Bargain with British Columbia," Canadian Historical Review, XXVI (June, 1945), 142-154.
25. Dale C. Thomson, Op. Cit., 226, 351.
26. Canadian Parliamentary Guide (Ottawa: Pierre G. Normandin, 1958), 664.
26. Canadian Parliamentary Guide (Ottawa: Pierre G. Normandin The 1958), 664.
28. J.M. Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 157-162.
29. J.S. Willison, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party, Vol. II (Toronto: George N. Morang, 1903), 254.
30. Frank H. Underhill, "The Development of National Political Parties in Canada," Loc. Cit., 39.
31. J.S. Willison, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 290-291.
32. The figures were obtained from Canadian Parliamentary Guide (Ottawa: Pierre G. Normandin, 1958), 423-427 and E.P. Dean, "How Canada has Voted: 1867-1945," Canadian Historical Review, XXX (September, 1949), 227-248.

The addition of the figures does not always give identical results because of changes in the allocation of seats among the various provinces.

The results in Nova Scotia during this period are especially noteworthy:

	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Conservatives</u>
<u>Election:</u> 1896	10	10
1900	15	5
1904	18	0
1908	12	6

33. The figures concerning the number of seats were obtained from Canadian Parliamentary Guide (Ottawa: Pierre G. Normandin, 1958), 423-427. The percentages from 1935 to 1949 are taken from H.F. Quinn, "The Role of the Liberal Party in Recent Canadian Politics", Political Science Quarterly, LXVIII (September, 1953), 399.

Addition of the seat figures will not always give identical totals because of changes in allocation of seats among the various provinces. As well, during this period, the number of seats in the House of Commons changed from 245 to 262 to its present 265-seat size.

34. This approach was first suggested in 1935 by Frank H. Underhill in his already-mentioned classic, "The Development of National Parties in Canada," Canadian Historical Review, XVI (December, 1935), 367-387 and was applied to the Macdonald and Laurier administrations. It is more fully developed in Steven Muller's "Massive Alternation in Canadian Politics," Foreign Affairs, XXXVI (July, 1958), 633-644. The terminology "massive alternation" is employed to emphasize the violent shifts of electoral disposition that accompany the accession of these new coalitions to national dominance. See also Donald V. Smiley, "The Two-Party System and One-Party Dominance in the Liberal Democratic State," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIV (August, 1958) 312-322.

Samuel Lubell has analyzed the course of American politics as follows:

"Thumbing back through history, we find relatively few periods when the major parties were closely competitive, with elections alternating between one and the other. The usual pattern has been that of a dominant majority party, which stayed in office as long as its elements held together, and a minority party which gained power only when the majority coalition split. Our political solar system, in short, has been characterized not only by two equally competing suns, but by a sun and a moon. It is within the majority party that the issues of any particular period are fought out; while the minority party shines in reflected radiance of the heat thus generated."

The Future of American Politics, Second Edition (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 212.

35. See V.O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics, XVII (September, 1955) 373-382. Key enumerates five elections which he considers crucial for the United States: 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, 1932.
36. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Year Book, 1948-1949 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1949), 658.
37. Frank H. Underhill, "The Party System in Canada," loc.cit., 167.

38. Mason Wade's The French Canadians, 1760-1945 (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1956), provides a complete political history of the province.

The social system of pre-1763 French Canada is analyzed in Leon Gerin, Aux Sources de Notre Histoire (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1946). Studies of modern Quebec include Miriam Chapin, Quebec Now (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955); Everett C. Hughes, French Canada in Transition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), and Horace Miner, St. Denis: A French-Canadian Parish (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939). See also Hubert Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXVI (November, 1960), 533-551.

39. See H. Blair Neatby and John T. Saywell, "Chapleau and the Conservative Party in Quebec," Canadian Historical Review, XXXVII (March, 1956), 1-22.
40. H. Blair Neatby, Laurier and a Liberal Quebec: A Study in Political Management, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto, Toronto, 1956, 71.
41. See W.R. Graham, "Arthur Meighen and the Conservative Party in Quebec: The Election of 1925," Canadian Historical Review, XXXVI (March, 1955), 17-35.
42. R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, A Political Biography, 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958* 366-373).
43. John Meisel, "Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behaviour: A Case Study," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXII (November, 1956), 481-496. The choice of the city of Kingston is a good one. Although its Catholic inhabitants constitute an important minority (25%), Kingston is an essentially Protestant community. With 85% of its population of British stock, only 5% are of French extraction. Thus, Meisel was able to remove the aspect of purely French Canadian allegiance to the Liberals at a time when St. Laurent was leader of the party.
- The following table reproduces some of the results of the study, Ibid., 486.
- (The figures ignore such factors as "intensity" and "closeness to the Church", which Meisel explores elsewhere in the paper.)

Voting Behavior by Religious Denominations, Kingston, Ont., 1953 (%)

<u>Denomination</u>	<u>Lib</u>	<u>Cons</u>	<u>CCF</u>	<u>Not Voting</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>No. in Sample</u>
Anglican	44	43	4	10	100	101
United	35	46	4	15	100	147
RC	83	2	3	13	100	101
Presbyterian	44	42	-	14	100	36
Others	39	39	5	17	100	57
All Denominations (1953 sample)	49	34	4	14	100	442*
(1953 elec- tion returns)	42	35	2	21	100	33,400

*Of the 450 interviewed, eight refused to reply.

44. Hugh G. Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 61-63, 107.
45. John Meisel, Op.Cit., 487. On the other hand, Catholic respondents made no reference whatsoever to religion.
46. Public Archives of Canada: (Unless stated otherwise, all private collections used are on deposit here, either in microfilm or in the original.) Cameron Papers: T.A. Crerar to A.K. Cameron, January 19, 1922.
 Thomas A. Crerar, leader of the Progressive Party and A. Kirk Cameron, a Montreal industrialist were in continuous correspondence throughout the period of the Progressive ascendance in the West. In this letter, Crerar reported to his friend on the state of opinion on the Prairies, deploring the injection of the "racial" and religious issue which he felt tended to cloud the real question of economics.
47. Examples similar to the following leaflet have occasionally cropped up during election campaigns:
 "You Protestant Liberals in Southern Saskatchewan better take stock of yourself as ROME is using you as sure as the Sun shines, as a means to an end, and I cannot fathom how you that are MASONS can uphold the present Liberal Machine which is without a doubt controlled by Bishop Mathieu of Regina. Better get wise to what 'Wee Jimmie' (Gardiner) is doing and give him the big 'Go-By' and ask your nominee J.P. Tripp, where he stands on the school question, would he or you like to have a black shirted 'she-cat' of a Nun teach your children in a public school that you are a heretic and that you and your wife are living in sin and your family are bastards, then when chastising your child to make it kiss the forbidden image, the crucifix ... Better

wake up before it is too late and we have a revolution, for as sure as you are alive, blood will be spilled if the Protestant people don't band together. If you believe in the faith of your fathers...you cannot vote Liberal in the next election. IT IS NOT to be GRIT or TORY but pure and simply, PROTESTANT VS. ROMANISTS.

MARK MY WORD"

Lapointe Papers: L.A. Taschereau to Ernest Lapointe, May 21, 1929. Taschereau, Liberal Premier of Quebec, forwarded the item to Lapointe suggesting that this would make good election fodder against the Conservatives.

48. H. Blair Neatby, Op.Cit., 70.
49. Mason Wade, Op.Cit., 479-481.
50. Quoted in O.D. Skelton, The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, II (New York: Century, 1922), 96.
51. Mason Wade, Op.Cit., 506.
52. Ibid., 867-877.
 Ever since the experience with Laurier, rabid French Canadian nationalist opinion has been wary of having a leader of French extraction at the head of the national parties (i.e. the Liberal Party). On the grounds that French Canadian interests are always compromised with a Laurier or a St. Laurent at the head of government, the preference instead is for an "English" leader, with a French Canadian second-in-command. This partner can advocate policies favorable to Quebec that a French prime minister would never dare to think of, since a French prime minister is by necessity always fearful of alienating support in English Canada and always bending over backward to appear "moderate". Thus, these nationalists claim, Canada can never have a truly French Canadian prime minister. The aphorism is as follows:
 "On peut avoir un Canadien Français premier ministre; on ne peut pas avoir un premier ministre Canadien Français."
53. See G.O. Rothney, "Nationalism in Quebec Politics since Laurier," Canadian Historical Association, Report of Annual Meeting, 1943, 43-49.
54. Mason Wade, Op.Cit., 1075.
55. Ibid., 1015.
56. Quebec's political morality, never conspicuously high, may well have reached a new low under Duplessis. The corruption of the Union Nationale regime extended to such niceties as 10%

"kickbacks" to party officials on government contracts, stock-jobbing by members of the government in Quebec Natural Gas shares and blunt reminders to the electorate by Duplessis himself that the only way in which a district could ever obtain much needed roads, schools, hospitals, etc., was by returning the Union Nationale candidate for the constituency in an election.

See Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIV (August, 1958), 297-311; also reports of the hearings of the Salvas Royal Commission appointed by the newly-elected Liberal provincial government in 1961 to investigate charges of corruption, The Gazette, Montreal, March 15, 1961, and ff., passim.

57. For an analysis of the election, see my "The Canadian General Election of 1958," Western Political Quarterly, XIII (June, 1960), 349-373.
58. On two separate occasions before 1957, Gordon Churchill, a member of the Conservative inner circle and MP for the constituency of Winnipeg South-Centre (at first Minister of Trade and Commerce and now Minister of Veterans Affairs in the Diefenbaker government) presented a closely reasoned tactical plan for his party to follow in the next election. His thesis was that, heretofore, the Conservative Party had wasted much time, effort and money in trying to break the Liberal hold on Quebec. Instead, went the argument, since it appeared that there was little the party could do about a solid Quebec, its efforts should be concentrated elsewhere, most notably in Ontario and the Maritimes. These were two areas in which the party was not cursed by past programs and attitudes (the West was supposed to have a built-in anti-Conservative bias because of the well-known Tory high tariff dispositions) and where there were deep-seated Tory voting traditions. Churchill claimed that concentration of effort and money here (the question of finances may have been paramount --- the Tories had not seen federal office for over two decades) might well result in the Conservatives being able to form a minority government. It is unnecessary to point out that the results of the 1957 election in which the Conservatives obtained 112 seats to the Liberal 104 imparted a definite oracular quality to Churchill's plan.
59. See Michael Oliver, "Quebec and Canadian Democracy," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIII (November, 1957), 504-515.
60. This section rests heavily on the following studies: S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950); C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953); D.E. McHenry, The Third Force in Canada: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-1948 (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1950); W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950); and S.G.C. Smith, Politics and the Party System in the Three Prairie Provinces, 1917-1958, Unpublished B.Litt Thesis, Oxford University, 1959.

61. S.M. Lipset, Op. Cit., 206.
62. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Year Book (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1921), 129.
63. Dafoe Papers: John W. Dafoe to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, November 5, 1912.
64. John W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton in Relation to his Times (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1931), 142.
65. Lewis G. Thomas, The Liberal Party in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 142.
66. L. Ethan Ellis, Reciprocity 1911 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 21; W.L. Morton, Op. Cit., 20. The volume by Ellis remains the best single study of this event.
67. O.D. Skelton, Op. Cit., 369.
68. Dafoe Papers: Dafoe to Clifford Sifton, July 21, 1919.
69. Cameron Papers: Excerpt from a copy of a press release prepared by A.K. Cameron for Crerar after a January, 1924 conference in Ottawa between Crerar and Mackenzie King.
70. Dafoe Papers: Dafoe to A.E. Zimmern, February 22, 1923.
71. W.L. Morton, Op. Cit., 92-93.
72. Dafoe Papers: Dafoe to Sifton, November 10, 1920.
73. Gouin quit ostensibly on grounds of ill health but really because of a strong disagreement with King over government fiscal policy. Gouin Papers: Gouin to King, December 13, 1923.
74. W.L. Morton, Op. Cit., 190.
Four protectionist Liberals voted against the government and another, Walter G. Mitchell, the representative of Montreal English business interests from the constituency of St. Antoine, resigned his seat in protest.
75. Ibid., 194-199.

76. Ibid., 35.
77. See D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950).
78. M.S. Donnelly, "Parliamentary Government in Manitoba," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIII (February, 1957), 29.
79. Ibid., 30.
80. See J.R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954).
81. Dennis Wrong's "The Pattern of Party Voting in Canada," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXI (Summer, 1957), 252-264, provides the most complete discussion of this topic.
82. F.H. Underhill, "Canadian Liberal Democracy in 1955," in In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1960), 227-242. See also his "Political Stagnation in Canada," Ibid., 254.
83. Steven Muller, Federalism and the Party System in Canada, paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, September 7, 1961.
84. See Howard A. Scarrow, "Federal-Provincial Voting Patterns in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXVI (May, 1960), 289-298.
85. See R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, second edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), 120. See also footnote #22 above.
86. While it is true that a Canadian Prime Minister, like his British counterpart, chooses his own cabinet, his freedom of maneuver is circumscribed not only by the usual factors influencing choices in the British situation but by indigenous Canadian ones as well. Regional, ethnic, religious and economic interests must be satisfied and the ground rules, although elaborate, have been rather well established by tradition and usage.
For a complete description of the factors influencing cabinet-making, see R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, second edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), 210-219.
87. This is an important point in Steven Muller's Federalism and the Party System in Canada, paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, September 7, 1961.

88. See, for example, Frank H. Underhill, "The Revival of Conservatism in North America," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, LII (June, 1958), 14-16.
89. R.M. Fowler, President, Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, Interview, Montreal, November 11, 1960. A close associate of present Liberal leader L.B. Pearson today, Mr. Fowler had served on the War-time Prices and Trade Board.
90. J.E. Hodgetts, "The Liberal and the Bureaucrat," Queen's Quarterly, LXII (Summer, 1955), 181-182.
91. Ibid., 176-183. Also, J.E. Hodgetts, "The Civil Service and Policy Formation," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIII (November, 1957), 472-473.
92. H.S. Ferns, "The New Course in Canadian Politics," Political Quarterly, XXIX (April-June, 1958), 118.
93. John Porter, "Political Parties and the Political Career," Canadian Forum, XXXVIII (June, 1958), 54.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., 55. Also see Porter's "The Economic Elite and the Social Structure in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIII (August, 1957), 376-394.
96. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Year Book (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), 218.
97. Hon. David Croll, Interview, Ottawa, December 14, 1960.
98. See The Montreal Star, May 9, 1962 - June 19, 1962, passim; also "The Canadian General Election of 1958," Western Political Quarterly, XIII (June, 1960), 349-373.
99. The figures are in J.R. Williams, Op. Cit., 188.

CHAPTER III: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY

"If a person wishes to enhance his political position, he must first seek parliamentary prestige."

- Hon. Walter E. Harris¹

* * * * *

In many respects, the following analysis of the organization of the Liberal Party is little more than an elaboration of statements made by Duverger regarding the domination of parliamentary representatives over the party. He points out that this domination is characteristic of a certain phase of party evolution and a special kind of social structure. Parliamentary domination is characteristic of "middle class" or "cadre" parties which are founded upon local caucuses and which are, at the same time, ideologically in the center of the political spectrum. The aim of their existence, their sole justification and their only form of activity constitute participation in elections and in the working of parliament. All their effort is concentrated upon insuring the election of as many members as possible to parliament and on participating in the affairs of the country through the intermediary of these members, whether they succeed in forming the government or merely sit on the

1. Footnotes to Chapter III appear on pp. 274-293.

opposition benches.

Duverger goes on to point out that it is therefore natural that the members of parliament should occupy positions of power in the party. Furthermore, there is no one to challenge them, except defeated candidates, or rivals for the candidature in the constituencies. There is no party hierarchy outside parliament able to oppose these members either because it would have no "constituency" to which it could appeal. There are no militants in "middle class" parties; the party supporters are too dependent upon elected representatives who have favors and advantages to dispense; and they are too filled with respect for parliamentary institutions. Moreover, the party organization is so rudimentary that no class of bureaucrats can arise to challenge the authority of the elected members.

There is also little danger of a gap in social class developing between the elected representative and his supporters when he gets to parliament as is often the case with socialist parties. In the latter, the elected member often "turns bourgeois" in relation to his "proletarian" support which naturally creates hostility. Even financial backers cannot exercise any permanent control upon the party's leaders. When they intervene, they generally do so on particular occasions with specific aims in view and perhaps succeed in diverting the energies of the party in a particular direction. But they cannot be considered as rivals to the parliamentary representatives because they do not attempt to replace them or to lead the party themselves.² Finally, if the members from the

constituencies can effectively dominate their supporters, they, in turn, are dominated by their parliamentary leadership as personified by the party leader and his close associates.

A study of the organization of the party also reveals the effect of the federal structure of the country upon party institutions and operations. While this is a study of national organization, it is impossible to overlook this factor, which has so many implications not only for organization but for policy-making as well.

This section attempts to illustrate the significant features of the organization of the party. The succeeding section will deal more fully with the leader and the means at his disposal for controlling his followers. In order to adequately describe the structure of the party, a brief history of national organization will be presented. This is necessary because the manner in which the party has organized has been in a continual process of change, with the last significant amendments having been made in January, 1961. It is possible to claim, even at this date, therefore, that the party remains unsettled as to the way it will finally organize. Following this historical account, the various component parts of the party will be examined for the period 1935-1961 and such subjects as the role of the "central office", the relationship between parliamentary party and the outside organization, the conducting of an election campaign, the place of the provincial parties and their relations with the federal party, and how the party finances itself will all be considered.

I

The Liberal Party as a national entity originated as a parliamentary party. The manner in which this occurred seems clear: Just after Confederation, the party was a parliamentary group. Local and constituency organizations in the country were established. In Duverger's terms, the Liberal Party began as an "internal" party³ which means that it will be inherently less centralized than one which had its origin outside the legislature. In addition, the parliamentary party will predominate over its supporters in the country.⁴ It is hardly necessary to emphasize that what formal "organization" of the party there was, was basically legislative and consisted of a leader and a parliamentary caucus.

This very condensed account does not mean to imply that there were no associations supporting Liberal or "Reform" candidates before any parliamentary organization was created. Certainly this was the case before Confederation in the province of Upper Canada. Furthermore, these brief remarks should not be construed as overlooking the fact of the federal structure of the country and that each province necessarily has its own Liberal Party, each developing in its own way and each having its own interests. Nevertheless, the direction of development was as outlined. In these early days, one of the most important functions of the party leadership was to tour the countryside in order to choose candidates for a forthcoming election. The sectional leaders were able to do this through personal contact with personalities in

the provincial parties and the local associations. While this was a tedious and strenuous process, it was possible because, although the territory that had to be covered was vast, the country's population was small enough to permit this form of communication. This task was not too menial for the leader himself as he was the most knowledgeable member of his party regarding conditions in his own area.⁵

Under Laurier's leadership, the first national convention of the post-Confederation period called by either of the two parties was held in 1893. Its aim was essentially to give Liberals from all parts of the country an opportunity to meet, see their relatively new leader, and take part in the formulation of policy. The Liberals had been out of office since 1878. There was, therefore, little danger of conflict between the members of the convention and the party leadership. However, in case of such an eventuality, Laurier and his lieutenants had the convention well in hand.⁶ At the time, there was still no formal organization of the party, nor was there a "central office". It is evident, however, that the party leadership realized that organization of some sort was a requirement. On the eve of the convention, Laurier addressed a gathering at the Ottawa Reform Club pointing out that all parties needed organization: "It...(is) not enough to have good principles; they must have organization also. Principles without organization may lose, but organization without principles may often win."⁷ Sir Richard Cartwright echoed these sentiments during the convention itself.⁸ These demands for organization were not

suggestions for a nation-wide machine, but rather simply were exhortations to all Liberals to return to their home areas and to work hard for the party in order that the next election might be won.

In 1896, Laurier led the party to victory. He did so on the strength of the provincial associations, led, for the most part, by in-office provincial leaders. This tendency toward provincial organization was reinforced by the party's provincial rights ideology which was the result, in part, of long opposition to the Conservatives who had spent most of the previous generation in power in Ottawa. With no organization geared to federal interests, Laurier called upon provincial party leaders to staff his cabinet. Three provincial premiers, Oliver Mowat (Ontario), W.S. Fielding (Nova Scotia) and Andrew G. Blair (New Brunswick), and three other high ranking provincial personalities, Louis H. Davies (Prince Edward Island), Henry Joly (Quebec) and Clifford Sifton (Manitoba) filled important cabinet posts. Joseph Israel Tarte, a renegade Conservative whose organizing ability and knowledge of Quebec helped deliver the province to the Liberals, was another important nominee.

As long as the Liberals succeeded in winning elections, there appeared to be no need for any permanent organization. The country was divided for this purpose on the basis of the cabinet.⁹ It is well to underline here that, as has already been pointed out, success in Canadian politics is dependent upon careful conciliation of the diverse elements in the country. One method of accomplishing

this is for the party leadership to be representative of the various groups and interests. Since the party leader cannot perform this function alone, he must choose those who will surround him with a view to fulfilling this representational requirement.

The cabinet is, therefore, an important representative device.

Accordingly, cabinet ministers are by necessity chosen on a representative basis and the fact that they may or may not possess administrative skills is sometimes overlooked in favor of the fact that they come from certain areas or represent special groups that must be given a voice in the cabinet. The ideal situation, of course, would have cabinet members fulfilling both requirements.

It is not surprising then, that there is an inherent logic in organizing the country on this basis. Individual ministers are responsible for specific areas. Sometimes these areas will consist of an entire province or even a group of provinces. Thus, Clifford Sifton was responsible for the entire Canadian west. Sometimes a minister's area will be outlined precisely as consisting of so many enumerated constituencies when a province, such as Quebec or Ontario with a large seat allotment in the House of Commons, has more than one of its members in the cabinet. The duties of the minister may not involve much more than seeing that every constituency entrusted to his care has an acceptable candidate (if there is no sitting member) to fight an election. He may, in the process of doing this, have to resolve factional feuds. He may also be involved in the distribution of funds and, although very indirectly, with their collection as well.

This system seems to operate reasonably well when the party is in power. The difficulties with it when the party is out of office and when it is possible that the party will have elected no one from an entire area, much less a province, are apparent. Defeat in an election seems to have operated as the most important force motivating attempts to institute a permanent form of organization for the party.

Successive defeats in the elections of 1911 and 1917 forced Laurier to reconsider the basis of party organization which had prevailed during the years in office. In the nine years of opposition, three projects were launched in order to strengthen the federal party: A Central Liberal Information Office was created in 1912; a National Liberal Advisory Committee was set up late in 1915, and a National Liberal Organization Committee with an Ottawa head office was constituted in 1920. All three ventures received their impetus from the party leadership and this was a characteristic that marked every one of the future developments regarding organization within the party.

The Central Information Office was created after the 1911 defeat in the Reciprocity fiasco. Through it, Laurier hoped to affect public opinion by disseminating party information via the medium of pamphlets and the Canadian Liberal Monthly, which began regular publication in 1914. After 1918, it appeared intermittently because funds were lacking. Throughout its life, the publication devoted itself to a denunciation of the Conservative government, highlighting patronage scandals and featuring the party's own policies. This Office was also supposed to cooperate with the

constituencies but was to in no "...way interfere with, or supercede the work of the local Liberal organizations in the various constituencies or provinces."¹⁰ A committee of five, Laurier, Sydney Fisher and Rodolphe Lemieux from Quebec, and Charles Murphy and Mackenzie King from Ontario (all ex-Cabinet ministers) supervised the operations of the office and in the editing of the major pamphlets cooperated with King who was its director. In spite of this supervision, there were many complaints from some high-ranking party M.P.s that some of the pamphlets misrepresented the party's stand on such matters as naval policy and imperial relations.¹¹

In December, 1915, Laurier, convinced that the aftermath of the War would bring about a new political and economic era in Canada, decided to call together "the best minds of the community" which would give "the most serious thought to our political and financial conditions and problems." The people best able to give such "serious thought" were convened in Ottawa in the party Caucus Room of the House of Commons and the National Liberal Advisory Committee was organized. Thirty-two leading Liberals, only four of whom were from the West, attended this founding meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting, Laurier's aims in setting up this body were two: He hoped that such a group would help bring greater unity among the various factions and provincial organizations and he expected that such a Committee composed of parliamentary and non-parliamentary people would provide a mechanism which would be representative of Liberalism across the country.¹²

The Committee was to consist of fifty-six members. The

country was divided into four areas, Ontario, Quebec, the Maritimes and the Prairies, and each of these areas had ten representatives. Each of the ten were broken down in different ways but they had this in common: Each area had three members selected from the parliamentary party (one of whom would be a senator); provincial leaders, either by themselves or in conjunction with their provincial associations, would select one; Laurier himself would select four members from Quebec and Ontario and two each from the Maritimes and the West. The leader had five more at-large candidates whom he could choose while the entire Committee could select ten others without reference to area. In short, parliamentary representation on the Committee was potentially more than half. Meanwhile, in the interim between then and the election following, after which, presumably, the proper selection of the Committee according to the rules laid down would be carried out, a Committee of fifty-six was constituted on the spot. Of these, at least thirty-two were members of either the Senate or the House. The rest were members of provincial legislatures or such well-known figures as Phillipe Paradis, the organizer for the Quebec City area; A.K. Cameron, Frank O. Fowler and P.C. Larkin, all close Laurier associates; and J.E. Atkinson, a heavy contributor to the party's war chest and the owner of the rabidly-Liberal Toronto Star.

The powers of the Committee were as follows: To promote the spread of Liberal education; to assist in shaping the policy of the party; and generally to promote efficiency in the party ranks.¹³

The Committee was scheduled to meet twice a year with special

meetings "when necessary". Nine separate sub-committees on such matters as Finance, Rural Credits, Welfare of Returning Soldiers, Social Reforms and Health legislation and Railway and Transportation problems were set up.

Almost immediately some members of the party objected to the Committee. In spite of its obviously tame character, they considered it an innovation and felt that "it would disturb existing political institutions and interfere with well-recognized practices while others felt that it would not be wise to change the status quo in the government and direction of the party."¹⁴ Although the sub-committees subsequently met and passed policy resolutions the following July, the National Advisory Committee never amounted to very much. Laurier had hoped that the Committee would be a useful device to prepare a series of resolutions which could then be presented to a national convention of the party¹⁵ which he had been thinking of calling since 1912. It was to remain dormant for the next fifteen years, only to be resuscitated with a slightly different name as one of the bodies of the National Liberal Federation which was set up in 1931.

Meanwhile, even the central office, geared as it was only for information and propaganda activities, was finding the going rough. By 1917, it was discovered that the office was \$15,000 in arrears. The Maritimes had not subscribed anything, the West had contributed only 1/3 of its quota of \$10,000 and both Quebec and Ontario had contributed but 1/2 of the \$20,000 they had each been assessed.¹⁶ However, what helped neutralize the effect of the Office was something more substantial than the absence of money:

The attitude of Quebec toward such a central organization had instinctively been one of wariness. This feeling was exacerbated by the 1917 Conscription crisis over which the Liberals were badly split. Accordingly, when Laurier wrote to Senator Raoul Dandurand asking that the Quebec section of the party remit its share of the operating expenses of the Central Office,¹⁷ Dandurand turned him down. This reply is quoted in full here because it is the best and most succinct statement of Quebec's position regarding a central organization and because this was the position of the province from that date until 1957 when the provincial Liberal Federation officially joined the National Party. Dandurand wrote that he, Pierre Beique and Marcellin Wilson (these were the most substantial contributors to the party from the province) had discussed the matter and had come to this conclusion about the office:

"Nous sommes toujours de même avis sur l'inutilité de cet établissement pour ce qui concerne notre province. Nous sommes aussi convaincus qu'il ne nous a rendu aucun service appréciable dans la plupart des autres provinces.

Nous croyons que chaque province doit avoir son organisation distincte.

Et puis, la situation de notre parti est telle que nous ne pouvons dire quels seront nos alliés de demain. Dans ces conditions nous croyons que nous devrions donner plutôt notre aide à notre bureau de Montréal qui nous rend des services réels. Si dans les autres provinces on est incapable d'en faire autant c'est qu'il n'y a rien à espérer d'ici à ce qu'il se produise un événement d'importance majeure. Nous ne saurons qu'après la guerre si le parti libéral anglais nous reviendra avec la presse anglaise. Ce n'est pas l'action du Central Liberal Inf. Office qui influencera sur ce retour...."

18

Laurier was forced to admit that the office was doing little for the province, although he felt that it had helped in the English

sectors of the country. He had to agree with Dandurand that "il faut mieux conserver vos ressources pour votre province."¹⁹

If the crisis in the party over Union Government and Con-
scription reinforced French convictions that they had better not
become too involved with any centralizing party schemes, the same
events convinced many who were so inclined to intensify their ef-
forts to establish at least some sort of permanent organization.
The impetus was given, as was to be the case in other organiza-
tional attempts during this period, by Charles Murphy. For example,
when Newton Rowell, leader of the Liberal opposition in the Onta-
rio legislature, joined Borden's Union government in 1917, this
left the party in the province without a leader and without an
organization. With Laurier's approval and encouragement, Murphy
arranged a plan of organization for the province which set up three
District Associations, headed by a province-wide association. By
May, 1918, Murphy was able to report:

"You will note that the above arrangement will pre-
vent any one, or two, or three men walking off with
the whole Liberal Party in Ontario, as happened dur-
ing the election in December last. Treachery cannot,
under the new plan, succeed, to any extent. In any
event, it will be localized, if it should exist, and
the general damage cannot be done, as was the case
last fall."
20

By 1920, these three districts had become six²¹ and the plan had tak-
en hold permanently, although it hardly did the party much good in
the 1917 election. This direct action by Murphy could not obvious-
ly be carried on elsewhere. With the three Liberal Premiers of the
prairie provinces all supporting Union Government, the federal Li-
berals were virtually helpless in trying to contest the 1917 election

in the area.

The death of Laurier early in 1919 led to the calling of a Convention to select his successor. D.D. McKenzie, the House Leader in the interim between Laurier's death and the selection of a new leader by the convention, appointed a twenty-three member National Convention Committee composed of three Senators, twelve Members of the House and the leaders of the party in eight of the nine provinces (William Martin of Saskatchewan was left out because of his strong support of Union Government). This was too scattered and unwieldy a Committee and, with no central organization in existence to take charge of arrangements, the responsibility for organizing the Convention devolved upon Charles Murphy with Andrew Haydon as his secretary. Murphy believed that "if Laurier had paid more attention to organization in 1911 and in 1917, he would have won the first election and rendered the second unnecessary."²² The Convention provided Murphy with an opportunity to indulge his interest in establishing a national organization.

A lengthy anonymous memorandum was circulated to the Convention outlining what were obviously Murphy's views: It pointed out that it was common knowledge that the party had never had any organization in Dominion affairs and had rarely had anything very substantial on the provincial level either. Any success at the polls, while usually associated in the public mind with organizational efficiency, was more likely the result of the popularity of the government or the weakness of the opposition.²³ The memorandum claimed that Laurier himself was of the opinion that one of the

major weaknesses of the party was that it had not had a coast-to-coast national organization. The value of such an organization would be threefold: "First, it would serve as a link between the leaders of the party and the rank and file in the country. Second, it would serve as a unifying force looking toward common action by all the different parts of the country. Third, it would enable the leaders to have a continuous organization that would not be subject to change because of the death of men here and there and because of defections."²⁴

Murphy's memorandum laid out the projected form of the new national Liberal organization and the Convention's political Organization Committee returned a report that echoed every one of its suggestions. The Committee recommended that a National Liberal Organization Committee together with a National Head Office located in Ottawa be set up. The Committee, the governing body of the party, would be composed of the following: A national president "who shall be the Leader of the Liberal Party"; nine vice-presidents, one from each province, to be named by the Liberal Association of each province (In the case of any province in which there was no Provincial Liberal Association, the Liberal Premier or Leader of the Opposition would nominate the vice-president); and a National Council of fifty-four, six from each province, broken down so that one of the members of the Council would be the Provincial Liberal Premier or Leader of the Opposition or his nominee and five others (to be selected by the Liberal Association for the Province where one existed or by the Liberal Members of the House of Commons in a province where there

was no Liberal Association). The members of the Council in each province were to constitute the finance committee for their province. Finally, the Committee was to select a National Organizer who would be in charge of the party head office located in Ottawa.²⁵

The Committee report failed to mention any of the powers, duties or functions of the National Liberal Organization Committee except that it would appoint the National Organizer. It stated, however, that the functions of the Central Office were two: Publicity and Organization.

In moving the resolution to the gathering, the Chairman of the Convention Committee on Party Organization, J.R. Boyle, undertook to outline some of the duties of the party's Central Office and in so doing reflected the basic problem confronting all attempts to organize the party: How to reconcile the necessity of central direction with the political reality of provincial autonomy. In explaining the organizational functions, Boyle stated that it would be the duty of the head office to see that every province was thoroughly organized and that when the election writs were issued, the party would be ready and "under unified command that will bring about success." However, in the next breath, the chairman continued: "It is not the intention of the Committee to interfere at all with the particular scheme of organization established in any individual province. Each province has its own peculiar conditions and must have a scheme of organization to fit those conditions..."²⁶ These remarks paraphrased the reassuring remarks in the Murphy memorandum to the

effect that the Head Office would not supplant or interfere with the organizational work of any province or any parts of any province.

This attempt to have things both ways is not especially noteworthy in this context. None of the convention delegates raised any points of issue with the resolution of the organization committee and the new organizational structure of the party was unanimously passed without a single word of debate.

A few months later, in December, 1919 in Ottawa, the National Liberal Organization Committee was set up. An Executive Council was named and Andrew Haydon was appointed National Organizer of the party (his title was Executive Secretary). The Committee appears to have played little part in party affairs in the subsequent decade, however. The success of the party in the 1921 elections in which it won enough seats to form a minority government ended the possibility of establishing a functioning machinery for organizational purposes. Upon its assumption of office, the party reverted to its former practice of the Laurier days of assigning organizational responsibility to cabinet ministers from the various areas of the country.

It is not as simple to list organization responsibility minister-by-minister for the King cabinets of the 1920's as it was for the Laurier era because this first decade of King's leadership was one of flux both in terms of party allegiances in the country and in terms of internal arrangements within the party itself. For example, the West was really in the hands of party provincial leaders such as C.A. Dunning of Saskatchewan

or out of reach of the party because of the Progressive sweep. Certainly, it would be stretching a point to claim that W.R. Motherwell, the new Minister of Agriculture from Saskatchewan, was responsible for maintaining the party's forces in his area. Furthermore, when King formed his first government in 1921, he was saddled with some of Laurier's "old men", such as W.S. Fielding and George P. Graham, some old warriors such as D.D. McKenzie (Leader of the Party in the House in the interim between the death of Laurier and the selection of King in the 1919 Convention), and others who had to be recognized because they had remained faithful to Laurier in 1917, such as Charles Murphy, and finally such individuals as Sir Lomer Gouin, the ex-Premier of Quebec who was the representative of the conservative wing of the Quebec party, all of whom had claims to consideration for cabinet seats that could not be refused. King had little faith in some of these men, especially Gouin, and barely tolerated others. To maintain flexibility so that younger men could be brought in, he took the unusual precaution of extracting written promises from five Ministers (McKenzie, J.A. Robb, A.B. Copp, Graham and Motherwell) that they would resign whenever he thought necessary if any changes were desirable.²⁷ It was only towards the end of his second administration that the personnel of the cabinet became set.

As for the Central Office, it was especially active during the 1921 election campaign, pouring out a considerable amount of propaganda material. This role was repeated in 1925. However, the Office was seriously hampered in its operations between elections because of the absence of funds. At one of the first meetings of

the Executive Council, it was decided that every constituency would contribute the sum of \$250 a year toward the maintenance of the office.²⁸ Few constituencies fulfilled this obligation and the financial basis of the office continued to be haphazard. By 1926, the staff of the office consisted of an underpaid secretary who spent most of her time working in the Prime Minister's office.²⁹ At the end of that year, Murphy, who was in charge of paying the rent, locked the office premises up. One year later, he aptly summed up the experiment of a Central Office when he remarked to Haydon, "I know of no reason why either you or I should continue to make any further payments when nobody else connected with the Liberal Party takes the slightest interest in the place."³⁰

The absence of machinery for communication within the party during the 1920's did not prevent Prime Minister Mackenzie King from keeping in touch with conditions in the country. Andrew Haydon was his instrument for this purpose. Haydon travelled across the country almost every year, submitting lengthy reports, recording conversations with provincial Liberals and reporting about the state of organization in the various areas. He appears to have had King's complete confidence³¹ and might be seen as an ambassador from the Liberal government in Ottawa to the provincial Liberal parties and to provincial governments. Throughout this period, he was especially useful in the negotiations preparatory to bringing western Progressive Party members into the federal cabinet. This was one of King's major objectives from the moment it became obvious that, by virtue of his party's success in the 1921 election, he would be called upon to form a government.

In effect, "under Andrew Haydon, organization was a one-man thing."³² This was possible in that era because, in spite of the size of the country, personal contact still was the prevalent basis of communication. Haydon's experience and personal ties together with the trust placed in him, not only by his leader but also by the people of the various party organizations and governments across the country, sufficed in providing King and the party with the organizational link they required. While providing the Prime Minister with knowledge of political conditions, this system had the added advantage of leaving him and his supporters in the House with the freedom of action which he seems to have desired. To King, this freedom of action must have been especially appreciated. It gave him considerable scope to bargain with the Progressives and left him relatively immune to any objections to this activity which might have come from regular party organizations in the country. Criticism of this origin would have had some legitimacy and may have required a great deal of public discussion. There were, of course, many objections emanating from other sources such as the parliamentary party and (for example) the business community. However, these could be dealt with behind closed doors by King personally, either in caucus or in face-to-face confrontation.

The Conservative victory in the 1930 election, under R.B. Bennett, ended nine years of almost continuous Liberal rule. Now out of office, the Liberals were forced once again to reconsider the character of their organization. Furthermore, by 1931, the party was in power in only one of the nine provinces --- Quebec.

Finally, the scandal over the Beauharnois Power Corporations's alleged attempts to influence the Liberal government's policies with regard to the diversion of water in the St. Lawrence River and the Corporation's donation of \$700,000 to the Liberal campaign fund in 1930 underlined the existence of a real crisis in organization for the party.³³ It was obvious to many Liberals, Vincent Massey in particular, that the party could not continue in its accustomed manner much longer.

In November, 1931 a National Liberal Organization Committee meeting was held in Ottawa at the call of Mackenzie King.³⁴ Plans were laid for a temporary National Liberal Association with Senator (as of 1923) Andrew Haydon as Chairman. A capital fund of fifty thousand dollars was projected by levying quotas on the provinces based on the number of constituencies represented in the House of Commons. During the next year, this temporary Association began its operations, establishing a Central Office in Ottawa.

The following year, on November 25 and 26, the founding meeting of what was to be known as the National Liberal Federation was held. Andrew Haydon had died in the interim and Vincent Massey was appointed President of the new organization with Norman P. Lambert as Secretary. At this meeting, the structure of the Federation was laid out by Angus L. Macdonald (soon to be Premier of Nova Scotia), Chairman of the Committee appointed for this purpose.

The Organization Committee's Report recommended the formation of a National Liberal Federation to be composed of the Liberal

Associations and organizations of each province. It outlined the various executive positions, executive bodies and affiliated organizations.³⁵ These will be briefly listed here because, except for a few additions and changes of name, this first proposal was to remain more or less the blueprint for the structure of the Federation.

The Federation was to have an Executive, a General Committee (its name was changed to Advisory Council in 1936) and an Executive Committee which was to supervise a Central Office in Ottawa. The Twentieth Century Liberal Association (the Young Liberals of subsequent years) and the National Federation of Liberal Women also became part of the National Federation. In 1947, a third organization, the Canadian University Liberal Federation, was added.

The structure and functions of the National Liberal Federation are examined in greater detail later in this section. At this point, it may be noted that from its inception, the Federation was hampered by a lack of funds and by some confusion within the party regarding its role. In practice, it immediately became a central clearing house, coordinating organizational activities of the various provincial associations for federal purposes, especially with regard to the 1935 campaign. It also acted as a center for the dissemination of information and propaganda to individual Liberals in the country. All this work was carried out under the supervision of General Secretary Norman Lambert.

The organizational clearing house function became unnecessary after the Liberals swept to victory in the 1935 election.

Henceforth (until 1957 when the party was finally beaten) the party resumed its practice of assigning organizational responsibility to the various cabinet ministers as it had done when in power in the past. From then on, the National Liberal Federation through its Central Office was a publicity instrument for the government, with Lambert, appointed to the Senate in 1937 (as his predecessor Haydon had been in 1923), serving Mackenzie King in the role of national trouble-shooter and envoy.

In 1940, the activities of the Federation were halted and the Ottawa offices closed when Mackenzie King called a "political truce" to endure while the country was at war. The Federation was reactivated in September, 1943 however, when the Advisory Council together with the parliamentary caucus met in Ottawa to help the government formulate a policy for the post-war period. The impetus to this renewal of activity came from the political situation in the country which showed the forces of the opposition, especially those on the left, gaining considerable popular approval. The results of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion poll for August of that year showed the standing of the parties to be: CCF 28%; Liberals 27%; Conservatives 27%; and Others 18%. The popularity of the government had fallen from its 1941 high of 55%, as estimated by the Gallup Poll, to a point where the party no longer commanded even a plurality in public support.

A number of resolutions passed at that September, 1943 Advisory Council meeting were incorporated into the 1944 Speech from the Throne. Thereafter, until 1957, the Advisory Council met eight times, never again approaching the degree of importance it had

achieved in 1943. Meanwhile, the functions of the Central Office and the Federation seldom deviated from those of propaganda and information. This situation persisted through the change of leadership from King to St. Laurent in 1948. However, in spite of the fact that the control by cabinet ministers and the domination of the parliamentary party seemed everywhere evident in the affairs of the party, the defeat of 1957 brought forth cries from many of the rank-and-file that the Federation and the Central Office had failed in their organizational tasks. It was, nevertheless, true that the stunning upset of that year left the party with virtually no organization wherever their candidates had been defeated. The Federation was unable to establish new lines of communication in the short space of nine months that elapsed between that election and the 1958 debacle. With nine cabinet ministers having been defeated in 1957, the campaign was fought from a small room in the Federation Offices in Ottawa manned by two men: Senator John J. Connolly, who was in charge of English Canada and the general campaign and Senator Charles G. Power, who handled matters in Quebec. In summing up the experience, Senator Connolly had this to say:

"There was NO organization. I would refuse to have anything to do with another election campaign if we had to fight it the same way that we did in 1958." 36

With the Liberal contingent in the House reduced to its lowest point in this century, pressures from many sources within the party for a permanent organization naturally became intense. Three different committees met during the 1958-1961 period and various organizational forms within the framework of the National Liberal

Federation were proposed. Finally, at the 1961 Advisory Council Meeting, a set-up differing in some detail with the previous structure was proposed and adopted with little debate.

The remainder of this section will deal specifically with the structure of the Liberal Party, its methods of operation, and some of the problems inherent in them. The analysis is based upon the experience of the party since 1935. The dangers of this approach are apparent. The party was in office for twenty-two years during this period and this means that statements made in connection with this time will not be completely applicable to the post-1957 period. In order to redress the balance in some way, some attention will be paid to organizational developments which have occurred during the years of opposition from 1957 to 1961.

II

In analyzing the structure of Canadian parties, MacGregor Dawson claimed that

"the provincial association is the effective head of the party organization in Canada. There is...a national organization also, but this is essentially no more than a federation of autonomous provincial bodies. Poll, village or town or municipality or ward, riding, region or district, and province --- these comprise the party building proper and the Dominion organization forms a tower or superstructure, which is by no means useless but could probably be removed without any serious impairment to party activity or efficiency on most matters. The party as a Dominion organization can have contact with the voter only through the province and at other lower levels."

37

Except for the Newfoundland party which maintains only a central office in St. John's, all the provincial parties have constituency-

based associations (both federal and provincial where there is a difference in boundaries) with provincial executive officers, executive committee, central offices, and Annual Meetings and (with the exception of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island) provincial leadership conventions. As a rule, membership in these provincial associations is accorded to Senators and MPs from the province; members of the provincial assembly; candidates who have been defeated in the most recent federal and provincial elections; officers of the constituency associations; officers and members of the Women's Liberals, the Young Liberals and University Liberals; and, occasionally, "all those persons...who adhere to the principles of the Liberal Party"³⁸ in the province. Some of the provincial associations can trace their origins to the Confederation era. Others are decidedly more recent: Quebec waited until 1955 before instituting this pattern to replace a straight caucus-type organization. Prince Edward Island did not do so until 1952, and, as mentioned above, continues to select its leader in the legislative caucus rather than by a convention in which all the units of the party are represented. These provincial associations are joined for national purposes in the National Liberal Federation and thus the organization of the party theoretically conforms to the federal structure of the country.

Nevertheless, Dawson's statement is only partially accurate. With a Liberal Party in operation in each province, it is true that the formal line of communication is from Ottawa through the individual provincial headquarters to the constituencies. However, that this is a formal line cannot be overemphasized because the

party's structure and the relations among its various components can be complex for several reasons: In the first place, as the preceding remarks have indicated, there is considerable variation according to the success or failure of the party to win elections. Secondly, the pressures of federal politics mean that ten provinces will have indigenous Liberal parties, each with special interests. Thirdly, there has been some disagreement within the party as to what the functions of the body entitled "National Liberal Federation" should be. As well, the units of the Federation along with the membership have undergone considerable change throughout its existence and in 1961 a constitutional revision was enacted which theoretically alters much of the significance of the statements made here about the practices of the party during the twenty-two years of power. It is, of course, possible that the following analysis of the organization of the party in power may be of little more than historical interest because of these changes.

Finally, the use of the device of the Convention as an instrument for choosing a national leader is another complicating factor. This is especially true because conventions are not called regularly but only when a new leader must be chosen. However, while in the process of sitting, the Convention always attempts to deal with matters of organization and policy. The status of decisions arrived at by the Convention in connection with these two subjects is unclear although past experience indicates that circumstances and the leader's dispositions about specific issues determine the amount of importance attached to the deliberations of the Convention by the parliamentary party.


The diagram on the following page portrays the actual, as opposed to the constitutional, structure of the party during most of the period since 1935. A second diagram picturing the new structure of the party as a result of changes made in 1961 accompanies the analysis of the post-1957 period.

Although some attempt has been made to separate the operating methods of the period of power from those of the recent years of opposition, this separation is not strictly maintained in describing the practices within some of the components of the party. Occasionally, the description lapses into the present tense because, in spite of the 1961 changes, the practices of the party have not altered, nor do they appear to be about to do so.

1. The Party in Parliament and the Cabinet

A description of the organization of the entire party, much less the parliamentary party, should begin with a discussion of the role of the leader. However, since the Liberal Party operates within the context of a parliamentary system in which the party has more often than not held a majority of the legislative seats, the role of the leader is almost by definition so important that the entire following section of this study is devoted to the subject of his selection and a systematic account of the manner in which he exerts his control. It is sufficient to point out here that he is the dominant focus of authority and decision-making and the operation of party institutions in parliament (and in the country) serves to enhance rather than to diminish his powers. A

THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY
(In Power - c. 1955)



fuller discussion of the parliamentary party in its relations with the leader is also relegated to the next chapter. It is outlined here in order to present as complete a description of the structure and operations of the party as possible.

The members of the Cabinet are, of course, next to the leader in importance. The manner in which they are chosen and why some are selected while others with perhaps equal claims are overlooked are subjects worthy of a special study in themselves. Some of the more important features of the cabinet for organizational purposes have already been outlined. One or two points are worth emphasizing.

Cabinet ministers, Conservative and Liberal alike, are chosen not only for the administrative skills they may possess but also because they are representative of areas and provinces, economic interests and ethnic and religious groups. In making his selections, the Prime Minister attempts to satisfy as many of the claims for representation as possible thereby presenting to the country an image of his party as a "national" one. In winning elections, the Liberals have been fortunate enough to have had successful candidates from most of the areas and groups that have been traditionally represented in the cabinet. In the absence of a successful candidate who can represent some important group or area which must be represented, the party has been able to co-opt personalities from provincial politics or private life to serve instead.

It is difficult to ascertain the extent and level of coordination of ministerial organization responsibilities for this is a subject about which cabinet ministers are vague if not entirely

tight-lipped. There is some evidence of high-level and semi-permanent coordination by a cabinet sub-committee on organization.³⁹ However, it is apparent that sustained coordination was the exception rather than the rule⁴⁰ and, especially in the final years of the St. Laurent regime, the control some ministers maintained in their areas of the country approached that of a feudal lordship. The specific constituency responsibilities of individual cabinet ministers are discussed in the following section.

When the party is in opposition, there appears to be no special tradition attached to a "shadow cabinet" appointed by the leader or the parliamentary caucus. However, the party has been in opposition so little in the last fifty years that there is little which can be stated with certainty on this subject. Seated on the opposition front benches on the leader's right and left are those members of the House who served as ministers in the cabinet when the party last formed the government. Occasionally, the leader will promote to the front ranks a promising back-bencher or someone who had served as a parliamentary assistant when the party was in office. The departmental subjects with which each of these opposition front-benchers are to deal are apportioned more by agreement than by the leader's fiat. Usually, a member of this parliamentary "shadow cabinet" will be concerned with more than one subject because there are naturally fewer members with potential cabinet ability now with the party in opposition.

It would be inaccurate to claim that the few members of the opposition front-bench comprise the entire "shadow cabinet".

Many potential cabinet ministers are out of parliament, engaged in non-parliamentary pursuits. An accountant and a corporation executive from Toronto, a Montreal businessman, a Vancouver lawyer, an ex-editor of a large mid-western metropolitan newspaper, all these will be in constant close touch with the leader and are recognized by both the general public and party members alike as likely material for the cabinet and, for the time being, as members of the party's inner circle.

The party in parliament is informally organized. The members of both Houses, the Senate and Commons, have their own individual caucuses which meet separately or together. The usual practice is to hold separate caucus meetings weekly, with a joint meeting of the two caucuses every two weeks. This is not fixed practice, however, because there is no regular meeting date. It is the party leader who decides when the caucus will meet.

The chairman of the parliamentary caucus is invariably a member of the House of Commons which reflects the predominance of the House over the Senate. The caucuses of both Houses have their own chairmen and all three are chosen by their respective caucuses.

Generally, the caucus is an open-ended affair, meeting at ten in the morning and continuing until everyone has had their say. An agenda is hardly ever used except on special occasions when the leader wishes specific matters discussed or intends to introduce a new policy. It never meets without the leader or, in his absence, without someone whom he has delegated to represent him. This is true whether the party is in power or in opposition.

If the party had enough members distributed across the country, there would be a caucus and a whip for each of the sections. The different sections meet separately to discuss common problems and it is theoretically possible for the party to have ten such caucuses. However, the West, Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes are the traditional geographic divisions of the country and these areas are the ones which caucus individually. In the period 1958-1962 the party had no representation west of the Great Lakes. There was therefore no western caucus and members of the party from other sections of the country were supposed to represent this area as well as their own. It must be underlined that these sectional caucuses are even more informal than the House caucus with the Quebec caucus being slightly more significant than any of the others.

Aside from the caucus, contact between the leader and his followers is continuously maintained through the Chief Whip who is appointed by the leader. The Chief Whip in turn operates through the provincial or sectional whips. He keeps in close contact with the leader's office; arranges for membership in the various House committees; keeps check on party attendance in the House; distributes the work of the House among the members; and also works in cooperation with the other party whips. In order to carry out his duties, the Chief Whip is seated direction behind the leader in the House and confers with him several times each week. Two facts are especially noteworthy about the position: The Whip does not have the intimate connection with a Central Office that

is the case with his counterparts in the Conservative and Liberal parties in Great Britain. Secondly, when the Liberals were in office, he was not concerned with patronage matters as is the Chief Whip in the British Conservative Party. In this crucial matter, the cabinet ministers were supreme and patronage was handled by them through the individual M.P.s and defeated candidates in the constituencies.

As far as the Senate is concerned, there is little here of significance to the functioning of the party. The party in power in the House is the government in the Senate in spite of the fact that the opposition may have more members in the Upper House. The position of whip is honorary and only ornamental and it is the Senate government leader who sits in the cabinet who is the effective point of contact between the party's Senators and their leader. Out of office, the whip, individual personal contact and the joint caucus keep Senators in touch.

The importance of the Senate for party purposes is not in the formal role it plays in the structure of the party (or even in government), but in its informal functions. A seat in the Senate is a useful patronage device by means of which a leader can reward a faithful follower. Aside from this, the Senate is really important only because some of its members are. Some of the largest contributors of party funds have been Senators; five presidents of the National Liberal Federation have been members of that body as well. Finally, the Senate can be an ideal place for party organizers because it provides them with a decent salary thus freeing them from the problem of earning a living while carrying out

their duties.

2. The Constituencies

It would be futile to attempt to describe constituency organization in anything but the broadest of terms. As has already been pointed out, with the party in power, the organization has basically been parliamentary in the sense that cabinet ministers have organizational responsibilities and private members are the people dealing directly with their constituencies. When the party is out of office, "cabinet responsibility" for organization is no longer possible. There are not enough ex-Cabinet Ministers in parliament, and, even if there were, they no longer possess the power, prestige, and personal influence that they had when they formed the government. The "shadow cabinet" members in the country (the non-parliamentary notables) do not have much influence either. While they may be recognized as important personalities, they themselves are engaged in trying to find constituencies in which to run in the next election. In these circumstances, the provincial associations assume many organizational duties.

These remarks concerning constituency organization overlook the problem of the intermeshing of "provincial" and "national" parties. With the Liberal Party a going concern in all ten provinces, this mixing is inevitable, and the extent of cooperation and collaboration between federal ministers and M.P.s and provincial organizations is often extensive. On the other hand, in some provinces, separate provincial and federal organizations have to be set up

because of personality conflicts or policy differences. This subject has so many implications that it is discussed under a separate heading at the end of this chapter.

The breakdown of the country for organizational purposes among cabinet ministers corresponded to the regions from which the ministers came or to the constituencies or areas containing the groups which the ministers supposedly represented. In recent times, each of the four Atlantic Provinces (with the periodic exception of Prince Edward Island) has had at least one cabinet minister and the division of responsibility was on a provincial basis. In Quebec and Ontario, matters are more complicated because each of the provinces can at one time have as many as six representatives on the front benches.

Quebec was split into an eastern and a western section by an imaginary line running north-south through the town of Three Rivers. Twenty-eight constituencies to the East were administered from a Quebec City office and received the watchful attention of a minister from the area. Although both Ernest Lapointe and Louis St. Laurent sat for the constituency of Quebec East, their administrative and general responsibilities were so extensive that this chore was in the hands of C.G. Power, who served in King's cabinet until 1944, but who continued in his role as organizer even after his departure. Both Lapointe and St. Laurent acted as the final authority in the province in virtually all matters, although they both disliked dealing with organizational problems. In 1955, upon Power's appointment to the Senate, his duties were assumed by two

men: Ernest Lapointe's son, Hugues, Minister of Veterans' Affairs and then Postmaster General; and Maurice Bourget, the member from Lévis and the Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Public Works.

The thirty-seven (now 47 with the increase of the province's seat total from 65 to 75) western constituencies of the province were administered from a Montreal office and, except for six English-speaking constituencies on the Island of Montreal, were at first the responsibility of P.-J.-A. Cardin, King's Minister of Public Works who left the cabinet in 1942 in the first phase of the conscription crisis. He was replaced by two men: Alphonse Fournier, Minister of Public Works from 1942 until 1953; and Ernest Bertrand, Minister of Fisheries and then Postmaster General from 1942 until 1949 when he was elevated to the bench as was Fournier in 1953. They in turn were succeeded by another duo: Alcide Côté and Roch Pinard, Postmaster General and Secretary of State, respectively. The Montreal English constituencies were initially under Brooke Claxton who served first as Minister of Health and Welfare and then at the head of the Department of National Defence. He left the cabinet in 1954 and was succeeded in his organizational role by George Marler, who served out the rest of the term of the St. Laurent government as Minister of Transport.

These organizational duties were obviously not as clearly defined as all this. For example, the Quebec City office was for a long time under the management of Wilfrid Hamel, the Mayor of Quebec City. He was followed by Maurice Bourget, MP for Lévis. In

Montreal, Senator Elie Beauregard was in charge of the office and was succeeded by Jacques Vadeboncoeur, who held no elective office whatsoever. The present organizer, René Lagarde, holds no elective office either.

There was no neat line separating constituencies in Ontario and the interests of brevity demand that the breakdown of ministerial organizational responsibility be confined to the decade of the 1950's. The eighty-five Ontario constituencies were divided among the Ontario Ministers as follows: Twelve constituencies in north-western Ontario bounded on the West by Kenora-Rainy River and on the east by Parry Sound-Muskoka were under the thumb of C.D. Howe; Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare, was in charge of six constituencies in the area around Windsor; Toronto was the joint responsibility of Howe and Walter Harris, who was at first Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and then Minister of Finance from 1950 until 1957 although there is no doubt that Howe was definitely the senior of the two in the city. Minister of National Revenue James J. McCann controlled the constituencies of Renfrew North, Renfrew South and Lanark, and the rest of the province was effectively in Harris' charge. Some regions of the province, such as nine constituencies in south-central Ontario in an area bounded by the ridings of Kingston, Ontario, Victoria and Hastings-Frontenac were left to him as the result of another Minister's absence. This region was originally Lester Pearson's responsibility but the duties of the Department of External Affairs forced him to be away from the

country frequently and for extended periods. In other areas, such as eastern Ontario, Harris operated with the assistance of other members of the House (and Senator William Fraser) from the province. Finally, in ten constituencies surrounding his own of Grey-Bruce in middle and western Ontario, he alone was in charge.

The organizational responsibilities in Western Canada were distributed among three ministers by province. Minister of Justice Stuart Garson, Agriculture Minister James G. Gardiner, and Minister of Mines and Technical Survey George Prudham were in charge of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta respectively. British Columbia was in the hands of Fisheries Minister James Sinclair and Ralph Campney, who was Solicitor-General and then Minister of National Defence. Campney was responsible for the Vancouver constituencies while Sinclair dealt with the rest of the province.

There are no local party agents appointed, trained and paid by any national Central Office in any of the constituencies. As a general rule, the provincial offices are not equipped for this type of operation either although while the party was in power in Saskatchewan from 1905 until 1929 an elaborate organizational system was set up. Each constituency had its own organizer who kept the provincial organizer in constant touch with goings-on in his area. As an adjunct to this, the party used the provincial civil service which was recruited purely on the basis of party affiliation (particularly the highway supervisors, sanitary inspectors, and liquor store managers) as important sources

of information regarding political activity and general public attitude. In turn, this information was relayed to the constituencies which made good use of it in the election campaign.⁴¹

In spite of such examples, it can safely be stated that most constituency operations are dormant between elections. In some rural constituencies, such as the Yukon with an area of over 700,000 square miles and others such as Meadow Lake and Prince Albert in Saskatchewan, Cochrane, Kenora-Rainy River and Port Arthur in Ontario and Chapleau and Saguenay in Quebec, elaborate organizational efforts are impossible and the absence of constant activity is understandable.⁴² On the other hand, some urban constituencies in Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg do not include much more than a few city blocks. These urban constituencies are nevertheless not especially noted for their active associations and the rule seems to be that the rural constituencies are the scenes of considerably more activity than the urban ones.

The above remarks do not mean that no organizations exist. Some consist of no more than a collection of people who are known in the constituency as Liberals and are often dominated by local elected officials such as the mayor of a town, a reeve or a city councillor. Others are well-organized down to the poll level with a membership of over 1000 paying yearly dues, holding annual meetings or dinners and keeping the constituency and its elected member under constant surveillance. When the party was in power, virtually all the constituencies had one person, elected or

appointed, who was in charge of patronage.

The results obtained by the mailed questionnaire reveal the looseness of rank-and-file activity in the constituency that generally prevails across the country. Only 19% of the Liberal respondents said they paid yearly dues and only 22% had membership cards. These figures are only slightly higher in the Conservative Party while, as might be expected, 67% of CCF supporters said they paid annual dues and 73% had membership cards.⁴³ The extent of activity for Liberals consists of little more than going to meetings and talking to friends. While 69% of the sample claimed that they attended party meetings "sometimes" or "often", only 5% engaged in canvassing or similar organization work.⁴⁴

With many constituencies having a tradition of one-party allegiance, the member is often re-elected several times and it is not uncommon for a constituency to have the same MP for two decades running. In such circumstances, the constituency organization tends to consist of little more than the personal following of the member although this is not always the case. From the point of view of efficiency, however, it is often these personal organizations that function best in insuring that their constituencies maintain their Liberal allegiance. From the scanty material available on the subject in personal papers in the Public Archives (and from personal observation), some of the members of parliament⁴⁵ kept elaborate, up-to-date lists of every voter in their respective ridings together with their voting records not only in federal but in provincial and municipal elections as well. At election time

many such M.P.s could depend upon an entire ladies auxiliary to handle clerical duties, some dependable and close supporters to man the constituency headquarters and, in more recent times, at least seventy-five supporters with cars to transport voters to the polls on election day. Of course, such efficiency is not necessarily an exclusive feature of these personal organizations. Constituencies in which relatively democratic processes prevail may achieve similar organizational efficiency. On the other hand, many MP-directed constituencies tend to have no organization at all and whenever an election campaign must be fought, the member in question must call upon his personal acquaintances, relying upon friendship to bring them out to help. For example, one such M.P. was recently forced to send out the following letter to friends both in his constituency and scattered over a wider area as well:

"As an old friend I again turn to you for help in the forthcoming federal election. In the past you were most helpful and I hope I will enjoy the benefit of your continued friendship once more.

The natural shifting of population has considerably altered the complexion of my constituency. This may require an increased effort in organization --- more so at this time than ever before --- and I would genuinely appreciate it if you would be at my side when the time comes. I urgently need and anxiously look forward to your support." 46

In short, the success or failure of the constituency organization depends far more upon such intangibles as the personal qualities and enthusiasm of the local people than upon organizational procedures.

The variation in the organization and customs of the constituencies across the country is best demonstrated by the

different practices connected with the selection of candidates for national elections. Ideally, nominating conventions are held. These may be public gatherings to which all are welcome and in which all may participate; they may be open only to party supporters; or, in very rare instances, the polling subdivisions of the riding may send accredited delegates and only these are permitted to attend and vote. The wide-open conventions are more likely the device of opposition parties, especially the Conservatives who have nothing to lose by such practices in areas where their chances of election are slim. If any open conventions are held by the Liberals, these are usually in the rural areas where personal political dispositions are often public knowledge and there is little danger of opposition party members packing the meeting.

The supervision exercised by the ministers usually conformed to the built-in traditions of the area under his control. For example, in the thirty-seven constituencies in the Eastern or Quebec district in the province of Quebec,

"...the practice...has been to have conventions to select candidates only when the past member was no longer in the running; that is a member is always considered as the official candidate for the next election, unless he elects not to run again for Parliament. Exceptions have taken place only in very special circumstances when local associations have petitioned the organizers or the ministers for the district to have a convention."⁴⁷

On the other hand, in Nova Scotia, in constituencies held by the party, conventions would only be called after the date for the next election had been set⁴⁸ and the constituency association would

naturally be expected to accept the sitting M.P. as its candidate once again. In constituencies which had returned members of other parties, conventions would be held long before the election date had been announced.

Practice in the Northern Ontario area, the responsibility of C.D. Howe, was not especially rigid except that local nominating conventions were always called. According to Howe: "I never tried to pick a candidate. I just tried to pick a good man to go before the convention." Occasionally, Howe's selection was rejected by the constituency convention. "In that case, he wasn't my candidate. We don't dictate. After the pick is made, we try to help them (the candidates eventually selected) all we can."⁴⁹

Gardiner maintained that, in Saskatchewan, "I tried to find as many candidates as I could and I often had four good men to put up. I never held a convention unless there were at least two candidates. ...I had teams of men going out into the province looking for them."⁵⁰ On the west coast, matters were more rigidly controlled. In Vancouver, claims Ralph Campney, "I had inculcated in my part of the province the idea that you didn't hold a convention until you had a candidate." His selections were never denied.⁵¹

Some constituencies would not have a nominating convention for as long as fifteen or twenty years because they continued to elect the same candidate. In many traditionally Liberal constituencies, candidates would be chosen either by the minister concerned or by a small inner circle without a convention. Often, these constituencies cannot afford the potential conflict inherent in a

convention contest because of various warring factions anxious to secure the nomination for their candidates. This is more likely in an urban constituency and if that riding is a traditionally Liberal one, elaborate screening procedures are set up by several Ministers in order that the right candidate might be chosen. The constituency of Cartier in Montreal is an example of this type of arrangement. In 1946, an Ottawa meeting of Ministers Douglas Abbott, Claxton, Fournier and Lapointe presided over by St. Laurent screened eight candidates before according the Liberal label to one of them. Four years later, upon the death of the sitting member, another ministerial committee consisting of Claxton, Fournier and Lapointe was set up by St. Laurent. It met in Montreal and spent two days reviewing the records and credentials of seven aspirants before choosing one of them.⁵²

Such subservience by an area is counterbalanced by the following example of independence in the Ontario constituency of Glengary-Prescott. The 1952 Redistribution Act combined the ridings of Glengary and Prescott into one constituency. In 1949, Glengary had elected Liberal Wilfrid Major and Prescott had returned Independent-Liberal Raymond Bruneau who beat the incumbent E. Bertrand, who was the official Liberal candidate. As a reward for his victory, Bruneau was snubbed by other Liberals in the House and was not invited to the caucus for over a year. In the inevitable contest for the nomination as official Liberal candidate prior to the 1953 general election, Major had the support of the Ministers in Ottawa led by Walter Harris. The old organization of Prescott refused to be

swayed, held its own convention, and persisted in nominating Bruneau.⁵³ In the ensuing election which witnessed the spectacle of two candidates running as "official" Liberals opposing each other, Bruneau captured a plurality of the votes while Major finished third, 500 votes behind the Conservative candidate.

The practice in constituencies where the party is not likely to win or in which the opposition appears solidly entrenched is often that the nomination may be had by anyone wishing to try his luck. The Montreal constituencies of St. Lawrence-St. George and St. Antoine-Westmount were two such areas in 1940. Both had been Conservative strongholds since 1925 with ex-cabinet minister C.H. Cahan sitting for the former and R.S. White, the owner of the Montreal Gazette, the member for the latter. In the 1940 election, two young lawyers, Brooke Claxton and Douglas Abbott, beat both of them, Claxton winning in St. Lawrence-St. George and Abbott taking the Westmount seat. Claxton related the manner in which he obtained the nomination in the following whimsical note to Dafoe, celebrating his victory:

"The quaint thing about all this is that it began five weeks ago with three women having tea together and working themselves into a high pitch of indignation at the effrontery of the Conservative Party in allowing White and Cahan to occupy the two softest seats in the country in perpetuity. They approached me tentatively and then found out who was the Liberal organization (that takes some doing here) and then got their reluctant consent to allow me to run. Having put that through, the three women rallied about fifty others, out twice a day and sometimes until very late hours in the early morning, addressing envelopes, looking up telephone numbers, canvassing, and doing all the rather unpleasant things about an insufficiently financed electoral campaign. ...It does show the highbrows, the parlour pinks, the armchair critics and all the rest of the things a good many of us have been at one time or another, what can be done. It is quite a terrifying example."

Candidates nominated by local conventions fairly constituted and receiving the endorsement of cabinet ministers representing the district may not win elections in spite of this --- even in areas which traditionally vote Liberal. For example, in Quebec federal by-elections held in 1949 and 1950 in four different constituencies scattered all over the province, self-styled "Liberal" candidates running as "Independent-Liberals" handily trounced the official candidates.⁵⁵ They were able to do this in spite of strong ministerial and provincial support and heavy financial assistance accorded the official nominees. In connection with this development, some party members have claimed that in at least three of the cases, the official candidate chosen was so poor that had an individual minister from the area made the selection himself without calling a convention, the uproar in party circles would have been tremendous and charges of domination and unfairness would have been rife. Perhaps the issue is complicated by the special situation of Quebec where the Union Nationale strongly supported each of the four insurgents in a successful attempt to embarrass the federal government. Nevertheless, these examples are significant because they demonstrate the ease with which non-party personnel can penetrate into the highest circles of the party. For when these successful candidates presented themselves at the House of Commons after election, they were welcomed into the Liberal caucus after only a short interval.

The use of so many examples from the experiences of the province of Quebec should not lead to the conclusion that informal

constituency organization was characteristic of this province alone. English-Canadian folklore has it that Quebec is not an area especially conducive to democratic institutions and practices. The condition of the party's organization in the constituencies outside of Quebec in the 1950's leaves the impression that there was plenty of room for improvement there as well. In 1955, the Central Office conducted a survey by mail (underlining the absence of party agents) in the 190 constituencies outside the province in order to determine the state of constituency organization. Out of only 80 ridings answering the survey, two were completely unorganized, twenty-one had held an association meeting that year, eighteen had held one in 1954, only four in 1952, and eight claimed that they did not know.

The question of finances is an important one not only at the constituency level but nationally as well. Although it is difficult to separate the two levels, this subject will be discussed briefly here only as it applies directly to the constituencies and the individual candidate. The manner in which the party collects its funds and finances national campaigns is covered under appropriate headings elsewhere.

More often than not, the candidate is forced to spend a great deal of his own money in order to get elected. This applies to all parties, not only the Liberal. The candidate may have local sources such as personal friends or some area business establishments to which he can appeal but it is a certainty that his constituency association (if there is one) is usually unable to help

very much. In such circumstances, he appears to be at the mercy of the party leaders who presumably can call the tune since they are "paying the piper". While it is the favorite complaint of members of parliament and defeated candidates that election campaigns are inordinately expensive and way beyond their means, there have been few if any charges made within party ranks or by the public at large that the party leadership has withheld money from candidates it did not favor. Admittedly, the manner in which the individual candidate or the constituency association obtains funds is a subject shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. However, it appears as if the instrument of coercion employed by the party leadership, both federal and provincial, is not funds but the party label which is granted or refused, not on any rigid grounds of ideology or policy but for such pragmatic reasons as whether the candidate can win in the constituency or whether the association in the area is strongly in his favor.

With the cost of a modern election in the average constituency estimated by experienced organizers at somewhere between 25¢ and 50¢ per voter (perhaps up to \$1 per voter in urban ridings)⁵⁶ and where there are few constituencies with less than 50,000 eligible voters, the M.P.'s cries of anguish are understandable. Of course, there are records of some successful candidates not spending more than \$600,⁵⁷ but these are the exception rather than the rule. This matter is raised at this juncture because it involves a consideration of the type of candidate that can be induced to run in circumstances in which he may well be forced to spend at least \$10,000 of his own money without any guarantee of

election. It is possible that some constituencies might base the choice of their candidates on the criterion of whether or not they can pay the expenses of an election. It is more likely that widespread knowledge of the high costs of election in itself acts as a powerful deterrent to anyone with meagre financial resources and is therefore an effective filtering device in itself. Certainly, the low annual parliamentary indemnity does not act as an inducement for the less than well-to-do prospective candidate either.

3. The National Liberal Federation

As outlined in the Report submitted by Angus L. Macdonald's Committee to the organization meeting of the National Liberal Federation in 1932, the Federation was created "...to serve the interests of the Liberal Party of Canada, the Liberal Associations of each province and of each constituency."⁵⁸ The Report set down the following structure for the new organization.

The officers of the Federation were to be: An Honorary President (the leader of the party), a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary and an Honorary Treasurer. A second Secretary was added in 1938. Among his many duties was the responsibility of serving the French section of the party, both in Quebec and in other provinces.⁵⁹

A General Committee composed of the following was set up: The President and Secretary of the Federation: the President and one other representative of the National Federation of Liberal

Women (the party's Women's organization); two representatives from the Twentieth Century Liberal Association (which became the Young Liberal Federation in 1944); and seven representatives from each province who were to be selected by the Liberal Association of the Province. If no such Association existed in a province, then the Liberal members of the House of Commons from the province would make the selection. (This provision was inserted primarily to cover the case of Quebec.) As mentioned elsewhere, the name of this Committee was changed to "Advisory Council" four years later. Scheduled to meet yearly, this was, in effect, the body with the largest representation in the Federation and its meetings in the 1930's were often referred to as Annual Meetings of the National Liberal Federation.

An Executive Committee, to meet more frequently and to supervise the work of the Ottawa Office was created. It was to be composed of the President and Secretary of the Federation; the President of each Provincial Association or his nominee (in the cases where there was no provincial association in existence, the Liberal Members of the House from that province would select a representative to the Committee); the President of the National Federation of Liberal Women; two representatives from the Twentieth Century Liberal Association; and the Finance Committee. This latter Committee was to have a membership of five, one of whom would always be President of the Federation, and it was supposed to deal with all matters of financial policy for the Federation. In 1933, it was decided that the Finance Committee be recognized as the "working Executive Committee of the Federation"⁶⁰

because the Executive Committee, the body which the constitution made responsible for the continuous supervision of the Ottawa office was so constituted that it could hardly meet often enough to carry on its duties.

While the Federation supposedly maintained contact with rank-and-file Liberals through the provincial offices and provincial associations, it also instituted a system of "associate membership", a device through which, by 1933, the party was able to recruit 50,000 supporters across the country, each paying \$1 yearly. Associate members were those not enrolled through provincial organizations but who were nonetheless Liberal Party supporters. The funds from this source helped the hard-pressed Federation to underwrite a considerable part of the cost of its publicity work. Furthermore, since an associate membership entitled an individual to receive the publications of the party, it also provided an ideal mechanism through which Liberal propaganda could be spread throughout the nation. After some success with this vehicle before the outbreak of the Second War, the scheme was forgotten with the resumption of the Federation's activities at the War's end.

At the outset, the question of finances loomed large. Mackenzie King sent letters out to many of the party's wealthy supporters asking them to contribute \$1000 each to get the new Federation going. The response was very poor. In his presidential speech to the Federation in 1933, Vincent Massey revealed that less than one-half of the capital fund of \$50,000 projected in 1931 had been

achieved.⁶¹ In fact the Federation was to continue to remain in dire financial straits until the 1950's when, through the efforts of President J. Gordon Fogo and Duncan K. MacTavish, it achieved some measure of financial stability by no longer being entirely dependent upon subscriptions from the provincial associations.

It will be noted that, aside from the early device of "associate member", the Federation made no attempt to differentiate between federal and provincial politics. It was assumed that Liberals in provincial politics would likewise be federal Liberals and that, accordingly, "...contact between the National Liberal Office and the rank-and-file of Liberalism throughout the country is established through the provincial offices and provincial organizations,"⁶² because this was the most expeditious manner of reaching these people. Since the Women's Federation and the Young Liberals were likewise provincially organized, Massey's remark that the new national structure was "...a real federation in that it represents a central superstructure resting on provincial pillars"⁶³ was an accurate statement of the manner in which representation in the Federation was allocated. Whether the assumptions underlying this statement were borne out is a subject that will be discussed later.

This assumption regarding the identity of interest between Ottawa and the provinces was constitutionally maintained from the beginnings of the Federation until the most recent amendments. In part, it may be considered the result of the traditional Liberal ideology of provincial rights which harks back as far as the

Confederation era. However, it is also true that the party had been defeated in the 1930 federal election and, not having any permanent organization oriented toward federal politics, it had no choice but to fall back on its provincial associations or organizations, eight of which were undergoing a thorough overhauling because they were in opposition in their provinces. In the ninth, Quebec, there was no permanent association, but here the party seemed firmly entrenched (the Union Nationale was a few years off) and, besides, the province's pro-Liberal tendencies in federal politics were by now well established.

In that same speech, Massey described the Federation as "...primarily a body of men and women who are not in parliament, its function being to stand behind the Members of Parliament and support them in their heavy task."⁶⁴ Mackenzie King is reported to have regarded it as a "mirror and sounding board for the guidance of the Leader of the Party and his colleagues in the government."⁶⁵

With the party out of office, however, the Federation through its central office and its General Secretary, Norman Lambert, played an important role in conducting the 1935 election campaign, with Lambert (soon to be President) playing the role that Haydon had performed in the 1921 campaign. During the next five years, the Federation Central Office was in danger of being regarded by many party supporters in the country as an avenue for patronage and as an important point of access when a judicial appointment had to be made or a factional feud settled.⁶⁶ This was

in part the result of the trust placed in President Lambert and a tribute to his contacts in the country. Lambert's access to the government was automatically assumed by supplicants for favors.

This was obviously not what King or Massey had intended when the Federation was founded. When War broke out, King decided to close the Federation offices on the public grounds that party politics were out of place in a situation which demanded a total and undivided national effort. As well, with a war on, most of the officers of the Federation wished to use their talents working for the government. Pressure to close the Federation came from another important source, the Department of Munitions and Supply. C.D. Howe preferred to have the Federation closed because he did not want anyone "using the Party to get to his Department."⁶⁷ As a result of the Federation closing down, Howe could claim that, "I think we came through (the war) cleaner than any country I know of."⁶⁸

With the resumption of the Federation's activities in 1943 and with an election supposedly in the offing, Lambert cautioned the Advisory Council meeting that the experiences of the late thirties could not be repeated. He pointed out that it had been the idea of the Prime Minister and Vincent Massey that "the National Liberal Federation should develop along the lines of the National Liberal Federation in England."⁶⁹ He recalled that when he was appointed secretary of the Federation, he had been presented with J. A. Spender's biography of Sir Robert Hudson, Secretary and then President of the National Liberal Federation in Great Britain for forty years.⁷⁰ Lambert claimed that after reading the volume, he

was convinced that,

"...Sir Robert Hudson succeeded in his job because he constituted the most effective bridge between the Federation and the machinery of the Liberal Party as it was represented in parliament and the government of the country. The fact that he was able to perform that function effectively was due undoubtedly to the existence of an efficient group composed of Liberal Whips in parliament who controlled and directed the practical workings of the party's election machinery. The responsibility for party patronage, financing and the operations of the party's political organization rested with that parliamentary group. The work of promoting Liberal ideas and policies amongst the rank and file of the electorate was the job of Sir Robert Hudson and the National Liberal Federation."

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Lambert then reviewed the development of the Federation in Canada from its inception until 1940:

"For the three years while the Liberal Party in Canada was in opposition to the Bennett government the National Liberal Federation developed very much after the pattern of its prototype in England. But with the ascendancy of the Liberal Party to office in 1935 and the departure of Mr. Massey to his present post in London,⁷² it fell to my lot as his successor in the Presidency of the National Liberal Federation to try to combine the educational and promotional features of that institution with the practical operation of the party's affairs.

"I did my best to make such a combination work as well as possible, but I am frank to say now that I was never satisfied with it... I always felt and said many times, both in the form of memoranda and by word of mouth, that our political organization required the establishment of a parliamentary group machinery which has been such an important factor in party affairs in England...

"By the time of the election of 1940 the National Liberal Federation offices were regarded throughout this country and in far too many quarters as the gateway to departmental favours from the Liberal Party in power. I can assure you that few of the steady stream of people who passed through my doors in those days gave evidence of appreciating the character of the National Liberal Federation as it had been conceived in the beginning."

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As if this warning were not enough, Senator Wishart McL.

Robertson, then President of the Federation, echoed the tenor of Lambert's remarks to the Advisory Council two years later:

"...Clause Number 1 section (b) of the Constitution provides, and I quote:

'It shall be the prime duty of the National Liberal Federation of Canada to foster study and research into social, economic, financial and political matters, particularly in their bearing on the post-war period, and for that purpose to create and organize study and research groups on as wide a basis as possible.'

The Federation has no authority to do otherwise --- such as engage in pre-election activities or organization --- and indeed its personnel under the Constitution makes no provision for activities along anything in that line." 74

From then until 1961, this was how the Federation was regarded, especially by the members of the cabinet who considered the organization as "the educational end"⁷⁵ of the party.

(a) The President and the Executive

The Executive officers of the Federation, originally six in number, were in an almost constant process of change until the 1950's when they consisted of an Honorary President (still the leader of the Party), the President, six Vice-Presidents (one each representing Western Canada, Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces and two ex-officio members: The Presidents of the Liberal Women and the Young Liberals), an Honorary English Secretary, an Honorary French Secretary and an Honorary Treasurer. Except for the Leader, the ex-officio Vice-Presidents and the Honorary Treasurer, the other six are, by the constitution, elected by the Advisory Council. The Leader does not undergo an election at any time except, of course, at the beginning of his tenure when he is installed by a National Convention. The Honorary Treasurer, who

is responsible for overseeing the financing of the Federation, is appointed by the Executive Committee.

Aside from the President and the Honorary Treasurer, the officers have no special functions except perhaps that of representation with the two secretaries usually being members of the House of Commons. There have never been any contests for the positions. The Standing Nominating Committee of the Federation (consisting of the Presidents of the ten provincial associations and the presidents of the affiliated organizations or their nominees) has, in the past, presented its list to the assembled Advisory Council which has ratified the list without dissent.

The President of the Federation is the most important figure in this list.⁷⁶ He is the Leader's man in the sense that the Leader always at least approves the nomination before it is submitted to the Advisory Council. On occasion, the leader will go so far as to make his views known publicly to the Council. This was the case in 1936 when King dispatched a lengthy letter urging the election of Norman Lambert.⁷⁷ Sometimes, two names are presented to the Council by the nominating committee but a vote has never been taken because, in every case, one of the nominees has withdrawn his name.

The duties of the President vary with the incumbent, who has never received any salary. Usually, he is responsible for maintaining a casual supervision over the Federation offices in Ottawa (close and continuous supervision is maintained by two appointed General Secretaries, one English and the other French,

with the English Secretary pre-eminent) and he is officially in charge of all the publications emanating from the National Office. Once a year, the President attempts to maintain personal touch with the provincial associations across the country by visiting the provinces. Usually, this chore cannot be accomplished every year but every President has tried to go across the country at least once every two years. In general, the President acts as the Leader's liaison with the Federation and keeps him posted with developments not only at the office but across the country as well. The one exception to this was Quebec, where provincial Liberals would have nothing to do with the Federation. Especially in the late 1930's, Senator Lambert was compelled to report to the Executive Committee that "...the federal Liberal organization (was) absolutely denied entrance into the Québec picture in the past."⁷⁸ Knowledge about political conditions in that province was available to King if he wanted it at the cabinet level, however: "Ernest Lapointe was Mr. King's alter ego as far as Quebec was concerned."⁷⁹ St. Laurent, of course, needed no one else.

In the 1950's the Presidents of the Federation, Fogo, Woodrow, MacTavish and Matthews also engaged in collecting funds for the party (not for the Federation which has a regular contribution schedule worked out by the Honorary Treasurer). However, this is not normally the function of the President. Fund raising happened to be the forte of these Presidents, especially the latter two, and it would have imposed some hardship on the party had these men terminated this activity upon assuming their new position.

(b) The National Executive Committee

The Executive Committee is the organ that was entrusted with the general supervision of the Ottawa Office and to act in the interim between meetings of the Advisory Council. The members of the Committee held their positions on the body, not through direct election by the Advisory Council, but ex-officio, the result of holding office either as president of provincial associations or as the representatives of the affiliated organizations. The elected officers of the entire Federation were the only ones subject to election and they sat on the Executive Committee by right. The size of the Committee continued to grow until by the 1950's, it contained a membership of thirty consisting of the officers of the Federation, two representatives from each provincial association (one of which was the President) and two representatives each of the Women's and Young Liberal Federation.

Since 1932, the number of times the Committee was to meet varied from two to four yearly and it was the duty of the President to call the meeting. However, with such a large number of people stretching from coast-to-coast and paying their own fare, Executive Committee meetings often accompanied the meeting of the Advisory Council whenever these were held. In effect, the supervision of the Federation offices and its activities could only be carried on by those members living in the Central provinces of Quebec and Ontario and more immediately by the members of the Executive living in Ottawa. In 1938, after the rule that the Finance Committee of the Federation should supervise the day-to-day

activities of the body had been in force for five years, it was decided that the two secretaries, one French and one English, be appointed by the Executive Committee to serve as full-time salaried employees of the Federation.

Aside from the constitutionally laid-down duty of supervision, the Committee at the beginning had the power to add four to its membership. Eventually, that power was increased so that it could appoint such officials and special Committees as the Executive felt necessary. It also was authorized to appoint the five standing Committees of the Federation which covered the subjects of Credentials, Constitution, Resolutions, Finance and Organization. The membership of each of these Committees totalled fourteen and was selected as follows: One representative from each of the ten provinces together with two representatives from the National Federation of Liberal Women and two from the Young Liberal Federation. Finally, the Executive Committee was empowered to call the Advisory Council meetings and set the time and place for them.

The early meetings of the Committee were informal affairs with hardly any minutes kept but with the members of the Committee demonstrating that it was here that the decisions governing the Federation were being made.⁸⁰ By the 1950's, the Executive Committee had become a much larger body. Whereas in the 1930's, nine members was the usual complement, the number of participants in the meetings had increased to anywhere from 17 to 27. The meetings were also much more formal and often began with expressions of "confidence in the leader". Then the representatives from the provinces would each present a review of conditions in their

respective areas and this would be followed by reports from the Presidents of the Women's Federation, the Young Liberals, and later on, the University Liberals. Cabinet ministers would sometimes be present but this was the exception rather than the rule. Usually, the Leader would drop in to say a few words, although there was no regular procedure in this regard. The Leader was not constitutionally a member of the Committee. Of course, he was never barred; rather his presence always provided a welcome diversion. The President of the Federation chaired all meetings.

During the period of power, the Executive Committee was used, partially as a mechanism of liaison among the provinces and between the provinces and Ottawa, and as a helpful device for the transmission of the Leader's wishes to the party in the country. It also provided a forum for frank discussion of party problems of all varieties because the meetings were closed to the public and to the press. Even after the defeat in 1957, no open meetings of the Committee have been held, and it therefore retains its importance along with the Central Office as an instrument of liaison.

(c) The Advisory Council

As mentioned before, the meeting of the Advisory Council was the largest regularly scheduled gathering of the party rank-and-file in the country. According to the constitution, meetings were supposed to be called annually by the Executive Committee, which sets the time and place of the gathering. In practice, the Advisory Council met thirteen times between 1933 and 1957 and all meetings were held at the Chateau Laurier in Ottawa.⁸¹ Aside from

the war-time interlude, there are several other reasons for the failure to hold meetings annually. In the first place, the party was in power throughout this period and there appeared to be no necessity for new ideas or "a mirror and sounding board". Besides, an Advisory Council meeting could conceivably pass resolutions embarrassing to the government. Finally, the question of funds is important. Delegates must come from all parts of the country taking time from their work and paying their own way. The last consideration became so important that in 1955, President MacTavish told the Council that one meeting every two years would probably have to suffice. He also laid down a few more ground-rules, claiming that it seemed useless to hold a meeting in election years and that Advisory Council gatherings were "impractical" when parliament was not in session.⁸²

The size of the Advisory Council continued to increase throughout the history of the Federation (as did the other bodies) from an initial membership of 69 to one of 236 by 1955. This was distributed as follows: Ten representatives from each provincial association (100); one member each from the electoral districts of the Yukon and Mackenzie River (2); five members from each provincial women's organization (50); two women from the Yukon and Mackenzie River District (2); five members from each provincial Young Liberal Association (50); two Young Liberals from the Yukon and Mackenzie River District (2); and the thirty members of the Executive Committee (30). (The University Liberal Federation had not as yet achieved sufficient prominence to receive membership.)

MacTavish's stated reasons for the intermittent calling of the Advisory Council meetings may be accepted at face value or not. The fact remains that, in spite of the few meetings of the Council, attendance at the gatherings seldom consisted of the full complement entitled by the constitution to attend. It is difficult to ascertain the exact percentage of attendance of those eligible at the meetings. The custom rapidly developed of permitting interested observers and guests to attend the gatherings and the Credentials Committee did not always present a breakdown of those in attendance in terms of guests and those entitled to vote.⁸³ However, a fair estimate would be that the meetings contained between 55% and 65% of official delegates qualified to attend.⁸⁴ There was (is) usually a large contingent of visitors and guests from Quebec and Ontario.

The meetings themselves are quite formal. Lasting anywhere from one to three days, they attempt to discuss policy, pass resolutions and decide on matters of organization. The President of the Federation is usually in the Chair and the gatherings are conducted on the basis of an agenda supposedly drawn up by the Executive Committee.

Sometime during the course of the meeting, the Leader usually addresses the gathering in a formal speech which covers such items as government policy since the previous meeting and party organization (in generalized hortatory terms) for a forthcoming election. In the final years of power, these speeches generally consisted of a discourse on the ideological foundations of the

government's policies and an exhortation for "national unity". Cabinet ministers were also on hand to present their views on the issues under consideration and the meetings were often treated to a full-fledged address by (say) the Minister of Agriculture concerning the marketing of grain or a similar peroration by the Minister of Defence on "Strengthening Canada in the Cold War". It should not be assumed that the cabinet ministers imposed themselves upon recalcitrant party supporters. So hard-pressed were members of the Executive to find enough to keep the members occupied that they were only too eager to have members of the government present. For instance, in 1950, President Gordon Fogo applauded the presence of ministers, commending them for being able "...to get away from the many duties they have to spend some time with us and give us the benefit of their views on some of the important matters of business before us."⁸⁵

As might be expected, no public resolutions disparaging the government were forthcoming from the Advisory Council.⁸⁶ Whenever anything approaching criticism or challenge appeared imminent, there was always a cabinet minister, usually Brooke Claxton,⁸⁷ to caution the gathering or to sideline the resolution. At the advisory council meeting of 1943, Claxton warned the membership that,

"...it should be recognized that we are meeting as a political party at a time when a Liberal administration is in power. That is quite a different situation to that facing a political party which is in opposition and which wants to get into power. Anything that we say here should be done by the Liberal government or by the parliament of Canada will at once put the government on the spot. If it does it, then it does it in accordance with the resolutions put forward by the Federation; if it does not do it, it of course will

be charged immediately with having had the opportunity of putting into effect Liberal principles and not having done so. So that it is probably unwise from the political point of view to put forward things which the government will not do or cannot do because of its responsibilities to the people of Canada." 88

It will be recalled that this was the meeting which Prime Minister King had expressly convened because he realized (as Laurier had during the course of the First War) that the end of hostilities would bring new problems for the country. He wanted new ideas and the 1943 meeting brought forth a list of fourteen resolutions, some of which eventually found their way into the statute books. The resolutions were soon published in a booklet entitled "The Task of Liberalism" and, while such topics as "Production and Employment", "Primary Industries", "Rights of Labour", "Social Security", "Finance and National Credit" and "National Unity" were covered, the wording was vague enough to permit the government leeway should it have deemed the results of the Council's deliberations embarrassing. Nevertheless, King was sufficiently concerned about maintaining his government's freedom of action that after examining the resolutions on the evening of the close of the session, he impressed upon Brooke Claxton that "care be taken not to issue it as a programme settled upon by the Liberal Party, but merely as some suggestions from the Advisory Council to the government."⁸⁹ This was of course the way the resolutions appeared.

On other occasions, Claxton not only gave a general warning to the Council, but openly intervened on specific resolutions and had them modified. At the 1949 meeting, the Resolutions

Committee presented a motion to the effect that "the Liberal Party recommend to the government that it undertake in cooperation with the provinces a plan for a national contributory pension without a means test."⁹⁰ Claxton immediately opposed the resolution, drawing to the attention of the Council the fact that the National Convention held the previous August had unanimously adopted a general resolution dealing expressly with this subject:

"I do not want to be misunderstood, I do not oppose for a second the object of this resolution. On the contrary, this has been an objective of the Liberal Party for a good many years, and I have had something to do with similar resolutions which were incorporated in the resolutions of 1943, 1944 and again at the convention last year...

I submit that the Convention last August passed a resolution dealing expressly with the subject-matter of this resolution. I raise the question as to how advisable it is for you or for the Council at this short date to repeat just one part of one of these resolutions, because then the fact that the rest is not repeated will be commented on. I think you may observe from the Canadian Press report of yesterday's proceedings how this kind of thing may be taken up in the press by the opposition. Yesterday it was said, quite wrongly, but said by the Canadian Press: 'Liberals revise old resolutions' Then: 'The Advisory Council of the National Federation endorsed two resolutions tossed aside as platform planks by the convention.'

"If you adopt this resolution today, it will be made to appear as if we adopted this resolution following the adoption of a similar resolution by the Conservative convention, whereas we led the Conservatives right along, and we are already on record in 1943 and 1944, and particularly in August, 1948.

"I simply raise the question of tactics. It is no other question than political tactics whether or not it is advisable to pick this out in this form at this time."

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After a heated debate lasting over an hour Claxton was unable to have the matter referred back to Committee. He did succeed, however, in toning down the resolution by having the Council agree to prefix

the main body of the motion with the words "having regard to the unanimous desire of the Liberal Party for the implementation of its social security program."⁹²

On the previous day, Claxton had been more successful. Maurice Boisvert, Chairman of the Resolutions Committee, had moved that the party, in cooperation with the province, should translate its belief in the principle of equality of opportunity in education by enacting such measures as Dominion-Provincial bursaries and scholarships; the encouragement of student exchanges both nationally and internationally; and the continuation of per capita grants to universities and vocational training schools together with any other measures that might seem advisable.⁹³ Claxton opposed the resolution,

"...on the grounds that education...is a provincial matter. There is no more sensitive subject in Dominion-Provincial relations than that of education. We have just lost a provincial election in Quebec in which the issue of provincial autonomy in such matters as this was the main issue in the campaign. Further, the provinces of Canada whose constitutional responsibility it is are in a better financial shape to discharge their constitutional responsibilities than ever before in the history of our country. So far as I know there is no such thing as Dominion-Provincial bursaries and scholarships, as referred to in this resolution. It refers to encouragement of exchanges of students both inter-provincially and internationally. Well, these are very desirable things, and I am all for them. I have taken part in them, and supported them by my own financial help. But they are not things easily accomplished through federal agencies, except in so far as we do them federally...

"I suggest that if this resolution were passed it would embarrass us and we would not be able to carry out our objectives. On that account I would suggest that the Resolutions Committee be asked to reconsider this matter. I suppose I have not a vote, but I raise the difficulty that I see, because I cannot see the wisdom of a Council such as this adopting things it cannot do, and just setting up a target for the attack of our opponents, if we do them or do not do them." 94

As a result of this interjection, the motion was referred back to the Resolutions Committee and the next day Boisvert announced that after due deliberation the Committee had decided to withdraw the resolution.⁹⁵

Sometimes ministerial control regarding resolutions would be exercised behind the scenes. In 1952, the Young Liberal Federation sent ten resolutions to the Advisory Council Resolutions Committee on various subjects. The Young Liberals endorsed Canada's part in the Colombo Plan and urged, among other things: the assignment of French-Canadians to ships on which orders were given in French; an increase in Federal grants to the provinces; a study of the re-sale price maintenance system; and interim cash payments to farmers unable to harvest crops. Claxton regarded these suggestions as so potentially dangerous that he managed to convince the Young Liberals that "...the material included in these resolutions should not be presented to the Advisory Council on the floor" but should "...be submitted to Cabinet in the form of representations from the organization concerned."⁹⁶

It must be emphasized that the Advisory Council meetings were not ordinarily the scene of controversy. Quite often, the Chairman of the Resolutions Committee would present a list of motions and have them accepted unanimously by the gathering without so much as a word of discussion. Occasionally, there would be some words of protest when Cabinet Ministers took up a considerable portion of the meetings' agenda, but this was the exception rather than the rule.

The best public statement regarding the role of the Council

both in real and ideal terms was presented by Federation Vice-President C. Irving Keith of Winnipeg:

"We have here, or we should have here, an assembly of the lay people of the party, and we should meet for the purpose of discussing public affairs in a general manner, and freely and openly from the floor of this meeting house. If we arrive at certain things, we should record them for the benefit of the government, or the press, or whoever in the country cares to take note of it." 97

However, it is apparent that the Advisory Council had little in the way of an independent role in connection with the formation of policy. It is true that the policy of Family Allowances originated in the Council at the 1943 meeting but, in this event, much of the credit for the innovation must be given to Brooke Claxton, who chaired the Resolutions Committee, and not to the general membership. The conclusion is inescapable that any possibility of the Council asserting its independence, if it was so disposed, or of even carrying on free discussion was hampered by ministerial control and supervision. The fact that the press has access to the meetings,⁹⁸ and that guests may attend its deliberations may be the most apt indications of the effectiveness and significance of the Council. The conclusion must be reached that it served more as an enthusiasm-generating body than one from which ideas or policy could originate.

(d) 'Auxiliary' or 'Affiliated' Organizations

There are three organizations attached to the National Liberal Federation: The National Federation of Liberal Women, the Young Liberal Federation and the Canadian University Liberal Federation. The names of these bodies accurately describe their

membership.⁹⁹

The Women's organization is concerned with "political education" of the women of Canada. Organized on a provincial basis, it attempts to set up women's clubs in all constituencies. Through the Federation office in Ottawa, publicity is directed to various women's organizations across the country and to the Liberal women's clubs as well. These clubs also receive monthly bulletins in either French or English.

There has been little impetus to join the women's clubs with the regular constituency organizations where they exist. While there is a great deal of cooperation between the women and the "regulars" at all levels, the women seem to prefer to remain separately organized. They have never attempted to supplant any of the constituency organizations with one of their own and see their role as that of cooperation. However, they can be extremely militant about the functions which they perform. On occasion, when for example they have been denied funds which they regard as their rightful due, the entire party is likely to be on the receiving end of some sharp words. Witness the remarks of Mrs. Nancy Hodges, President of the Liberal Women, at the Advisory Council Meeting in 1949:

"We have heard a great deal about what has been done by various men's organizations in the various provinces. But I am going to say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that I very much regret that in practically all the reports..the men who gave these reports spoke in terms of what the men had done, only. They told us that the men in key positions had done certain things, and spoke about the marvelous job the men had done.

"I sat back there, simply quivering to get at you and to tell you that from my experience very few men have got anywhere without a woman at the back, prodding them. The fact of the matter is, gentlemen

---and I am addressing these remarks particularly to the men, whether they admit it or not --- that the Liberal movement in Canada, and the Liberal Party in Canada would not have been what it is today had it not been for the women...the time is long overdue when we women think we should be recognized.

"...We have got to have a little more money to spend in organization. We have got to build our fences. And no matter how you may wish to do so, you cannot build them on honeyed words. We have got to have an organization of women. And if I, and the women who are associated with men, have anything to do with it, it will be a strong organization. Because make no mistake about it, when the time of election comes around the men will be coming along and saying to the women: 'Come and help us; you lick the stamps on the envelopes; you knock on the doors; you ring the doorbells; you do all the things which we have not the time to do.' And, to their credit, be it said that the Liberal women will do all these things. They will do it, I know. But we do feel that we should have recognition to the extent of having more funds for organization and for the carrying on of the fine work entailed in our Dominion-wide organization --- more funds than we have had in the past."

100

There is no denying that women are significant in the tedious tasks of conducting an election campaign in the constituencies. As well, they often hold socials, teas and dances in their areas. Activities at the national level are dependent more upon the enthusiasm of the president than on any other factor. The conscientious incumbent tours the country at least once every two years, making speeches and encouraging local activities.

While there is little explicit prejudice against women in politics within the party, Liberal women do not play the important role assumed by members of their sex in the old CCF party, although they have received greater acceptance within their party than has been the case with their Conservative counterparts.¹⁰¹

The Young Liberals are organized in much the same way as the Women's Federation and the national activities of this section of the party are likewise dependent upon the vigor of the personalities involved rather than upon any built-in enthusiasm. At the local level, these members are often the ones engaged in constituency activities.

The Young Liberals have tended not to be as discriminated against as has been the experience until recently of young Conservatives in their party¹⁰² although there have been some inevitable complaints that the regular organization has ignored this segment of the party. As with the women, no attempts to join them with the "regulars" have been made.

The University Liberals are the most recent addition to the party. Officially organized into a Federation in 1947, by 1960 there were 43 Liberal clubs at universities across Canada, some of them dating back to the 1920's and before. Their activities are heavily concentrated among students. They contest annual elections for the model parliaments which form part of the extra-curricular activities at their universities; they often hold debates with their Conservative and CCF (now New Democratic Party) counterparts; and they sponsor visits by prominent members of the party to address student audiences.

Success or failure in these model parliament elections is not a matter to be taken lightly. Politicians with an eye to the next election like to consider the success of their party's university club a good omen for the party's chances in the area. It can

even become a factor motivating choices. In 1957-1958, seventeen of twenty-two university model parliaments had Conservative governments. In Saskatchewan, where the populace takes fierce pride in its university, the fact that university Conservatives had been successful there was often mentioned as an important impetus to the province's strong support of the Conservatives in the election of 1958.

Occasionally, university Liberals will serve as the riding organization in constituencies in which their university is situated. This is more often the case in urban ridings where the transient nature of the population makes any permanent organization difficult. However, here the university Liberals do not attempt to name the candidate or control his activities. Rather, in such cases, the candidate, co-opted by local notables or by a cabinet minister, calls upon the local club and asks for support. The candidate usually has no difficulty in obtaining help. The students feel that campaign activity provides an interesting diversion and realize that it also provides a way to earn some easy money. Finally, students may be called upon by the party regulars to speak on the hustings in rural areas at election time. Many Liberal politicians have begun their careers in this way, although this training ground is not as available today as it once was.

Aside from serving as a device for keeping the young segments of the party out of the hair of their elders, one would assume that the Young Liberals and the University Liberals would act as a useful recruiting instrument for their party. To some

extent, the figures obtained from the questionnaire bear this out: While only 15% of the total number of Liberal respondents stated that they had been in the Young Liberals, this figure jumps to 25% when the percentage is obtained from the number claiming "membership" in the party.¹⁰³ On the other hand, a bare 2% of party supporters claimed membership in one of the university clubs while 24% stated that they had either graduated from university or had received some university training.¹⁰⁴ This disparity is undoubtedly the result of the relatively low status held by the university party clubs among the student body. While there may be many Liberal-leaning students, few of them feel their party affiliation so strongly as to be motivated to join the student club.

(e) The 'National Office'

Throughout this chapter, the terms "Central Office", "National Office", and the "Headquarters" of the National Liberal Federation have been used interchangeably to describe the body through which the National Liberal Federation carries out its operations. A similar confusion in terminology exists within the party. However, generally this Ottawa office which performs the functions of coordination and administration is known, especially to the members of the Parliament, simply as the "National Liberal Federation."¹⁰⁵

The functions of the office were first described in a rather lyrical way in the 1919 Convention report on organization. Thirty years later, these remarks were quoted verbatim by Gordon

Fogo in presenting his presidential report to the Advisory Council.

"As a gatherer of news, a compiler of information, an investigation bureau critical of our opponents, and, on the positive side, of collecting real data concerning leading questions that arise among the body of the people with the view of consolidating the ideas of our friends, enunciating the doctrines of Liberalism and providing lamps and signboards along the political highway by which the Liberal pilgrim can clearly distinguish his way." 106

Two years later, he again emphasized that the role of the office was not an organizational one: "In this party we do not attempt to run the organization of the party from Ottawa. The party is made up of units. This happens to be the headquarters; but the real work of the party organization in the Liberal Party is not done at headquarters; it is done in the wards and polling divisions and constituencies, and mainly in the direction of the provincial organizations."¹⁰⁷

While the party was in power, the office was little more than a publicity and information organ for the parliamentary party and the cabinet. It also acted as a coordinating and administration center in general election campaigns, by-elections and in the arrangements for national conventions. Depending upon the activities in which the office is concerned during any year, it has operated on annual budgets ranging from \$45,200 in 1945 to over \$150,000 in 1960. To some extent, rising costs have made for an increase in the budget and the average cost of maintaining the services of the office was somewhere between \$70,000 and \$90,000 annually during the 1950's. Today, the office can be expected to spend over \$100,000 yearly.¹⁰⁸ This increase is also the result of new

functions of the office for a party which is now in opposition. Funds are collected partly from the provinces who pay for the services of the office as they are used. However, provincial subscriptions do not cover the entire bill. The source of the remainder is, of course, not public information.

The President of the Federation is supposedly in charge of the office. However, because of his other duties, it is impossible for him to maintain the close supervision that is necessary. Two salaried General Secretaries, one for English-Canada and second-in-command, and the other for French Canada are effectively in charge of the staff, which may number from fourteen to twenty persons depending upon the functions the office is called upon to perform. This includes general secretarial help and clerical aides. Among the staff are permanent secretaries for the Women's and Young Liberal organizations and someone in charge of public relations. Since 1958, a national organizer who also doubles as the English General Secretary has been added to the staff. This innovation should be seen as a part of the revamping of the entire Federation and is discussed elsewhere.

The publicity activities of the office involve myriad duties. The office maintains a national mailing list of over 150,000 entries which includes the executives of the auxiliary organizations, the provincial associations and general party supporters in the country's 265 constituencies. The names of these party supporters are obtained partially from the provincial parties but mainly from the M.P.s and defeated candidates in the constituencies

involved. The office arranges for speaking tours, radio speeches and television appearances for the Leader and members of the cabinet or important party members when the party is out of office. It reproduces important speeches by leading party personalities in the House or in the country and along with various brochures, reports and pamphlets, these are mailed to the national list without charge or are sent to the various party organizations as they are requested. As part of its research activities the office occasionally warns members of parliament about something the opposition has said or done and provides members and candidates with copies of speeches, newspaper clippings and statistics.

It publishes the party magazine, The Canadian Liberal. First issued as a quarterly in 1947, it was available for 25¢ per copy. It contained a record of the attainments of the Liberal government, speeches by the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet, reports of Advisory Council meetings, feature stories on members of the party and even some articles ("Gladstone and Home Rule", "The U.S. Citizen and his Northern Neighbour") by journalists and academics such as Bruce Hutchison, James M. Minifie, Lord Campion, and Norman Ward. Although the content was of a surprisingly high caliber considering the aims and nature of the magazine, it had little more than 5000 paying subscribers at best and after the defeat of 1957, the format was altered and eight issues appeared yearly, still on a subscription basis. In 1960, the format was again changed, this time to a black-and-white newspaper tabloid as compared to the previous magazine style, and

was now an eight-page monthly distributed free to the 150,000 on the mailing list. Since the party was now in opposition, the object was to reach as many people as possible with the material, which is naturally very different from that carried previously.

Finally, at election time, the office handles the clerical duties: It sends out speakers' guides and copies of speeches, arranges for the printing of national posters and makes some attempts to coordinate speaking schedules of the important members of the party who are criss-crossing the country.

It must be emphasized that contrary to the position of the Central Office in the British Conservative Party, where it is subject to the Leader's control, the Federation office is constitutionally part of the National Liberal Federation. Therefore, it is theoretically under the control of the Federation --- by the Executive and ultimately by the Advisory Council itself. However, with the party in power, control of the office's activities was in the hands of the cabinet ministers who were unable to bring themselves to permit any freedom even in connection with propaganda ("education") and in spite of the various informal controls already at work. From the first, attempts to supervise the office were formalized. In 1943, Norman McLarty, formerly President of the Federation and then Secretary of State, suggested to Federation President Wishart Robertson that a meeting of the cabinet sub-committee on organization and the officers of the Federation be held "as occasion requires, but at least once every month... (to) afford a communicating point with the government as

a whole."¹⁰⁹ The role of this committee remains obscure, for, within a year, three members of the five-man cabinet sub-committee were no longer in the government. For several years thereafter, Brooke Claxton was the Minister directly involved with the Federation and he also supervised editing of The Canadian Liberal.

Beginning in 1953 and continuing until the defeat of 1957, a special Federation Liaison Committee, consisting of twelve cabinet ministers, the Chief Whip, the President of the Federation, the two general secretaries and the Prime Minister's secretary was set up.¹¹⁰ The Committee met every month at various places in Ottawa --- in the House, at the Chateau Laurier, at the Rideau Club and at the Federation offices --- sometimes with a full complement and sometimes with the attendance down at low as four. With J.W. Pickersgill usually in the chair, the meetings would last anywhere from 1 1/4 to 2 1/2 hours and it was this body that took charge of all matters of organization at the national level for the party during this period. Among its activities, it reviewed each issue of The Canadian Liberal before publication, discussed the content CBC free broadcasts should have (these programs were entitled "The Nation's Business"), decided upon new candidates in a federal constituency to replace those who had died and approved the programme for the 1955 Advisory Council Meeting, at the same time confirming the names to be submitted as the new Executive of the Federation to the Council.

The office was not allowed to handle public relations either. In the 1940's, the advertising agency of Cockfield, Brown and Co.

of Montreal was hired and was placed in charge of campaign public relations. Often, Ministers would by-pass the Central Office and deal directly with the agency both during election campaigns and whenever they embarked upon speaking tours. There are many within the party who claim that Cockfield, Brown was the central office of the party, particularly around election time. For example, by late 1956 and early 1957, four members of the agency sat in on the Federation Liaison Committee in order to prepare for the coming election. The agency also provided the party with its general secretary. In 1948, H.E. Kidd, one of the agency's vice-presidents, severed his formal connections with his old firm and succeeded A.G. MacLean as general secretary, serving with the party for eleven years.

With a central office in Ottawa, it might normally be expected that its facilities would be the ones depended upon for information about conditions in the country regarding such questions as availability of funds, the state of the organization in the constituencies and the general political situation. It might also be expected that an election campaign would be conducted mainly through its channels. The matter of constituency organization has already been discussed. The organizational arrangements regarding election campaigns present a similar picture of cabinet domination.

In five general elections from 1940 until 1957, it was the cabinet that was relied upon. In 1939, Mackenzie King set the pattern for subsequent procedures when he circulated the following

memorandum to each of his colleagues in the government. It is quoted in full here because it is an accurate outline of the government's attitude toward the Federation as well as an indication of the operating methods of the party when in power:

"I shall shortly have to decide whether a general election is to be called in the immediate future, or delayed until a later date. The decision will necessarily depend upon the state of preparedness of the Party for a nation-wide campaign. The Government will be held primarily responsible by the Party for the success or failure of the campaign

"In order that our collective responsibility be made clear to every member of the Administration, I have felt that I should seek, from each Member of the Government, a definite expression of opinion as to the wisdom of holding a campaign this autumn, and, secondly for a statement, in so far as it is possible for each Member of the Government to make it, as to:

- (1) What he believes to be the probable outcome of an appeal, (a) in his own province, (b) in the country generally;
- (2) What he knows to be actually in readiness and available for printing or distribution, in the way of campaign literature, relating to (a) the record of the Government as a whole, (b) the work of the Department or Departments over which he himself presides; and
- (3) What is available, so far as he is able to ascertain, in the way of finances wherewith to meet the expenses of a campaign (a) for his own province, (b) in addition for the Dominion as a whole.

"I am, of course, aware that the National Liberal Federation is expected to have to do with both literature and finances, but in each of these matters the Federation is in a position to effect but little without the cooperation of the Members of the Government. It is important, therefore, that both the Federation and the Government should be in a position to know to what extent each may rely upon the other, as respects all matters pertaining to a campaign.

"I am writing to Senator Lambert, the President of the Federation, for a statement as to the Party's position in the particulars herein mentioned, in so far as he is in a position to advise me of it. I shall see that Members of the Cabinet are made aware of the position as viewed and known to the Federation. At the

same time, I should like to be able to present to the Cabinet the situation as it is viewed and definitely known by yourself and other of our colleagues. I think you will agree that it would be the height of folly to bring on the campaign without knowing exactly what the situation is in the particulars which I have enumerated, and that each and all will have to be taken into full account before a final decision can be reached." 111

King continued to emphasize the role of the parliamentary party in the conducting of elections. On the day before the 1943 meeting of the Advisory Council, he recalled in his diary that in anticipation of the next election he reminded the Parliamentary caucus of its responsibilities:

"I said I am making that plain the presence of you all. I here and now say to my colleagues that I feel that it is their duty, and it is the duty of Ministers of every province to be responsible first and foremost for the organization of their own province, and for all the federal organization collectively. That I did not end the responsibility there. I would say there was not a Senator who did not owe his position for life as a Senator to the Liberal Party. That I thought they owed it to the party to help in the work of organization. I thought, too, some of the Members were in a position to do a great deal themselves." 112

For every election campaign throughout the years of power, one or two cabinet ministers together with the President of the Federation and the General-Secretaries would take charge. It was this body that assisted in planning the Prime Minister's and Cabinet Minister's trips in various parts of the country, arranged for the free-time political broadcasts provided by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, mediated conflicts and even dealt with the press at the national level.

Cabinet ministers would often by-pass the office in the interim between elections and difficulties with the provincial

associations would be the result. They would sometimes make speaking trips to Western Canada without the knowledge of the provincial associations because the central office had not been notified. In the early 1950's, this had become the established routine until complaints from the provincial associations of British Columbia, Alberta and Manitoba to the office¹¹³ and lengthy discussions in Executive Committee meetings evoked an order from the Prime Minister's office that henceforth, in advance of any trips, cabinet ministers would have to present itineraries to the central office which would then transmit them to the provincial associations concerned.

On the other hand, the office was very useful whenever ministers could not carry out their organizational responsibilities or were unwilling to do so. Often the office would be called upon to provide the Postmaster General with names of candidates or of those who were in charge of patronage in some constituencies (always outside Quebec) because the ministers involved were either too busy to do this or did not care to be bothered with such mundane chores. This last point is worth underlining. The assumption among many, both within the party and in the press, has been that only cabinet ministers are the ones who are privy to the arcane secrets of constituency organization because they are supremely political men. While there is no denying that many ministers were quick to resent any outside interference (either from the office or from provincial associations) in such matters,

some would occasionally call upon the office to help them resolve difficulties resulting from local personality conflicts in their regions and to advise them on such matters as how to organize a poll committee. Some cabinet ministers have commented that some of their colleagues left the government for the tranquility of the bench or private life because they found that their duties as cabinet ministers required that they busy themselves with organization. They were really far more interested in policy and administration and considered organization matters boring and personally odious. D.C. Abbott, G.E. Rinfret, J.L. Ilsley and J.L. Ralston are notable examples of ministers with this attitude.¹¹⁴

As for the research activities of the office, the government could have little use for the results of the efforts of a small staff or for policy suggestions from the Advisory Council (which was, after all, composed of amateurs) when it had the resources of a skilled, well-staffed and expert civil service at its disposal. By the 1950's the practice had become established to leave much of the formulating of policy to the cabinet and much of what had come to be regarded as Liberal policies or Liberal programme was actually the product of intimate cooperation of the higher civil service and the ministers.¹¹⁵ Particularly for the election of 1957, "the conclusion is inescapable that the election programme of the party originated not with the Federation but with the Ministry. And, the ministers' views on desirable government policy were shaped at least as much by the civil

servants in Ottawa as by the party faithful throughout the country."¹¹⁶ In this respect, the Federation office's "research" responsibilities were reduced to providing a seldom-used newspaper clipping service. In short, "the East block had become the 'mirror and sounding board' --- not the Federation."¹¹⁷

4. The National Convention

The Liberal Party was the first to adopt the innovation of a national convention, although the Conservatives have been the ones forced to resort to this device more often because of a greater turnover of their leaders. It will be recalled that the first convention was called in 1893 for organizational and policy reasons. Thereafter, conventions have been called only three times, in 1919, 1948 and 1958, in order to select a new leader. Officially, the purposes of all three Conventions have been similar:

"(1) To consider the platform of the Liberal Party of Canada; (2) to consider the question of Party organization; (3) to consider the question of party leadership."¹¹⁸ However, undoubtedly because the party has been in office for most of this century, there has until now been no desire to hold national gatherings for policy or organizational purposes alone. The importance of the convention has essentially been confined to the question of leadership selection and as such will be discussed in the next chapter on the Leader. The other functions of the convention together with the manner in which it carries on its deliberations will be briefly reviewed here.

Every one of the conventions has been called by the Leader of the Party. The basis of representation has been the same for both the 1948 and 1958 gatherings which were composed of the following six categories of representatives: (1) the Liberal members of both Houses of Parliament and, where a constituency has no Liberal M.P., the defeated candidate in the previous election or the newly-nominated candidate; (2) the provincial leaders of the party; (3) the presidents of the National Liberal Federation, the Young Liberals, the Women's Liberals and the University Liberals (the latter were not represented in this category in 1948 but were in 1958); (4) the presidents of the nine (ten in 1958) provincial associations and where no such officer exists, a person is chosen to act in this capacity (the manner in which this is to be done is not specified); the presidents and two other officers of each of the provincial organizations of Liberal Women and Young Liberals; and the president and two other officers of each of the university Liberal clubs in the country; (5) three delegates coming from each federal constituency, elected by a local convention chosen for that purpose (in a constituency entitled to two parliamentary representatives, six delegates are chosen); (6) the Liberal members of each provincial assembly and the Liberal candidates defeated in the provincial election or the newly-nominated candidates acting jointly choose from among themselves a number of delegates equal to one-fourth of the total number of representatives in each provincial assembly.

Regulations concerning the announcement of the Convention

are explicit. The call is supposed to be sent to each provincial Liberal leader, the provincial Liberal associations, the Association presidents, to each Liberal MP, the defeated candidate or the newly nominated one, to the Presidents of the Provincial Women's and Young Liberal organizations and to the president of each university Liberal club.¹¹⁹ There can be little dispute that the above list demonstrates the potentially widespread representation of any convention. Aside from the possibility of domination by the leadership of any of the provincial associations or the affiliated organizations, thus destroying some part of the ostensible democratic character of the convention, the real difficulty in this question arises in the selection of delegates at the constituency level.

The rules governing the procedure to be carried out by the constituencies are as follows: Each constituency MP or candidate, in conjunction with the Provincial Liberal Association is supposed to arrange the date, place and hour of the meeting of the local convention. In the event that the sitting member or the candidate fails to act, or in the event of his death, the Provincial Liberal Association together with the local association in the riding must take the necessary steps to have the convention called. To insure that the attendance at these local conventions is representative, sufficient advance notice of the meeting containing the date, hour and place must be given "by advertisement or otherwise."¹²⁰ In order that the constituencies be fully represented at the national convention, three alternates are chosen along with the three regular delegates at the local meetings.

These regulations are outlined here because of the potential importance of the constituency associations. Alone, they constitute the largest single bloc of votes at the convention. In 1948, the number of potential voting constituency delegates was 735 out of the 1302 total that constituted the Convention; in 1958, the number was 795 out of the 1537 possible delegates.¹²¹ When the number of M.P.s and defeated candidates or new nominees are added to these figures, this constituency predominance is even more marked. In 1948, the constituencies sent 980 out of the 1302 total and in the Convention ten years later, 1060 out of 1537. However, this dominance is effectively translated into control by the parliamentary party and the cabinet, for, as already indicated, there were at this time few constituencies in the hands of functioning, widely-representative associations. What organizations that did exist at this level were invariably controlled by a small group of local notables or by the M.P. and if this was not the case, there was always a cabinet minister to be reckoned with.¹²² The extent of parliamentary dominance is completed by the addition of Senators to the above totals. In 1948, 62 out of the 96 Senate seats were held by Liberals; in 1958, the figures were 78 out of 102.¹²³

If parliamentary domination was more than likely in the make-up of the convention, it was everywhere evident in the arrangements and proceedings. The Convention of 1948 provides a good example. While there was a National Convention Committee typically composed of the Leader, the Leaders of the Provincial Parties, the Presidents of the Provincial Liberal Associations,

the Officers of the Federation and some members of the Parliamentary Caucus,¹²⁴ administrative arrangements were in the hands of the Federation staff because of the difficulty of assembling the Committee with any regularity. Moreover, the composition of the two important sub-committees, on Resolutions and Political Organization, was heavily weighed in favor of the parliamentary party: The seventeen-member Resolutions Sub-Committee, through which all the resolutions emanating from the constituencies and provincial associations had to pass, had eleven of its members from the parliamentary party --- five Senators, three M.P.s and three cabinet ministers. Of the remaining six, four were from the hand-picked Federation Executive and the other two were the permanent General-Secretaries. The Political Organization Sub-Committee was almost entirely composed of members of the House. Of the twenty members, eighteen were M.P.s, one was Senator Lambert and the other was Ottawa Lawyer John J. Connolly, formerly executive-assistant to Angus L. Macdonald and within five years a Senator himself.¹²⁵

In spite of the predominance of the parliamentary segment of the party on the Resolutions Sub-Committee, the government was still uneasy about the possibility of critical resolutions getting by and being submitted to the Convention Resolutions Committee (a body of 110 selected by a caucus of each province's convention delegates on the spot at the beginning of the Convention). At the first session of the Sub-Committee, Brooke Claxton, one of the cabinet representatives on the body, arose and stated that he had his own prepared resolutions representing the views of the

government with him. Prime Minister King had also sent word that he wanted the cabinet to see the results of the Sub-Committee's deliberations so that the government could produce a final statement. Senator Norman Lambert, Chairman of the Sub-Committee, adamantly refused to accede to King's demands, pointing out that if the Prime Minister wanted to present a resolution or a whole platform or if the cabinet ministers, collectively or individually, wished to do so, this could by all means be done. But this would have to appear explicitly as resolutions from the government, not as the result of the work of the Sub-Committee. Eventually, the Committee won its point and no Cabinet review was permitted.¹²⁶

To be sure, Lambert's successful stand against Claxton was a hollow victory. In his acceptance speech after winning the Convention's support as new Leader of the Party, St. Laurent more or less echoed his predecessor's remarks regarding the platform of the convention which had chosen him. Throughout the years of his tenure as Leader, Mackenzie King never deviated from this assessment of the 1919 platform: "I consider the platform as a chart to guide me, and with the advice of the best minds in the Liberal Party as a compass, will seek to steer the right course. The platform was laid down as a chart."¹²⁷ In 1948, St. Laurent announced to the assembled faithful that "I will do whatever it may be within my power to do to uphold the principles and advance the policies affirmed at this national Convention, as circumstances may permit them to be implemented."¹²⁸

It is pointless to review here the various proposals brought forward at the conventions and to ascertain whether they were enacted into law, because it is apparent that the fact the Convention has made a legislative proposal has little bearing on the course of government action. It is enough to point out that in spite of resolutions condemning centralization and bureaucratic trends in government and demanding that the government do something about the housing shortage and the rising cost of living, there was never at any time during the 1948 Convention any serious challenge to the authority of the cabinet. Even a resolution of the Organization Committee that the party appoint a national organizer was subsequently ignored. ¹²⁹

A comparison between Liberal and Conservative party conventions is instructive. They are similar in terms of procedure and both conventions would undoubtedly appear relatively staid to American observers who are accustomed to the ballyhoo and paid claques of demonstrators which have now become fixtures at the national conventions in their country. They are dissimilar in that the Conservative conventions seem to increase the discord within the party while Liberals seem to come away from their gatherings more united than at the beginning of their three-day meetings.

Perhaps it is impossible to compare the two parties in this respect because none of the five Conservative conventions have been held while the party was in office. J.R. Williams claims that the 1948 Conservative Convention was "better organized"

than the Liberal meeting of that year. Williams may be correct when administrative arrangements such as maintaining decorum in the hall, correctly accrediting and seating delegates and providing press facilities are considered.¹³⁰ However, he then goes on to demonstrate that the device of the Convention has harmed the Conservatives by bringing conflicts into the open. He further extolls the practice of the Conservatives of bringing all resolutions before the entire convention for discussion, deploring at the same time the handling of the freight-rate issue at the Liberal Convention of 1948.¹³¹ The resolution, a watered-down version of an attempt by the West and the Maritimes to place on record a criticism of the Liberal government's allowance of a 21% increase in freight rates, was gavelled through with scarcely a murmur after St. Laurent had been elected and a large number of delegates had left.¹³² Williams might also have noted that during the dying moments of that same Convention, a resolution calling for the taxation of excess profits was not passed but was instead referred to the next meeting of the Advisory Council where it was conveniently forgotten.¹³³⁻

It may be that while the Conservatives are more efficient in seeing to the administrative aspects, the Liberals are able to control procedure better. This may in part be the result of the fact that holding office has not only taught the Liberals not to fight their battles in public but has also effectively removed an important incentive to criticism from the floor. A comparison between the Conservative Convention of 1956 and the 1958 Liberal

Convention, occasions when both parties were out of office, would evoke similar conclusions regarding arrangements. However, the Conservative meeting almost dissolved in chaos because of Quebec's dissatisfaction with the selection of Diefenbaker, while those who attended the Liberal meeting thirteen months later were struck by the rigid control both in the Committees and on the floor that prevailed throughout the event.

5. Finance

The manner in which the two major parties collect and distribute their funds and the amounts involved are among the best kept secrets in Canadian political life. There is no legislation which makes it compulsory for a party to disclose the source of its funds or how much it spends during a campaign. Only the old CCF used to open its books to the public, partly because it had access to pitifully small amounts. Public utterances in parliament, energetic work by members of the press and private interviews are therefore the only sources of information available and these are necessarily suspect. No attempt will be made here to cover the entire history of party finance because this subject has been reviewed elsewhere.¹³⁴ There are, nevertheless, a few specific points worth repeating and some additional material which is relevant. However, only tentative statements can be made regarding such aspects of party finance as the precise sources, the amounts collected, the methods of distribution and how the process is controlled.

As might be expected, the concept of mass financial support has been, until now, an alien one in the party, at least from the point of view of the national arrangements made for collection. The traditional practice has been to have standing Finance Committees, staffed by trusted party supporters in the corporate and business world, in the major cities --- Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg and Vancouver. The Montreal and Toronto Committees are the most important because these cities are in the areas which are the sources of most of the party's funds.

The machinery goes into operation mainly at election times and it is essentially "a hand to mouth operation" as one experienced collector put it. The procedure is markedly informal. Usually, a collector will be armed with an innocuous letter from a party personality who is known by the prospective donor --- this party personality is invariably the cabinet minister from the area or the Leader of the Party himself --- in order to assure the donor that the collector is working for the party and that his money will reach its intended destination.¹³⁵ Often, however, collectors are well-known and such documents of identification are superfluous. During the first quarter of this century such notables as Senator Raoul Dandurand, Alphonse Decary, Gaspard de Serres, Sydney A. Fisher, Aimé Geoffrion, Albert Hudon, Senators Jacob Nicol and Donat Raymond and Arthur Tourville in the province of Quebec and J.E. Atkinson, Milton Hersey, P.C. Larkin, E.G. Long, A.B. Matthews and Frank O'Connor of Toronto were well-known collectors and donors as well. A modern list would have to include

John Aird, Jr., Senator Paul Bouffard, Peter Campbell, Armand Daigle, Louis P. Gelinas, C.A. Geoffrion, Walter Gordon, Duncan K. MacTavish, A. Bruce Matthews and Senator Alan L. Woodrow. With corporate giving much more the rule now than in earlier days, the tradition of heavy individual contribution no longer exists to the extent it did then, when, for example, as one story goes, Senator Donat Raymond would often be forced to finance almost the entire Quebec side of a federal campaign or a provincial one out of his own pocket in the hope that later remittances from the party's supporters would be sufficient to cover what he had laid out.

In recent years, some sort of tradition has developed within the individual corporations as to the distribution of their political contributions between the two major parties. Most corporations tend to "hedge their bets" in the sense that donations generally go to both parties at election time: The party in power can normally depend upon receiving 60% of an individual corporation's political donation while the opposition party receives 40%.¹³⁶ The reasons for both corporate and individual contributions runs the gamut from a feeling on the part of some corporations which depend on government contracts that, as Beauharnois President R.O. Swezey put it in 1931, "gratefulness was always regarded as an important factor in dealing with democratic governments,"¹³⁷ to the attitude that political contributions are no different than church donations and represent little more than a "commitment to democracy". This latter attitude is not as transparently disingenuous as it may seem, especially if it

originates with individuals. A blanket assessment would probably be that most large donations are given to the parties if not for some immediate tangible return then simply to maintain the party's commitment to "free enterprise". Of course, in this process, the parties do not simply approach individuals without some reason to expect cooperation. For example, while they were in power, the Liberals were not above keeping a list of all those contractors who had received business from the government in excess of \$5000.

The results of the questionnaire mailed out tend to contradict the implication of the foregoing remarks that the source of financial contributions is very narrow, for they give evidence of considerable popular participation. While 35% of the respondents "never give" money to the party, one-third of the remainder claimed they gave "sometimes" and another 7% stated they "often" gave.¹³⁸ However, it is difficult to ascertain the amount this 40% contributes in relation to the total the party receives and in the absence of such information, these figures are the only evidence mitigating any sweeping conclusions that the party depends entirely upon the donations of the wealthy few.

It has already been stated that experienced campaigners calculate the cost of elections at the local level at 25¢ to 50¢ per elector (see footnote No.53). This estimate does not include expenditures for such national purposes as billboard, press and radio advertising, travelling expenses for the leaders and the press or the work of the national office.¹³⁹ It does not include the general operations of the National Liberal Federation whose

financing is in the hands of a separate Federation Finance Committee. With a potential electorate of over nine million, it would not be extravagant to claim that the party would have little difficulty spending \$5 million. A wild guess would be that only the Conservatives in 1958 have come close to spending that much although, in the campaigns of 1949 and 1953, the Liberals could well have equalled the level of the most recent Conservative expenditures. (Both major parties could easily have spent \$5 million apiece in 1962.)

Although it is not available, some information about distribution and control would be even more significant. There is some evidence that the Quebec and Ontario provincial parties have had to help the national party finance its campaigns when the party was in opposition in Ottawa and according to Senator Norman Lambert, the relations between federal and provincial wings in financial matters is "more complicated than negotiations over Federal-Provincial tax agreements."¹⁴⁰ There is also the question of allocation of funds to the individual candidates in the constituencies across the country. This is another subject about which party members are completely silent. Such evidence that exists seems to be that this was a matter of cabinet discretion during the years of power. Finally, there is the problem of the role of the Leader.

According to all public utterances, leaders are not supposed to have anything to do with the raising or distribution of funds. The evidence strongly negates this. It is well known that John A. Macdonald was personally involved in the Pacific Scandal

and the Laurier, Tarte, and Dandurand papers are full of letters from Laurier to Tarte, Dandurand, Sydney Fisher and others arranging for special committees and soliciting personally. King was widely believed to have known about the \$700,000 Beauharnois donation to his party in 1930 although to his death he denied having any knowledge of it and became wildly incensed whenever he was accused of complicity in the transaction.¹⁴¹ However, he did acknowledge that both he and his party were, as he put it, "in the valley of humiliation"¹⁴² as a result of their involvement.

King need not have gone to such great lengths protesting his innocence. In 1873, Macdonald, disgraced similarly in the Pacific Scandal, justified his involvement in fund-raising to Lord Dufferin:

"It has been stated in the English press that I should not have mixed myself up in these money matters, but should have left it to our Carlton (sic) and Reform Clubs. This may be true --- indeed is true if such Clubs existed, but as a matter of fact the leaders of political parties have always hitherto acted in such matters --- and there can be no special blame attached to a leader for continuing the invariable practice on this occasion." 143

King could have truthfully made an identical statement regarding Liberal Party national organization seventy years later and all the evidence shows that his successor could have done likewise in 1957.¹⁴⁴

* * * * *

"The Party was organized on the basis of the Cabinet. This is true in power. When you're out of power, that's something else again." - Hon. Walter E. Harris¹⁴⁵

6. The Aftermath of 1957: 'Something Else Again'

Throughout the years in office, there were few warnings to

the party that the use of the cabinet as the mode of organizing the country was an unreliable practice. The 1948 Convention was the only occasion of public record when such warnings were made, and even then in a sufficiently equivocal manner to reduce their potential significance at least as far as the rank-and-file of the party was concerned.

Retiring Leader Mackenzie King devoted a considerable part of his nationally-broadcast speech to this question. Recalling that one of the reasons for calling the Convention was to have it deal with the problem of organization, he cautioned his followers, echoing the words of Laurier just before the Convention of over a half-century before, that,

"...no matter how good its principles and how sound its policies, no political party these days can hope to give effect to either or to retain or gain office without effective organization. By effective organization, I mean constant and continuous activity throughout the period between elections, and not merely a great burst of activity after a by-election or a general election has been called." 146

He claimed that he did not wish to imply by these remarks that he was critical of the efforts of the National Liberal Federation. He simply wanted to point out that the party did not at that time possess in the Dominion, the provinces, or the constituencies, the effective organization that was necessary to "ensure the Party's record and its policies being brought before the people as they should be."¹⁴⁷ While claiming that he hoped the Convention would bring this necessary nation-wide organization into being, he then, in that obfuscating manner that had become his hallmark by now, continued to the effect that the supervision of a nation-wide politi-

cal organization could not be the obligation of a leader of a party although he must of course have the decisive voice in such matters. This was especially so when the Leader was Prime Minister because he then had too many other responsibilities. The responsibilities of organization "...are duties which should be voluntarily undertaken by leading members of the party."¹⁴⁸

One of King's former ministers, C.G. Power, added his words of caution in his speech to the Convention asking for its support as leader of the party. Not a serious contender for the leadership, Power took advantage of this opportunity in the spotlight to warn the party about the increasing centralization and concentration of power, both in terms of policy and organization, in Ottawa.¹⁴⁹ Finally, the Convention Committee on Organization suggested the appointment of a full-time national organizer for the party. Not only were the warnings ignored but the committee's resolution was not implemented either.

The results of the 1957 election in which nine cabinet ministers were defeated and the number of M.P.s was reduced to 104 with only eight out of 60 successful west of the "Lakehead" imposed an unaccustomed organizational role upon the Federation for the 1958 campaign. In the words of Federation President A. Bruce Matthews, "almost overnight, an immense strain was imposed on the Federation organization which was not attuned to the role which had been assumed by the members in their ridings and by Ministers in their provinces."¹⁵⁰ The electoral shambles wreaked by the Diefenbaker landslide in that election intensified the

organizational problems.

However, even before the 1958 Diefenbaker sweep, attempts were under way to revamp the organization of the party. At the Leadership Convention which chose Lester B. Pearson to lead the party, the Chairman of the Convention Political Organization Committee, Senator C.G. Power, presented a series of ten resolutions among which were recommendations for greater attention to liaison between all branches of the party, frequent consultation among provincial organizations and leaders, encouragement and assistance of Women's, Young Liberal and University Liberal activity with emphasis upon recruitment from the latter two organizations and a review of the party's press relations. In view of the possibility of an election because of the unstable situation in the House of Commons, one resolution recommended that a special committee be created. The resolution also suggested that this Committee be convened by the Leader as soon as possible after the close of the Convention and that it should function for the duration of the campaign.

The Committee Report emphasized, however, that there be "no alteration in the basic constitutional structure of the National Liberal Federation which should continue to be founded on provincial organizations in conformity with Canada's federal structure and the Liberal Party's traditional regard for provincial rights."¹⁵¹ Almost immediately objections were raised from the floor. A delegate from the riding in South Renfrew, Ontario complained that "nary a soul comes to the National Liberal Federation from the riding or constituency level."¹⁵² A change in the entire constitutional structure of the party was suggested, so that "the party supporter, the

member of the legislature or House of Commons, the candidate, the cabinet minister --- yes, the party leader himself --- must ever answer to a body whose function is literally known from coast to coast and the permanency of Liberal principle assured." He went on to urge that majority representation in the "ational Liberal Federation be accorded to delegates from the riding level and had such been the case before, the party would not be out of office now.¹⁵³ This suggestion that majority representation on the Federation be from the constituency level was seconded by Winnipeg delegate and ex-Manitoba Liberal Association President C. Irving Keith who added several suggestions of his own: that the President of the Federation not hold office longer than two years and that the position pass from province to province every two years; that Senators and M.P.s not be permitted to be officers of the Federation; and that the Federation be empowered to call a national policy convention at least once every five years to consider and review the national policies of the party.¹⁵⁴

It was apparent to Senator Power that these suggested amendments had considerable support and he therefore ordered that his Committee convene again to discuss the suggestions. The final and amended Committee report of the following day left unchanged its proposal to the Convention that no modification be made in the structure of the Federation but it did incorporate two of Keith's amendments --- the ones concerning a rotating Federation presidency and policy conventions every five years.¹⁵⁵

At the meeting of the Advisory Council in November, 1958, the Report of the Council's Organization Committee repeated the recommendations of the Convention Organization Committee and added a provision that a National Organizer be appointed by the Executive Committee in consultation with the National Leader, thus finally implementing the resolution of the 1948 Convention. While ignoring the suggestions that the ridings be represented on the Advisory Council, the Committee could not arrest criticism that arose in connection with the necessity of establishing democratic constituency organizations with card-carrying and dues-paying members which were proposed from the floor at that meeting. Such demands were answered by the Secretary of the Committee, Ray Perrault of British Columbia, by a statement to the effect that constituency organization was a matter of provincial jurisdiction and not properly the concern of the National Federation. Senator John J. Connolly, Chairman of the Committee, had already emphasized in his opening remarks that no change was being contemplated in the Federation because "this is an association of lay supporters of the party."¹⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the Organization Committee did suggest that a "working group" be appointed to study the functions and constitution of the Federation and to recommend any changes in the constitution at the Advisory Council Meeting of the following year. Accordingly, after the meeting, the Executive Committee implemented this resolution by appointing a thirteen-member Committee, ten from the provinces together with the three presidents of the affiliated organizations.¹⁵⁷

This Committee's report to the 1959 Advisory Council Meeting recommended few changes in the constitution. It suggested a clarification of the status of the affiliated organizations, the setting up of a group of "Honorary Officers" (the retired leader and the party leaders in each of the provinces) of the Federation who would not be active members, that the National Organizer be an officer of the Federation and a member of the Executive Committee, and that a new clause be inserted in the constitution to govern the procedure to be followed for calling National Conventions or National Meetings of the Party. In its report, the Committee noted with approval the portion of the report of the 1958 Convention Organization Committee to the effect that no basic changes in the constitution of the Federation be made.¹⁵⁸ However, because of strong pressure from a few members of the Committee, notably the two presidents of the Young Liberals and the University Liberals with the support of the Manitoba and New Brunswick representatives, a minority report was included along with the report supported by the majority of the Committee membership.

These members, a distinct minority of the Committee, felt that the position of the Federation had to be re-examined with regard to its general responsibilities. They felt that the Federation "should be a democratic body truly responsible to the wishes of the rank and file of ... (the) party membership, and further, that it should bear the ultimate responsibility for (1) policy in a general sense, (2) finance, (3) research, (4) publicity and (5) organization."¹⁵⁹ In view of the electoral position of the party,

they considered that organization was the responsibility that came first. The general Committee report continues that this minority view of the party,

"...means that the Federation will have an entirely different complexion than at present. In effect, it would mean that the Federation will become the National Liberal Party.

"Specifically, the Federation should cease to be a mere confederation of provincial and affiliated bodies. This has resulted in the Federation becoming simply a superstructure far removed from the source of Liberal strength. Instead, the National Party would be based on regional groupings of, say, 7, 8 or 9 constituencies." 160

The minority on the Committee intended that representation at the Advisory Council, which they termed "the parliament of the party", would be based on these regional groupings; that the Advisory Council would meet annually; that the Executive, now a "truly responsible body", would meet regularly; and that every four years there would be a full general meeting where every constituency would be represented.¹⁶¹

At that time, it is evident that such a proposal did not have general support. In his presidential address to the Council at the opening of the session, Bruce Matthews presented the up-to-then accepted view of the role of the Federation as a reminder to the assembled delegates "to keep things in proper perspective".¹⁶² He pointed out that the organization was a voluntary grouping of provincial associations and affiliated organizations which was designed to produce a flow of information and ideas through its members:

"The National Liberal Federation is not the Party as such. The Party is composed of our leaders, national and provincial, our Members of Parliament and of provincial legislatures --- our Senators --- every member of our constituency organizations, and every voter who casts a Liberal ballot. At least that is the way I interpret the party; there may be other interpretations. The Federation is the servant of the Party, designed to perform a role in support of the Party. It is not designed to run or control the Party and must not be placed in that position under its present terms of reference."¹⁶³

Matthews recognized, however, that circumstances could change this conception of the Federation and that "... a party in office, forming the government of the day, ... (had) somewhat different requirements than the party in opposition. Political organization must always have an important place, but the degree of emphasis and timing will change. We must be quick to recognize the changing requirements."¹⁶⁴ These remarks were echoed by various delegates throughout the course of the two-day meeting.

Nevertheless, demands for a change in the structure of the party and for constituency representation were so strong that in order to placate the dissident minority in the Committee who had also reported, it was suggested that another Committee be appointed and that this new Committee should report to the Committee on Organization of the forthcoming National Rally which Lester Pearson had planned for the following year. Accordingly, a sixteen-member Committee, consisting of ten provincial representatives, the Presidents of the National Federation, the Liberal Women, the Young Liberals and the University Liberals plus two Chairmen, Hugues Lapointe from Quebec and Wilfred P. Gregory of

of Ontario, was set up by Pearson acting together with the Federation Executive Committee.¹⁶⁵

The new Committee's terms of reference were as follows: It was to consider the possibility and desirability of establishing a direct link between the federal electoral districts and the national office and to study possible means of collecting funds from party supporters to meet the annual budget of the national office. However, should any constitutional changes be deemed necessary, the Committee was cautioned that these alterations had to ensure that "the appeal to the public of the Liberal Party as a democratic and broadly-based institution ... (would) be maintained;" that the interest of the Federal wing of the party would be effectively furthered; and that any executive groupings and party meetings would balance the need for "executive direction of party activity on the one hands, and general participation in party work on the other."¹⁶⁶

In June 1960, the Committee circulated an invitation to officers of all categories of Liberal Associations across the country as well as to many individuals. The circular asked them to consider the Committee's terms of reference and to express their views on the following two questions: "(1) Is the present structure of the party satisfactory? (2) Do you favor direct lines of representation from the constituencies to the National Federation?"¹⁶⁷

In January 1961, in announcing the results of the

questionnaire and presenting the Committee Report to both the National Rally and to the Advisory Council Meeting on the day following the end of the Rally, Lapointe was forced to admit that response had been poor. In spite of a follow-up letter which had been dispatched the previous August, only 2% of the 2500 organizations and people polled sent replies to the Committee. Four out of five of those replying expressed dissatisfaction with the present structure of the party. However, while the answers to the second question concerning direct representation to the Federation from the constituencies were evenly divided for and against, Lapointe claimed that the results of the poll demonstrated that "there was unanimity...on the importance of avoiding having two kinds of Liberals, two distinct Liberal organizations within a province, the 'provincials' and the 'federals'."¹⁶⁸ Lapointe's report stated that members of the Committee were informed by mail of all correspondence received and that he and Co-Chairman Gregory met several times to consider whatever submissions there were. After consultation with leader Pearson and the Executive of the Federation on October 29, 1960, full Committee meetings were held for two days in December during which time the new constitution was drawn up. It was presented for approval at what was to turn out to be the final meeting of the Advisory Council.

The preamble to the New Constitution¹⁶⁹ was not altered but the amendments subsequently approved by the Council put teeth into Clause #1 (C) that the National Federation "shall have the

power to coordinate the efforts of the provincial Liberal organizations throughout Canada and to promote the formation of provincial Liberal organizations where such organizations do not exist, or where they no longer function." Membership in the Federation to consist of the Liberal Associations of each province and the Yukon and Mackenzie River Federal Electoral Districts, was not changed but the status of the Liberal Women, Young Liberals and University Liberals was officially set down as "affiliated". The two categories of officers of the Federation, Honorary and Elected, were continued. Honorary officers were: Honorary Life President --- any retired leader of the party; Honorary President --- the present leader; and Honorary Vice-Presidents --- the Leaders of the party in the provinces. There were only four elected officers: The President of the Federation; two Vice-Presidents, one English-speaking and the other French-speaking; and a Secretary-Treasurer. The General-Secretaries (the English one doubling as National Organizer) were to be appointed and as such are not mentioned in the constitution. There is no change in the composition of the Standing Nominating Committee which presents the nominees to the Advisory Council for approval.

The new nineteen-member Executive Committee was to consist of the elected officers of the Federation; the Leader of the Party; the immediate Past-President of the Federation; the ten presidents of the provincial associations; the presidents of the three affiliated organizations; and one representative of the Federal Liberal caucus. Although members of parliament had served as Vice-Presidents

and as Honorary Secretaries before, this was the first time the parliamentary side of the party was officially accorded representation. This was also the first time that the Leader was an official member of the Committee. The duties of the Committee, "to carry out the aims and purposes of the Federation" with the power to "appoint such officials and special committees from time to time as may be required", have not been altered. It also retains the power to appoint members to the four standing committees on organization, research, information and finance. The Executive Committee is supposed to meet at least twice yearly.

The name of the Advisory Council was changed to "National Council" and for the first time was to include the Leader and representation from the constituencies and the Parliamentary Party. The following are entitled to membership: The elected officers of the Federation; the Leader of the Party; the Honorary Life President; the leaders of the party in the provinces; Past Presidents of the Federation; ten representatives from each province, two of which must be women and another two must be Young Liberals. In addition, each province is entitled to one additional representative for each complement of three federal electoral districts in the province; one representative each from the Yukon and Mackenzie River Districts; the presidents of the Liberal Women and Young Liberals; seven representatives from the Executive of the University Liberal Federation; ten representatives from the Parliamentary Party; and the chairman of the Standing Committees appointed by the Executive Committee.

The final innovations concern the national convention. The

new constitution provided that all Conventions would henceforth be announced by the Executive Committee and not called, as in the past, by the Leader acting on his own responsibility. Like the new National Council, the Convention Organization Committee was to have representation from the provinces, the affiliated organizations and the parliamentary party. Representation at the Convention was increased and changed to some extent. It was to include the following categories: All Liberal Privy Councillors, Senators, Members of the House and defeated candidates or the new candidates in the federal constituencies without a Liberal MP; the leaders of the party in the provinces; all members of the Executive Committee of the Federation, the Liberal Women, the Young Liberals and the University Liberals; four members of the Executive Committee of each provincial association; the presidents and two officers of each of the provincial organizations of Liberal Women and Young Liberals; two representatives from each University Liberal Club; six delegates from each federal electoral district, at least one of which was to be a Liberal Woman and another to be a Young Liberal; and, finally, the Liberal members of each provincial assembly and the candidates defeated in the previous provincial election (or the new candidates), acting jointly, have the right to select from among themselves a number of delegates equal to one-fourth the total membership of their respective provincial assemblies. Although the constitution also required that Conventions be called "at least every five years" it does not specify whether the question of leadership will always be considered.

The only objection to the new constitution concerned the inclusion of the ten members from the parliamentary caucus in the National Council. The delegate raising the objection claimed that she had once presented a resolution which had the support of her provincial association to the Advisory Council only to have a member of parliament raise such violent objections to it that the resolution, which appeared at the outset to have had unanimous approval from the membership, was soundly defeated. She felt that the resolution was especially important because it dealt with the problem of Canada's natural resources and called for "keeping control of our Canadian economy in Canadian hands for the benefit of Canadians"¹⁷⁰ an issue upon which Diefenbaker subsequently campaigned. She pointed out that the resolution was presented in 1951 and recalled with some irony that the MP who had opposed her resolution did so on the grounds that "it was a Conservative Resolution."¹⁷¹

"We feel that we laymen are the people who are the grass roots of the party. We are very close indeed to public opinion. Those of us who promoted that resolution realized what the trend of public opinion was in Canada regarding our resources...

"I do not like to suggest for a moment that we should not have ten members of parliament on this Committee (sic). I know that our members are badly badgered around at times, but also they tend to live in ivory towers. I feel that when we have the leader of our party present at these Advisory Council meetings, we have sufficient representation of the parliamentary point of view without having a group of MPs. We are laymen and I feel that this Advisory Council should carry the opinion of the laymen in the party." 172

She thereupon moved that M.P.s be excluded from membership.

There was hardly any support for the motion, which was almost

unanimously defeated after one of the new Vice-Presidents, J. Harper Prowse, observed that the Leader had enough to do already without having to report back to caucus upon what was said at the meetings.¹⁷³

The docility with which the assembled faithful greeted the changes in the federation implicit in the new constitution demonstrates that pressure for reform originated with the provincial associations. Beginning sometime during the period between 1955 and 1958, the provinces of New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba had been undergoing a thorough organization revamping. For example, in the Province of Quebec, the Liberal Party had become, by 1960, a genuine mass party, organized down to the poll level, with central offices (in Quebec City and Montreal), a provincial party newspaper called La Réforme and a dues-paying membership which party officials claimed exceeded 50,000. To some extent, such party organizational activity was going on in every province after 1957. With the party in opposition in Ottawa, the provincial fields seemed to be the most logical starting points. These organizational efforts were soon crowned with success in 1960 in both New Brunswick and Quebec, where the Liberals won upset victories in provincial elections.

It will be recalled that the first substantial public manifestation of support for a change in the structure of the party came in 1959 when the University and Young Liberals, backed mainly by Manitoba and New Brunswick, had a minority statement

read to the Advisory Council along with the majority report. The composition of the 1961 Committee chaired by Lapointe and Gregory was significantly different from its predecessor Committee headed by Senator John Connolly (see footnotes #157 and #165). In 1959, Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Ontario were represented by Allan J. MacEachen, Maurice Lamontagne¹⁷⁴ and Senator Connolly respectively. Since they were not especially connected with their respective provincial parties, they could not be expected to support any change in the structure of the Federation. However, they were replaced on the 1961 Committee by Orval J.T. Troy of the Nova Scotia Association, Jean-Paul Gregoire of the Quebec Provincial Federation (which had only joined the National Federation in 1958) and Gordon Dryden of the Ontario association. Troy, Gregoire and Dryden were strong believers in control by the provinces where it appeared that democratic parties were being established in stark contrast to the situation which had prevailed for so long in federal politics. The fact that the two most important provinces were thus represented and that one of them was, by June, 1960, an emissary of a newly established government, was more than enough to bring about the amendments incorporated into the new Constitution.


It may also be true that the calmness with which the changes were greeted underlines the fact that many of the delegates were unaware that any noteworthy alterations were being made. The evidence shows that the functions of the Federation and the Central Office were not always understood by the party rank-and-file. The

frequent reminders made by Federation Presidents to the Advisory Council meetings in the past about the proper role of the Federation are testimony to this.

It is also possible to overestimate the importance of these changes. Nowhere in the constitution is there a statement to the effect that "the Federation is the party", as the minority report of the 1959 Committee would have liked. Nevertheless, the feeling that the Federation "is based on the principle that Liberals are Liberals whether or not they are operating in the provincial or federal sphere"¹⁷⁵ held by many may presage an entirely different role for the Federation than the one it played before. The new methods of operation of the party are signs that this may be so. (See diagram on following page.)

Under the direction of the National Organizer,¹⁷⁶ one of the chief functions of the Federation now is to build up efficient riding organizations in every federal constituency in Canada. This is done through the individual provincial associations which the Federation has encouraged to select one or more organizers (depending upon the size of the province). The National Federation has working agreements with each provincial association so that these organizers will be available for purposes of federal organization as well as their usual role of responsibility for provincial organization. A recognized but unwritten principle has evolved that "which ever general election --- provincial or federal --- is closer that priority will be given to which ever is most imminent."¹⁷⁷ In this structure, the lines of communication are from

THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY
(In Opposition - 1961 Constitution)



the constituencies to the provincial associations and via their organizer to the National Liberal Federation and the national organizer. This system involves close liaison with each of the ten provincial associations and one of the primary duties of the national organizer is to keep in touch with all parts of the country in order to ensure that this machinery is functioning properly.

The organization outlined for a national election campaign follows this same pattern and was first suggested by the 1958 Convention Organization Committee. A National Campaign Chairman is appointed by the Leader. Through this National chairman, and in consultation with the provincial association concerned, ten provincial chairmen are chosen to round out a National Campaign Committee. These ten provincial chairmen then gather provincial committees in their own provinces to supervise the various departments --- Finance, Electoral Laws, Publicity, etc. --- the campaign requires. The provincial chairmen report constantly to Ottawa and the National Federation, and thus the Federal Party uses the facilities of the provincial associations in contesting a national election.

One indication of the new role of the Federation Office was a group of pamphlets entitled "Key to Victory Series" on such subjects as organizing a poll committee and arranging for local publicity. These were drawn up by the office and distributed to the constituencies. Another important function of the Federation, that of publicity, was continued through the Canadian Liberal in its new format and through the national mailing list. In addition, the Young Liberals and Liberal Women had special general secretaries on the staff to deal directly with these affiliated organizations.

Quite apart from the constitutional changes, the proceedings of the Advisory Council after 1955 differed considerably from those which took place during the years of power. The handling and discussion of resolutions was marked by greater freedom and the gatherings were used to attack the entire range of the Conservative government's policies. In opposition, the practice of having meetings open to the press has advantages which the party did not overlook.

On the other hand, many activities were carried on outside the auspices of the Federation. In the field of policy and research, the Leader's office was expanded to include an entire research staff and the caucus was given the use of its own staff as well. Both of these were completely divorced from the Federation. Pearson was personally responsible for two further innovations in this connection. A "Study Conference on National Problems" under the chairmanship of former Deputy-Minister of Trade and Commerce Mitchell W. Sharp was held in Kingston in September, 1960. Its purpose was to bring together a group of about 150 "liberally-minded people" to discuss national issues and to suggest what government policy should be in respect to them. The Conference was reminiscent of a similar gathering called under similar circumstances during the Summer of 1933 by Mackenzie King, which took place at Vincent Massey's estate near Port Hope, Ontario. King's conference was labelled as a party gathering. This one was not, although the Sponsoring Committee and virtually all those presenting papers were generally known for their Liberal allegiances if they were not in fact party members. The most notable exceptions were Russell Bell of the Canadian Labour Congress

and Jean Marchand of the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour.¹⁷⁸

The other innovation was the National Rally held on January 9,10,11, 1961 in Ottawa. While the Federation's facilities were used to organize the gathering, open to all "liberally-minded Canadians", the chairmanship was in the hands of two M.P.s --- ex-Associate Defence Minister Paul Hellyer of Ontario and Hedard Robichaud of New Brunswick. The gathering was a remarkably "open" one and discussion both in committee and from the floor was unrestrained. The party hoped the Rally would have an effect similar to Laurier's 1893 meeting which, according to the now-accepted tradition, was instrumental in bringing the party to power three years later.

This brief account of these two meetings should not be construed to mean that policy-making had now passed from the hands of the leader and his parliamentary followers into those of the party rank-and-file. In a televised interview preceding the National Rally, Pearson set the record straight. In reply to the question, "How do you regard yourself as bound by the resolutions of this Rally?" Pearson said,

"I would certainly be guided and influenced by every resolution that comes out of this Rally. But, of course, conditions change and you would not be bound to put into effect every resolution which may be passed now, when you are in office even a short time from now." 179

Pearson retained control over the activities of the Federation as well. Both Presidents so far elected during his tenure were approved by him as were the National Organizer and any slate of officers

presented to the Advisory Council Meetings. The programme and resolutions of the meetings continued to be subject to the review of the parliamentary party.

Finally, the issue of finances should be mentioned. One of the duties of the Lapointe-Gregory Committee was to study possible means of collecting funds from party supporters to meet the annual budget of the national office. In submitting the Committee's report in 1961, Lapointe claimed that the Committee "did not feel sufficient advance had been achieved in public opinion to submit concrete proposals on this subject on a national basis" and suggested that the matter remain under continued scrutiny.¹⁸⁰

Since the defeat of 1957, many in the party were disturbed about the problem of financing both between election activities and the campaign itself. Addressing the Advisory Council in 1958, Pearson extolled a system of national card-carrying, dues-paying membership, claiming that there was "no stronger link between a man and the organization" than finance.

"If you can get them to pay \$5 for a membership card in the Liberal Party then he is identified with the party and we have \$5. One hundred thousand people paying \$5 would be \$500,000 a year, and that might work to keep us going between elections. I am very impatient as a new leader with this idea that every four or five years we can find \$4 or \$5 million to fight an election and we cannot find anything between elections to win the next election."¹⁸¹

Throughout his tenure as President of the Federation, Bruce Matthews tried to stimulate financial contributions at the local level so that "the constituencies would be taken off our back."¹⁸² He would have liked to broaden the base of contributions to enable the constituencies to cover the expenses for their own local campaigns

thereby leaving the Finance Committee (he was Chairman of the Toronto Committee) to collect for the national aspects of the campaign.

Some of the provincial parties achieved considerable success in attempting to broaden the base of their financial support. The developments in Quebec have already been noted. Ontario provides another example. In 1959, the Ontario party launched a financial project entitled "The Liberal Union". Membership subscriptions were set at \$100 yearly and an initial objective of enlisting 1000 members was undertaken. For this purpose, the Metropolitan Toronto area was made responsible for 500 memberships and the rest of the province was divided into 40 areas and organized through local committees. With a former cabinet minister in the St. Laurent government, Robert Winters, at its head, and with the cooperation of some members of the federal Finance Committee, provincial collectors ranged all over the province in two's setting up local committees. Close to \$100,000 was collected during the following two years and there were side-effects of renewed party activity in the constituencies as a result.

However, in spite of the suggestions from the leadership and these examples of success, the Finance Committee Report to the 1959 Advisory Council stated that "it was the opinion of the Committee that at the moment it is impractical for the National Liberal Federation to initiate and carry out a centralized program for the raising of funds through membership at the national level"¹⁸³ --- a conclusion the Lapointe-Gregory Committee repeated two years

later. The best the 1959 Committee could suggest was that the Federation might stimulate the raising of funds at the constituency level through the use of uniform Liberal party membership cards and the establishment of a coordinating record system which would result in national acknowledgment of membership. It also suggested that the experience of Ontario with the Liberal Union might be emulated in other provinces.¹⁸⁴

According to one highly-placed party official (who had best remain nameless), there is little hope for a nationally coordinated regularized system of fund raising:

"The Federation will never be a fund-raising body...the point is very simple. If an organization is involved with raising funds, then the membership wants to know where it came from and how it is spent."

The reason given for the prediction of the future role of the Federation in this connection may perhaps reveal an ignorance of the tendencies which Michels observed operating in all organizations. The prediction may nevertheless be an accurate one. Many people concerned with political fund-raising have commented that contributors are reluctant to have themselves or the amount of their contributions revealed. Many correlate this, as the informant did, with the general Canadian reluctance to submit to interviews with pollsters or to divulge their voting intentions. Canadians are not as ready as Americans to be identified as followers of a political party. However, it is also true that if the amount of contributions were made public, then if (say) the Conservatives received a certain sum, the Liberals would then demand a like amount. In a political system in which government economic

involvement is taken for granted, the stakes in this matter for large corporations can be quite high. Should a party receive a relatively small contribution and should it succeed in forming a government, secrecy provides some protection for corporations against retaliation because accurate comparisons with what the opposition may have received are thereby usually impossible to make.

7. 'Two Kinds of Liberal': Federal-Provincial Party Relations

The ease with which such party personalities as C.A. Dunning, W.S. Fielding, James G. Gardiner, Stuart Garson, Sir Lomer Gouin, George P. Graham, Mitchell Hepburn, Jean Lesage, Angus L. Macdonald, Paul Martin, Clifford Sifton and Ross Thatcher have moved between federal and provincial fields erroneously suggests that all Liberals are alike whether they operate in federal or provincial politics. In this sense, the preceding description of the national organization of the party is artificial because it tends to present the operations of the party as being uniform across the country. While the foregoing sections have strongly contradicted Professor Dawson's almost unequivocal assertion that the provincial association is the effective head of Canadian party organizations (at least where the Liberal Party is concerned), the role of the provincial associations cannot be ignored. In fact, a review of the history of the interaction between the federal and provincial wings of the party can easily lead to the conclusion that at times there are eleven Liberal parties operating in Canada, ten provincial and one national.

As part of the preamble to their constitutions, most provincial Liberal parties include the statement that one of the objects of their associations is "to organize the Liberal Party in the Federal and Provincial ridings" and "to promote the election of Federal and Provincial Liberal candidates" in the province.¹⁸⁵ One of the manifestations of theoretical party unity is found in the uniform practice of according membership in provincial party associations to all federal Members of Parliament, defeated candidates and Senators. In some of the provincial party constitutions there is the further provision that the Honorary President of the Association is the Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada.

Some provinces, most notably Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan, have a long history of unbroken Federal-Provincial cooperation. In Nova Scotia, W.S. Fielding became Premier in 1884 and when he moved into the Laurier Cabinet as Minister of Finance in 1896, he left a hand-picked successor, George H. Murray, in charge. With Fielding in federal politics and Murray at the head of the government in the province, there was usually complete cooperation between federal and provincial interests for the next thirty years except during the Union Government period. Under Angus L. Macdonald there was seldom any question as to the locus of control. Macdonald was Premier from 1933 until 1940. He switched to Federal politics, serving five years under King and then returned to head the provincial government until 1954. While Robert H. Winters was the Nova Scotia cabinet minister during the entire period of the St. Laurent administration, no separate federal organization was set up and

Winters carried out his duties with the cooperation of the provincial party. The only difference between federal and provincial organizations was that at the constituency level, where federal and provincial constituencies did not coincide. Separate constituency party machinery had to be set up. Federal and provincial constituencies had their own executives and separate local party machinery but these were invariably staffed with the same personnel. This has remained the practice in the province to this day.

The celebrated Saskatchewan Liberal "machine" was organized from Regina. However, from 1922 until 1957, it was effectively in the hands of James G. Gardiner. Gardiner began his career as a local organizer in the Lemberg area during the first decade of this century and became C.A. Dunning's chief organizer when the latter succeeded William Martin as Premier of the province in 1922. When Dunning joined King's cabinet in 1926, Gardiner succeeded him. In 1935, when Gardiner came to Ottawa as Minister of Agriculture, he left William J. Patterson behind as Premier but retained control of the organization himself. The problem with the differences between federal and provincial boundaries was solved in the identical manner and with the identical results as in Nova Scotia.¹⁸⁶

Newfoundland is an area in which the provincial organization has never been challenged since the province has been part of Canada. J.W. Pickersgill, a member of the St. Laurent cabinet from 1953 until 1957, and accordingly responsible for seeing to the interests of the government in the province, has often admitted that he and his fellow Newfoundland M.P.s would be helpless without the support of Premier Joseph Smallwood's organization.

In Manitoba, where a coalition Liberal-Progressive regime under John Bracken lasted for two decades after the farmers' insurrection of the 1920's, the relationship for this period between the Federal party and provincial Liberalism is vague. In the late 1930's, Minister of Agriculture Gardiner attempted to impose his own organization on the province but a sharp rebuke from King and cries against "Saskatchewan domination" from strongly resisting Manitoba Liberals squelched his efforts. However, after Stuart Garson became Premier of the province in 1943, there appears to be no doubt that the Liberal-Progressive and Federal Liberal party were almost identical organizations. This situation continued when Garson became Minister of Justice in St. Laurent's cabinet in the Fall of 1948. Like Gardiner, Garson retained the position as the final seat of authority for his province in spite of the fact that Douglas L. Campbell, also a Liberal-Progressive, continued as Premier in Winnipeg.

It is possible to claim that the above are examples of provincial domination and that the cooperation that existed was more the result of personal liaison among federal ministers and individuals and provincial people than of any special machinery which was set up for this purpose. Two more provinces, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, can be added to this list of areas in which federal and provincial organization operations have generally coincided. However, the remaining four provinces, British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec, provide examples of actual or potential discord between federal and provincial interests which was so

substantial as to require separate organizations to be set up so that the respective elections could be contested without internecine conflict.

The party's problems in British Columbia stemmed from local provincial circumstances and not from a conflict of personalities or policy. Until the early 1940's, especially under the leadership of Liberal Premier T.D. Pattullo, there was little difference between the federal and provincial party, although some policy differences did arise over tax-agreements. However, the coalition government which ruled the province for approximately ten years until 1952 contained both Liberals and Conservatives. In order not to embarrass the provincial party, the federal Liberals set up separate machinery to contest the elections in 1949 and even in 1953, after Social Credit had won the provincial election of the previous year. The provincial Liberals on their part were careful not to be associated with the federal party. For example, after the coalition won 40 out of 48 seats in the provincial election of 1949, the party's organizer informed the Federation office in Ottawa that the federal government should avoid saying anything that referred to the role of the provincial Liberal party in the election. Any boasting from Ottawa would endanger relations between Liberals and Conservatives in the coalition. The message was relayed to Prime Minister St. Laurent and this policy was strictly adhered to. Many consider that the niceties of coalition politics and the separation of federal and provincial parties as a result was an important factor in defeating the party in the province.

The Alberta situation is a confused one. In the 1920's and 1930's conditions varied. Sometimes the provincial organization would be in charge of arrangements for both federal and provincial elections. In other cases, individual candidates in federal constituencies would have to fend for themselves. Former Premier Charles Stewart who was nominally the Alberta representative in the King cabinets of the 1920's (although sitting for a constituency in Quebec) was not looked upon as an effective organizer and in the early 1930's the burden of organization seemed to fall upon provincial leader William Howson's shoulders. There were regional variations also. For example, in 1935, there was no federal organization at all in Calgary while, in the northern part of the province centering in Edmonton, a fierce conflict, mainly over campaign funds, was being waged between federal and provincial interests. The rivalry between the two was especially acute because federal and provincial election campaigns happened to be going on simultaneously.¹⁸⁷

After the party was returned to power in Ottawa in 1935, Gardiner attempted to assume organizational functions for the province in the absence of any Alberta cabinet representative. As in Manitoba, the Alberta provincial party organization also strongly objected to the "political domination of Saskatchewan."¹⁸⁸ However, in spite of a constitutional fusion of organizations towards the end of the decade, strains in the relationship continued. With the 1950 appointment of George Prudham to the cabinet, these strains increased to the point where, in 1955, Prudham opened a separate office devoted exclusively to the interests of the federal

party in Edmonton.

The most publicized case of intra-party federal-provincial rivalry is presented by Ontario. It will be recalled that after provincial Leader Newton Rowell took a considerable portion of his organization with him in joining Borden's Union Government scheme in 1917, Charles Murphy led a reorganization of the Ontario Liberal Association and succeeded in creating a unified Liberal party in the province. In the period from 1930 to 1942, during which time Mitchell F. Hepburn led the provincial party, this unification was tenuous at best and finally broke down completely for the 1940 federal election campaign. However, only the barest outlines of the story can be presented.¹⁸⁹

The seeds of discord were planted at the 1930 convention which chose Hepburn to lead the Ontario party. Mackenzie King sent a message to the convention at Toronto advising the delegates against any course which would tend to confuse any Dominion and Provincial issues. He claimed that with this in mind he had decided to stay away from the meeting.¹⁹⁰ According to Senator Lambert, after Hepburn led the party to victory in the 1934 Ontario campaign, he wrote to King asking his advice on the selection of cabinet ministers in the government he was about to form. King is reported to have replied in a long letter informing Hepburn that he did not think it was his (King's) right to advise him on matters such as these. Hepburn was Premier and it was his responsibility to select his colleagues. It is clear that in refusing to interfere in the provincial cabinet-making process, King wished to forestall

similar attempts by Hepburn to impose any candidates he might have upon King should the federal party succeed in winning the forthcoming federal election which by that time it seemed certain to do.

After the 1935 election victory in which Hepburn's organization was partially instrumental in winning 56 out of the 82 Ontario seats for the party, the eventuality which King had cagily foreseen occurred. During that campaign, Hepburn had appeared on the platform in North Bay with Arthur G. Slaght, the eventually-elected candidate for the constituency of Parry Sound, and advised the audience that he was standing beside the next Federal Minister of Justice. This was obviously impossible because Ernest Lapointe had held the post in the past and it would take more than someone of Slaght's stature to displace Lapointe, who was the acknowledged leader in Quebec and to whom King owed his secure position. Nevertheless, after the election and while King was in the process of selecting his new cabinet, Hepburn made several unsolicited representations including one on Slaght's behalf. He was flatly turned down and in fact King did not consult him at all about the composition of the Federal Government. If this did not anger Hepburn sufficiently, the eventual composition of the cabinet did. When King's decisions were announced, Hepburn and his followers were especially peeved over the selection of C.D. Howe and Norman Rogers, whom they considered "non-political outsiders".¹⁹¹

Hepburn mistakenly considered King's refusal to participate in provincial cabinet-making and his subsequent refusal to even consult with Hepburn about the composition of the Federal Government

as tantamount to urging that separate organizations in Ontario be set up. Accordingly, when the time to send delegates to the 1936 Advisory Council Meeting came, he wrote the following letter to Senator Lambert outlining his views on the future course of organization in the province:

"During the past few months I have given a great deal of thought to the question of the relationship which should exist between the Ontario Association and your Federation, and after many conferences with my colleagues it has been decided that we will not be represented at your annual meeting. I am also asking Mr. Johnson¹⁹² to keep his organization separate and distinct from yours. I believe this to be in the interests of both Governments. I am constantly being pressed from all sides to make representations to the Federal Ministers and in accordance with the intimation given to me by Mr. King shortly after the Federal Election I have carefully refrained from doing anything of such a nature which I know would ultimately be embarrassing not only to Mr. King but to myself as well.

"In future, it will be our intention, and may I make this very clear, to keep our organization separate and apart from yours."
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The following two years were marked by a long series of differences between Hepburn and King. For a time, Hepburn even joined with Maurice Duplessis, head of the newly elected Union Nationale government in Quebec, against what he considered to be the attempted encroachments of the Dominion Government upon provincial rights. He charged that the federal government was attempting to invade provincial regions of taxation and that Ontario was not getting a fair proportion of unemployment relief from Ottawa. He even attempted to deal directly with Washington over the King government's refusal to approve the export of hydro-electric power and the diversion of water from the Hudson Bay watershed to Lake Superior, which was contrary to a long-standing treaty with the United States.¹⁹⁴

Finally, within the province itself, his reactionary labour policy, over which two of his ministers resigned, severely damaged the image of the party with the growing union movement.

It was not long before many within the provincial party objected to these activities and began asking for help from Ottawa. Many shared Lambert's concern about the next federal election as well. By 1938, the entire Eastern Ontario Liberal Association (one of six regional associations in the provincial organization) pledged its support for federal purposes and the President of the provincial Twentieth Century Liberal Association (the fore-runner of the Young Liberals) promised the same. Several constituency associations likewise wrote to Lambert proclaiming their allegiance to King in the conflict with their provincial leader.¹⁹⁵

In spite of these concrete manifestations of unrest, Hepburn continued to snub the federal party and its leaders. When a dinner was held in Toronto on August 8, 1939 to celebrate King's twenty years at the head of the party, Hepburn not only stayed away but forbade his Ministers to attend.¹⁹⁶ The vendetta reached its height the following January. Hepburn, who had been attacking the federal government's war effort as apathetic and niggardly, obtained the support of the Conservative opposition in the provincial legislature, led by George Drew, and passed a resolution of censure to the effect "that the federal government at Ottawa has made so little effort to prosecute Canada's duty in the war in the vigorous manner the people of Canada desire to see."¹⁹⁷ While this censure motion provided King with an excellent issue upon

which to appeal to the country, the party still had to fight the federal campaign in Ontario without the cooperation of the Ontario Association. This was done through Lambert and the Ontario Ministers in direct contact with the constituencies.

The results of the election, in which there was scarcely any change in the party standings in the province, demonstrated the futility of Hepburn's opposition. Nevertheless, King could not permit the party organization of the country's largest province to remain outside the fold indefinitely. Hepburn retired in 1942, and, in naming G.D. Conant to replace him as Premier, he so incensed provincial party supporters that at the 1943 leadership convention Harry C. Nixon was elected instead. Nixon, who had voted against the 1940 censure resolution and who had on other occasions taken a stand against Hepburn in the federal-provincial conflict, had King's support in the contest. The Prime Minister offered no encouragement to Conant and tried to dissuade Arthur Roebuck (one of the Ministers resigning from Hepburn's government over the 1937 labor troubles in Oshawa and now a federal MP) from running. To be certain of Nixon's success, nine federal cabinet ministers attended the convention¹⁹⁸ and it is certain they had no small role in selecting the delegates to the meeting. There was no pretense of separating federal and provincial affairs now.¹⁹⁹

It is unfair to compare the subsequent history of organizational relationships with the goings-on of the Hepburn period. Immediately after his assumption of office, Nixon led the party to a crushing defeat in the 1943 provincial election and the party has

remained in opposition ever since. Accordingly, any objections the "provincials" might have had to federal cabinet domination could not have the impact comparable to that which such objections would have had had they emanated from a party in power. In fact, these are grounds for claiming that the balance had shifted in the other direction and that the federal ministers and federal M.P.s played an overwhelming role in provincial affairs. For example, in the 1951 provincial campaign, a six-member joint committee composed of three members of the provincial legislature and three M.P.s from the province drafted the Liberal platform. Furthermore, the federal government during these years had no difficulty using the party in the Ontario legislature as a device for embarrassing the Conservative provincial government. For example, Ministers would send notes to the provincial leader asking him to place awkward questions on the order paper of the provincial legislature requesting information on the expenditures of the Ontario government especially in connection with joint federal-provincial ventures.

Organizational relationships in Quebec, while not as well publicized as those in Ontario, are just as interesting and probably more significant from the point of view of the role of Quebec in the Canadian political process.²⁰⁰ Since the days of Laurier, federal and provincial organizations were kept scrupulously apart in the province. The federal party maintained two regional offices, one in Montreal and the other in Quebec City. The Finance Committees were always kept separate and the rule was established that each would have a different chairman. In the

provincial sphere, there was, as mentioned before, no provincial association but rather a caucus-type party, with local conventions the exception rather than the rule and with the members and the defeated candidates supreme in the constituencies. When the National Liberal Federation was founded, the provincial party refused to send any delegates. Instead, the federal ministers from the province or the Quebec federal caucus would select the requisite number to which the province was constitutionally entitled.

Quebec's well-known position as defender of "provincial rights" and its traditional aversion to anything remotely connected with federal "domination" are the reasons underlying this separation. No Quebec party can afford to be too closely associated with a nation ("i.e. centralizing") organization. Nevertheless, until the end of the Second War, there was substantial cooperation between individuals in federal and provincial parties at all levels. This cooperation was especially close at the highest level where Lapointe and Premier L.A. Taschereau had a special relationship in spite of their ideological differences. There were some difficulties, particularly in connection with the federal government's unemployment insurance program in the 1930's. Taschereau strongly objected to it on the public grounds that the federal government was encroaching upon the autonomy of the province because under the British North America Act such programs properly came under the jurisdiction of the provinces. It is more likely that his objections were grounded on his conservative dispositions regarding the role of the government in the economy. The problem was solved when Taschereau's

government was defeated in 1936. With Duplessis now in power, the federal Liberals could always explain away any cries about infringement of provincial rights as being typical obstructionist tactics of a French Canadian nationalist party.

There was little incentive to alter the organizational style of the provincial party. Beginning with 1897, the Liberals continued to form the provincial government for close to forty years. No attempts to change were made even after the defeat at the hands of Duplessis in 1936 because it was automatically assumed that it was only the corruption of the Taschereau regime that had led to the party's downfall. A victory three years later, even though it could not have been accomplished without the aid of the resources of the federal government, naturally did not encourage reform. After Duplessis was returned to power in 1944, the requirements of the federal party which found itself fighting the repercussions of its conscription policy absorbed all the energies of the Liberals in the province.

Attempts to set up a permanent organization based on riding associations might have begun immediately after the 1948 provincial election which left the once-mighty party with but eight seats in the ninety-five seat legislature. However, barely ten days after that disastrous provincial election, St. Laurent was elected leader of the party in Ottawa. With one of their own at the helm, all Quebec's efforts automatically seemed to turn to the federal field in anticipation of the long run of power that appeared to be in store for the party. It also appeared that Duplessis was going to be unbeatable. After the 1949 federal

election campaign in which the Union Nationale gave considerable support to George Drew's Conservatives, many federal M.P.s from the province concluded that the only remedy for such opposition was to enter into what have now become the infamous "non-aggression" pacts with the Union Nationale. By 1957, approximately thirty Liberal members sitting mainly for rural constituencies had entered into these agreements, which consisted of little more than a reciprocal undertaking between federal M.P.s and Union Nationale members not to participate in the election campaigns of their counterparts. The federal Liberals involved found these agreements especially enticing. There was little patronage available for them in federal politics where civil service rules are relatively stringent and the ethos of honesty prevails. On the other hand, Quebec political life has traditionally been characterized by just the opposite. So for close to a decade, the province witnessed the spectacle of Liberal candidates campaigning vigorously in federal campaigns, not so much for the privilege of representing their constituencies in Ottawa but in order to be in on the graft pouring in from Quebec City that would automatically be theirs. It is hardly necessary to point out that many of these federal M.P.s were not anxious to see a rejuvenated Liberal Party in the province. However, it should be emphasized that these agreements were made on an individual basis and were by no means the policy of the federal party leadership.²⁰¹

It has been pointed out elsewhere that several of these federal Liberals had begun their careers in the late 1940's running

as "Independents" or as "Independent-Liberals" often with Union Nationale support. (In the 1949 election alone, five "Independents" or "Independent-Liberals" were elected and this number does not include subsequent by-election successes by similar candidates.) After they had beaten the official candidate in an election, they were soon accepted as full-fledged Liberals by the parliamentary caucus. This easy-going arrangement in Ottawa was more than equalled by looseness in organizational matters in Quebec. For in spite of nominal ministerial responsibility private members were often almost impregnable in their own areas. There was certainly no point in refusing the party label to them because, given the state of constituency organization, any official candidate would have been soundly beaten running against them.

Georges E. Lapalme, leader of the provincial party, realized that his forces had no hope of victory using the old methods of organization campaigning against the most powerful and corrupt machine in Canadian politics at the time --- especially when the Union Nationale had the tacit support of many in the federal party as well. Upon his election as leader in 1950, he led the attempt to organize the party, poll by poll, in every constituency in the province. By 1955, when the Quebec Liberal Federation was set up as the framework for the new Quebec Liberal Party, a genuine mass organization was beginning to take shape. In 1957, the Quebec Federation was affiliated to the National Federation and while the federal M.P.s from the province attempted to remain aloof from this new development, the provincial forces began taking steps to

unite the two wings of the party in the province.

At the 1958 National Convention, André Rousseau, President of the Quebec Federation, submitted the following resolutions, which while presaging things to come, were at the time overlooked in the confusion preceding the election campaign. Rousseau suggested that federal and provincial constituencies be integrated under the Quebec Liberal Federation; that those M.P.s who had openly or tacitly collaborated with the Union Nationale should be barred from the Liberal caucus in the House of Commons, that every Liberal candidate standing for election either had to receive his investiture from a properly constituted and representative local nominating convention or be accredited by the Quebec Federation before being permitted to run; and that a joint committee composed of members of the Executive of the Quebec Federation and those in Ottawa responsible for the direction of the federal campaign in the province be set up.²⁰²

Almost immediately after the 1958 defeat in which the federal party failed to obtain a seat majority in the province for the first time since 1891, the Quebec Party showed it meant business. In the autumn of that year, Senator Sarto Fournier, then Mayor of Montreal, was read out of the party by a resolution passed at the Annual Meeting of the Federation in Quebec City. It was not that Fournier's collaboratory activities were particularly heinous or noteworthy. While the resolution was aimed specifically at him, it was really designed as a symbol that the reform elements in the Quebec Liberal Party had succeeded in wresting control away from

the "old-guard". It was a decision in which the newly-elected Leader, Jean Lesage, played almost no part, and the fact that Fournier could only muster twenty votes in his favor out of the 590 voting on the resolution was conclusive evidence of the new spirit in the party.

After Jean Lesage led the party to its upset victory in the 1960 provincial election, the Quebec party was in a strong position to impose its demands for unity upon any recalcitrant Liberal M.P.s from the province. In November, the President and Executive-Secretary of the Quebec Federation met with Lester Pearson, Maurice Lamontagne, Walter Gordon, the National Organizer and the Associate General-Secretary of the National Federation in Pearson's office in Ottawa. The representatives of the Quebec party presented a lengthy brief which had been approved by the Executive Committee of the Quebec Federation two weeks before, outlining the future relationship between the National and Quebec provincial parties.

The memorandum set out the following procedure which the Quebec Federation wished to see followed in a federal election campaign in the province: Only two organization committees, one in Montreal and the other in Quebec City, would be set up. These Committees would have a membership of five or six and would be chosen jointly by the National Federation and Quebec Federation subject to the approval of both Pearson and Lesage. Each federal candidate wishing to stand for election would have to be chosen by a constituency organization affiliated with the Quebec Federation

--- and this rule was to apply to sitting members as well as new candidates. No conventions would be called without the approval of one of the organization committees. Only one Finance Committee was to be set up and it was to have exclusive jurisdiction over party funds. The members of this Committee, the Organization Committee and a Committee on Publicity were each to receive letters attesting to their position in the direction of the campaign. Finally, over-all direction of the campaign would be in the hands of the National Organizer. The Quebec Federation expected to have this machinery in effective operating condition within three months.

Understandably, the uproar in the caucus of the Quebec M.P.s was substantial. It was aggravated by the fact that there was no Quebec M.P. in attendance at the meeting.²⁰³ The comments on the projected changes reveal the depth of feeling on the part of the parliamentary contingent. As one M.P. put it:

"They think they're the only ones who know how to win elections. These are the same ones who just a while ago were going down on their knees in front of the federal organization for favors --- and they had been doing this for years."

Another claimed:

"That Montreal office can't be closed down. An integration of the two organizations is impossible. Lesage has his own enemies in Quebec. The Union Nationale is the enemy and they have already been howling that Lesage is too close to Ottawa. Le Devoir would raise a great hulabaloo if Lagarde (René Lagarde was the federal organizer in the office) was moved over to the Federation. This would be proof enough that the party was centralist --- too close to Ottawa."

Cries of dismay even reached the press. Azellus Denis, the M.P. for

the constituency of St. Denis on the Island of Montreal, is reported to have pointed out to one reporter that

"...sans organisation, les libéraux fédéraux ont quand même fait beaucoup mieux que les provinciaux depuis vingt ans et soutenu qu'il faut que chacun s'occupe de ses affaires ... Il ne faut pas qu'on restreigne notre liberté, surtout quand nous avons une organisation qui fait notre affaire, qu'il a produit des victoires depuis des années. Il y a des 'Bleus' qui ont voté pour Lesage." 204

Naturally, members of the Quebec Federation saw things differently. Executive-Secretary Maurice Sauvé summed up their attitude with the remark: "You can't have two roosters with the same bunch of hens."²⁰⁵

An indication of the outcome of the conflict may be found in the fact that the federal M.P.s were using every medium available, even so public a vehicle as the press, to make their case. With the provincial party in power, it would appear that they have little choice but to comply. In addition, the "provincials" were feeling especially haughty because it was they who had collected most of the money for the federal campaigns in Quebec in 1958 (and 1962) and financed the 1960 provincial race without any aid from Ottawa. However, the results of the 1962 election in the province have not helped the situation. Prior to June 18, 1962, the "provincials" had privately boasted to all those in the federal party who would listen that it was the Quebec organization that was going to deliver the vote that would bring the party back to power in Ottawa. They even threatened the Ontario "provincials" that they would have nothing to do with the election unless they could see

evidence that the Ontario party was exerting itself suitably. In the end, however, it was the Quebec organization's failure to hold up its end that was the reason that it was Diefenbaker and not Pearson who could form a minority government. The target in Ontario was between 35 and 40 seats; in Quebec, 55 to 65. Ontario returned with an unexpected Liberal total of 44 while the party was fortunate to come out of Quebec with 35 seats.

It should not be inferred from this that organizational difficulties in the provinces are based solely on materialistic grounds or upon a lust for spoils. There can be ideological undertones as well. For example, in spite of the organizational difficulties with the "federals" in Quebec, members of the provincial party criticized the M.P.s more often on grounds of political philosophy than on those of corruption. They characterized the "old guard" as little more than stand-pat conservatives, mindless of the needs of their province. This point can be over-emphasized and it is possible to claim that ideological differences were being emphasized to legitimize what was little more than a struggle between "ins" and "outs". However, as mentioned before, the new Lesage Government (with mixed support from the rank-and-file), had already embarked on a program of social, economic and political reform. Many contended that should the "old guard" have regained control of the party, these forward-looking policies would have been emasculated if not entirely revoked. Some claimed simply that Quebec was once again merely going through the "crisis of generations". Many more saw the ideological cleavage as one based on principle. It is therefore not surprising that the struggle for organization control was

(and, as this is written, continues to be) at times fought with a fierceness that only serious conviction can impart.

III

While the organization of the Liberal Party has, through the years, been in a state of flux, its historical course has not been a patternless one. It may be characterized as a process of ebb and flow, from decentralization, to centralization and back to decentralization once again, according to the electoral fortunes of the party as it vies for power at the national level. In other words, whether the party is fighting an election to gain office or to hold it determines the mode of organization employed.

When the party is in opposition, the national organization is run from the provincial headquarters with coordination from Ottawa. With provincial and federal elections often held years apart, the provincial fields are the natural areas in which to begin to prepare for a return to power nationally. Moreover, there is the added incentive of less stringent civil service rules and a lower political morality at the provincial level. Paradoxically, provincial electorates tolerate corruption on their own doorstep and are relatively indifferent to dishonest practices in contract letting and the like --- practices that would not for a moment be condoned on the national scene. The job of coordination for national purposes is a relatively easy one for Ottawa to perform for it is a simple task to convince all Liberals, federal and provincial, whether in power in provincial capitals or not, to attack the

common foe forming the government in Ottawa. This interest in the provinces by the federal leadership is also based on the premise that a certain sign of victory in a federal election is victory in several provincial elections. The period between 1932 and 1935 is always given as a prime example. In 1932, the Liberals held office only in Quebec. Before the victory of 1935, which set off the long string of subsequent successes, the party had captured seven of the nine provinces (only Alberta and Manitoba held out).²⁰⁶

When the party is returned to power nationally centralization takes place --- not, however, through a national office, but at the parliamentary level, through the Cabinet. Traditions of cabinet representation provide an ideal framework and when a constituency has succeeded in electing a representative, there is little further incentive for constant activity. Even well-intentioned provincial organizations are helpless and, besides, they have their own local problems with which to keep themselves occupied. The requirements of the cabinet system make this centralization imperative. To govern, a government must be sure of its majority. In any case, Ottawa looms much larger in the mind of the general public than the local provincial capital (again Quebec may be the exception). If politicians often complain that the goings-on in the House of Commons are seldom followed by the public, this is infinitely more true with regard to provincial politics (with the exception, of course, of groups specifically affected by provincial legislation). The average M.P.'s attitudes conform to this

hierarchy of values. He has far more prestige as an M.P. than as an M.L.A. and, although there seems to be no coherent self-image of an M.P. which acts as an integrating factor in making for specific parliamentary attitudes, it is certain that M.P.s do not relish being dictated to by provincial parties, whether these parties are in office or in opposition. It is often the case that when the "federals" are in opposition, the M.P.s are hard pressed to fend off interference from the "provincials", especially when the latter hold power in their province. However, the traditions of parliamentary supremacy, while considerably weaker in Canada than in Great Britain, are applicable against any and all attempts from outside organs, be they rank-and-file attempts at control or similar attempts by provincial bodies.

What is probably equally significant, however, is that this centralization is virtually forced upon the national party by built-in constitutional conflicts regarding the respective roles of provincial and federal government. Differences over resource use and development, taxation rights and social and economic policy (in such forms as unemployment insurance and national medical and pension plans) are certain to arise. No national government can afford to place itself at the mercy of any provincial party, even if it is a Liberal one, by leaving control of the organization --- the sinews of power --- in its hands. This problem is most acute in any province where the party is in power provincially as well.²⁰⁷ In such circumstances, separate organizations may have to be set up as was the case in Ontario in the 1930's and this is a perfect

excuse for presently maintaining separate machinery in Quebec in anticipation of the day when the party is returned to power federally. On the other hand, when the party is in opposition in the province, there is seldom any problem in the relationship.

The system of organizing through elected members is inefficient because many do not enjoy this chore. It is also latently impermanent although it is certain that fifteen to twenty years of continuous electoral success can give a strong sense of security. Defeat in a general election leaves great gaps in the national structure. This is especially so in Canada where voting behavior fluctuates wildly in the course of an electoral turnover. A renewed interest in setting up some sort of permanent structure follows. With provincial parties fully operational or at least in existence in all the provinces, the structure is always federal rather than unitary. Thus the cycle begins again. In the light of past experience, a cynical prophecy concerning the future of Liberal party organization might easily be that when the party returns to power, the most recent attempts to reform the party will turn out to be little more than "good intentions".

The cycle of decentralization-centralization-decentralization in party organization helps explain a peculiar phenomenon in voting behavior referred to elsewhere: Namely, that opposition to a government in Ottawa is not manifested first in a general election at the national level, but rather at the provincial level. It has already been pointed out in partial explanation that elections at different times and at various intervals permit the electorate

to split its voting allegiances by supporting one party federally and another provincially. However, it is possible that the organizational activities of the party when it is out of office nationally aggravates this voting disposition of provincial electorates. Then when the party comes to power in Ottawa, attention is shifted to the national scene and there is often a lessening of provincial activity to the detriment of local organizational requirements. On occasion, when the federal government co-opts provincial personalities, usually the Premier, to fill a seat on the cabinet, this shift is intensified. With no one minding the store at home, the opposition has a relatively free field in which to operate. There are glaring weaknesses in this explanation for while it may be applicable to the Liberals, it ignores the factor of the minor parties operating in Western Canada and the weakness of the Conservative party in several provinces, notably British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan. (For the purposes of this analysis, the Union Nationale in Quebec is considered as part of the Conservative party particularly because it has supported the Tories in federal elections almost throughout its history.)

There are several points worth emphasizing regarding the questions of the establishment of a permanent central organization and control of the parliamentary membership by the party rank-and-file. On the basis of pure logic, it would seem that the most sensible way to avoid this impermanence in national party organization would be to set up a system in which a central office in Ottawa maintains direct contact with each of the 265 constituencies

without going through the provinces. The Liberals claim that such a system is against their philosophy and use the Conservative Party, fresh from the considerable success with the methods instituted by their National Organizer Allister Grosart (who has by now become an eminence grise to all good Liberals) as a foil. Associate General Secretary Paul Lafond had this comment to make:

"A good organization depends on work at the local constituency level with coordination at the top. After the defeat of 1958, people were grumbling that what the Liberals need is another Grosart or a super-Grosart --- but I don't agree with this. For twenty years we have been preaching that this has been the Tory practice. So this is foreign to our nature. The traditional practice is to say to the provinces: We are here in Ottawa; we can give services; we can provide services; ...If they feel they don't need them --- well, fine! They are the bosses in their own territory. What I think is repugnant to us are the pressure methods used by Mr. Grosart."

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The Liberals may wish to justify their methods on philosophical grounds. It seems more likely that the Conservatives are able to run a more centralized organization because of the absence of any provincial organizations in four provinces. As has been pointed out incessantly, this is a situation with which the Liberal Party is not blessed. One also wonders, in spite of his accomplishments, how successful Grosart was in dealing with the Ontario Conservative Party, in office in that province since 1943, or the other Conservative governments in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia in the 1958 federal campaign.

As for control of the party by the National Federation, the history of the relationship is a chronicle of dominance by the parliamentary party. It is, of course, possible for the

Federation as constituted in 1961 to develop in a different direction. However, the M.P.s are reluctant to say that "the Federation is the party", claiming that one can be a member of the party simply by voting for it at election time without becoming a member of the organization. Those members of the parliamentary group who recognize the implications of a change in the status of the Federation express themselves in strong terms:

"This is not a totalitarian party. If there was real and effective control of the party by the Federation, the secretary of the party would then be the most powerful man in the party --- not the Leader. This is just like the Communists. Remember, the Leader when he is Prime Minister represents all the people. He should not be a tool of the party secretary."
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An ex-cabinet minister was equally adamant and even more specific:

"Mr. King used to call the deliberations of the Federation a chart. And that was right. These 'working papers' you see here (at the National Liberal Rally, Ottawa, January, 1961) are too specific. They give people the impression that when the Liberals are the government, before they do anything, they're going to look over the papers and thumb through the papers before instituting a policy ... I don't want to have experts, outsiders, telling the people who are politically responsible what to do."
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A partial solution to the dilemma of the National Organizer and permanent organization is suggested by Senator Power. He contends that centralization in the cabinet is a built-in feature of the modern Canadian political process. Since organization also means appointing judges, awarding contracts and the like, from his experience in the party, the organizer is helpless in the system now in operation unless he is in the cabinet himself.²¹¹ The fact

that Grosart of the Conservatives has no cabinet appointment operates to lessen his powers, although he has two advantages in his favor: He held his position before the party came to power and he is very close to Diefenbaker. The closest the Liberals came in this connection was in 1943 when Secretary of State Norman McLarty was President of the Federation as well. The party also used to appoint the President of the Federation to the Senate or to pick Senators as Presidents. After the War, however, even this practice ceased, perhaps with the goal of maintaining the position of the Federation as the "lay association" of the party's supporters.

Finally, the looseness and informality of the organization must be accounted for beyond the statement that such informality is typical of North American parties. In analyzing the organization of the British Conservative Party, R.T. McKenzie notes that the decision by the party to create a mass organization outside parliament was prompted by the necessity of minimizing the dangers inherent in the Tory Party's 1867 "leap in the dark". Their Reform Act of that year roughly doubled the electorate and of particular importance was the fact that the new voters were mainly members of the working and lower middle classes in the urban areas. These people could hardly be relied upon to automatically recognize their identity of interest with the Conservative Party. The earliest efforts of the National Union were therefore devoted to wooing these newly enfranchised urban voters. After a casual beginning, these efforts grew in intensity because of the stiff

competition provided by the Liberal Party inspired by Joseph Chamberlain and the Birmingham Caucus. Then, in the 1880's, effective restrictions on campaign expenditures made it increasingly necessary to rely on the assistance of voluntary party workers. The finishing touch was the spread of public education and the increased literacy of the masses which made it imperative that the party should have facilities for the preparation and distribution of party literature.²¹²

Two of the above elements were missing from Canada (aside from the obvious differences between the two countries). In the first place, the size of the electorate did not increase suddenly but grew gradually and more or less steadily through the years until by 1921, property qualifications ceased and the present situation of universal adult suffrage was attained.²¹³ Indeed, it seems as if the growth of the electorate was hardly noticed and the local representative had little need for a party machine in his locality. Secondly, there are to this day no operative restraints regarding the collection and distribution of funds for political purposes. In short, the only motive for establishing some sort of permanent machinery is to maintain some supervision over the local electorate and it may be noted that there is even less need for such permanence in Canada compared with the United States. In the United States voter registration is on a party basis and much party energy is devoted to registration campaigns to swell the party rolls. In Canada, it is the duty of the government to enumerate the electorate. Thus even this incentive to activity is lacking.

As McKenzie intimates, and as Duverger makes explicit, the concept of "mass" party is a Twentieth Century product, in part the result of non-socialist parties responding to the challenge of universal suffrage by obtaining mass memberships in order to meet left-wing electoral competition.²¹⁴ While this is hardly the place for a disquisition on the failure of the "left" in North America generally and in Canada in particular, it is clear nevertheless that the Liberal party has never been faced with a serious challenge from this direction. (The activity and commitment of CCF-NDP supporters compared with Liberals and Conservatives which will be discussed later in this study is in some ways testimony to the electoral hopelessness of that party.) Until such time as it is, periodic attempts at reorganization may be a reflection of nothing more than the fact that an election is imminent or that the party has just experienced a defeat at the polls and is assuaging its discomfiture by a paroxysm of activity.

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Note on the Party Press

From the point of view of both the Liberals and the Conservatives, there is little remaining in Canada of a truly partisan party press. (The CCF-NDP understandably has its own viewpoint.) In the last century and in the first three decades of this one, many newspapers were closely associated with one or the other of the major parties.²¹⁵ The Globe of Toronto was, of course,

the leading Liberal journal of its day. The Sifton-owned Manitoba (later, Winnipeg) Free Press, while it had its disagreements with official Liberal policy, was the journalistic leader of Liberal opinion in the West. Likewise, the Mail and Empire of Toronto and The Gazette of Montreal were the important Tory papers.

Fifty years ago, a leading Conservative M.P. pointed out:

"There are certain newspapers in every province owned or controlled by friends of the party. The more important of these journals have correspondents in the Press Gallery in the House, who can be depended upon to omit to mention no action likely to create in the public mind a favorable impression." 216

This was sadly understating the case for that period. Newspapers and newspapermen fulfilled more significant functions than this. For example, the role of George Brown's Globe was certainly not confined to simply the favorable reporting of Parliamentary news. The Globe was an instrument of constant propaganda and Brown himself had been very close to the party center of power until his death; his successor was also an important party figure; Dafoe also sat in the Manitoba Liberal Party's war councils for close to half a century and made frequent trips to Ottawa besides. For the Tories, Hugh Graham of the Montreal Daily Star underwrote the campaign costs of Bourassa's Nationalist candidates in the alliance with Borden's Conservatives in 1911 (Ames had been very much part of the plot); the Mail and Empire was rabidly Conservative. Again for the Liberals, J.E. Atkinson of the Toronto Star was a bulwark of Ontario Liberalism, providing both financial and editorial support. Senator Jacob Nicol, operating out of Sherbrooke, played a similar role for the Eastern Townships. There are many lesser examples.

However, the nature of the environment in which newspapers operate today has changed their role from that of institutions confined solely to newsgathering and reporting to those providing far more varied and diverse services. For a paper to continue as a profitable concern, it cannot afford to confine its market by indulging in the blatant partisanship that might formerly have characterized its contents. Parties no longer consider it worth their while to obtain franchises for newspapers as, for example, Andrew Haydon tried to do for his party in Ottawa as late as 1923. It is also not surprising, therefore, that, in 1958, of the 91 member newspapers of the Canadian Press, only eleven listed their political affiliations as "Liberal" or "Independent Liberal"; only six gave allegiances that were labelled "Conservative" or "Independent Conservative". All the rest claimed they were "Independent".²¹⁷ If those coming under this last category express any party preferences, they usually do so only at election time, confining their expressions of support to either of the old parties. Not one paper of this entire group of 91 has ever supported the CCF or its successor, the NDP, although the Liberal Toronto Star, for one, has given the NDP a reasonable share of lineage and treatment that is exemplary in its fairness (especially in comparison with some other dailies).

The most notable big-city daily supporting the Liberals today is the Toronto Star which is still in the hands of the Atkinsons and which is still very much an "insider" in the party's highest circles. The Winnipeg Free Press, after a brief lapse into

non-partisanship in the middle 'fifties, is next in importance. The two major Saskatchewan dailies, the Regina Leader-Post and the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, are not much more than house-organs of the Liberal Party of the province. It is no exaggeration to claim that the intensity of support provided by the Leader-Post for the Liberals often reaches peaks of partisanship achieved only by the most wildly biased of the old-style nineteenth century party journals. In Quebec, Le Soleil of Quebec City is the most noteworthy long-term Liberal supporter, having remained steadfastly in the fold throughout its life. The Globe is no more, having been amalgamated with the Mail and Empire in the 1930's under the banner of the Globe and Mail which is now the leading Conservative paper in the country (in spite of the fact that it lists its affiliation as "Independent"), followed closely by The Gazette. Other major Tory supporters over time include the Ottawa Journal and the Winnipeg Tribune.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Interview, Ottawa, January 9, 1961. Harris was Minister of Finance, leader of the House of Commons, and responsible for the organization of almost the entire province of Ontario between 1954 and 1957.
2. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Wiley, 1955), 183-184.
The figures substantiating the reference to the social composition of the party are presented in the chapter on membership.
3. Ibid., xxiv.
4. Ibid., xxxiv-xxxv.
5. Dale C. Thomson, Alexander Mackenzie: Clear Grit (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), 120.
J.S. Willison has this to say about the talents of George Brown:
"No man ever knew Ontario better than George Brown: not even Sir John Macdonald or Sir Oliver Mowat. He searched every corner of the province for candidates. He knew the tendencies, sympathies, and prejudices of every constituency. He knew who might win here, and who must fail there. He understood the enormous value of strong candidates, and knew how the best cause could be wrecked by bad work at the party conventions."
Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party, Vol. I (Toronto: George N. Morang, 1903), 19. These remarks were made with reference to the period around confederation.
6. John W. Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1893", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XVI (May, 1950), 40-52.
7. Quoted in Ibid., 42.
8. National Liberal Convention of 1893, Official Report (Ottawa, 1893), 49.
9. There were some attempts, especially in Ontario, to set up something permanent. Prior to 1896, and for a short time after the federal election of that year, a militant organization entitled the Ontario Federation of Liberal Clubs, made up of many Liberal clubs and associations, was established. With a membership of over 18,000, this body was instrumental in helping the party win half the seats in the province in that election. The organization was disbanded within ten years. Usually, however, suggestions regarding a permanent organization envisioned little more

than the setting up of ad hoc local or regional committees in order that a cabinet minister might be properly informed as to the goings-on in the area of his responsibility.

For example, after a long letter outlining the vagaries of the situation in Ontario in 1908, one party member suggested that his account was "an object lesson to what may be accomplished, of course, if behind this information were the strong personality of a good executive committee and the activity of a good district organizer." George P. Graham Papers: Alex Smith to Laurier, September 7, 1912.

See also, S.W. Jacobs Papers: Alex Smith to S.W. Jacobs, April 20, 1916, recounting previous local organizational successes in Vancouver.

10. Dafoe Papers: Laurier to Dafoe, May 3, 1912. The office consisted of a small room on Elgin Street.
11. F. Lemieux, The National Liberal Federation and Central Party Organization, Unpublished M.A. Thesis (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1961), 10.
12. The minutes of this founding meeting are found in the Jacobs Papers: #3535-3545.
13. Ibid.
14. The Canadian Liberal Monthly, III (January, 1916), 147.
15. Dafoe Papers: G.F. Pearson to Dafoe, February 7, 1916. Pearson was a member of the Executive Committee.
16. Graham Papers: O.M. Goddard to Laurier, February 15, 1917 (Goddard was the Secretary of the Office).
17. Raoul Dandurand Papers: Laurier to Dandurand, December 26, 1917.
18. Laurier Papers: Dandurand to Laurier, December 31, 1917.
19. Dandurand Papers: Laurier to Dandurand, January 4, 1918.
20. Ernest Lapointe Papers: Charles D. Murphy to P.C. Larkin, May 28, 1918.
21. Charles D. Murphy Papers: #14028-14030.
22. H.S. Ferns and B. Ostry, The Age of Mackenzie King: The Rise of the Leader (London: Heinemann, 1955), 308.
23. National Liberal Convention, Official Report (Ottawa, 1919), 12-13.
24. Ibid., 14.

25. Ibid., 81.
26. Ibid., 83.
27. R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), 373.
28. Murphy Papers: #5143-5147. The office was situated at 115 Sparks Street.
29. Ibid., Murphy to Haydon, December 22, 1926.
30. Ibid., Murphy to Haydon, January 3, 1928.
31. MacGregor Dawson reports about the relationship between King and Haydon: "He (Haydon) was a most perceptive politician who combined to an unusual degree qualities of warmth and intellectual objectivity. Mackenzie King placed full reliance on Haydon's discretion and personal loyalty."
Op.Cit., 36ln.
32. Hon. Norman P. Lambert, Interview, Ottawa, September 14, 1960.
33. See Canada, House of Commons, Evidence and Report of the Special Committee on Beauharnois Power Project, Journals of the House of Commons, LXIX, 1931.
Involved in the development of a power project on the Quebec section of the St. Lawrence River, the Beauharnois Power Corporation applied to the federal government for permission to divert the necessary water from the river. There was opposition from rival companies and shipping concerns which were worried about possible interference with navigation. In 1929, after assurance was given that navigation rights would be protected and that the canal to be built by the company could if necessary be taken over by the federal government, the company was allowed to proceed with a scheme that would have eventually placed virtually the entire flow of the river at its disposal. While negotiating for the water rights, R.O. Sweezey, President of the Corporation, gave \$700,000 to the Liberals. R.B. Bennett refused Sweezey's offer of \$200,000 to the Conservative Party's central funds although individual Conservatives did accept about \$40,000 of Beauharnois money.
34. In addressing a gathering of the Advisory Committee of the National Liberal Federation in 1933, President Vincent Massey referred to this meeting as a meeting of the National Advisory Council established by the 1919 Convention.
35. National Liberal Federation (henceforth designated NLF) Files: Minutes of the Organization Meeting of the National Liberal Federation of Canada, (Ottawa: November 25, 26, 1932), 5-6.

36. Interview, Ottawa, January 9, 1961. Senator Connolly is now President of the NLF.
37. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), 534.
38. Nova Scotia Liberal Association, Constitution and By-Laws, By-Law #3, sub-section 8, 1957.
The Nova Scotia party has historically been the most open of all the Liberal parties. Other constitutions do not include this statement. Otherwise, the various components of the parties are more or less uniform throughout nine of the ten provinces.
39. NLF Files: Norman McLarty (Secretary of State) to Senator Wishart Robertson (President of the NLF), October 4, 1943.
The sub-committee was chaired by Minister of Pensions and National Health Ian Mackenzie and had four other members: C.G. Power (Associate Minister of National Defence and Minister of Air Defence), James G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture), Angus L. Macdonald (Minister of National Defence for Naval Services) and Norman McLarty. This Committee dealt directly with the NLF and was supposed to be responsible for the organization of the 1945 federal election campaign.
40. This statement is based on conversations with various ministers.
41. See Escott M. Reid, "The Saskatchewan Liberal Machine Before 1929", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, II (February, 1936), 27-30. Few other parties in Canadian history have achieved the extent of organizational efficiency displayed by the Liberals in Saskatchewan during this period. The closest facsimile was the Duplessis Union Nationale organization in Quebec which lasted for fifteen years beginning with the end of the Second War, although some claim that Premier Smallwood runs a similar organization for the Liberals in Newfoundland. This account by Reid is one of the few published accounts of Canadian "machine" politics at any level.
42. During the 1958 election campaign, the Conservative candidate in Saguenay resorted to a helicopter in order to cover the territory of the constituency which stretches all the way across northern Quebec from the Gulf of the St. Lawrence to James Bay and Hudson Bay. That he beat the Liberal incumbent by 2500 votes may no doubt be attributed at least in part to his novel campaigning technique.
43. See Appendix, #9 in the questionnaire.
44. Ibid., Question #13.
For more complete figures on between-election activity, see Chapter V, Section II.

45. For example, Sir Lomer Gouin, S.W. Jacobs and Ernest Lapointe.
46. The sender wishes to remain anonymous.
47. Lapointe Papers: L.P. Picard (Lapointe's private secretary) to H.R.L. Henry (Mackenzie King's private secretary), June 21, 1939.

In attempting to discover the practices of the party in connection with the selection of candidates, I considered that it would be more useful to rely upon interviews with cabinet ministers and upon an examination of archive material rather than upon party headquarters in the provinces or in Ottawa. In the first place, when the party was in power, Ministers were usually in charge of the process. Secondly, paid party functionaries are the most close-mouthed of all party people and it seemed likely that Ministers who had left politics or who had never regarded this aspect of their responsibilities as anything but a tedious chore would be more likely to talk about this process without restraint.

48. NLF Files: Robert H. Winters (Minister of Resources and Development) to NLF, January 26, 1953.
49. Interview, Montreal, December 9, 1960.
50. Interview, Ottawa, January 8, 1961.
51. Interview, Ottawa, January 10, 1961.
52. My informant wishes to remain anonymous.
53. Ottawa Citizen, July 25, 1953, 7.
54. Dafoe Papers: Claxton to Dafoe, April 2, 1940. (The three women in question were Claxton's wife, one of her distant cousins and one of Mrs. Claxton's close friends.)
55. The following constituencies were involved: Jacques-Cartier and St. Mary's (on the island of Montreal) and Kamouraska and Rimouski (on the south shore of the St. Lawrence).
56. This was the claim made by George C. Marler, Interview, Montreal, October 31, 1960.
57. One such member was CCF leader J.S. Woodsworth who accomplished this feat in Winnipeg in the 1930's. See Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 264.
58. NLF Files: Minutes of the Organization Meetings of the National Liberal Federation of Canada (Ottawa, November 26, 1932), 5. The difficulty of reconciling the three often-opposed interests involved was of course not mentioned in the report.

59. In 1933, a French publicity department was set up under a French supervisor. This position was not recognized in the Constitution of the Federation until five years later, however.
60. NLF Files: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Liberal Federation of Canada (Ottawa: December 2, 1933), 5.
61. Ibid., 8.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., 7.
64. Ibid.
65. Hon. Norman P. Lambert, Interview, Ottawa, August 17, 1960.
66. The Federation files for the period before 1950 are very sparse. However, an important segment of what remains is a huge sheaf of letters addressed to Norman Lambert, requesting jobs, appointments, and even contracts.
67. Norman P. Lambert, Interview, Ottawa, August 17, 1960.
68. Interview, Montreal, December 9, 1960.
Some may dispute the fact that during the war, corruption in contract letting and the like was kept at a minimum in Canada. The point of this statement is not to whitewash the Liberal government but to point out some of the significant factors in the history of the role of the Federation. As far as Howe's remark is concerned, it may be pointed out that cabinet ministers are notoriously jealous of what they consider their prerogatives to be (patronage being one of these) and Howe was merely being certain that if anyone wanted favors, they would have to come to him. This he denied vehemently in the interview. From the point of view of corruption, there is no public evidence to refute his claim. The matter of "ministerial prerogatives" may be another question entirely.
69. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: September 27, 1943), 31.
70. J.A. Spender, Sir Robert Hudson, A Memoir (London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1930).
71. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: September 27, 1943), 31-32.
72. Massey was appointed High Commissioner to the United Kingdom in 1935, serving until 1946.
73. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: September 27, 1943), 32-34.

74. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: November 14, 1945), 6.
75. C.D. Howe, Interview, Montreal, December 9, 1960.
76. To 1961, there have been ten Presidents of the Federation: Vincent Massey (1932-1935); Norman P. Lambert (1935-1940); A.K. Hugessen (1940-1943); Norman McLarty (1943); Wishart McL. Robertson (1943-1946); J. Gordon Fogo (1946-1952); Allan L. Woodrow (1952); Duncan K. MacTavish (1952-1958); A. Bruce Matthews (1958-1961); and John J. Connolly (1961-).
77. NLF Files: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Liberal Federation (Ottawa: December 10, 1936).
78. NLF Files: Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting (Ottawa: June 21, 1938).
79. Norman P. Lambert, Interview, Ottawa, August 18, 1960.
80. The proceedings and minutes of the Executive Committee Meetings are not available to the public. The following remarks concerning Committee proceedings are based on interviews and a few copies of some minutes I was permitted to see.
It may be pointed out here that the proceedings of the Advisory Council are not public property either. However, the meetings of the Advisory Council are open to interested "guests" and the press. The Executive Committee Meetings are always private gatherings.
81. The meetings have been held in the following years: 1933, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1943, 1945, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1955. There were three subsequent meetings after the 1957 defeat, in 1958, 1959 and 1961, making a total of sixteen in all.
82. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: March 28, 1955), 9.
83. For example, at the 1947 gathering, the Committee reported simply that attendance was 100%. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: February 6, 1947), 235.
84. In 1949, the Credentials Committee report showed a total attendance of 208 with 63 delegates from Ontario, 46 from Quebec and 29 from Nova Scotia. However, the Committee noted that, in these cases, only 17, 16 and 17, respectively, were "authorized delegates with voting powers." NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: March 29, 1955), 201-2.
85. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: January 10, 1950), 218.

86. Occasionally, the Advisory Council would feel impelled to emphasize its support of the government and to this end would pass a strongly worded resolution remarking on its "complete and unbounded confidence" in the Leader of the Party.
87. Claxton was specifically appointed as the Cabinet Minister responsible for liaison between the NLF and the government by Prime Minister St. Laurent. When Claxton left the government in 1954 he was succeeded in this role by Minister of Citizenship and Immigration J.W. Pickersgill. King had no special cabinet minister acting in this capacity. However, with Ernest Lapointe as Vice-President of the Federation in the 1930's, such an appointment was unnecessary. Claxton's role regarding the Federation developed during King's tenure as leader as the result of the fact that he was chairman of the Resolutions Committee of the Federation when the Advisory Council convened in 1943.
88. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: September 28, 1943), 181.
89. Quoted in J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol.I, 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 585.
90. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: January 26, 1949), 167.
91. Ibid., 167-169.
92. Ibid., 182. It may be of interest to note that this suggestion was never adopted by the government as its policy. In January, 1962, a contributory pension plan was put forward as a special plank of the party, now in opposition.
93. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: January 25, 1949), 102.
94. Ibid., 103-104.
95. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: January 26, 1949), 166.
96. NLF Files: Memo to H.E. Kidd (General Secretary of the Federation), November 12, 1952.
97. NLF Files, Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: February 28, 1951), 275.
98. Delegates have often deplored the presence of the press. As a westerner once put it:
 "I was wondering whether it could be arranged that one session toward the end of the meeting would be held by the delegates without having the press in the room. Our

work on the Resolutions Committee was seriously hampered. Very good resolutions came in from the east and from the west as well as from the centre of Canada, and we had to withdraw them for various reasons, because it might be embarrassing to a certain member of the government or to the officers of the Association or to someone else. They did not want these resolutions to reach the press and become too publicized. But a discussion of matters of this kind in camera --- if I may use that expression --- might be very useful."

NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: February 28, 1951), 278.

99. These organizations were not officially considered as "affiliated" to the National Liberal Federation until the 1961 constitutional change although they received representation on the various bodies of the Federation as mentioned above. In order to cover both conditions, the two terms "auxiliary" and "affiliated" have been used in the heading.
100. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: January 25, 1949), 64-65.
101. See J.R. Williams, The Conservative Party of Canada, 1920-1949 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1956), 122-123.
102. Ibid., 121-122.
103. See Appendix, #5 in the questionnaire.
104. Ibid.
105. There have been three locations of the office. From 1932 until 1940, it was situated at 114 Wellington Street; from 1943 until 1957, at 130 Queen Street; since 1957, the office has been located in a rambling old house at 251 Cooper Street.
106. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: January 25, 1949), 23.
107. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: February 29, 1951), 284-285. Fogo was obviously ignoring the role of the cabinet as a "centralizing" factor. In fact, there appears to have been no inclination on the part of any high-ranking party members during this period to refer to the cabinet's organization functions.
108. NLF Files: Draft Budget, 1945; also Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: February 18, 1951), 250; and interview with Paul C. Lafond (Associate General Secretary, NLF), Ottawa, January 26, 1961.

The reports of the Finance Committee to the Advisory Council are often vague and occasionally the reports of the proceedings do not contain any reference to finances at all.

109. NLF Files: Memo, McLarty to Robertson, October 4, 1943. This sub-committee has been referred to elsewhere. See Note #37.
110. The Committee was at first composed of the following members: Cabinet Ministers, Stuart S. Garson, Walter Harris, Hugues Lapointe, Jean Lesage, George C. Marler, Paul Martin, J.J. McCann, Lester B. Pearson, J.W. Pickersgill, Roch Pinard, James Sinclair and Robert Winters (later Paul Hellyer and Alcide Côté joined the Committee); W.G. Weir (the Whip); Duncan MacTavish (President of the Federation) and Dan Wallace (of St. Laurent's office).
111. Queen's University Library: Charles A. Dunning Papers: King to Dunning, July 10, 1939.
112. Quoted in J.W. Pickersgill, Op.Cit., 578.
113. For example, on one occasion, the President of the Alberta Association complained to President Fogo that "I remember one time we heard about Mr. Gregg by reading about it in the paper the next day after he had left and this is what happened in numerous other cases." (Gregg was then Minister of Veterans' Affairs.)
114. Senator C.G. Power, for one, has often deplored the organizational demands of a cabinet post as being one of the factors keeping men of talent out of public life.
 Ilsley was Minister of Finance and Ralston Minister of Defence in King's cabinet in the 1940's. Abbott was Finance Minister from 1946 until 1954 and Rinfret served as Postmaster General in the first few years of the St. Laurent administration.
115. See two articles by J.E. Hodgetts: "The Civil Service and Policy Formation," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIII (November, 1957), 467-479; and "The Liberal and the Bureaucrat," Queen's Quarterly, LXII (Summer, 1955), 176-183.
116. John Meisel, "The Formulation of Liberal and Conservative Programmes in the 1957 Canadian General Election," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXVI (November, 1960), 567.
117. Senator Norman P. Lambert, Interview, Ottawa, September 14, 1960. It will be recalled that since the election of 1953, the Advisory Council had met but once, in 1955.
118. Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1948), 14. The conventions have all met in Ottawa.

119. Ibid., 14-16.
120. Ibid., 16.
121. The number of constituencies in 1948 was 245; in 1958, the number was 265.
The totals for 1948 are obtained from the figures found in Ibid., 25; for 1958, in NLF Files: Fourth National Liberal Convention, Proceedings, Report of the Credentials Committee, Vol. II, January 15, 1958, GGG-4.
122. These remarks regarding cabinet domination may not be entirely applicable for 1958 because the party was now out of office.
123. The regulations concerning representation were copied directly from the rules laid down for the 1919 convention. For 1948 and 1958, representation for the auxiliary organizations was simply added. With no such auxiliary organizations in existence in 1919, parliamentary dominance was accordingly even more pronounced.
The 1893 convention was composed of Liberal M.P.s and defeated candidates and five delegates per constituency who were theoretically appointed by each of the local Liberal Associations. National Liberal Convention of 1893, Official Report (Ottawa: 1893), 3.
124. Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention (Ottawa: NLF, 1948), 17-18.
125. The totals were obtained from lists in Ibid., 19-20.
126. My informant wishes to remain anonymous.
127. Canadian Annual Review (Toronto: 1921), 460. See also National Liberal Convention, Official Report (Ottawa: 1919), 81, and Canadian House of Commons Debates, May 23, 1923, 3048.
128. Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention, (Ottawa: NLF, 1948), 231.
129. Ibid., 163, 227, 237.
130. Williams quotes a remark by an observer to the effect that "Why shouldn't the PC Convention be better organized? They've had more practice." Op.Cit., footnote #32.
Perhaps the reason for the dissimilarity is precisely that the Liberals have had greater success in the selection of their leaders than have the Conservatives.
131. Op.Cit., 97.
132. Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1948), 234-237.

133. Ibid., 237-238. Also H.F. Quinn, "The Third National Convention of the Liberal Party", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XVII (May, 1951), 230.
134. The most comprehensive review is found in Chapters XIV and XV entitled "Electoral Corruption" and "Electoral Expenses" respectively in Norman Ward's The Canadian House of Commons: Representation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 240-272. See also J.R. Williams, The Conservative Party of Canada, 1920-1949 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1956), 135-150.
- In addition to these sources, the material in this section is based upon interviews with various personalities such as A.K. Cameron, Senators Norman Lambert and C.G. Power, Duncan K. MacTavish and A. Bruce Matthews. There is also some scattered material about early Quebec practices in the Laurier, J.S. Tarte and Raoul Dandurand Papers in the Public Archives.
135. There is the classic story of a Toronto opportunist by the name of John Aird, Jr., who, posing as a collector for the Conservative Party in 1930, fleeced R.O. Swezey of the Beauharnois Power Corporation for \$125,000 in victory bonds which he then promptly cashed and deposited to his own account. Canada, House of Commons, Evidence and Report of the Special Committee on Beauharnois Power Project, Journals of the House of Commons, LXIX, 1931.
- Such occurrences undoubtedly made prospective contributors especially cautious in examining the credentials of collectors.
136. See, for example, Peter C. Newman, "Backstage at Ottawa: Who'll pay the Shot for our Next Election", Maclean's Magazine, LXXIV (May 6, 1961), 62.
137. Canada, House of Commons, Evidence and Report of the Special Committee on Beauharnois Power Project, Journals of the House of Commons, LXIX, 1931, 823.
138. See Appendix, #9 in the Questionnaire.
139. Televised political broadcasts on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation network are free and are allocated among the parties by the CBC.
140. Interview, Ottawa, August 18, 1960. Some references to this point are made in the section on Federal-Provincial party relations.
141. See, for example, Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 30, 1931, 4380-4382; Ibid., June 10, 1938, 3740; also King's speech to the Annual Meeting of the Ontario Liberal Association in London on October 20, 1931 in Toronto Mail and Empire, October 21, 1931, 6. It is hoped that King's biographer will clear up the mystery once and for all.

142. Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 30, 1931, 4387.
143. John A. Macdonald Papers: Vol. 78, #30963.
144. At that same 1931 Ontario Liberal Association Annual Meeting at which King disclaimed any knowledge of Beauharnois, he reviewed the history of the party organization during the previous decade for his followers:

"I regret to say that...since the National Convention of 1919, the Federal party has never had any one filling the position of organizer who was giving his whole time and attention to this branch of the party's work. One or two members of the party have voluntarily given such supervision to the work of the office as they could, but except at times of general elections there has been no actual direction of its affairs, alike as regards organization and publicity. Though the Convention drew up and approved a plan of organization effect was never given to its recommendations, and the affairs of the old National Liberal Office have for the most part been left to the tender mercies of such clerical assistance as it has been found possible to retain, which at times has meant little more than the services of one of two stenographers."

Toronto Mail and Empire, October 21, 1931, 6.

However, there is reason to doubt that St. Laurent was himself very much concerned with organization matters much less with those of finances. In this connection, his close associates are all agreed, as he himself maintains, that their leader preferred to leave such affairs in the hands of his colleagues --- indeed, implicit in some of these remarks is a note of criticism of the ex-Prime Minister. Some claim that he should not have permitted his cabinet ministers the wide latitude to exercise the control that they did.

In connection with Macdonald's remarks about the absence of Carleton and Reform Clubs, mention should be made of the various Reform Clubs in the major cities across Canada. Their membership consists of what might loosely be termed Liberal "supporters" such as members of parliament, members of provincial legislative assemblies, senators, defeated candidates, municipal politicians, local notables and important fund raisers and contributors. The clubs are basically social and have no official place in the party organization. They are referred to here because many of the members play important roles sustaining the party financially.

Regarding the collection and distribution of party funds, St. Laurent had this to say:

"I thought it was not my responsibility, and I don't want to feel under any obligation to anyone in that respect. I think that it was realized that it would be just as well for me not to know who was a contributor to the party fund and what his contribution was; that if I did know it, I would be apt to be leaning over backward to

avoid doing anything that might be construed as recognition of generosity to the party."
Interview, Quebec, City, December 6, 1960.

145. Interview, Ottawa, January 9, 1961.
146. Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention (Ottawa: NLF, 1948), 11.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid., 112.
149. Ibid., 203.
150. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: December 7, 1959), 8.
151. NLF Files: Fourth National Liberal Convention, Proceedings, Vol. II (Ottawa: January 15, 1958), EEE-2 - EEE-4.
152. Ibid., FFF-2.
153. Ibid., FFF-3 - FFF-5.
154. Ibid., FFF-10 - GGG-3.
155. Ibid., HH-3 - HH-6.
156. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: November 18, 1958), 194. It will be recalled that after 1946, the concept of a "lay" Federation was reinforced by the election of non-parliamentary individuals to the position of President (See Footnote #76).
157. The following served on the Committee: Hon. J.W. Pickersgill (Newfoundland); Earle G. MacLeod (Prince Edward Island); Allan J. MacEachen (Nova Scotia); David M. Dickson (New Brunswick); Maurice Lamontagne (Quebec); Hon. John J. Connolly, Chairman (Ontario); J.F. O'Sullivan (Manitoba); Walter A. Tucker (Saskatchewan); Mel Shannon (Alberta); Arthur Cox (British Columbia); Mrs. R. A. Kinnear (National Federation of Liberal Women); Jean David (Young Liberal Federation); and Tom Summer-ville (Canadian University Liberal Federation).
158. NLF Files: Report of the Committee Appointed to Study the Functions and Constitution of the National Liberal Federation, 1959, Mimeographed.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.

161. Ibid.
162. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: December 7, 1959), 7.
163. Ibid. (My italics)
164. Ibid., 7-8.
165. Aside from the two chairmen, the membership of the Committee was as follows: Hon. J.W. Pickersgill (Newfoundland); Ian M. MacLeod (Prince Edward Island); Orval J.T. Troy (Nova Scotia); David M. Dickson (New Brunswick); Jean-Paul Gregoire (Quebec); Gordon Dryden (Ontario); T.A. Crerar (Manitoba); Otto Lang (Saskatchewan); J. Harper Prowse (Alberta); Arthur Cox (British Columbia); A. Bruce Matthews (National Liberal Federation); Mrs. R.A. Kinnear (Liberal Women); Jean David (Young Liberals); and Herb Epp (University Liberals).
166. NLF Files: Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Study the Constitution of the National Liberal Federation of Canada, 1961. Mimeographed.
This report was read to the National Liberal Rally on January 10, 1961 by Co-Chairman Hugues Lapointe.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid. The significance of this statement will be fully explored in the next section of this chapter.
169. NLF Files: Constitution of the National Liberal Federation, as amended, 1961.
170. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: January 12, 1961), 53.
171. Ibid., 54.
172. Ibid., 53. The delegate in question, Miss Naroldine Copp, was at the time President of the federal constituency association of Vancouver-Burrard in British Columbia. In an interview after the meeting, she continued in the same vein: "We tend to think of the M.P.s as gods. This would be all right if we had the best men as members but we don't. You know that the M.P.s speak with a certain air of authority. Maybe the Pipeline wouldn't have happened if that resolution had passed."
173. Ibid., 54.
174. MacEachen was a Nova Scotia M.P. who was defeated in 1958. He held an advisory position in Pearson's office. Lamontagne had served as financial advisor to St. Laurent. In the 1958 election he was narrowly beaten in St. Laurent's (and both

- Laurier's and Lapointe's) constituency of Quebec East. Thereafter, he served as advisor to Pearson and was attached for that purpose to the Leader's office.
175. NLF Files: Memorandum, The Structure of the Liberal Party, 1961, Mimeographed. Also Lapointe's statements to the National Rally and the Advisory Council.
- The following remarks about the new methods of organization are based on personal observation and interviews with local party supporters as well as federal and provincial General Secretaries and organizers. The most notable among this latter group are: James Scott and Paul Lafond of the National Federation; Ronald Fairclough of British Columbia; Joseph O'Sullivan of Manitoba; Bruce Powe of Ontario; and Maurice Sauvé of Quebec.
176. Instead of two general secretaries (English and French) and an organizer, the office now has the organizer double as the English General Secretary. The functions of the French Secretary, aside from his supervision of the French aspects, are to deal with the day-to-day problems surrounding the operation of the office.
177. NLF Files: Memorandum, The Structure of the Liberal Party, 1961, Mimeographed.
178. The following were on the Sponsoring Committee: Geoffrey Andrew, Vancouver; Frank Covert, Halifax; Clifford Curtis, Kingston; Davidson Dunton, Ottawa; H.A. Dyde, Edmonton; Jean-Charles Falardeau, Quebec; Robert M. Fowler, Montreal; Walter Gordon, Toronto; William F. McLean, Toronto; Jean-Marie Nadeau, Montreal; Hilda Neatby, Saskatoon; Mitchell W. Sharp, Toronto; Victor Sifton, Winnipeg; Renault St. Laurent, Quebec. With one or two exceptions, this group constituted a fair representation of the corporate and academic elite of the party.
179. Interview, CBC Newsmagazine, January 8, 1961.
180. NLF Files: Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Study the Constitution of the National Liberal Federation of Canada, 1961, Mimeographed.
181. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: November 7, 1958), 263-264.
182. Interview, Ottawa, January 9, 1961.
183. NLF Files: Advisory Council, Report of the Finance Committee, 1959, Mimeographed.
184. Ibid.

185. Ontario Liberal Association, Constitution of Ontario Liberal Association, Article II, 1958.
186. Interview with Gardiner, Ottawa, January 8, 1961.
187. This brief account modifies Dawson's statement that before 1937 "the Liberal Party in Alberta was organized in a Federal and Provincial Association." / The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), 535n. / That was the theoretical arrangement but matters did not work out this way.
- These remarks are based on several lengthy letters from Howson, Charles E. Campbell (publisher of the Edmonton Bulletin) and G.M. Bell (President of the Calgary Albertan) to C.A. Dunning in 1934 and 1935 in the Dunning Papers, Queen's University Library.
188. Several letters from Alberta reached Senator Lambert at the National Federation informing him of Gardiner's activities and asking him to intercede with Mackenzie King on behalf of the provincial organization.
189. The Hepburn Papers remain closed to the public, as do the King Papers. Much of the factual material which is not footnoted is the result of interviews with Ontario Party supporters and a distillation of remarks by Senator Lambert on the subject. The interpretations are my own.
190. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), 545.
191. J.W. Pickersgill, Op. Cit., 34.
192. Harry Johnson was the Executive Director of the Ontario Association.
193. The "intimation" mentioned by Hepburn referred to King's refusal to have anything to do with Hepburn's suggestions concerning cabinet personnel.
- The letter is dated November 12, 1936 and was shown to me by Senator Lambert.
- Hepburn obviously considered Lambert to be the National Organizer thus holding a position in the federal organization similar to the one held in the Ontario Association by Johnson.
194. See The Canadian Annual Review, 1937 and 1938, 150-152.
195. These letters and promises of support are in the files of the National Federation.
196. J.W. Pickersgill, Op.Cit., 34.
197. R. MacGregor Dawson, Canada in World Affairs, Two Years of War, 1939-1941 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1943), 22-23. Only some dissident Liberals voted against the motion.

198. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), 546.
199. See J.W. Pickersgill, Op.Cit., 491-493.
 If King's own account of the meetings with Conant, Nixon and Roebuck were taken at their face value, one would be led to believe that King had remained entirely aloof in the contest.
 His diary entry for April 30 is a perfect example of the manner in which he liked to interpret events. Greatly pleased by the news that Nixon had won the leadership by a wide margin on the first ballot (Conant suffered a breakdown and withdrew), he recorded the following version for posterity:
 "The whole affair is a remarkable evidence of the moral forces that work in the unseen realm and of the vindication of rights in the end. It has taken a long time to get Hepburn and his gang out of the control of the party's affairs, but they have each in turn killed themselves, beginning with Hepburn himself. Nixon, the man who has been most outspoken in support of myself...is now leader by an overwhelming majority.
 It was a king-Hepburn battle so far as the province generally was concerned, with a complete routing of all the Hepburn forces, and he and his right and left bowers left wounded and bleeding on the field --- no one prepared to lend them succour of any kind... It is a great triumph --- a wonderful expression of loyalty. It reveals the extent to which despite 'everything', I have been able to keep the party together in provincial as well as federal politics and this... by refusing to enter a quarrel and through allowing my enemies to confound and destroy themselves. Again I say it is the evidence of a moral order that controls in the end."
Op.Cit., 492-493.
200. Much of this information was obtained from personal observation and interviews with persons who wish to maintain their anonymity. The facts are unimpeachable. Again, the interpretations are my own.
201. Many disgruntled provincial Liberals unhistorically blame St. Laurent for this federal-Union Nationale cooperation. They claim that the tax-rental agreements concluded between the federal government and the province led back-benchers to believe that since "The Chief" was cooperating with Duplessis, it was permissible for them to do so as well. However, the agreements were not made until 1955 and many of these "non-aggression" pacts had been in existence long before.
202. NLF Files: Fourth National Liberal Convention, Proceedings, Vol. II (Ottawa: January 15, 1958), KKK-9 - KKK-13.
203. Former Minister of Transport Lionel Chevrier, now the member for the constituency of Laurier in Montreal, was ostensibly

the leader of the French wing of the party and Pearson's right-hand man from Quebec in the tradition of King-Lapointe. Why he did not attend the meeting can only be conjectured, although informants claim that his absence was due to an oversight on someone's part. However, it is possible that someone could have been playing Machiavelli, especially with Lamontagne being identified in many quarters as the heir apparent to the Laurier-Lapointe-St. Laurent mantle (he was scheduled to run again as the candidate from Quebec East and was very close to Pearson). He was therefore Chevrier's natural rival although admittedly this is entirely within the realm of speculation.

Walter Gordon is a Toronto Accountant, former Chairman of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects and probably Pearson's closest non-parliamentary confidante. He was Chairman of the Policy Committee of the 1961 Rally, Chairman of the Campaign Committee, and elected for the Toronto constituency of Davenport in the 1962 federal election.

204. Denis is quoted in La Presse (Montreal), January 12, 1961, 35. Conservatives in the province are nicknamed "Bleus".
205. Interview, Montreal, January 16, 1961.
206. The most complete statement of this assumption by a ranking party member was presented by Agriculture Minister Gardiner at the Advisory Council Meeting of 1955. See The Canadian Liberal, VII (Summer, 1955), 34-35.
207. "When election time rolls around, the provincial secretary is confronted with a choice of loyalties --- the Leader close to home is usually the choice."
Walter E. Harris, Interview, Ottawa, January 9, 1961.
208. Interview, Ottawa, January 26, 1961.
209. Maurice Lamontagne, Interview, Ottawa, January 26, 1961.
210. Ralph O. Campney, Interview, Ottawa, January 10, 1961.
Campney had worked as King's secretary from 1924 until 1927.
211. Interview, Ottawa, January 26, 1961.
212. R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1955), 146-147; 164.
213. For a complete history of the franchise, see Norman Ward, Op. Cit., 211-232.
214. M. Duverger, Op. Cit., 63-67.
215. In the early period around Confederation and somewhat beyond, the key to the relation between the press and the politicians

was patronage in one form or another:

"Patronage helped to keep some newspapers alive, others prosperous. Each newspaper had its circle of subscribers and advertisers, but other support, in the form of private financial aid or government printing contracts was sometimes necessary. When newspapers looked for patrons, and politicians looked for publicity, some connection between them was inevitable."

P.B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 10.

216. Herbert B. Ames, "The Organization of Political Parties in Canada," American Political Science Association, Eighth Annual Meeting, Proceedings (December 27-30, 1911), 185.
217. These figures are based on a list compiled by the Canadian Press.

CHAPTER IV: THE LEADER

In the last SIXTY YEARS

LIBERALS had 3 leaders

WON 11 General Elections

CONSERVATIVES

11 leaders

WON 3 General Elections¹

* * * * *

"There is no institutional way (to depose a leader). I suggest you study the Conservative Party and you'll see how it's done... we haven't had to dispose of leaders. We've had very few leaders. As you know, I'm the fourth... The Leader deposes himself. I don't know what other arrangement there could be."

- Hon. Lester B. Pearson²

* * * * *

"It is in keeping with the genius of our party system that the leader who begins as the chosen chief of his associates proceeds by stages, if he has the necessary qualities, to a position of dominance; the republic is transformed into an absolute monarchy."

- John W. Diefenbaker³

* * * * *

Much has already been made of the fact that Canadian politics, in this century at least, has been effectively dominated by the Liberal Party. The party in turn has been dominated by three

1. Footnotes to Chapter IV appear on pp. 417-434.

men who have all been prime ministers during much of their tenure as leader. As the first statement quoted above demonstrates, Liberals have often considered it a great virtue that their leaders have been few in number and have, on occasion, even gone so far as to attribute their phenomenal success at the polls to this fact. Whatever the reasons for this success may be, this factor tends to complicate matters as it poses a problem regarding an analysis of the role of the leader and the circumstances of his selection, for it has the effect of confusing the two roles of leader of the party and of prime minister. Of course, to a large extent, it is true that the two roles are inherently confused whenever a party is in power for one of the sources of a prime minister's strength and pre-eminence lies in his leadership of the party. However, the Liberals have been out of power so little that comparisons between an in-office and an out-of-office leader are virtually impossible.

The matter is further complicated by the relative strength of the party as compared with the opposition with which it was faced. For even in opposition, the Liberals, unlike the Tories, invariably presented an image to the public that they were ready, at a moment's notice, to assume the reins and responsibilities of office and to govern the country. This image was inevitably realized in fact, and it had the effect of always presenting the party leader in the guise of more than simply a potential prime minister with the instruments of power, the ability to distribute ministerial offices, and the capacity to make or break the careers of colleagues and rivals alike almost at will. The leader, in effect, is also a prime minister. It is understandable, therefore, that there have

been few revolts against the party leader in this century. None have been successful. This is not meant to imply that there are any special or formal restraints upon the leader when the party is in opposition. There are none. Restraints are always informal and consist mainly of the psychological ones which are the result of the party's (and, it follows, the leader's) recent lack of popular appeal as demonstrated in the previous election.

There is also the problem of generalization. It would be quite foolhardy to attempt to generalize in anything more than the broadest of terms on the basis of a few examples. Even here one might be on shaky ground, particularly in connection with the process whereby the leader is selected. The Liberal Party was the first in Canada to employ the convention as a means of choosing a leader. This method has been used three times. Two Prime Ministers, W.L. Mackenzie King and Louis S. St. Laurent were chosen in this way in 1919 and 1948 respectively. The present leader, Lester B. Pearson, was chosen by the Convention of 1958. However, the leaders of the party in the nineteenth century, Alexander Mackenzie, Edward Blake and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, were all chosen by the caucus of the Parliamentary Party. No Liberal Prime Minister has ever died while holding the position and, therefore, it is futile to discuss the possible future role of the governor-general in the selection process should a Liberal prime minister die in office except in a most hypothetical way. Furthermore, it is difficult to present the leader as "emerging" in the same way as (say) the leader of the Conservative Party in Great Britain.⁴ The convention system of selection would seem to make this impossible. However, of the three occasions

on which the party used this device to choose its leader, in only one, the 1919 convention, was there a real contest for the position and three ballots were required to resolve it. Both St. Laurent and Pearson can, on the other hand, be said to have been the only "logical" choices to succeed to the leadership, given the context of the situations in which they were chosen.

In spite of the relative success of the Liberals with their leaders, there is little in party literature or party folklore that places any special importance in the position. Nor is it possible to elicit such statements from Liberal leaders as "I can say without reservation that the focal point of control of any political party in Canada is the Leader."⁵ Such a remark, while accurate, is practically superfluous, for while Liberals seldom emphasize the importance of the leader in the affairs of their party, their actions and their attitudes in the course of general elections and during intra-party disputes underline his importance as the locus of authority. For example, in one such dispute between provincial and federal groups over control of the organization in the province of Quebec in 1960, the most illuminating comment as to the ultimate resolution of the conflict obtainable from the participants was simply: "The Leader will decide." And this was echoed on both sides at a time when the leader of the party was out of office.

This section will attempt to do two things at once. It will discuss the process whereby the leader is selected and, at the same time, describe the mechanisms by means of which he has controlled his party. These two aspects of the leadership are combined because

the manner in which a leader has controlled the Liberal party arises in no small part out of the circumstances of his selection. This analysis will go back to the time of Confederation. It is possible to object to this on the legitimate grounds that the party of the decades of the 1870's and 1880's was not the same one that Laurier established, that King re-united and that St. Laurent and Pearson were destined to lead. However, a brief account of the period of Mackenzie and Blake is meaningful not only out of historical interest but because the situation of the leader was so different then from what it is today. These differences have been manifested primarily in the party's public or electoral support, in the institutional arrangements within the party organization and even in the personal qualities of the leaders. Thus, these significant aspects of the development of the party itself are also important variables in the exercise of leadership.

Some of the electoral factors involved have already been referred to elsewhere. However, these factors have a bearing upon the aspect of the leader's personal qualities and qualifications also. While it is naturally impossible to compare the personalities of the various leaders except in very broad terms, the changing requirements of democratic politics have tended to emphasize personality as an important element in voter motivation. This concentration upon the leader in turn affects his exercise of power within the party itself. Finally, in the category of organization, it is well to repeat here what was pointed out in the previous

section: Namely, that the party made no attempt to institutionalize relations with its on-going support in the country until 1912 when a central office was established in Ottawa. Even so, the functions of this central office or the National Liberal Federation have not really been organizational in nature but have been confined to publicity and to providing the national party with rather irregular liaison with provincial party bodies or with the individual constituencies. The device of the convention is another innovation. Not only has the selection process seemingly been changed by its use but the role of the caucus of the parliamentary party has supposedly been altered as well.

I

It seems hardly necessary to recall here that there was no well-organized, coherent entity which one could call "Liberal Party" in the early years following Confederation. One could apply the name "Liberal" to the opposition to the Macdonald coalitions, but the opposition in the House was agreed upon no one leader. Previous to Confederation, a similar opposition was split in two groups: One, based in Ontario, looked to George Brown and his newspaper for leadership, while the French Canadians in Quebec recognized Antoine Aimé Dorion. After Brown was defeated in the 1867 election, he resolved never to stand for public office again.⁶ Instead, he decided to channel his political activity through his newspaper and to confine his influence to behind-the-scenes

manipulation. This left the leadership of the Ontario section in the hands of Alexander Mackenzie, Brown's protégé, and Edward Blake.⁷ Quebecers still followed Dorion. This lack of a parliamentary leader was by no means an oversight but the result of tactical necessity. Religion was an important point of cleavage in the party with Ontario Liberals having anti-French and anti-Catholic reputations in Quebec and French Canadians generally suspect in the Ontario constituencies where the party normally received support. The choice of a leader would offer the government forces a convenient point to exploit. As well, being in opposition, the party felt that the selection of a national leader would hamper them in an election campaign (especially in the forthcoming 1872 contest) which they hoped to be able to adapt to local conditions. There is also some strong evidence that Mackenzie refused to accept the position,⁸ although he had acted in that capacity for five years.⁹

In the election of 1872, fought over the Macdonald government's involvement in the Canadian Pacific Scandals, the opposition nearly succeeded in overthrowing the Conservatives at the polls, obtaining 97 seats to the government's 103; with so strong a representation, the choice of a leader seemed essential, if only to provide the governor-general with a candidate upon whom he could call when the Conservatives were defeated in the House, as seemed imminent. Accordingly, on March 5, 1873, on the day preceding the opening of parliament, Mackenzie called a meeting of Liberal members. While Dorion was explaining the situation to his

Quebec followers, Mackenzie informed the English Liberals that the time had come to elect a national leader at the head of a united party and, while he had previously acted in that capacity, he was "now resolved to retire from the position."¹⁰ He suggested that the group consider whether, from an electoral point of view, it might be preferable to have a leader from Quebec. However, since the Ontario delegation was the largest in the House, there would probably be more agreement upon someone from that province. If such were the case, he thought that Blake would be the best candidate. Blake, premier of Ontario for about a year until October, 1872, when he handed over the control of the government to Oliver Mowat, spoke next. He agreed that it was time a leader was chosen but if he were to be from Ontario, Mackenzie should be the choice because he had worked hard for five years and was not only responsible for the party's fine showing in the election just past but for the Ontario provincial victory in 1871 as well. As for himself, he refused to entertain any proposals that he should lead. As a result of this impasse, a Committee was formed to decide on a leader.

The Committee met three times. Dorion immediately supported the proposition that the leader should be from Ontario. He also stated that he would be equally content to serve under either Blake or Mackenzie. The two other leading members from Quebec, Luc Letellier and Luther Holton were more explicit. Letellier wanted Blake while Holton preferred Dorion, followed by Blake as a second choice with Mackenzie third. However, with both Blake and Mackenzie continuing to resist all pressure, the first meeting was only able

to agree that the leader should be from Ontario. On March 6, the day after the Speaker was chosen, another meeting was held. Mackenzie was adamant against accepting the leadership and entered the meeting determined to have Blake in that position or, failing this, Dorion. At the end of the meeting, it was Mackenzie who was chosen in spite of all his protestations and on the same day, after the reading of the speech from the throne, the caucus was informed of the decision by Dorion with Holton making the motion. The members concurred unanimously.¹¹

Mackenzie was nevertheless unsure of himself and almost immediately wrote to George Brown claiming "I am still afraid, indeed convinced, that I made a mistake in accepting but the way seemed closed up against retreat. We'll see how matters go, and if everything does not go well, I will endeavor to shake it off yet."¹² He was not successful in "shaking it off" for another seven years and then only after serving as prime minister from November of that year until the Fall of 1878 at the head of an honest but futile administration. For in spite of the seeming unanimity over his selection, Mackenzie was never able, even as Prime Minister, to muster all the forces of his party under his command. Blake may have been sincere in refusing the leadership, thereby forcing Mackenzie to take it. However, there was a strong element in parliament and in the country which thought that Blake should have succeeded to the leadership of the federal party when he resigned the Premiership of Ontario.¹³

Mackenzie was unsure of himself in personal respects also.

A young Scottish stonemason, he had emigrated to Canada thirty years before, virtually penniless. Forced to leave school at the beginning of his 'teens in order to support his family, he remained poor in spelling and composition throughout his life. In a political career characterized far more by hard work than by brilliance, he always seemed to be operating in someone's shadow. As Prime Minister, there was always Macdonald sitting across the way. But this was especially true within his own party. First it was Brown; then Blake. And so certain was Mackenzie that Blake was his superior that, when the Macdonald government was defeated in the House later in the year, he advised Lord Dufferin to call on Blake even though he himself was leader of the opposition.¹⁴ At the time, Blake refused to even consider the proposition. However, he posed a continuous problem for Mackenzie throughout the period of his leadership. Blake was invariably in the process of either entering or leaving the cabinet (he held three different portfolios in the entire administration and resigned twice) and this necessarily was a constant source of anxiety to Mackenzie. In 1874, Blake volunteered to enter the cabinet only on the condition that he would be permitted to lead the government while Mackenzie remained as Minister of Public Works.¹⁵ It is certain that Mackenzie never considered that Blake looked to him as undisputed leader although the rivalry between the two was not especially overt until much later.

Blake is an enigmatic figure in Canadian political history. His contemporaries, friend and foe alike, agree that he possessed

a towering intellect, was a marvelous debater and was a glutton for hard work.¹⁶ At the same time, Sir Richard Cartwright, Mackenzie's Minister of Finance, and unfriendly critic of Blake, charged that while "his general ability was unquestionable, ... he had certain faults of character and temperament which made him extremely difficult to get on with,"¹⁷ and which made him unfit personally and psychologically for politics. On occasion, Mackenzie had expressed himself to the effect that he wished Blake would take his place¹⁸ but for some reason one or the other of the two men always shied away from the necessary steps which would bring about a reversal of their roles. Blake was quite often on the verge of physical breakdown as Mackenzie himself often was, and it turned out that it was the health factor that eventually played an important part in determining their respective courses of action. The fact remains that rumors of Blake's imminent accession to the leadership of the party dogged Mackenzie throughout his tenure. Blake did little to disprove the rumors and often added credence to them such as the time, for example, when he took the platform at Aurora, Ontario in 1874 and denounced the government's attempts to negotiate a new reciprocity agreement with the United States and Mackenzie's policy of continuing the construction of the railway to the west.

The problems Mackenzie experienced with Blake may have been merely symptoms of a deeper malaise within the party itself. While the Liberals did succeed in winning an election on their own in 1874, their support at the polls was more a result of public

disgust with the Conservative role in the railway scandals than because of positive popular enthusiasm for the Liberal cause. In fact, the Liberal Party was not a united, well-organized group and Mackenzie aptly summed up his administration's difficulties in a letter to his brother mid-way through his term of office: "I have no sinecure," he said, "in trying to keep together a crowd of French Liberals Irish Catholics Methodists Free Traders Protectionists Eastern Province men Western men Central Canada men Columbians Manitobans all jealous of each other and striving to obtain some advantage or concession. I always knew it was very hard to keep liberals together but my experience has been far in excess of my utmost belief."¹⁹ Of course, every Canadian Prime Minister would have no trouble echoing a similar plaint at some time during his term but Mackenzie's troubles over his cabinet were such that they alone might have militated against any possible success for his administration.

From the beginning, Mackenzie was never able to bring the strongest leaders of the party into his administration. Aside from the troubles with Blake, Holton refused to accept a portfolio and Dorion retired early to the Supreme Court of Quebec. The absence of Dorion was crucial, as he might have been "the very man," claimed Cartwright, "to have given Mackenzie a foothold in Quebec."²⁰ Alfred Jones, the recognized leader from Nova Scotia could not be induced to join until near the end of the administration. Instead, Mackenzie had to rely on second-rate talent, some of which had just recently been in the ranks of Macdonald's supporters. A

backbencher summed up the situation: "...out of thirteen portfolios held at different times by twenty-three Ministers, there were only four Ministers besides himself who could defend their departments properly against the attacks of the opposition, namely, Cartwright, (David) Mills (of Ontario), Blake and (Lucius) Huntingdon (of Quebec)." ²¹

The result of all this was that Mackenzie was overburdened not only with the chores which should normally have been handled by his colleagues in the cabinet, but also by his own duties. He attempted to combine the post of Prime Minister with that of Minister of Public Works. His rigid integrity and his devotion to economy in the use of public funds compelled him to attempt this combination. However, as head of the patronage department, he was temperamentally unsuited to the task of handling deputations or letting contracts. In contrast to Macdonald, whose wit, geniality and capacity for compromise and conciliation were renowned, Mackenzie tended to regard all deputations as "marauders who were meditating a raid upon the treasury. ...It was said that Sir John could refuse the request of a deputation with better grace than Mackenzie could grant what was asked." ²² It is therefore not surprising that the Liberals were unceremoniously removed from power in the 1878 election, especially when it is recalled that throughout the 1870's the country was experiencing a depression for which the government could only prescribe the cure of economy, free trade and laissez-faire.

For a while after his government's defeat, Mackenzie remained unchallenged as leader. Blake was ill, Dorion was off the

scene and Mowat remained at the head of the Ontario government. However, Mackenzie seemed fed up with the tasks of leadership particularly because his uncompromising attitude had brought only despair in office and grief at the polls. He had also alienated many in his own party by his strict adherence to principle. Blake supporters were continuously pointing out that their hero had not been a member of the government which had been defeated in 1878 and when Blake announced he was ready to return to politics, he was elected by acclamation in Durham West in the Fall of 1879. The stage was set for a change.

Throughout the 1880 parliamentary session, Mackenzie did not even call a caucus, he took few of his followers into his confidence; and he was in poor health. From the time Blake entered the House, rumors of change were in the air. Mackenzie's biographer reports that there were two versions of what happened: The first is from the pen of Mackenzie himself as he related the tale in a letter to Louis H. Davies, the Premier of Prince Edward Island, approximately a month after he quit. Mackenzie claimed that there had been a conspiracy against him since the election defeat and that after Blake's return to the House, he was continually being ignored, with many of his followers feeling that his policies, especially with regard to free trade, were too rigid. He reported that he could have obtained a majority in his favor in caucus had he called one for the purpose, but he did not do so because he felt that Blake would not have submitted in any case. Bitter over this and saddened by the recent death of Holton and Brown's illness (he

subsequently died), he called his former cabinet colleagues together (with the exception of Blake, who was not a minister in September, 1878 and Mills, whom he suspected of engineering a coup against him) and announced his resignation. The other version is told by Skelton who claims that the chairman of the caucus, Joseph Rymal, called a meeting on his own initiative to consider the question of leadership. The result was that five cabinet ministers in the former administration were delegated to put the matter directly to Mackenzie. Mackenzie first charged that the whole business was simply a conspiracy by Rymal and Mills to supplant him with Blake. But the five, led by Laurier, insisted that this was not so and that he should consider his health and the fact that the recent electoral defeat meant that the public had lost confidence and that a new leader was in order.²³ Both versions probably have some truth in them. In any event, Mackenzie announced his resignation to the House at 2 A.M. on April 28, 1880, just before the sitting was adjourned. Thereafter, he refused to fight back against his conspirators²⁴ but felt badly enough not to attend the caucus that chose Edward Blake to succeed him later that morning; nor did he attend any other meetings of the caucus that were called while his successor was leader.²⁵

The interlude with Blake at the helm lasted seven years and was singularly uneventful. There were no revolts because there was no alternative to him for the leadership. Besides, Blake seemed to have the wholehearted support of all segments of his party. In fact, it was only under protest that he accepted the leadership in 1880

and on numerous occasions after that he is reported to have expressed a desire to resign. For example, only a few weeks before the 1887 election, he urged Oliver Mowat, still Premier of Ontario since 1872, to accept the position on the grounds that his prestige might carry the party to victory. The two met several times, with Mowat, much against his wishes, agreeing to lead if Blake would promise to enter the cabinet as minister without portfolio should he be called upon to form a government. The plan failed when Blake learned that Mowat would have to go back to practicing law in the not unlikely event of defeat. In view of the Premier's age and state of health, he decided that he had no right to expect him to give up the running of the government of Ontario and risk being defeated in a new sphere.²⁶ So Blake stayed on and led the party to its second electoral defeat of his stewardship.

Although the Liberals were more successful in the 1887 election than they had been in the first in 1882, Blake felt that two losses were sufficient proof, as if he needed any, that he was unfit for a position which he never really wanted. Accordingly, on March 3, 1887, a few weeks after the election, he addressed a circular letter to the newly elected Liberal members of parliament, telling them that his "present relation to the party ends with the opening (of Parliament); and it will devolve on the Liberals at once to choose their leader for the new Parliament."²⁷ So that the letter would not be construed as the expected resignation of a defeated leader who was seeking a vote of confidence from the

caucus, he added a Sherman-like statement that he would refuse to discharge the duties of the office if he were re-elected.

As one, the members of the party replied, pleading with him to reconsider. They did not regard the election results as proof of any failure on his part; instead, they were convinced that the party was on the threshold of success and his departure at this juncture would prove fatal to the party's chances. Many claimed that they had run in the election just past only because he was leader and all sorts of devices were contrived to induce him to reconsider. Cartwright even enlisted Blake's brother in the party's cause.

When Blake returned from a post-election vacation, he claimed that his poor health, neglected home life, poor financial position and his unsuitability for the position made it imperative that he resign. However, he agreed to stay on as nominal head if a committee would be appointed to lighten his load. This was done. In the middle of April, after Parliament opened, Blake was unanimously re-elected leader by the caucus and a special eight-member advisory committee consisting of the upper echelon of the party was appointed to assist him.

The arrangement lasted barely a month. Blake, seriously ill from overwork, was advised by his doctors to relinquish his position and on June 2, he sent his formal resignation to the caucus. While many did not believe that his retirement was permanent, this action threw the party into a panic. His resignation posed a

serious problem because there was no consensus as to a successor and anyone eventually chosen could not possibly be said to be able to command the respect and allegiance that seemed to come so easily to Blake.

* * * * *

The most frequently mentioned successor to Blake was Sir Richard Cartwright who had served as Mackenzie's Minister of Finance. However, he had aroused a great deal of opposition in Quebec because he had supported Macdonald in the Riel affair. With the French Nationalists in power provincially, Cartwright would obviously never do. The business community would also be affronted by his selection because he was a confirmed free trader.

David Mills was widely considered as an alternative to Cartwright. Mills had been a member of the House since Confederation and had served with Mackenzie as Minister of the Interior. Exceptionally well-read in constitutional law of both the British and American variety, he was a more likely candidate for the Supreme Court than for the party leadership. He was, in fact, eventually appointed to the court fifteen years later. Moreover, he lacked personal popularity and his extreme partisanship would surely alienate the non-committed voter whose support the Liberals obviously needed if they were ever going to win another election.

Strangely, Wilfrid Laurier seems to have been entirely overlooked as a prospective leader. A few of the Liberal politicians

replying to Blake's circular letter referred to him, but their remarks were not especially encouraging. As Louis A. Davies put it: "Poor dear Laurier, a more charming fellow never lived. I would stand by him and fight for him and so I am sure would many others. But it would be the veriest piece of political Quixotism."²⁸ Nevertheless, it was Laurier who was chosen. The idea seems to have originated entirely with Blake. Skelton reports that, at least a few days before resigning, Blake had advised his English supporters that "there is only one possible choice --- Laurier,"²⁹ and subsequent letters between him and his successor bear this out.

Blake had come to this conclusion over a period of a few months. Since the abortive negotiations with Mowat to switch to the federal field, he had come to doubt the expediency of the move. Besides, Mowat soon decided to remain in Toronto. Even if he had not done so, Blake would probably have concluded that it would be better for the party to have a Quebec member as the new leader. With Tory and Orange Lodge influence at their height in Ontario, there seemed to be little chance for the party to make any headway especially because many more Liberals than Conservatives were leaving the province to live in the United States. (The usual explanation for this is the obvious one that Conservatives were generally averse to things American while Liberals had no such compunctions.) On the other hand, there seemed to be solid possibilities for the Liberals in Quebec where the Conservatives were losing their grip after the Riel episode. One of the strongest reasons against Blake's resignation was that it was

clear that Quebec would not follow any other English leader. To the Quebecois in the party, Blake had behaved with admirable restraint (for an English Canadian) in the Riel affair and his generally tolerant attitude endeared him to them. If Quebec would not follow Cartwright or Mills, it could scarcely have any objections to one of its own.³⁰ Of course, from the viewpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec, Laurier could not be looked upon with equanimity. (He had never entirely overcome the Rouge label, the result of his early connection with the Institut Canadian.) But this could easily be said about any other member of the party and with Dorion long since departed from the scene, Laurier was the foremost French Canadian in the party. He had served in Mackenzie's cabinet as Minister of Inland Revenue, sat at Blake's side throughout the period of his leadership and, by virtue of his moderate views and effective speech-making, had made a good impression upon English Canadians.

After his resignation, Blake spent a few days convincing the ranking members of the party that Laurier should be chosen. J.D. Edgar, a back-bencher, considered the prospective selection of Laurier "a fearful blunder,"³¹ but when the caucus met on June 7, Blake's resignation was formally accepted and Laurier was chosen to replace him. Cartwright refused to be involved in a contest in spite of wanting the position badly. While he was invariably at odds with Blake on policy matters (particularly on the tariff) and had retained his jealousy of him from the Mackenzie days when the Liberal Prime Minister kept going out of his way

to placate the reluctant Torontonians, he knew he did not have a chance should he have attempted to oppose the leader's wishes.

Laurier's reaction to the responsibility placed upon him by the caucus was the by-now characteristically Liberal one: He doubted his suitability for the position and at first declined. When pressed, he asked for a few days to reconsider. He personally favored Cartwright and seems to have regarded his selection as a grave personal and political mistake. His reasons were many: He had never enjoyed entirely good health, his financial means were limited and he had reconciled himself to a life of scholarly pursuits, a pastime to which he was honestly and sincerely devoted. He was not anxious for power and regarded his position in the House and within the party as giving him all the authority and influence he would ever desire. Most significantly, from the political standpoint, however, was his feeling that the fact that he was a French Canadian Roman Catholic militated against any success he might have as leader of the party. It was a fact that the party's base of support was in Ontario. He therefore felt that the new party leader should be an Ontario Protestant whose native language was English.

With substantial pressure within the party exerted upon him to accept, he waited less than two weeks before doing so. The public reaction to the event ranged from incredulity to indifference. The consensus was that his selection was temporary and that as soon as Blake's health was restored he would be back. The Conservative press was certain that the selection was not permanent, that Laurier was unfitted for the job and that either Mills or

Cartwright would replace him in the near future. Laurier himself thought of the appointment as temporary and expected Blake to return as soon as he could. Blake never did and in spite of Laurier's lack of confidence in himself and his certainty that his selection was a grave political error, he was forced to carry on. His letters to Blake and some of his supporters in subsequent years demonstrate that he was obsessed with these doubts. In 1890 he wrote to Blake:

"Apart from my personal shortcomings, it is now more and more manifest to me that I can never successfully lead the party. ...A French Canadian will not get a cheerful support in the English provinces...On the other hand what I lose in the English provinces I ought to gain in Quebec. But that corresponding gain I cannot claim. The views which I hold will never meet the cordial support of the clergy & for generations the clergy must be here the commanding influence." 32

At the same time he recognized his party's dilemma if he should resign for in another letter,³³ a few days later, he admitted: "The only trouble is if I give it up, who will assume it, since you decline." Five years later, hounded by the bishops over the Manitoba school question and on the verge of electoral success, the refrain was similar: "I have always been of the opinion that an English leader would be much stronger than I ever can be, and everything confirms me in that opinion."³⁴ While this is getting somewhat ahead, Laurier never had any reason to alter this diagnosis throughout his thirty-two years at the head of the party. He always felt that his "racial" origin created greater difficulties both for himself and for the party than would be the case with an English leader. In 1896 over the Manitoba school question, in the Boer War controversy, in 1905 and the Autonomy Bills at the time of the establishment

of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, in 1909 and the Naval Bill, in 1911 and Reciprocity, in the 1916 Ontario Education agitation, over the country's involvement in the war and in the crisis over Conscription in 1917 --- in every one of these events, Laurier was accused in English Canada of paying too much attention to French Canadian nationalist feeling while at the same time he was being condemned in Quebec as a traitor to his own people. After the political catastrophe of 1917, Laurier is reported to have expressed the hope that "it would never be the unfortunate fate of any other French Canadian to be the leader of a national political party."³⁵

At first, Laurier had some difficulty asserting himself as party leader. He was hampered by the universal expectation that his appointment was only temporary and that Blake would surely return. The problem with his reluctant predecessor was heightened during the election of 1891. The Liberals campaigned on a platform of unrestricted reciprocity with the United States while the Conservatives, led for the last time by Macdonald, saw the issue as a treasonous attempt by the Liberals to lead the country into annexation and away from Great Britain. Blake thrust himself into the controversy in a letter he dispatched to his supporters in the constituency of West Durham in which he rejected their offer to have him as their candidate. In his letter, he pointed out that if one assumed that absolute free trade with the United States ought to be accepted, then this arrangement should only come as a precursor of political union. To Blake this was,

in effect, a constitutional issue for which the electorate was totally unprepared.³⁶ While there is no doubt that this letter gave credence to Tory charges and seemed to indicate a split in the leadership between Laurier and Cartwright on the one side and Blake on the other, its electoral effect was not crucial. Laurier had often claimed that the Liberals had little chance of gaining power as long as Macdonald was alive³⁷ and the party's advocacy of unrestricted reciprocity as its official trade policy was in itself sufficient to ruin its chances in spite of the wide support the policy commanded within party ranks.

Blake disappeared from the scene for good in 1892 when he entered Irish politics, subsequently serving for a number of years as a member of the parliamentary committee of the Irish parliamentary party. The Conservative press encouraged rumors that he would be back, hoping thereby to give the impression that the Liberals were dissatisfied with Laurier. Meanwhile, however, the party's prospects were improving. The Conservatives lost Macdonald soon after the election of 1891 and could not find a suitable successor. Laurier found a strong ally in ex-Conservative Joseph Israel Tarte, whose knowledge of Quebec and organizing ability were important factors in turning the province over to the Liberals. At Laurier's instigation, the party held a National Convention in 1893 in order to strengthen its organization and to give the impression of wider popular support for the party's programs. The well-controlled convention began with a unanimously passed motion of confidence in Laurier's leadership and then moved

on to a consideration of policy. The party's commercial policy was the most important one the meeting considered and the unequivocal reciprocity plank of 1891 was replaced by a resolution denouncing protection and promising that the party was prepared to enter into negotiations with the United States for such a treaty.³⁸ Of equal importance was the fact that party members across the country could see their leader up close. It was not long before English-speaking Liberals, especially those outside Quebec, became accustomed to Laurier. In fact, when the issue of the Manitoba School question arose, the chief opposition to Laurier's counsel of compromise came not from the English but from his own province where the Roman Catholic hierarchy vehemently opposed his stand.

Success in the election of 1896 provided the means for consolidating Laurier's control of the party. He used the cabinet as the instrument for this purpose. Aside from the premiers of three provinces, Andrew G. Blair (New Brunswick); W.S. Fielding (Nova Scotia); and Oliver Mowat (Ontario) who were among the first to be given portfolios, Louis H. Davies of Prince Edward Island, although no longer head of the government there, was also included. Joseph Israel Tarte, along with Laurier, the architect of victory in Quebec, where the party captured 49 of the 65 seats, was ensconced where he would do the most good, as head of the Department of Public Works. Sydney Fisher and R.R. Dobell represented the English of the province while Charles Fitzpatrick was the Irish-Catholic incumbent. While Richard Cartwright was an obvious

candidate for the post of Minister of Finance, his doctrinaire views in favor of free trade forced Laurier to give the portfolio to the more respectable Fielding, leaving Cartwright as Minister of Trade and Commerce. Manufacturer William Paterson represented the Ontario business community in the post of Controller of Customs. Finally, Manitoba's rising young Clifford Sifton was appointed Minister of the Interior. The relatively conservative nature of the administration is emphasized by the fact that the only Rouge in the cabinet was C.A. Geoffrion --- and he was Minister without Portfolio.

This brief list of some of the cabinet members selected by Laurier undoubtedly represents some of the finest political talent ever assembled in one administration up to that time. However, the Prime Minister did not depend on this team of political personalities or their group and organizational ties to secure his position for him entirely. He also utilized his own personal contacts and the force of his personal appeal. Leading the Liberals was no dour Scottish stonemason but a genial personality whose "loving nature" and "sunny ways"³⁹ endeared him even to his opponents. In contrast to his two predecessors, Laurier had little difficulty coming to terms with the realities of political life. He recognized the usefulness of patronage and knew that rigid principles concerning trade or religious teaching in the schools had no place in a society as diverse as Canada's. Finally, the contrast between him and previous Liberal leaders was particularly marked by his success in coming to terms with the commercial interests whose funds and support had sustained Macdonald for so long.

Throughout the period of his leadership, Laurier was plagued by three basic problems --- commercial policy, the French-English cleavage, and the question of relations with Great Britain, with the latter two closely interrelated. Threats to his authority invariably came over these issues. On occasion, insubordination from within the parliamentary party was easily dealt with as a result of the fact that he was Prime Minister. For example, in 1902, while Laurier was away in Europe attending the Colonial Conference in London and interviewing French officials in Paris, Tarte embarked on a speaking campaign in Ontario in which he advocated a policy of protection for the country. Upon his return from abroad, Laurier obtained Tarte's resignation not so much on grounds of political philosophy but because the Minister's attitude constituted "a self-evident violation of...(his) duty to the government of which... (he) was a member."⁴⁰ The following year, Andrew G. Blair was forced to resign from the cabinet on similar grounds over the government's railway policy.⁴¹ On the other hand, while Laurier could invoke the prerogatives of the Prime Minister, he was, at the same time, often forced to compromise.

In 1905, when the growth of population in the West required the creation of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, the framing of the provincial constitutions once again raised the question of separate schools. The Autonomy Bills provided that the Catholic minority had the right to establish their own schools and to share in public funds. This in effect restored the system set up in the Northwest in 1875. However, in the intervening years,

successive acts of the territorial government had considerably modified these provisions by restricting the establishment of new Catholic schools and the place of religious instruction and by standardizing curriculum and administration in such a way that the system was virtually a unified one. Clifford Sifton resigned from the cabinet in protest⁴² and threats of similar action came from William Fielding. The party press objected on grounds that provincial rights were being abrogated and spread rumors of further impending cabinet resignations. Laurier replied to this opposition by claiming that this implied distrust of him as a French Canadian and as a Catholic by Protestant Liberals suggested that he should resign as Prime Minister. When this threat proved ineffective and opposition continued to increase, he met the Quebec caucus and informed them that compromise was necessary in order to remain in power.⁴³ The amended draft defined the rights of the minority in terms of the existing situation and mollified most opposition. However, this modification was not sufficient to induce Sifton to return and Laurier's original plan left a residue of uneasiness among his English supporters.

The Prime Minister's privilege of choosing his cabinet was a significant factor in maintaining Laurier's pre-eminence.

"Men of strong, individual views and ambitions, with reforming temperaments and a desire to force issues, did not find the road to the Privy Council open to them; different qualities held the password. ...At least twice in the last four years of his regime, Sir Wilfrid, conscious of the waning energies of his party, took advice outside of his immediate circle as to what should be done; on both occasions he rejected advice tendered to him because this involved the inclusion in his cabinet of personalities that might have disturbed the charmed serenity of that circle."⁴⁴

This comment by Dafoe is elaborated further in his biography of Sifton:

"In 1908 Sir Wilfrid, when a discerning electorate had deprived him of a colleague whose political incapacity had been completely demonstrated, became a party to a deal by which he re-entered parliament. An old friend took the liberty of asking Sir Wilfrid why he wanted this associate back in the cabinet, only to be told that 'So-and-so never made any trouble for me.'"

45

Certainly the personnel of the cabinet in the final years of the administration does not in any way compare with the 1896 group. Tarte, Sifton and Blair were gone. Sir William Mulock had resigned in 1905 partly because of ill-health but probably also because of disagreement with Laurier on government ownership. The absence of Tarte and Sifton was the most serious and their replacements did not possess the vigor, talent and the appeal of these two leaders. Ontario was without a forceful leader too. In effect, Laurier permitted his colleagues to grow old in office with him. The cabinet was indeed a serene place. Mackenzie King recalled in his diary many occasions when he discovered a number of his fellow cabinet members sound asleep during a meeting.

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There is little doubt, then, that toward the end of the fifteen years of his party's tenure in power, Laurier had become the absolute master of his administration. However, if the prerogatives of his position or (if these were insufficient) the technique of last-minute compromise served to establish his effective control of the parliamentary party, he could obviously not so easily deal with revolts against his leadership in the country. The 1911 Reciprocity fiasco brought together two of these elements in the party,

the French Canadian Nationalists and the manufacturers. Along with the Conservatives who played on the country's latent fears of American annexation, it was this strange alliance which drove an ageing and by-now ineffective government from office.

There was no question of Laurier's resignation after the 1911 defeat. By now he had become too fond of politics to relinquish his position and, besides, there was no one else even approaching him in popularity. In the late Autumn of that year, at the opening of the new session, he did offer his resignation to the caucus. This was a perfunctory action, however, and the members were unanimous in rejecting the offer.⁴⁷ There appears to have been no further question of his leadership for five more years. The uneasy alliance with the Quebec Nationalists forged by Borden seemed to the opposition to be on the verge of break-down and the Conservative leader's naval policy seemed to increase that possibility. The Liberals, for their part, almost immediately got over their reciprocity madness. Even Sifton who had organized and led the celebrated revolt of the eighteen Toronto manufacturers and bankers⁴⁸ once again became a close Laurier associate, cooperating with him in opposition to the naval issue.⁴⁹ The government was also having its problems with the general economic situation. It seemed to the Liberals that their time in opposition would not last for more than the term of that parliament.

The outbreak of war in 1914 gave the Conservatives a new lease on life. At first, there was national unanimity over all aspects of Canada's involvement. This could not continue indefinitely.

The spontaneous enthusiasm for the war was soon exhausted and opposition first arose over the corruption in the letting of war contracts. However, the most important aspect of opposition both to the Conservative government and to the war effort revolved around the French-English cleavage and it was this issue that dominated the situation for the rest of Laurier's life.

The traditional isolation of Quebec from world events and the undoubted fact that the Canadian armed forces were an anglicized stronghold provided the Bourassa-led Nationalists with a convenient foundation for their agitation against continued participation at the level of personnel. They wished to confine the country's contribution to that of food and equipment. Nationalist objections were first focused on domestic affairs. In 1913, the Ontario Department of Education issued an order --- the notorious Regulation 17 --- which altered the prevailing bilingual school system. The order provided that the use of French as a language of instruction should be discontinued after the first two years of elementary school except where pupils had no comprehension of English at all. Protest against the ruling took the form of school closings and children's strikes with the Separate School Boards refusing to enforce the ruling. The provincial authorities retaliated by stopping grants to the schools and fining and often imprisoning school commissioners.

The issue confronted Laurier with a difficult problem. He had to maintain himself as the leader of French Canadian opinion while at the same time avoiding the loss of English support. He

also wished to avoid using the issue against the federal government in such a way as to evoke the charge of treason against his party from its opponents. While he and his party continued to denounce the government over recruiting methods and corruption, Laurier maintained his support of full participation in the war. Early in 1916, he even consented to Borden's request for a one-year extension of parliament. However, with Bourassa and his nationalists leading the furor over the Ontario School Question in Quebec, there was the possibility that Laurier would cease to be regarded as the leader of French Canada.⁵⁰ He could not continue the statesmanlike pose indefinitely. The matter came to a head in the Spring of 1916. On May 9, Ernest Lapointe introduced a resolution calling upon the Ontario Legislative Assembly to refrain from interfering with "...the privilege of children of French parentage of being taught in their mother tongue."⁵¹ In his accompanying impassioned speech, Lapointe admitted, as Laurier was to do in a subsequent and equally impassioned peroration,⁵² that while the matter was one of provincial concern, there was also the question of minority rights to be considered.

In spite of Laurier's eloquent appeal following in the wake of that of his young supporter, the members of the party west of Quebec were reluctant to follow their leader. During the debate, the party caucused by provinces. Afterwards, Senator Dandurand reported to Laurier that Quebec and the Maritimes agreed to support the resolution. The members from the West had voted to oppose while the Ontario contingent, doubting the expediency of the motion,

would support it if Sir Wilfrid so wished.⁵³ Once again Laurier is reported to have claimed that "the forces of prejudice in Ontario have been too much for my friends. It was a mistake for a French Roman Catholic to take the leadership. I told Blake so thirty years ago."⁵⁴ He then scribbled a few lines to the effect that he was going to resign and would announce the intention in the House that afternoon. He dispatched Dandurand with this note to George Graham, the senior member from Ontario. The Ontario caucus assembled immediately: "They had not realized that 'the old man' took it so much to heart."⁵⁵ At once the members voted their positive support and urgently requested that their leader withdraw his resignation. Needless to say, confronted with this change of heart, Laurier agreed to continue.⁵⁶ In the voting, eleven of seventeen Western Liberals bolted while only one Ontario member supported the government.

The conscription issue of the following year could not be managed so easily and the difficulties over the Ontario education question foreshadowed the ultimate split in the party. Throughout the war, Laurier had opposed conscription and was not disposed to change his mind in spite of the acknowledged failure of recruiting and the deteriorating situation in Europe. He was similarly opposed to the idea of a national, or Union, government scheme.⁵⁷ In the Spring of 1917, when Borden proposed a coalition to carry on the war, impose conscription and postpone an election for another year, Laurier refused. He did so because he felt that such an arrangement would permit the Conservatives to gain all the political credit while placing him in a position of losing his hold on

Quebec and compromising his principles besides.⁵⁸

Upon Laurier's refusal to join with him, Borden introduced a Military Service Act in June. Laurier countered with an amendment providing for a referendum to the electorate before any action was taken by the government. The voting on the Third Reading of the Military Service Act revealed how deeply split the Liberals were. Only 44 out of 86 Liberals opposed conscription and these primarily represented constituencies east of the Ottawa River.

While Laurier had rejected coalition, many of his followers did not consider the matter closed. On July 20, a conference of Ontario Liberal M.P.s and candidates was held in Toronto in anticipation of the coming election. The meeting decided that winning the war was the first consideration, that there should be no extension of the parliamentary term, that coalition with Borden was out of the question, that there should be another voluntary effort before conscription was imposed and that the next campaign would be fought under Sir Wilfrid's leadership.⁵⁹ Less than three weeks after, a convention of approximately 1000 Liberals from the four western provinces was held in Winnipeg. It too officially rejected Union government and affirmed its support of Laurier.⁶⁰ However, these official statements of support of Laurier's position could not hide the differences of opinion which the proceedings of these meetings revealed, and the evident pressures in the country soon drove many Liberals, if they were not already so disposed by personal conviction, to

not only accept conscription but to either join Borden in a coalition or to support the Unionist cause.

The passage of the War Time Elections Act in September, which gave the vote to women next-of-kin of overseas service-men and which at the same time disenfranchised all former citizens of Germany and Austria and all other German-speaking Canadians who had become naturalized since 1902, was an important factor in breaking many Liberals away from Laurier. It was an especially effective device against Western members because this ethnic support would normally have been theirs, particularly in the circumstances of the time. Early in October, after protracted negotiations which had been going on intermittently since June and continuously since the middle of August, ten Liberals joined a Union Government under Borden. However, seven of these received their support from provincial politics. Of equal significance was the fact that many more important federal figures, such as George P. Graham, W.S. Fielding and Fred Pardee (the party whip in the House), while not joining the government, supported Borden's policies and moved to the cross-benches. In the general election that followed two months later, the split in the party was reflected in the electorate. Quebec returned 62 Liberals, two Conservatives and a solitary Unionist; only eight Liberals were elected out of a possible 82 in Ontario; in the Maritimes the count was Liberals 10, Unionists 7 and Conservatives 14; and the party was able to win only two seats out of the 57 available in the West, with 18 falling to the Unionists and 37 to the Tories. This out of a total

of 82, only twenty Liberals were elected outside the province of Quebec.

Throughout the year, the question of a change of leader was not seriously considered, however. Back in June, well before the final vote in the Military Service Bill was taken, the possibility was in Laurier's mind. He rejected it:

"It is quite true: in these recent weeks, I have often thought of resigning, but whenever I sat down to think the matter out, my courage rose up against the difficulties which I saw impending were I to give up the fight, now especially that the fight has become a losing battle." 61

That fall, a few days prior to joining Borden's coalition, several conscriptionist-inclined members, hoping to avoid crossing the floor, attempted one more solution to their difficulties before deserting.

Skelton reports the incident as follows:

"Early in October three Liberals waited on Sir Wilfrid Laurier in his study to suggest that he resign in favour of an English-speaking leader. They intimated that the leadership of a French Canadian, opposed to conscription, would be a handicap in their communities and that even in spite of the War Times Elections Act, a Liberal party under a conscriptionist leader would have a chance for victory. Sir Wilfrid...was surprised by this intimation, but at once replied that if there was any general feeling in that direction he would immediately withdraw; he would therefore consult his friends. On the way home, one of the visitors stopped at a news agency, and stated that Sir Wilfrid had definitely resigned. The blaze of astounded query and indignant protest from every quarter the next day revealed the fatuity of the suggestion. The Liberal party was clearly doomed to defeat, but it was not doomed to dishonour; any change in leadership in that crisis would not have averted defeat and would still further have accentuated the racial cleavage. Sir Wilfrid took the train immediately for Toronto and Montreal, where he consulted political and personal friends. Their insistence confirmed his rising pugnacity, and he stayed." 62

Early in 1918, on the heels of the electoral defeat, the press was, as might be expected, full of rumors of his resignation. The composition of the contingent in the House made this possibility remote and the members were unanimous in their desire to see him continue.⁶³

Supporters of conscription and/or Union Government gave various reasons for deserting Laurier. Many rationalizations had ethnic or regional overtones:

"I hope most westerners are as tired as I am of being told that we must not do this, because Quebec would not like it; or that the party must do that, because otherwise Quebec will rally to Bourassa. After one has been told twenty-five times in succession, as I was at Ottawa, that our national course in the war must be determined by the consideration that it is preferable that Laurier instead of Bourassa should control Quebec, the dose became nauseating. I did for a while think this myself but I now believe this is a wrong view. If Bourassa is the real leader of Quebec the sooner the rest of Canada knows it the better. The present situation as it seems to me is that Bourassa controls Laurier through the latter's fear of loss of support in Quebec, and Laurier in turn undertakes to control the Liberal Party. This makes Bourassa the real leader of the Liberal party and in the event of a Liberal victory at the coming election it will make him the power behind the throne. I do not believe that many English Liberals will agree to this."⁶⁴

To this Laurier invariably countered that,

"...if at this juncture I were to depart from the policy which I have hitherto maintained in all the provinces, I would hand over the province of Quebec to extremists and the condition of things will be still more serious..."⁶⁵

A substantial majority of Liberals who favored conscription and who therefore were unable to follow Laurier were motivated by honest conviction on the basis of issues or had their actions forced upon them by conditions in their areas. From the outset they regretted their

desertion and, even in the party's darkest hour after the defeat in December, they did not hesitate in communicating their apologies to their leader:

"You know Quebec as no other man knows it, and I am perfectly convinced that your policy was dictated by a sincere wish to promote harmony in Canada. Believe me we Liberals over here (the note was written from London, Ontario) all give you full credit for your high ideals and absolute conviction, but to us speedy reinforcement seems to take precedence of all else, and we had to act on our own opinion, in a crisis which permits no man to submit his judgment to that of another.

"We have not turned Tory, nor shall we do so. Liberal principles are as deeply ingrained in us as ever, and when the time comes, after the war is over, we shall continue to promote them by every means in our power." 66

For his part, Laurier felt that a few of the Unionist Liberals were showing their true colors in the crisis and were little more than Imperialists or members of the "Round Table Group" who belonged in the Tory Camp in any case.⁶⁷ He also recognized, however, that most of his former supporters differed with him only on this issue and were anxious to return to the fold. He tried to leave the door open for them to do so. Just before his death, at the Annual Meeting of the newly-formed Eastern Ontario Liberal Association in Ottawa in January, 1919, in anticipation of the National Convention which, eight days after the armistice, he had announced would be held that year, he issued a public invitation:

"We have differed in the past; but let the past be forgotten. Let us all be Liberals again, actuated only by conscience. If a Liberal who has been a Unionist comes to me, I shall not rebuke him. I will say, 'Come, put your hand in mine, we must not look back, but ahead, not at the past, but to the future, for that is the only horizon for us.'" 68

Not all Liberals were as charitably disposed to the Unionists. Almost uniformly, those who had remained steadfast behind Laurier, Westerners such as Gardiner and Motherwell and Easterners such as Aylesworth, Fisher, McKenzie, and Murphy --- especially Gardiner and Murphy, to say nothing of French Canadians such as Lemieux --- retained an unshakable distrust of the Unionists although they often echoed their leader's conciliatory words in public.

Laurier died on February 17, 1919, and it was left to others to face the formidable task of reconstructing the party which was not only split over the war but which now also had to deal with the agrarian discontent festering in rural Ontario and the West. The difficulty of this task was mitigated somewhat. Aside from the legacy left by his personal appeal which extended across the country and which has never been surpassed by any other national leader before or since, Laurier bequeathed a solid bloc of 65 seats from Quebec to the party. These were the factors which conditioned the selection of a new leader and which were to circumscribe his area of maneuver once chosen.

* * * * *

Exactly one week after Laurier's death, the parliamentary caucus selected Daniel D. McKenzie of Nova Scotia as the leader in the House to act in the interim before the meeting of the party in a national convention. An anti-conscriptionist, his choice was designed to placate both Quebec and the rest of the country. The

fact that he was "cautious, unimaginative, parochial, and (that) the contrast to his predecessor was painful even to his opponents"⁶⁹ made him an ideal person for the temporary appointment. While this was the first time that the parliamentary caucus was willing to forego its previously exercised prerogative of choosing the leader, it is uncertain whether Laurier had intended that this issue would come before the convention which he had called. However, the meeting which was convened for the purpose of uniting a divided party and creating a common platform seemed to be the best method, given the composition of the parliamentary group, to select a leader who at least had the nominal approval of a national membership. The use of the convention for this purpose was rationalized by Ernest Lapointe. According to a reporter at the Convention: "Mr. Lapointe said that Sir Wilfrid Laurier had been leader of a democratic party and it was therefore fitting that his successor should be chosen not by a coterie of politicians but by a great democratic convention."⁷⁰

Representation at the Convention which was held on August 5, 6 and 7, 1919, was modelled after that of 1893 and set the pattern for subsequent meetings: Senators, M.P.s and defeated candidates; Liberal provincial premiers, leaders of the opposition and presidents of the provincial associations; three delegates each from every federal constituency and three alternates; and Liberal members of each provincial assembly and Liberal candidates defeated in the last provincial election acting jointly were entitled to

select a delegation from among themselves equal to one-fourth the total number of representatives in each provincial assembly.⁷¹

Out of a total of some 1850 delegates and alternates theoretically entitled to be present, approximately 1150 had voting rights.⁷²

The composition of this group of voting delegates is significant. Almost without exception, the 235 federal constituency organizations were in the hands of Laurier Liberals, most of whom strongly resented the apostasy of the Unionists. The latter, as mentioned before, were mostly from provincial politics. It is apparent, then, that when M.P.s and defeated candidates (excluding Senators) are included, the representation was weighted overwhelmingly in favor of those who had remained faithful to Laurier. While not unmindful of conciliating, Murphy and Haydon along with the rest of those in charge of arrangements were nevertheless determined to see that the staunch party supporters would be in control.⁷³

Four candidates for the leadership presented themselves to the Convention: William Lyon Mackenzie King, D.D. McKenzie, George P. Graham and W.S. Fielding.⁷⁴ A French Canadian and a Catholic was out of the question because of the feeling that "Laurier's successor should be an English-speaking Protestant, not because a Frenchman or Roman Catholic is objectionable, but in recognition of the Protestant element which for more than thirty years gave loyal support to a French and a Catholic leader."⁷⁵ The candidates were not of equal quality. McKenzie's claim to consideration rested entirely on his having acted as temporary House leader (his performance had been mediocre besides). Graham was an ex-cabinet

minister, senior from Ontario, and of some ability. However, his support of the Military Service Act made it unlikely that he would be chosen in spite of the fact that he was almost universally well-liked. Both he and McKenzie were just entering their sixties.⁷⁶

In effect, the contest was between Fielding and King. Of the two, Fielding had prior claim on the basis of experience. Premier of Nova Scotia before 1896, he had served Laurier throughout the fifteen years of office as Minister of Finance. An able administrator and an excellent parliamentarian and speaker, he had the respect of all on both sides of the House. It is reported that on one occasion, in 1908, when Laurier was contemplating retirement, Fielding was designated as his successor.⁷⁷ However, he was seventy years old and had deserted Laurier over conscription. That he had never taken office under Borden was in his favor and several months before the convention he withdrew from the cross-benches and rejoined the party.

"It was ... possible to turn... (this) reason against his candidacy into a strong one in his favour, for if the Laurier Liberals and the Unionist Liberals were to be re-united, Fielding's sterling character and his midway position would mark him as an ideal party catalyst for the next few years. This had apparently been Laurier's opinion; ... he had during the last few months of his life spoken of Fielding as the one who could best make the Liberals forget their differences. Lady Laurier let it be known that this had been her husband's wish, and even appeared in the gallery at the convention in the hope of aiding the Fielding cause."⁷⁸

If Fielding's prospects seemed good, he was a reluctant candidate nevertheless. He believed that because of the hangover from

conscription, he could not hope for the united support of even his home province of Nova Scotia, to say nothing about Quebec. He was also opposed to the low-tariff plank in the platform drawn up by the convention. He only agreed to stand for the leadership at 4 o'clock on the morning of the balloting after an all-night siege of entreaties⁷⁹ by his advisers who finally convinced him to mn on the grounds that his election or a substantial vote in his favor would be evidence to all that the convention was a genuine union of the party and that the Liberals who had been Unionists nevertheless retained the respect and confidence of the delegates. Even upon agreeing to run, however, he stipulated that, if elected, he would demand a substantial modification in the platform before accepting the position.⁸⁰

Of all the contestant, Mackenzie King seems to have been the only one to have consciously wanted the position. In fact, from the day of his birth in Berlin (now Kitchener) Ontario in 1874, he was groomed to be Prime Minister, first by his mother and then by himself partly out of ambition and partly in order to vindicate the memory of his maternal grandfather, William Lyon Mackenzie, the leader of the abortive 1837 rebellion in Upper Canada. After obtaining an undergraduate degree at Toronto and doing graduate work at Harvard, he tried his hand at social work and investigation of labor conditions in Chicago and London, England. Dissatisfied with this life, he returned to Canada and soon became Deputy-Minister of Labour and then Minister of Labour under Laurier in 1908. After his defeat in the election of 1911, he

embarked upon a career of labor conciliation for the Rockefeller interests as well as serving with the Ottawa Party Office and the National Liberal Advisory Committee set up by Laurier. He was again defeated in the 1917 election, this time as the candidate in the constituency of North York. However, according to most accounts, he had remained faithful to his chief in the war-time crisis. If this was not the case, he was believed to have done so by the party and this is what counted.⁸¹

King fancied himself Laurier's favorite and from the first was always pestering Sir Wilfrid about his career chances. Although he no doubt regarded King as a young man of considerable promise, Laurier in time probably became wearied of King's aggressiveness. As Dawson put it: "Laurier's attitude towards King...had been one of carefully guarded esteem."⁸² Laurier may have regarded King as his eventual successor but it is certain that he favored Fielding as the one behind whom the party could best unite. Lady Laurier let it be known that this had been her husband's wish and even appeared at the Convention Hall in order to aid the cause of the Nova Scotian.⁸³ In spite of this evidence, many at the Convention thought of King as Laurier's designee and King, of course, did nothing to dispel this illusion.⁸⁴ As might be expected, after King's success, the myth soon became current that not only did "the mantle of Laurier fall upon Mackenzie King"⁸⁵ but that Sir Wilfrid had placed it there as well.

For someone who wanted the leadership so badly, King was, on the surface, remarkably nonchalant in going about winning it.

He was in England for most of the period between Laurier's death and the convention and only returned to Canada two weeks before the meeting opened. He recalled in his diary that,

"I had no organization of any kind and did not seek the support of a single man. When spoken to, I told my friends that it was a matter for them to consider and do as they might think best. I literally abstained in every direction from exerting any influence whatever. The trip to England was evidence of my desire not to intrigue, and my attitude since my return was not less visibly so." 86

To this, Dawson adds his own conclusion to the effect that "no preliminary reconnaissance or preparation for the convention was made on his behalf during his absence, no person or committee was given the task of watching over his interests or sounding out delegates; no contact or communication with his friends was maintained during his trip on the one subject which lay nearest to his heart."⁸⁷ Other considerably less friendly biographers claim that King was involved all along in a careful plan to win the nomination:

"In real fact his candidature had been carefully planned by himself, and his machine meticulously constructed and well-oiled. According to one source, 'In London in 1919 he told a fellow countryman of his hopes and his desires at the Liberal Convention which was to take place later in the year. He had thought out every detail of procedure in advance, nothing was left to change...'" 88

The truth probably lies somewhere in between these alternatives. King could not announce his candidacy until Sydney Fisher, Minister of Agriculture for the whole period of Laurier's administration and who had remained faithful in 1917, made up his mind about what to do regarding the leadership himself. Fisher appealed to the same support that King did and it was only at the opening of

the Convention that Fisher decided to withdraw. It was Fisher who nominated King and they had maintained communication while King was out of the country. Yet Dawson is strangely silent about the possibility of any negotiations between the two. Once Fisher had made his decision, he used his influence with the delegates in King's favor as did Sir Allen Aylesworth, another who had remained faithful to Sir Wilfrid and who, along with Fisher, carried great weight with the Quebec federal delegation.⁸⁹ In effect, Fisher might be seen as acting as a substitute for King and the last-minute withdrawal on his behalf seems to substantiate this assessment. For what it was worth, King also had the financial support of J.E. Atkinson and P.C. Larkin⁹⁰ and the editorial backing of Atkinson's Toronto Star.

The rules of the convention did not permit the candidates to address the delegates in a capacity as supplicants for support. However, the program was arranged so that the candidates each had an opportunity to address the gathering. On the evening of August 6, King, Graham and McKenzie, in that order, spoke at great length on the resolution on Labor and Industry which King had introduced. The following morning, after he had finally made up his mind, Fielding had the chance to appear when he moved the Reciprocity Resolution.

All accounts agree that King's performance was one of the best of his lengthy career. Not an accomplished speaker at any time in his life, especially when confronted with large audiences, King this time brought the crowd to its feet with his eloquence.

In comparison, his three opponents excited no one. The speech was an important factor in convincing many hesitant delegates of his qualifications.

The rules governing the balloting were as follows and have been employed in subsequent conventions. Voting was by secret ballot. Nominations were in writing and the Chairman of the Convention simply read off the names of those nominated. The rules stated that voting for the candidates continues "until a candidate receives a majority of the total ballots cast, and thereupon he shall be declared elected. Provided, however, that if no choice is made on the fourth balloting, the candidate receiving the lowest number of votes on the fifth and succeeding ballots shall drop from the contest."⁹¹

It took three ballots to resolve the contest. King led from the first when he polled 344 to Fielding's 297 with Graham and McKenzie tied with 153 apiece. In the second round, Graham and McKenzie lost a substantial portion of their support. Contrary to expectations, Fielding did not receive the bulk of these votes. He gained only 47 while King obtained 67. Both McKenzie and Graham retired before the third ballot and King edged Fielding by 38 votes, 476 to 438.⁹² Fielding then moved that the vote be made unanimous.

Because of the secret ballot, it is impossible to obtain an exact breakdown of the vote. However, it would appear that ethnic (namely, French-English), economic and regional factors, in that order, were the significant determinants. Graham received his

support from his own province of Ontario where he had been working hard drumming up support for several months before the convention. McKenzie gained most of his strength from the Maritimes which gave him a courtesy vote on the first ballot. Those who deserted on the second ballot went heavily for Fielding. Fielding also had the backing of the provincial delegations (except for Ontario, which supported Graham) for various reasons. Westerners had been involved in supporting Union Government and, besides, remembered his efforts in favor of Reciprocity in 1911. In Quebec, the Gouin-led forces saw Fielding as one who could be depended upon not to do anything about changing the economic status quo. His stand on the tariff in the House, in committee and on the floor of the Convention substantiated this belief.

There were two significant factors determining the choice of King: The Quebec anti-conscriptionists who could not accept a traitor, and the failure of Nova Scotia to support Fielding. (In effect, Fielding had accurately assessed the situation.) While King had never failed to remind French Canadians (in public speeches and in private) that he had stood with Laurier in 1917, he was careful not to become too closely associated with the province lest he be considered as being wholly dependent on Quebec support and identified solely with its interests. It was for this reason that he declined the nomination for Laurier's seat of Quebec East.⁹³

The strong Quebec support ultimately given to King was also the result of an interest conflict in which he was only remotely concerned. Gouin's provincial administration had become increasingly

business-oriented through the years and, therefore, identified with the English and Montreal commercial elite which had always dominated the economic life of the province and whose activities have provided French Canadian Nationalists with considerable material for their agitation. The Nationalist objections might also be seen as part of an urban-rural split in the province. On the federal level, the Quebec forces were gradually falling into the hands of young Ernest Lapointe whose liberal views on trade and social policy automatically placed him in opposition to St. James Street and Gouin. The Lapointe support originated outside Montreal and included such younger luminaries as P.J.A. Cardin, Lucien Cannon, Andrew McMaster and C.G. Power.

Just before the convention opened, it appeared as if the Quebec delegation was going to allow the English to select the leader. As one prominent French Canadian M.P. said to a reporter from The World: "We French-Canadians efface ourselves. We admit that the leader must be English Protestant and, therefore, the English Protestants should tell us whom they want!"⁹⁴ Quebec did not abstain very long, particularly when it appeared that Gouin was supporting Fielding. On the day before the voting, the delegation met in caucus and the federal delegates led by Lapointe turned against Gouin on the grounds that if Fisher, an English Protestant from the Eastern Townships, and Aylesworth from Ontario could not accept someone who had deserted Laurier, neither could they.⁹⁵ This feeling in favor of King was not a positive one, but rather a desire not to see the desertion against the beloved Laurier go unpunished.

As C. G. Power put it: "King was merely the instrument whereby we defeated Fielding for the leadership."⁹⁶

That there was still more than a residue of French-English animosity is shown by the fact that King's supporters had been especially careful in choosing the two who would place his name in nomination. At first it had been agreed that Fisher and Lapointe would be his sponsors. However, Aylesworth was substituted for Lapointe at the last moment, again to avoid giving the impression that King was identified only with Quebec.

Nova Scotians failed to support Fielding because they remembered his actions in the 1917 election when he campaigned against them in support of Union Government. There was also the question of personal animosity between him and McKenzie who was from Cape Breton Island and therefore antipathetic to a mainlander. Cape Bretoners still recall that McKenzie resented Fielding's position of eminence under Laurier as well. The convention was his chance to get even. When he withdrew after the second ballot, he instructed his supporters to vote for King.⁹⁷

Finally, the reasoning motivating perhaps half the Westerners and those from Ontario supporting King on the final ballot, aside from the question of 1917, is summed up by James G. Gardiner who recalls that during the long train ride from Saskatchewan, he was able to convince Motherwell and a large number of delegates that King was the best choice:

"Fielding wasn't going to live long anyway and the leader was only going to lead the opposition --- so this was a chance for the young people. ...I supported King and I told Motherwell that he was going to win. I supported King because he was smart going to Europe like that. I felt he would come back full of new ideas for the party." 98

For these delegates, charges made by Gouin, Mitchell and even Graham that King was a socialist had little meaning especially with the Progressive revolt virtually in progress.

Throughout the 1920's, whatever opposition existing against King's leadership came as a result of an interest conflict between the low-tariff West and its natural enemies from St. James and Bay Streets. During and after the election of 1921, he attempted to effect a reconciliation between the two camps under the umbrella of the Liberal label. He was unable to do so mainly because of the uncompromising attitudes on both sides, especially the Progressive. He was also hampered by the insecurity of his position as leader arising out of similar economic differences but centered mainly in Quebec. Here the cleavage between urban and rural interests remained and the leaders were the same ones who had confronted each other at the convention.

Before the election, rumors were constantly making the rounds that the Gouin wing was going to join the Conservatives and cause a realignment of the two parties on the same basis desired by Crerar and his Progressives. It is impossible to ascertain how real a possibility this was.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, King was never certain about his support from this quarter. Rumors of an impending defection of the Gouin group continued right up to the election in December. While King was able to obtain a public disavowal of revolt from Rodolphe Lemieux, he was unable to force Gouin to do likewise and had to content himself with private protestations of loyalty delivered through an intermediary.¹⁰⁰

The results of the election in which the Liberals fell one

seat short of an absolute majority intensified King's attempts to lure the Progressives into his government. After lengthy negotiations, the best he could do was to hope for enough support from them on specific issues. He was sustained by the knowledge that of the two old parties, the Progressives regarded the Liberals as by far the lesser of the two evils. His failure to induce the Progressives to join his government forced him to staff his ministry with many holdovers from the Laurier days as well as a heavier proportion of the Eastern commercial interests than he would have liked. So insistent were the claims put forward by the Gouin contingent that Lapointe (to whom King had promised any department he wanted) had to agree to accept the lesser portfolio of Marine and Fisheries with Gouin obtaining the prestigious Justice Department. It was only by dint of great effort, too, that King retained the post of President of the Privy Council for himself against the demands of Gouin. The ministers from the West, Motherwell (Agriculture) and Charles Stewart (Interior) could by no stretch of imagination be considered representative of the area. In fact, Stewart had been defeated running in Alberta and a seat had to be found for him in Quebec.¹⁰¹

In spite of Crerar's refusal to join King's administration (mainly because he could not be certain that his supporters would follow), the Progressive leadership did not give up its hope that the new government would implement a low-tariff, economy-in-government policy. For his part, King continued to look for an

opportunity to bring a Progressive into the Cabinet. The next few years saw another development which was part of King's plan to unite east and west. A great deal of fraternizing in the House of Commons took place between the Progressives and rank-and-file Liberals whose political outlook was similar and who, it turned out, were more numerous than first anticipated.¹⁰² These Liberals included most of the members from the Maritimes, most of those from Western Ontario and a considerable group of French Canadians under Lapointe. A fair estimate would be that these members constituted half the Liberal House contingent. These Liberals were extremely annoyed when in April, 1922, the party was forced to side with the Tories against the Progressives on Andrew McMaster's motion to prevent Cabinet Ministers from holding directorships in business corporations. The outstanding offender in this regard was Sir Lomer Gouin who at the time held directorships in fourteen major corporations ranging from the Shawinigan Water and Power Company, and Montreal Light, Heat and Power Company to the Bank of Montreal and the Royal Trust Company.¹⁰³ They also resented Gouin's speech on the budget delivered soon afterward in which he urged "a reasonable measure of protection"¹⁰⁴ and were so incensed that they sent a delegation first to Fielding and then to King warning their leader that "if he did not 'get' Sir Lomer, it was only a question of time until Sir Lomer would 'get' him."¹⁰⁵ It was these same Liberals, led by William Euler and James Malcolm of Ontario, who were able to prevent the CPR movement led in caucus by Gouin and Walter Mitchell to suspend the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement.¹⁰⁶ These actions naturally

pleased the Progressives. However, the budget brought down by Fielding in the 1923 session gave the Westerners little cause for rejoicing. In the process, King barely avoided a tariff increase which Gouin and four other ministers strongly advocated. When the issue came before the caucus even here it was clear that the rank-and-file did not want any reductions either.¹⁰⁷

While the Liberals were ironing out their differences, the Progressives were at the same time splitting into two wings. The radicals were led by Henry Wise Wood and were distrustful of the entire apparatus of parliamentary government. The moderates had been led by Crerar. In 1922, for personal and financial reasons, he handed over the leadership to Robert Forke and returned to Winnipeg. This group, as mentioned elsewhere, was composed of not much more than Liberals whose major ambition was to break the hold of the eastern moneyed protectionist interests on the party. Crerar, along with Dafoe, A.B. Hudson, who sat as an independent Liberal from 1921 to 1925, Norman Lambert and two lawyers, Frank O. Fowler and H.J. Symington, were the opinion leaders of this brand of Progressivism. Dubbed "The Winnipeg Sanhedrin",¹⁰⁸ they concluded that the stand-pat policy of the government could be mainly attributed to King's poor leadership and they set out to replace him with C.A. Dunning, the young Liberal Premier of Saskatchewan.

In the Fall of 1923, Crerar informed his friend Cameron about the state of opinion in the West:

"I cannot see that the Government is improving its position. It is in a state of decline which will continue. I understand Dunning has served notice on both Stewart and

Motherwell, which is doubtless conveyed by them to their colleagues, that King need not count on any support from Saskatchewan. There is a good deal of talk among Western Liberals of revitalizing the Liberal Party, but they see no way of bringing it about. King's leadership is not making any appeal and I don't think it will." 109

It is probably more than a coincidence that at the close of the year, Sir Lomer Gouin resigned from the cabinet, supposedly because of ill-health but really because of a disagreement with King over fiscal policy. This action pleased the Westerners as did King's elevation of Lapointe one month later to Minister of Justice over Lemieux who was pressed upon him by the Montreal wing.¹¹⁰ This marked the ascendancy of Lapointe to undisputed leadership of Quebec and his position in the party's structure of power was concomitantly reinforced by the appointment of Cardin to his old post of Marine and Fisheries. At approximately the same time, King was negotiating with Crerar to once again try to bring him into the government. King was unwilling to meet all of Crerar's demands. With the failure of this attempt, Dafee and Hudson came to the conclusion that not only had King missed an opportunity which would probably never return but that he was hopeless as a leader as well.¹¹¹

King continued to try to placate the west. He permitted the news to leak back to Crerar that he was pleased with the results of their discussions. While Crerar was skeptical, he accurately predicted that King would make some attempt to reduce the tariff later in the year.¹¹² When, in the middle of May, the government came out for a tariff for revenue, Walter Mitchell, the representative of English Commercial Montreal sitting for St. Antoine resigned

his seat, as did Herbert Marler of the same crowd --- another sign to the West that the party might be reformed. Finally, that Autumn, on a tour of the West, King suggested to Dunning that he join the government and while the Saskatchewan Premier was cautious, even his friends recognized that he relished the prospect.¹¹³

These matters stood for almost a year. Then, the election of October 29, 1925 further complicated the distribution of House seats. The Liberal 1921 total of 117 was reduced to 101. The Conservatives more than doubled their representation from 50 to 116. The Progressive seat total was drastically reduced to 25 but in the circumstances gave the party the balance of power. As Crerar put it: "Whoever won that election --- one thing was sure: King didn't!"¹¹⁴ He had personally been defeated in North York along with seven members of his government, all from outside Quebec.

The regional distribution of seats was of even greater significance to those dissatisfied with King's leadership. The Meighen-led Conservatives had won 68 seats to a paltry Liberal 12 in Ontario. The two old parties had more or less split the Maritimes between them while there was a three-way stand-off on the Prairies. On the other hand, the Liberals had captured 60 out of the 65 seats in Quebec. This last result was not, however, attributed to King's appeal but to "the memory of Laurier, the hatred of Meighen and the fighting qualities of little Cardin."¹¹⁵ In effect, it was the outcome in Quebec that kept Meighen from his majority. King had the choice of either resigning or continuing in office at the head of a minority government with support from the

Progressives. Almost immediately he approached Forke in order to find out what kind of backing he could hope for. Forke discussed the matter with Hudson and Crerar and informed King that since he had not had the opportunity of consulting any of the other Progressives who had been elected, he was in doubt whether he could give King any assurances as to the kind of support he could command. However, as Crerar, Forke and King knew, there was hardly any question where the majority of Progressives would stand: "If the situation sifts down to a choice between King and Meighen, the West will be for King."¹¹⁶ The only flaw in this reasoning as Crerar himself recognized was that the nine-member Alberta contingent was not so automatically as willing as the Manitoba Progressives (as well as A.A. Heaps and J.S. Woodsworth, the Labour members from Winnipeg) to back King even on specific issues. It was more on the strength of his belief in his ability to carry the House on this basis than on any explicit commitment from Forke that King went to Lord Byng later in the month and proposed that he continue as Prime Minister.¹¹⁷

King's decision to cling to office was a satisfactory one to the Winnipeg group. If King had decided to resign, Crerar felt that it was possible that Meighen would be able to form an administration of his own although his difficulties would be considerable. Then, unless he were able to reach an understanding with protectionist Liberals, there would have to be an election within a year --- but with Meighen, not King making the appeal to the country. In such an event, Crerar was fearful that,

"...under these circumstances Meighen would make a stronger appeal to Quebec than was the case in the election just finished. Many French Canadians are, perhaps, a little more prone than most English speaking Canadians to be on the winning side. At any rate I can tell you definitely that the Tories are counting on this. I spent a couple of hours last night with a gentleman who is very close to Meighen and close to the Tory organization, and he figures that if an election were held under these auspices they would get quite a number of seats in Quebec." 118

Implicit in this analysis was the conclusion that King was not necessary to the party given its regional distribution of strength. If King were replaced, another leader would have a greater appeal in English Canada and with Quebec returning a virtually "solid 65", the Liberals would be automatically assured of power.

While the westerners were pondering the potentialities of the situation, the Bleu wing of Quebec liberalism centered in Montreal was now looking to provincial Premier L.A. Taschereau for leadership and had similar thoughts of its own on the subject. These conservative Liberals likewise felt that "King has no more appeal to the English-speaking than Meighen has for the French" and recognized that he could either resign or carry on at the head of a minority government. The line of action they favored was to have King stay in office for a term and then have the government go to the country under new leadership. Their candidate to replace King was elderly George Murray who had two years before retired because of ill-health as Premier of Nova Scotia after a twenty-seven year stint in office. According to their plan, King would be appointed High Commissioner in London. Murray, who was supposedly "persona grata to all sections of the country" would form a government in

which the Quebec cabinet contingent would be evenly split between the old and new guard (Lemieux, J.A. Robb on the one hand, Cardin and Lapointe on the other), the Ontario representation more or less protectionist with Hudson, Crerar and Dunning from the West acting as a low-tariff counterweight. Those supporting this plan believed that, in an election, Murray could carry half the Maritime seats, maintain the same level in Quebec, win 25 to 30 seats in Ontario and sweep the West with Dunning and Crerar in the cabinet. While they believed that King had to be ejected or disaster would be in store for the party, they recognized that "the great difficulty...to be faced is, how to bring Mr. King to see the line of action that is so obvious to others outside. At a conference with one or two of his friends today it was pointed out very forcibly that Lapointe and Cardin were the men who must put this up to him, if it is to be done at all. Will they do it?"¹¹⁹

This information, communicated to Crerar, Dafoe, Hudson, Fowler and Symington, brought an immediate response that Murray was out of the question,

"...not in any degree owing to lack of respect for Mr. Murray...but from the belief that putting this responsibility upon him after his retirement from Nova Scotia a few years ago on the ground that his health could no longer stand the strain of office would give a very unfavorable impression to the country. It could not be said that he was taking the position temporarily with a view that some one else would succeed him a few years later. Hudson mentioned that this could leave only one impression with the country, viz; -- that the Liberal Party was more concerned with its party fortune and preservation than with the welfare of the Dominion. He thought that this could be used with telling effect when the next election comes off."

Some thought was also given to the idea of having King continue and then replacing him with either Graham or Robb but since these two were closely associated with the conservatives in the party, this would have little appeal in the West.

In the back of the minds of the Winnipeg group was the notion of a Dunning-Lapointe joint leadership somewhat on the order of the Baldwin-Lafontaine Reform Ministry of pre-Confederation days. Dunning was an especially likely candidate to be part of such a duumvirate because, in contrast to King's lack-lustre electoral performance, Dunning was fresh from a resounding victory in the Saskatchewan provincial election held earlier that year. Crerar spoke to Dunning over the phone about the general situation on November 6 and asked him to come to Winnipeg. Dunning would not do so because he was tied down in Regina with government business. Crerar did not communicate the details of the news from the East over the phone but decided that H.J. Symington, who was going through to the coast by train should speak to Dunning the following morning during the fifteen-minute stop in Regina and get his views that way.¹²¹

Symington's report of the conversation demonstrates the difficulties involved in unseating King:

"Have just left Dunning after a few minutes conversation. He was very clear on one point and that was that any move towards the elimination of King must come from the East, Lapointe, Cardin, etc. and that this was most important. We must not give even the appearance of conspiracy. Briefly if they want King to withdraw let them arrange it and then come and talk. He agreed that King

was a terrible load and that he should go but it must be the East who does it. He was prepared to go if needed, said that under the circumstances he could do nothing else. I suggested that before going in he insist on a meeting of provincial leaders and he thought that a good idea. He has heard nothing from King and.. thinks that...we are in for a long period of opposition. He is doubtful if they (the Conservatives) can get in- to Quebec so long as Meighen is there but if they do, the Tories are in for 15 or 20 years.

He says Murray is impossible and that it is too soon for himself 'yet'.

Summarizing I would say

1. Dunning agrees King is impossible.
2. He agrees Murray is impossible.
3. He will not himself even hint at the removal of King but if the east would do it, it would be the best thing that could happen.
4. He thought C (Crerar) and all of us ought to be most careful about appearing to be plotting, leave it entirely to the Frenchmen.
5. He has agreed to stand by much to his regret but at present feels he can take no other position.
6. In the back of his mind he will spend the next two years getting known in the East, so as to be the man when the time comes.
7. Quebec must be held if possible until that time arrives and therefore they must be the initiating parties of everything in the meantime." 122

It was clear that Dunning was anxious to go into federal politics even at the cabinet level.¹²³ In the matter of leadership, however, it was equally clear that everything hinged on whether Lapointe was willing to cooperate. "Would he do it?" The answer was not long in coming. Since the election, Lapointe was vacationing in Atlantic City with Robb who, instead of Murray, was now being considered by St. James Street as the alternative to King. When Lapointe returned, he immediately made a public announcement that he was remaining loyal to his leader. He had no reason now to join forces with the interests which had so recently been eased out of dominance in the party. Then King himself added a public statement in response

to the report in The Grain Growers' Guide of November 21, that the West was fed up with him and was looking to Dunning for leadership:

"I have no intention of retiring from public life nor have I ever entertained an idea of the kind. No doubt the Tory Party in Canada would welcome nothing more than my retirement. Any intimation of the kind should be understood by the public as emanating, like so much else appearing nowadays, solely from that source, and as being only a part of a continuation of their campaign of misrepresentation and prevarication which became more general than ever in the recent election. Having failed in one direction, our political opponents, in seeking office at any price, are now driven to extremes in another. My advice to them and to all others who have any misgivings on this point, would be wait and see." 124

King moved quickly to further protect his position. Within three months he was back in the House by virtue of an easy victory in a by-election in the Saskatchewan constituency of Prince Albert. By standing for a western seat, he hoped to prove his acceptability to English Canada. On March 1, 1926, he brought Dunning to Ottawa as Minister of Railways and Canals, an important portfolio as far as the West was concerned. Staying behind in Regina was James G. Gardiner upon whose support King was certain he could depend. As Gardiner put it:

"I could have come East instead of Dunning in 1926. Haydon had come out to see me. I told him that Dunning was his man. I told Haydon that if people were going to talk, they'd better talk down there (in Ottawa) than back here ... I never did anything in Saskatchewan without discussing it with King --- and he never did anything in Saskatchewan without discussing it with me." 125

King was not safe yet. However, it is impossible to predict what might have been the result of the intrigues against him had not events of the next few months saved him. In June, his government was defeated in the House over the scandal in Jacques Bureau's

Customs Department. King went to Byng for a dissolution, was refused, resigned, and Meighen was called upon by the Governor-General to form a government. Within a few weeks, Meighen also sustained a defeat in the House. However, he obtained the dissolution which had been denied his predecessor. Campaigning on this "constitutional issue", King led the party to victory.¹²⁶ So obvious and substantial was King's personal role in these events that he was finally able to rid himself of the remaining protectionist old-guard while at the same time forestalling further attacks on his leadership. The end of moderate Progressivism was marked by Robert Forke's acceptance of a portfolio after the election and when he resigned in 1929, he was replaced by Crerar.

Even without the fortuitous intervention of the events of that year, it is doubtful whether the Progressive strength was sufficient to bring about the change. It is clear that the Winnipeg group overestimated the possibilities available to it as a note written early in 1926 by Dafoe's Ottawa correspondent J.A. Stevenson demonstrates. Stevenson was convinced that since Robert Forke had always set great store upon Dafoe's advice, he should tell Forke,

"...to use his change to get us rid of the incubus of Willie's soggy carcass; if they (the Progressives) will only say firmly they will cooperate with some other leader than Billy, Billy will get sick and go to Florida for his health. Now or never is the chance for otherwise he will get back via Prince Albert and sterilize the forces of reform for 20 years." 127

It was Lapointe, however, not Forke or Crerar or even Dunning, who held the key to the situation. And he refused to move against his

leader. By 1921, the famous bond of friendship between the two had already been established. Although there is nothing available which reveals Lapointe's feelings in the matter, King's high estimate of Lapointe is revealed in the following excerpt from his Diary, written as he was engaged in selecting his first cabinet:

"I told him (Lapointe) that I regarded him as nearest to me & wd. give him confidence in full now & always. We would work out matters together. I regarded him as the real leader in Quebec and sent for him first of all ... He...is just & honorable at heart ... a beautiful Christian character..." 128

By 1925, with Gouin gone, Lapointe was in position to show that this trust in him was not misplaced.

While the immediate danger to King's authority had passed with the 1926 victory, Dunning was still being regarded as the heir apparent. However, with Gardiner at the head of the Saskatchewan provincial party, Dunning had lost control of his base of support. As early as September of that year, Crerar reported that,

"I had a very interesting two hour chat with George Bell of Regina yesterday. He refers to Gardiner as the 'Mussolini' of Canada. I believe the official Liberal organization in Saskatchewan is against Dunning. I do not know whether King invited Gardiner to go to Ottawa or not, but it is significant that he went down with the Western Cabinet Ministers when King called them to conference." 129

Within the year, hope for a change was a thing of the past with Fowler's report to Crerar after a visit to Ottawa that his impression was "that the P.M. is at the moment quite firmly in the driving seat and is driving."¹³⁰

Dunning's long range hopes of being chosen successor after King's retirement died more slowly. In the defeat of 1930, he lost

his seat. He admitted to many friends that he felt the pull of public life¹³¹ but he decided to join the Eastern Corporate world (which was an easy matter since he had finished out the term of the last government as Minister of Finance) to pay off some debts --- and to no doubt make himself even more acceptable to these interests. The results of the election and the revelations of the Beauharnois scandal kept rumors of a change in leadership alive with Dunning's name in the forefront. Frank Dexter reported the political situation one year after the election to Dafoe as follows:

"The resentment to King's leadership among eastern Grits is quite formidable. Dunning has been approached by many influential people with the idea of deposing King at a new national convention. His mind is quite clear in this regard. He would not split the party over the leadership even if he was sure of the support necessary to give him the leadership. He believes if you would support him on the prairies, he could win a national convention, but that the result would be a party split which would take years to heal. King, he thinks, is still regarded as leader by the rank and file who do not know much about what has been happening.

"He thinks, also, that it would be unwise to call a national convention until, say, 1933. He knows that Mackenzie King is opposed to a convention now or later and will secretly do all he can to block it." 132

However, while the press kept the rumors in the air,¹³³ King was assuring that no convention would be called by founding the National Liberal Federation and placing Vincent Massey at its head. A policy meeting was held at Massey's Port Hope residence in 1933 as well. Dunning, at the same time, was disappointing his Western supporters by his close association with Eastern business (he was Executive-Director of the Seigneury Club for a few years and then moved to the Presidency of the Maple Leaf Milling Company in Toronto). In

the circumstances, Dafoe was forced to advise Harry Sifton, who as head of the Ontario Liberal Association had been opposing King since Beauharnois, that there was no alternative to the present chief.

"Theoretically, the Liberals would be happier if they had a new leader who would be young, attractive, competent...etc. They would then be able to go before the public and play the usual confidence game, representing him as a man who would make the country rich, if not in a night, at least in a year or so. With King in charge a campaign of this sort is not possible, since both his virtues and his limitations are well known to the country. I do not regard any suggestions to change the leadership of the Liberal party at this time as within the range of practical politics. There is no practicable alternative excepting Lapointe, and the difficulties in the way of putting Lapointe at the head of the party cannot at this time be surmounted. Chief among them would be his refusal to entertain the proposition if it were put up to him.

"I do not think the objection to King is related... closely to the Beauharnois episode... It arises more from restlessness and a desire for some kind of new deal. These are the factors of moment in politics, but their importance might easily be over-rated. A row in the party over leadership, particularly if it took the form of an attack upon King without any alternative name being mentioned, would probably do what is otherwise impossible, namely, return to power Mr. Bennett at the next election. I am very strongly of the opinion that the commonsense view of the situation is to accept the situation and make the best of it. I am inclined to think that upon the whole the Liberal Party is fortunate in having a leader with as many qualifications for the job as Mr. King has." 134

King's return to power with an overwhelming overall majority of just under 100 in 1935 ended Dunning's hopes. The new cabinet, containing as it did few of the members of the 1920's, presented none of the alliances and animosities with which King had been contending through the previous decade. To the old stand-by's --- Lapointe, Cardin, Dandurand, Rinfret, Crerar and Dunning --- were added C.G. Power,

C.D. Howe, Norman Rogers and J.L. Ilsley, young men who were chosen primarily for their administrative ability and to whom the old feuds and alignments were largely meaningless. The only exceptions were Ian Mackenzie of British Columbia and J.G. Gardiner whose inclusion was politically inspired, although there was no doubt as to Gardiner's administrative expertise. In effect, defeat in 1930 and then 1935 victory permitted King to do what his two great predecessors as Prime Minister, Macdonald and Laurier, could not do: Namely, renew his cabinet without endangering his position of pre-eminence; for, aside from Lapointe, he now ruled alone. Dunning's opportunity had passed,¹³⁵ and he retired from the cabinet as Minister of Finance in 1939 because of poor health.

At the beginning of the war, King was threatened by the strange alliance between the Hepburn forces and the Conservatives in Ontario. The organizational implications of this attack on a federal Liberal administration by an ostensibly "Liberal" provincial government have already been explored. There were, of course, leadership implications as well.

The charge levelled by Hepburn and Drew that King was not carrying on the war effort with sufficient vigor revolved around the questions of conscription and National Government. When, on May 22, 1940, Britain announced its stringent national service regulations, King foresaw that a demand would be made by his Toronto opponents for similar measures in Canada. He realized that some of his own supporters had dispositions in favor of such action and

recognized in such feelings the inherent threat to his leadership.

As he noted in his diary:

"I gather there has already commenced quite a movement against myself as not being active enough; against colleagues as well as myself for being complacent, etc., and some of our own people grumbling along these lines, becoming restive. I told my colleagues we might easily see the party divided into conscriptionists and non-conscriptionists... That I certainly would resign before I would accept any move in the direction of conscription. All this may pile up pretty rapidly." 136

At the caucus which he had called for the following day, King moved to squelch any possibility of a movement within the party for a National Government. He pointed out that he recognized that there was still talk in favor of such a scheme. However, the Tories had been overwhelmingly defeated campaigning on such a platform in the election held just two months before. Furthermore, with regard to Arthur Meighen being brought into such a government, he emphatically stated that he "...would not countenance anything of the kind in regard to a man who had been responsible for the Wartimes Elections Act and for conscription in the last war."¹³⁷ He intended to continue to lead a Liberal government which was the promise he had made to the electorate during the election.

King was also not averse to taking a few lessons from his illustrious predecessor. Just as Laurier used to threaten resignation whenever all else failed, so King on this occasion took great pains to explain to his parliamentary supporters the consequences of such action on his part. He recalled that he went on to,

"make plain at once what would happen with respect to change of leadership. In the nature of things, I myself could not hope to carry on many more years. Might, at any time, under strain, feel it better that someone else

should take on the leadership. Also that the party might itself feel this would be in its interests. If they would just let me know any such feeling any time, I would be quite ready to step out and help anyone else in the leadership. If, however, I thought desire for change sprang from an effort on the part of some minority to get control, and that division took place in the ranks of the party from anything of the kind, I would like to let them know at once they might expect pretty speedy action on my part. That I was telling them now that they might know consequences in advance; what my method of procedure would be. That it would be well for them all to remember that when I resigned, the Cabinet also resigned. Furthermore, it would be my duty to recommend to the Governor-General who should take on the next administration. That some of those who might be wishing to have a different leader might find themselves the most surprised men with respect to the consequences of their action. I mentioned all this because of necessity of maintaining solidarity of the party of which each man was a guardian...before resigning, I would make a statement in Parliament and to the people as to the reasons which had actuated me to take the step I did, and no one need be surprised if they found that statement a pretty telling one." 138

With the worsening of the war situation, the rest of that week was featured by intensified Tory demands for a National Government. King hoped to silence these by conferring with the leadership of the three other parties in the House and by holding such meetings (in which full information about the conduct of the war by the government was given) as often as they might be desired. However, the Conservatives increased their agitation, concentrating their attacks on King's leadership and suggesting that Ralston take his place.

Just in case the political lecture delivered in caucus had not been completely understood by his cabinet colleagues, King devoted part of the May 29 cabinet meeting to the subject of leadership. He reported in his diary that he informed the cabinet that he considered the talk of Ralston becoming the new leader a calculated attempt to destroy confidence in himself and the government

with the ultimate view of bringing about a National Government and getting Meighen into the House. He recalled for his colleagues that, before the last election, he had informed Ralston that he believed that the then-Minister of Finance ought to take over the leadership. He pointed out that many in the party probably preferred him and besides he had been leader for quite some time. King continued that, in replying to this offer, Ralston had told him,

"...he would not consider anything of the kind. I wanted now, in his presence, to say that I was quite prepared to step out, even today, and recommend to the Administrator (Chief Justice Duff was the Administrator as Lord Tweedsmuir died in February and the new Governor-General had not yet arrived in Canada) the formation of a Government under him, if members of Council believed that that would help in the present situation. Naturally, my first choice of successor would be Lapointe, but I knew he had stayed on only to be at my side and would not take the leadership. My next choice was Ralston, and I wanted him and the Cabinet to know that at once." 139

King, however, felt it necessary to point out what

"...the situation would likely be if a change came. I was not sure that Lapointe would stay on under any change. I would like them however to estimate for themselves what the effect of a change would be. I said I would be quite prepared to stay on under Ralston, and accept any post he would like to give me, particularly if he thought well of giving me External Affairs .. In any event, I could not hope to go on through a period like this indefinitely and they must prepare for possible sudden changes... At this time, it was too critical to allow any longer this underhand treachery to go on and help to unsettle our own loyal supporters in the House of Commons, and good honest people in the country. I told them I need not say that I had complete confidence in every colleague, but that was not enough. The people judged by actions and I thought we were getting past the point where silence should be longer maintained... This was a deep-laid plot, which affected the whole power of the Government, and I expected my colleagues to see that it was met in a formidable manner." 140

In the cabinet on the following day, King returned to the

subject and again stated that he thought it was time the members of his government spoke up.¹⁴¹ He was finally rewarded by a stirring reply to Conservative criticism by Minister of Agriculture Gardiner in the House that evening. "Gardiner's speech was really the turning point of the session; from that point on the Liberals began to fight back; and Mackenzie King never ceased to be grateful for Gardiner's decisive speech in that crisis."¹⁴²

Two years later, when Ralston attempted to resign, King recorded in his diary that he offered to hand the Prime Ministership to him and continue under Ralston as Secretary of State for External Affairs. Again the offer was refused, but the threatened resignation was not carried out by Ralston who was now Minister of National Defence.¹⁴³

Aside from the National Government episode, the only criticism emanating from within the party and from non-Tory circles during the early war years took the form of an attack on King's failure to play the role of public educator as Roosevelt had done in the United States:

"The great weakness of the King government, has, in fact, been that it has done so little to educate the Canadian people, as to the lines along which their efforts must be concentrated. It has given the impression of following pressure groups rather than of having a positive policy of its own. We wish Mr. King would have a conversation with President Roosevelt sometime on this aspect of political tactics. The president is a master in the art of side-tracking demagogues and mischief makers by publishing his own policies before his critics have published theirs." 144

Even so astute a political observer as John Daffoe, who had spent the previous quarter of a century pointing out King's deficiencies, was forced to admit that he was not all that hopeless:

"I can see no adequate substitute for King in the leadership of the Liberal Party or for that matter, in the premiership of the country. He is the best we have got by a considerable margin. Moreover, his personal stock is higher than it has been, even though the party stock is down. The country realizes that he is a very much abler man than he was given credit for being, even when his party is sweeping the country. As between Meighen and King, the electors preferred King; and they very decidedly preferred King after one experience with Bennett. But there was very little personal enthusiasm for him. I don't know that there is much change in this regard; but with respect to his services in the war and to his ability the change has been marked. The Conservatives have abandoned their absurd attitude, in which they persisted for years, that King was a political accident whom they could push out of office with any kind of leader. When they rejected their home-grown aspirants for leadership and beseeched Bracken --- who resembles King in many respects --- to take the leadership, it was an admission that King could not be beaten by a political and economic Tory. The despisers and haters of King are now pretty well limited to the little clique in Toronto..." 145

The final challenge during King's tenure as leader came in 1944 over conscription, the same issue which had nearly destroyed the party in 1917. Almost by conditioning, King had been prepared for this eventuality but this was one challenge which he faced virtually alone. Lapointe died in 1941 and St. Laurent was, compared to his illustrious predecessor, as yet an unknown quality. Since the issue affected the ever-present problem of French-English relations, King was also hampered by the fact that instead of such tested cabinet representatives of French Canada as Cardin, Pierre Casgrain and Dandurand, new men, Alphonse Fournier, Ernest Bertrand and Major-General L.F. LaFleche, with little public appeal in Quebec, were sitting in their places.

Only the bare outlines of the story will be presented here

as the complexity of the issues surrounding Canada's entry into the war and the extent and nature of its participation place a fuller account beyond the scope of this section.¹⁴⁶ It has already been recalled elsewhere in this study in connection with the question of the voting allegiances of Quebec that the course of the war soon forced King to try to squirm out of the no-conscription-for-overseas-service pledge given by his government in the 1940 election campaign. For this purpose, a national plebiscite was held in 1942. While it succeeded in freeing the government's hands, it also showed Quebec's antipathy toward such a policy. When Bill 80, the order-in-council to give effect to the verdict of the plebiscite to release the government from its pledge was introduced in parliament, Cardin resigned and King very nearly lost Minister of Defence J.L. Ralston as well --- both ministers' complaints being against the order for opposite reasons.

As the war progressed, it began to appear that overseas conscription was going to remain little more than a spectre haunting King. However, by the Autumn of 1944, casualty reports and military advice from the front made it apparent to Ralston at least that conscription for overseas service would have to be imposed if the country was going to continue its efforts. By this time, because of personal disposition or because of objective appraisal of the situation, Crerar, Ilsley and Angus L. Macdonald had become convinced conscriptionists. They were joined toward the end by C.D. Howe and had the vague support of Colin W. Gibson, Norman A. McLarty and William P. Mulock (the count in the cabinet was 13 to 8

against conscription).¹⁴⁷ Because of a series of statements, ranging from his celebrated 1942 remark "conscription if necessary but not necessarily conscription" to an off-the-record speech at the Quebec Reform Club where he was reported to have announced that he had never believed in conscription and that if it should turn out to be imperative, he himself would not enforce it but would retire and let someone else take the responsibility,¹⁴⁸ made by King, the convinced conscriptionists concluded that the Prime Minister could not be trusted.

By this time, the general domestic political situation had sadly deteriorated. The Gallup Poll of the year before showed that the federal government's appeal had fallen to a point where it no longer commanded even a plurality of popular support. In Saskatchewan, the CCF had just ousted the Liberals who had been in power since 1905; Ontario had a Conservative Government of almost two years' duration; and, most significantly, Quebec was no longer Liberal. The Union Nationale had soundly beaten the Godbout administration a few months before. There is no doubt that these facts weighed heavily upon King's mind as he contemplated his course of action.

At first, he refused to believe Ralston. When it became clear that the reports from the Front were accurate, he tried to postpone conscription by making the facts public hoping thereby to obtain the necessary manpower voluntarily. In the course of arguing for this method of meeting the army's needs in cabinet, King was fearful that Ralston and his supporters would succeed in maneuvering

the government into a position whereby only a half-hearted attempt would be made for voluntary enlistments with the result that conscription would have to be imposed. He also recognized that, because of his fine service as Minister of Defence, Ralston possessed tremendous prestige in English Canada where there was natural resentment against the government's no-conscription policy. This was not mitigated any by the propaganda machinations of the Conservative Party and a considerable part of the nation's English press. It was possible that if Ralston resigned from the cabinet over the issue and took some of his supporters with him, it would be 1917 all over again.

To prevent this, King had secretly negotiated with General A.G.L. McNaughton to bring him into the cabinet replacing Ralston. McNaughton was at the time Canada's best known soldier. He had been dismissed from his command of Canada's forces in Europe a year before after quarrelling with the British War Office and Field Marshall Montgomery over the disposition of Canada's troops: McNaughton wished to have them committed to battle as a unit rather than have them deployed by divisions as part of the Allied armies as was eventually decided. McNaughton returned a hero at the beginning of the year and there had been rumors that he was going to enter politics as a Conservative. A policy of continued voluntary enlistment could conceivably succeed with the General as Minister of Defence making the appeal. Accordingly, on November 1, 1944, King informed an astonished cabinet that he was accepting Ralston's old resignation tendered in 1942 during the conflict

over Bill 80 and which he had never destroyed. So sudden was this action that none of Ralston's colleagues resigned with him.

In the intervening three weeks until Parliament met on November 22, McNaughton as Minister of Defence led the appeal for volunteers with Ralston and the conscriptionists in the cabinet looking on. For some unexplained reason, McNaughton went about the campaign in a lackadaisical manner. It soon became apparent that the appeal would fail. Pressure from within the cabinet for overseas conscription mounted. The day before meeting the House, King attempted a compromise in cabinet whereby a time limit for obtaining volunteers would be set and if the volunteers could not be obtained, he would resign and permit conscription to be imposed under another Prime Minister. This appeared to be the policy that the government would present the following day in the House and it was over this policy that, in a private meeting, Crerar, Ilsley, Macdonald, Howe, Gibson and Mulock decided to resign.¹⁴⁹

However, the next day, King was informed by McNaughton that the voluntary system could not possibly succeed and that conscription was necessary after all. McNaughton thus faced the House (although he was without a seat, special permission was granted to have him appear as a witness) advocating the same policy for which Ralston had been dismissed. St. Laurent stood by his Prime Minister and the only withdrawal from the Cabinet was by C.G. Power, the Irish-Catholic Minister from Quebec City who bowed to the demands of his conscience and a pledge previously

given to his constituents. Subsequent action by the Liberal caucus and by the House was a tribute to King's "leadership". He had disappointed the anti-conscriptionists and had driven the conscriptionists to the end of their patience. He had treated his colleagues, especially Ralston, with utter ruthlessness. Yet no one could suggest an alternative as leader or as Prime Minister. Sixteen days after the House had been reconvened, conscription under a King government was voted and the crisis was essentially over.

Although 32 French Canadian Quebec members deserted and voted with the opposition on the issue, King never felt that this action barred them from continued membership in the party. In fact, C.G. Power, in extolling King's leadership abilities, never fails to cite 1945 as an example of his former leader's acumen in avoiding a repetition of the disaster of 1917.

"King accepted all the anti-conscriptionists back into the fold and no questions asked. Meighen wouldn't have done it."

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The important general political effect of King's actions throughout the war was to convince Quebec that he had done his best to avoid the dreaded conscription and had only imposed it as a last resort. Certainly it seemed senseless to jettison King now because to do so would only place another in control who was by far less sympathetic to French Canada. The results of the 1945 federal election in Quebec demonstrate better than any speeches and pronouncements French Canadian attitudes toward the events of

the late Autumn of 1944. Although the party fell just short of a plurality of the popular vote, it still managed to win 54 of the 65 seats in the province. At another level, that of leadership itself, it must be emphasized that not one of the "conscriptivists" in the cabinet was a rabid Tory out to impose conscription because of ideological conviction or because of an anti-French attitude. Conscription was considered desirable on the pragmatic grounds that conditions both at home and at the Front made such a policy necessary. It may be noted that Ralston, Ilsley and Howe (except Macdonald) as well as some of the lesser lights in the cabinet favoring this course can best be classified as "administrators" rather than as "politicians". As such, they were less affected by political considerations than was King who had virtually cut his political teeth as leader on precisely this issue of French Canadian attitudes toward involvement in foreign wars. But above all, this was a policy difference --- not a movement to replace King as leader, although King himself had devised the interesting theory that if a cabinet minister did not agree with his government's policy he had only one option: He could try to take the incumbent Prime Minister's place --- otherwise he had no choice but to go along with the rest of his colleagues.¹⁵¹ The vital issue to which, except for one lapse, the entire cabinet had given unquestioned priority was that the essential reinforcements be provided on time. To have attempted to displace King would have been to defeat that objective because to have done so would have undoubtedly required that a new government be formed or an election called. This

was the logic motivating Ralston's remaining in the cabinet in 1942 despite his unhappiness with Bill 80 and was the reason Ralston ultimately gave when he addressed the House for over two hours in support of the government on November 29.¹⁵² He also confessed that he did not want to take King's place:

"I know my own weaknesses. One of them is that I am not flexible enough. I was born that way. I am too old to change. I have not any ambition but to be a good Canadian and I know my place is not on the dizzy heights of leadership... I neither felt nor feel any duty to take on responsibility for which I am convinced I am not suited." 153

St. Laurent's recollections of the entire course of the Conscription Issue make much the same points and perhaps add the factor of his own conciliating role:

"During the war, there were a number who felt that he (King) might have to give up the leadership. But I think I perhaps was somewhat helpful in preventing or postponing any crisis because we were all concerned about winning the war and about getting the people of Canada to make the best and greatest possible effort... I think we were all conscious that if there was a crisis, there would have to be an election and that an election would paralyze Canada's war effort for three or four months... Those who thought there might be some advantage in different leadership realized that that advantage could not make up for the three or four months lost time that would have been occasioned by a general election during the war period. ... I think it was this consideration that weighed very heavily with Ralston and with Angus L. Macdonald and with Ilsley --- with those who felt that there should have been conscription from the start. I had many conversations with them at various times and I didn't attempt to discuss the merits or demerits of conscription but merely pointed out what we were able to do and what we were doing and also pointed out that if there was a general election, all that would be paralyzed for a period of very valuable time --- and that if there was conscription the controversy about it would have created such a division that they couldn't afterward expect anything like as much as they were getting

from the province of Quebec in the way of manpower --- manpower for the armies, manpower for the navies, manpower for the airforce, manpower for the munitions plants and subscriptions to war loans and compliance with all the war-time regulations. All that was going splendidly. Conscription might have meant a few more men from Quebec enrolled but the additional members certainly wouldn't have compensated for the losses otherwise that controversy over conscription would have motivated." 154

The crisis over conscription represents the final challenge to King's position. Originally, it seems that he had intended to retire in 1944 on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his leadership of the party. However, the rising popularity of the CCF and the desire to oversee at least the beginnings of a post-war reconstruction policy persuaded him that he should stay on.¹⁵⁵ The election of 1945 was his last triumph. He lasted as leader of the party until August 7, 1948 and as Prime Minister until November 10 of that same year, having served as Prime Minister longer than anyone in the Commonwealth.

* * * * *

While Louis S. St. Laurent seemed to everyone both inside and outside the party to be the obvious choice to succeed King in 1948, it was more by chance than anything else that he had entered politics at all just six and one-half years before.

When Ernest Lapointe, the colleague about whom King, with considerable truth, noted in his Diary that "but for him, I would never have been Prime Minister, nor would I have been able to hold the office, as I held it through the years,"¹⁵⁶ died on November

26, 1941, a successor as leader of French Canada had to be found at once. Next in the normal line of succession was P.J.A. Cardin who was easily the most accomplished orator in an area where ability on the platform is still often considered the first requirement of a politician. He was an excellent parliamentarian as well as an adept organizer. However, even if Cardin had been in good health, which he was not, he did not appear to be a likely candidate. He did not possess Lapointe's prestige even in the province of Quebec and carried virtually no weight outside the province, where Lapointe had been highly respected.

With Cardin out of the question, it was imperative that the successor be found at once because C.G. Power was the next Quebec minister in terms of seniority. He himself advised the Prime Minister that he (King) "...should get a French Minister appointed at once; otherwise they might come to talk of him as the Senior Minister for Quebec; not being French there would be the cry again of the French being ignored."¹⁵⁷ After canvassing around and speaking to many of his colleagues and acquaintances (among whom were Cardin, Senator Dandurand, Power and even Cardinal Villeneuve), King decided to offer the appointment to Adélard Godbout, the Premier of Quebec. Close to a week of negotiations with him were nevertheless insufficient to convince Godbout that his place was in Ottawa. The premier felt that his English was poor and that his departure would cause a split in his cabinet which Duplessis could easily exploit and thereby obtain a hold on the province on extreme nationalist lines or on grounds of non-participation in the war. He therefore

felt that he could best continue to serve the interests of his province in Quebec City. Godbout had previously suggested a member of his cabinet, Philippe Brais, for the post, and when he met with King, Senator Dandurand and Cardin in Ottawa on December 4, he put forward the name of T.D. Bouchard, another member of his government. However, both of these appeared unsuitable.

One week before, on the train to Quebec City returning from Lapointe's funeral in Rivière du Loup, Cardin had suggested to King that Louis St. Laurent might prove to be the best candidate. Power later seconded this suggestion en route to Ottawa, pointing out to King that St. Laurent would be ideal and that he would have no difficulty winning Quebec East, the constituency of Laurier and Lapointe. Accordingly, at the meeting at which Godbout finally decided he could not come to Ottawa, it was agreed that, after Godbout, St. Laurent was the man.¹⁵⁸

St. Laurent appeared in Ottawa the following day. He was reluctant to assume the responsibilities. One of the foremost corporation lawyers of his day, he was nevertheless fearful that in spite of the fact that he had the undoubted respect of Bench and Bar across Canada (and that this eased his selection as Minister of Justice), he was associated with "the big interests".¹⁵⁹ This might prove prejudicial to his potentialities as the leader of the province particularly because he had never really taken an active part in politics. He accepted the post but it seems clear from all the evidence that at the time he and King considered this but an interim appointment and that, after the emergency was past, St.

Laurent would return to private life.¹⁶⁰ The fact that he was in his 59th year when he acceded to King's wishes reinforced this expectation. In recalling the incident exactly nineteen years later, St. Laurent pointed out:

"I had never intended to take any part in politics, but it so happened that Mr. King's right-hand-man, the Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe died... Mr. King invited me to join the government and try to discharge the responsibilities of that Department (Justice). I thought that he was making a mistake. But I thought that during the war, the leader of the country had the right to ask any citizen to do anything that he thought might be helpful and there had to be very very serious reasons that would justify any refusal to comply with his request. It was quite inconvenient for me, but it was very inconvenient for the tens and hundreds of thousands of citizens who were enrolling in the armies and I felt that it was a duty that I would have to discharge to the best of my ability. It was well understood that I was there only for the war period and could return to my professional activities as soon as the war ended." 161

By the Autumn of 1945, with the conscription crisis receding into history, the war over and the 1945 election narrowly won, serious speculation within the party concerning the need for a new leader was well under way. During the 1945 election campaign in his home constituency of Prince Albert, King had publicly stated that he had no intention of contesting another election after the one then in progress. Despite St. Laurent's loyalty in the conscription difficulties of the previous year and J.L. Ilsley's recalcitrant attitude over the issue, the assumption in October, 1945 was that if King were to quit then, it would be Ilsley and not St. Laurent who would succeed to the leadership.

Minister of Finance, Senior Privy Councillor next to Ian Mackenzie and acting Prime Minister during King's absences, Ilsley

had considerable public popularity and was an able minister besides. However, aside from the fact that he was not noted as a conciliator, his major disadvantage was that, as Minister of Finance, he would be considered responsible for the high taxes and wage and ceiling policies that were in the offing for the country. Rumors to the effect that King personally favored St. Laurent were already in circulation but many thought that if the 1945 Parliament ran its full course the next leader of the party would be chosen from the younger group in the cabinet rather than from among the veterans. There were several of these younger men available, the most prominent being Brooke Claxton, Paul Martin, C.D. Howe, and Douglas Abbott. Of this group, Abbott was well in the lead. Just 46 years old, he was politically astute, had few enemies and had done a marvelous job as parliamentary assistant to Ilesley. He had also acted very successfully as Minister of Defence during the previous winter while General McNaughton was trying in vain to win a by-election to enter the house.¹⁶²

Within a few months, Ilesley had all but eliminated himself from consideration by supporting a tariff increase while acting as Prime Minister in King's absence. He had also, it was reported, permitted the issue to come to a vote in cabinet, something that King would supposedly never have done.¹⁶³ These speculations turned out to be meaningless. The first sign that the decision regarding the succession had for all intents and purposes been made came the following September, when St. Laurent was appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs. This was the first time that

Canada had an External Affairs Minister who was not also Prime Minister and the fact that King was giving up the portfolio, to which he had attached so much importance throughout his career, acted as a sign for all that the successor had been chosen.¹⁶⁴

In spite of the fact that King is supposed to have decided early upon St. Laurent as his successor, the issue could be no means have been considered settled. On several previous occasions, King had supposedly reached similar decisions only to have death, political circumstances or his own personal inclinations stand in the way. For example, Norman McL. Rogers, who served first as Minister of Labour and then as Minister of Defence from 1935 until 1940, would certainly have been the next leader had he not been killed in a plane crash.¹⁶⁵ During the 1940 by-election which brought Ralston into the House after an absence of ten years, King publicly stated that Ralston was to be his successor. The Prime Minister also made similar statements in cabinet.¹⁶⁶ Ralston also served as Acting Prime Minister for a short period in 1944. Of course, the Conscription embroglio removed him from further consideration. Finally, King's contemporaries recall that Dunning was a real possibility to succeed King even in the 'thirties only to have King effectively dispose of this challenger.¹⁶⁷

The plan of succession nearly failed because of two incidents of conflict between King and St. Laurent. Shortly after St. Laurent acquired his new portfolio a telegram from the British Prime Minister arrived in Ottawa relating that India was soon to receive its independence while still remaining in the Commonwealth.

Under-Secretary of State Lester Pearson prepared a reply to the effect that Canada welcomed the news which St. Laurent signed, although he delayed its transmission until King would approve it. It is reported that, upon his return, King saw it in Cabinet and "... was furious. He remarked that Attlee's cable had been addressed to the Prime Minister of Canada and he assumed that he and no other was still Prime Minister. Since he alone was entitled to answer his own correspondence, he took the draft reply rudely out of St. Laurent's hands and said he would deal with it himself."¹⁶⁸ Hutchison continues that St. Laurent took this "outrageous rebuke" in silence mainly because he was still fully expecting to be retiring from politics within a short time.¹⁶⁹

A more serious incident occurred early in 1948 after St. Laurent had already announced his availability for the leadership in a Winnipeg speech. Ilsley had gone to the United Nations as leader of the country's delegation and while there, at the instigation of the United States, he agreed to the appointment of a Canadian to the UN Commission in Korea. St. Laurent, as acting Prime Minister in King's absence from Ottawa, approved Ilsley's decision. When King returned he was once again incensed, fearful of Canada's involvement in what he considered to be one of the world's most critical areas. He tried to have Canada released from its commitment and sent Pearson to Washington to speak to Truman. When Truman refused, King still was determined to withdraw.

St. Laurent, taking full responsibility, considered the decision wise. He and Ilsley threatened to resign if they were not

supported by the Prime Minister and they were joined in this intention by several other ministers. Confronted by this insurrection, King backed down, settling for a compromise by which Canada remained a member of the Commission on the understanding that it would play an inconspicuous role. King and St. Laurent are reported to have resolved their differences at dinner at Laurier House.

Hutchison concludes that,

"This affair, so carefully hushed up, marked a watershed in the political lives of King and St. Laurent. King was no longer the dominant power in the Government. He was too old to fight. St. Laurent, the rising man, had challenged and beaten him. He was stronger than even King had suspected and the party could be safely left in his hands." 170

It should not be inferred from this that St. Laurent had forced a showdown with King or in fact had even actively sought the position of Leader. Both because of the difficulties over conscription and because of the disquiet in the province of Quebec as manifested, for example, by the results of the 1945 election, a French Canadian Catholic was a definite possibility --- so much so that St. Laurent himself recalls that one day as late as 1947 when he was busying himself with packing his files in anticipation of what he still believed was his imminent return to private life, he was told by a close friend, Conservative M.P. John T. Hackett of Stanstead, that the Liberals would never permit St. Laurent to leave because he was just the man to bridge the gap that, at the time, seemed to be widening between French and English.¹⁷¹ St. Laurent admits that this was an important factor leading to his elevation to the leadership. It loomed especially large in his own

mind:

"It so happened that there was a feeling in the province of Quebec that it was very unlikely that any other French Canadian Catholic could become Prime Minister of the country. It became apparent that the Liberal members of Parliament, many of them, were disposed to favor me to succeed Mr. King. That in itself wouldn't have been sufficient to wipe out this feeling that existed and that was in my opinion somewhat an impediment to the more rapid development of national unity among the two major groups of our population...

If a French Canadian Catholic were chosen leader and that was ratified by the electorate generally throughout the country, that would put an end to this feeling that there was anything to prevent a French Canadian Catholic from attaining the highest office in the land and discharging its responsibilities in a manner that would be as satisfactory as if he were of some other racial origin or some other religious group. It did have that effect because in the election after I was chosen there was a pretty general manifestation throughout the country that the fact that I was of French Canadian descent and Roman Catholic was of no importance whatsoever." 172

By 1948, so important had the French-English consideration become that it was possible to claim that if the party did not name St. Laurent as leader, such a rejection would be regarded in Quebec as a deliberate affront to French Canada. The great block of Quebec seats upon which the party had depended for over half a century would be lost to it for a generation at least.¹⁷³

Long before the time King decided that a convention should be called, St. Laurent had assurances of the Prime Minister's support.

"He never told me I was his choice; he was very careful not to be too obvious, but it was apparent at least to me that I would be chosen to succeed him... I know that those who were quite close to him also hoped and expected that I would be chosen." 174

That St. Laurent was not intent on remaking the party or on even substantially altering the composition of the cabinet is also

indicated by a further remark regarding his activities prior to the Convention:

"Before even allowing my name to even be prominently mentioned, I made sure that if that (his nomination to the leadership) did happen,... there would be some of the colleagues in whom I had great confidence who would stick by me while I was there because I didn't feel that if I had to go out and pick an entirely new team that I would be equal to the responsibilities." 175

Howe, Claxton and Abbott figured prominently in the prospective leader's calculations. He also made certain that Pearson would be willing to enter the government (which he was unwilling to do under King) as Secretary of State for External Affairs and that Stuart Garson, the Premier of Manitoba, would agree to accept the Justice portfolio which St. Laurent would vacate upon becoming Prime Minister. As for the rest, "...as a matter of fact, I had the impression that all those who were in the government at that time would be quite happy to cooperate with me if I became Leader."¹⁷⁶

The Convention which met for three days on August 5, 6 and 7, 1948 was essentially a charade in the sense of acting as the determining agent in the choice of the new leader. Nine candidates for the leadership were nominated (Ilsley left the cabinet on June 30 for the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia): Douglas Abbott, Lionel Chevrier, Brooke Claxton, James Gardiner, Stuart Garson, C.D. Howe, Paul Martin, C.G. Power and St. Laurent. Six immediately withdrew leaving Minister of Agriculture Gardiner, former cabinet minister Power and St. Laurent. The withdrawal imposed little subjective hardship upon five of the others. The cabinet ministers among them had only permitted their names to be put forward because, as at least two of them subsequently put it, King

knew that this was the first real nation-wide party assembly since 1919. The young cabinet ministers nominated might someday have to take the leadership of the party into their own hands. He therefore thought that it would be appropriate to have them presented to the Convention. "We had great respect for the 'Old Man's' political judgment. So we did what we were told so that the people could see what we looked like in the flesh."¹⁷⁷

It may have been an entirely different story for Paul Martin who even by his own admission had entertained dreams of the prime ministership since age 11. St. Laurent recalls that,

"There has to be concern given, you know, to the respecting of this tradition that in the Liberal Party some alternating between one of British descent and one of French descent (occurs) in the high...offices of the party. That was why, when, before the 1948 convention, Paul Martin was insisting that I consent to stay on, that I told him he was making a great personal sacrifice; that if I were chosen, whoever succeeded me would be someone of British descent and probably someone as young as he would be then; and that he was perhaps shutting the door against himself for what had been, I felt, his ambition since early boyhood. But in spite of that, he still insisted...." 178

In spite of the fact that Martin had declared for St. Laurent as early as the previous January (at about the same time as Abbott, Chevrier, Claxton and Howe) and repeated this declaration publicly the day before the convention opened, his supporters appeared to pay little attention to him. They organized a Committee Room in the Chateau Laurier which made it appear as if Martin's leadership intentions were serious. On Friday afternoon, on the second day of the convention, a group of about sixty Martin supporters paraded around downtown Ottawa, led by a kilted piper and waving

large placards. They ended their tour by marching into the Coliseum where the convention was in progress. With the piper at their head, they marched down the center aisle, interrupting the Prime Minister's farewell address.¹⁷⁹

While Martin's colleagues probably accepted his protestations that he himself had nothing to do with the demonstrations, several of them were nevertheless annoyed. They themselves had been under pressure from supporters and friends to run but had resisted the temptation and felt Martin could have done considerably more than simply making a show of vigorously restraining his supporters in public. Indeed, the demonstration had every appearance of being staged. As far as they were concerned, "...he stood too long under the mistletoe, for a girl who was supposed to be engaged."¹⁸⁰

Power realized that he had no chance of winning. He entered the contest to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the gathering to deliver a warning to the party that it had neglected its organization and forgotten its principles in the course of holding power. He had no organization and, although his speech to the Convention was by all accounts the best at the meeting, as well as of his life, he won only 56 of the 1227 votes cast.

Gardiner's attempt was by far the best organized. While St. Laurent is reported not to have even finished his nomination speech before lunch on Saturday, scarcely two hours before it was to be delivered,¹⁸¹ Gardiner's preparations were elaborate, but, in the end, futile, as he captured only 323 votes. His support

came mainly from his own province and the farming areas of the adjoining provinces, with a smattering from rural Ontario. It is possible to see in Gardiner's candidacy evidence of a last gasp of the western revolt against the powerful East.¹⁸² It is also true that Gardiner seldom got along with his fellow cabinet ministers and was really not one of them in terms of both background and inclination. They were basically administrators, efficient managers of government departments, with little of his knowledge or skill in the practical aspects of organization, vote-getting and general political maneuver. Gardiner's knowledge of the problems of farming in Canada are almost legendary. However, he was also a politician who, in contrast to his colleagues, made no bones about enjoying his chosen profession.

The overwhelming support accorded St. Laurent by the Convention which gave him 848 votes¹⁸³ was reflected in the country in the general election of the following year. If there had been any doubts anywhere within the party as to the new leader's popular appeal they were entirely dispelled by the record number of House of Commons seats won by the party. The general election of 1953 was more or less a repeat performance. By this time, St. Laurent had been transformed into "Uncle Louis". A national image had emerged in which the gentlemanly Prime Minister had become a composite grandfather, conciliator, statesman and genial campaigner.¹⁸⁴

In such circumstances there could be no question of revolt against his authority. If there were any such inclinations, they

were hardly necessary. St. Laurent permitted his colleagues a relatively free hand in the administration of their departments and while unanimity certainly did not always feature cabinet discussions, disagreements were never so sharp as to split the government. For one thing, with one or two exceptions, its members were of similar outlook. If that did not act as a conciliating influence, the fact of the booming economy did. Then, of course, there was always the undeniable fact of those tremendous electoral victories. There was never any doubt that St. Laurent was an important factor in them. After six years of St. Laurent's leadership, it appeared as if nothing could ever displace the party from its lofty position. However, within three years, the Liberals were out of office.

In retrospect, it is a simple matter to point to the particular reasons (outside of broader ones such as organization) for the abrupt turn-about of June 10, 1957. These may be summed up by the assessment that the entire party leadership displayed an almost unbelievable disregard for the niceties of democratic politics. However, while these causes may be apparent, they were hardly noticed even privately then.

It is difficult to blame St. Laurent for much of what transpired during his second full administration. Many acquaintances recall that just before leaving on his world tour in 1954, he was thinking seriously of retirement. It soon became apparent that if he did, the cabinet "team" would immediately be transformed into a collection of warring personalities and factions as the

jockeying for position began in earnest. As it was, St. Laurent's disposition to leave some of the organizational chores which traditionally had been the leader's in the hands of others may have made this possibility more likely. As he put it:

"I suppose the leader has to take some responsibility for party organization. But I never was the leader in that aspect. I trusted others to attend to that part of the duties that I suppose would normally be those of the leader." 185

But even when it became apparent that he would, in spite of increasing physical and mental exhaustion, continue as leader, the cabinet, during the last years of his tenure, continued to be the scene of considerable infighting. In the forefront were Walter Harris and C.D. Howe, with Paul Martin, still clinging to his hopes, not far behind. This had the effect of making the entire province of Ontario one large battleground with Harris in charge of the rural forces and Howe commanding the party's Toronto financial and commercial support. In comparison with these two figures, Martin, with his smaller "constituency" of south-western Ontario, was not really a contender.

In the inevitable post-mortems, several of his colleagues compared St. Laurent unfavorably with King. Gardiner pointed out that,

"King was as good a leader as the party ever had... There weren't many in the (St. Laurent) Cabinet who were politicians... I don't think Mr. St. Laurent was a politician at all. He and Howe were two of the best businessmen ever seen. He (St. Laurent) was a lawyer's lawyer --- but that isn't politics!" 186

Howe, perhaps feeling belatedly remorseful over his role in the events of the final years of power, had this to offer:

"King was a professional government man. One thing: You were sure where you were going once you decided upon what you wanted to do. King was tough, you sort of wanted that at times from St. Laurent. He didn't wield a big stick like King did and make sure that no one stepped out of line." 187

At the same time, all agree that loyalty to St. Laurent was "absolute"¹⁸⁸ throughout the period of his leadership. There was never any thought of displacing him. Indeed, in view of Howe's position of dominance, several cabinet ministers, including, of course, Harris and Martin, feared that should St. Laurent resign, Howe would be the logical choice to succeed him. But it was impossible to consider Howe's resignation too. In 1956, when the cabinet was unwilling to permit Howe to have everything his own way in the Trans-Canada Pipeline affair, Howe talked of resigning. Some of the younger ministers were prepared to see their taciturn colleague leave but were fearful that if he did, St. Laurent would conclude that "if he could not even keep his cabinet together," he ought to go too.¹⁸⁹ Always, the prime consideration was to keep St. Laurent at the head of the party because of his popularity which supposedly would assure the party of another election victory.

St. Laurent's comments are noteworthy:

"I think everyone knew that I wasn't there from choice and that I was quite disposed to carry on and do my best as long as it seemed to be the desire of a substantial majority... It had been understood that the 1953 campaign was the last one that I would attempt to lead. To my knowledge, everyone was very insistent that I continue for the 1957 campaign although they realized that I wasn't in fit condition to do it as vigorously as I had carried on in the 1949 and 1953 campaigns." 190

The evidence is overwhelmingly on his side.

The final years may be briefly summarized as follows:

"By October, 1955, the Cabinet was unhappy and rudderless. Its self-preoccupation largely detached it from public sentiment. It was giving first priority to the difficult task of hanging together. In June 1957,...it accomplished the task in a manner which few of the ministers had thought conceivable: nine of them mounted a common gallows." 191

* * * * *

As with St. Laurent, Lester B. Pearson's accession to the leadership was not the end product of a concerted power grab after he had skulked hungrily in the wings, impatiently awaiting his predecessor's departure from the stage. If anything, he was more reluctant than St. Laurent had been to assume the responsibilities of the position. Had St. Laurent gone through with his original intention to quit sometime after the 1953 election, Pearson would not likely have succeeded him, although he was often mentioned as a possibility. Before his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1954, Minister of Finance Douglas Abbott was the most likely successor. He was personally popular, skilled politically and, in spite of holding the most contentious portfolio in the government, had made few enemies. However, he was sincerely not interested in the position. Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton was likewise a candidate. But he left the cabinet on the same day as Abbott to become Vice-President and General Manager of the Metropolitan Life Assurance Corporation.¹⁹²

There were still several candidates to choose from: Howe, Harris, George Marler, Martin, Pearson and Robert Winters were all

prominently mentioned at one time or another.¹⁹³ However, Howe, Harris and Winters were among the nine ministers who went down to defeat in 1957 and to a considerable extent, both Howe and Harris were considered by the public to be the principal agents in the Party's defeat --- Howe, for his general arrogance; Harris, because as Minister of Finance, he had only raised the old-age pension by \$6. Almost immediately, Howe announced his retirement from politics. This was not unexpected. Winters joined the corporate world. Harris waited until matters cleared.

Amid the confusion following on the heels of the upset, there was little immediate discussion about a change in leadership although speculations were rampant.¹⁹⁴ The first significant public manifestation that a change was imminent came from the Toronto Star on June 15, two days before St. Laurent handed his resignation as Prime Minister to the Governor-General. After extolling the Liberal government's economic policies in the lead editorial of that day, the paper expressed concern that the party had lost its "traditional Liberalism". It called for a re-orientation and a new leader. It concluded with the following words.

"The Liberal Party must recapture the vision of Canadian humanity and Canadian destiny that inspired it from the greatest days of Laurier and King. It must formulate a program based on truly liberal policies and set out forcefully to enact it. This suggests the need for a national convention to give a new Liberal party a platform for liberal Canada.

"Prime Minister St. Laurent has been reported as wishing to retire from the Party Leadership. His service has been distinguished, but Liberalism now needs a younger man to give it aggressive guidance. Because the Liberal Party during the last twenty-two years has been able to recruit to its ranks young men of

outstanding quality, men who now have wide and expert experience, there is no doubt at all that the Liberals have the capacity and sheer ability to do for Canadians what their highest destiny calls for. Liberalism is now given a great opportunity and responsibility and men of the liberal nature of Mr. L.B. Pearson can assume it fittingly." 195

Almost overnight, Pearson had emerged as the obvious candidate. By September, four months before the national convention, a consensus had seemingly been reached and the decision, for all intents and purposes made.

St. Laurent retired to his summer home in St. Patrice to recuperate from the campaign and to cogitate over the downfall of his government. Failing health and medical advice soon convinced him that he should resign from the leadership. In August he asked Pearson to visit him to discuss the party's future.¹⁹⁶

"I was asked to come...because Mr. St. Laurent wanted to talk about the future, and was worried about his health and his own ability to carry on. And before he made a decision, he wanted to talk to me. He wanted to talk to Mr. Chevrier. Both of us were there together. And this had nothing to do with Mr. St. Laurent sort of trying to put the mantle of leadership on me. That wasn't in his mind at all. I had been very close to him. So had Mr. Chevrier. He and his family wanted me to come and see him and talk to him about the future and about his own condition because he didn't really feel he could carry on...

"Mr. Chevrier was Liberal leader in Quebec at the time and I'm sure that's why Mr. St. Laurent wanted him around too... If it had got out, and I'd have been there alone, there might have been the wrong deductions drawn. The fact that Mr. Chevrier went along with me showed that I wasn't singled out for this kind of consultation." 197

It is unclear whether St. Laurent also invited Chevrier or whether he only invited Pearson and the latter refused to visit unless Chevrier went along too. One of the reasons for Chevrier to accompany Pearson has already been pointed out: Although St. Laurent

was still leader, Chevrier was the obvious successor as leader from Quebec.¹⁹⁸ There is also the possibility, however, that since Chevrier was a French Canadian he was not a likely candidate for the leadership of the party following St. Laurent. He was therefore not a rival as far as Pearson was concerned. Even if personal intentions are overlooked, it is evident that Chevrier's inclusion served the dual purpose of demonstrating that the party paid more than lip-service to the French-English tradition and of safeguarding Pearson's interests, if he had any specific ones at that time.

Public indications were not long in coming. On September 4, former Minister of Fisheries James Sinclair was quoted as saying that Pearson would be the new leader by January, 1958 at a Convention. There was also the report that many Liberals agreed with him, feeling that a new leader had to be chosen before a reorganization could take place.¹⁹⁹ Several days later at a dinner of the Annual Meeting of the Ontario Young Liberal Association, Harris took the opportunity to go out of his way to praise Pearson. Speculation was that Harris would support Pearson for the leadership in return for the External Affairs portfolio which he would presumably obtain when Pearson became Prime Minister. It was at this same meeting that the Young Liberals attacked the old administration for losing touch with the "grass roots" and demanded a "cellar to attic housecleaning" of the organization. Harris admitted that it was his fault that the Party had failed to recognize the urgency of farm conditions in Ontario.²⁰⁰

On September 7, the same day upon which this story appeared, St. Laurent's statement of resignation was headline news across the country:

"After careful consideration and in the light of the medical advice which I have now received, I have come to the conclusion that I no longer have the vigor and necessary energy to lead the party through a general election campaign.

"I know, from the experience of previous elections, how great are the demands which they make on one's strength and physical resources and I am convinced that, as leader, I could no longer do full justice to those demands. "Health permitting, however, I will be happy to continue to serve as leader of the Liberal Party, pending the choice of my successor at the convention which will, no doubt, soon be held.

"My regret at having to make this decision is equalled only by my conviction that it is the right one and that any other would not be fair to the Liberal Party through which I have had the honor --- and there can be no greater --- to serve my country for so many years."

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Right at the outset, the Winnipeg Free Press mentioned three contenders: Pearson, Harris and Martin and predicted that the contest would be between Pearson and Harris.²⁰² However, that same afternoon, Pearson was already beginning to sound like the new leader. He closed the meeting of the Ontario Young Liberals at Presqu'ile Park with a speech calling for a "new Liberalism". He outlined the content of the party's future philosophy in four points which were to form the basis for his acceptance speech at the Convention which named him leader four months later.²⁰³

It may be unfair to Pearson to claim that by this time he had even decided to be a candidate for the position. It is clear, however, that many within the party asked him to take the leadership immediately after the June 10 defeat. These were led by a group of

five: Brooke Claxton, R.M. Fowler, Walter Gordon, Tom W. Kent and Maurice Lamontagne. With the exception of Claxton, who is now dead, these men have remained very close to Pearson, although Gordon is by far the closest of them to the leader.²⁰⁴ There are those who claim that Pearson had made up his mind by June 11. Pearson himself maintains that it was quite some time later that he finally reached a decision. He recalls that many kept after him to run for the position:

"I hesitated for a long time, and then, about two months before the leadership convention, it was less than that, it was about a month before, some of my friends said: 'Here, you've got to make up your mind whether you're going to do this, and you just have to stand for the leadership. You can't stay in the party, you can't stay in politics without at least indicating your willingness to accept this responsibility if they want you to do it. You've got to get out or you've got to stay in and stand for the leadership because there are too many of your friends who are anxious to have you Leader. You have no right to let them down. If the Convention doesn't choose you, O.K.!'

"And that was a very hard argument to refute. If you're in a party, I don't see how you can say, 'I won't be the Leader.' It was in December, before Christmas. I said, 'O.K. If you think so. If you want to put me up, that's alright with me.'

"...I'm not trying to give the impression that I was hard to get or anything like that. I just had to make up my mind. There was no alternative. The party was at a very low point. It had just been defeated in an election. I'd had ten years in the party, in the cabinet; had a chance to do what I wanted to in foreign affairs. It seemed a little ungracious of me to abandon the party when the lean days were beginning and the good days were over...

"If the party had been in power; if there had been three or four other candidates who would have commanded very wide support, I certainly wouldn't have stood for the leadership. I would have much preferred to have stayed in External Affairs. The party was entering its lean years. It seemed to me that all those who had survived the debacle of 1957 couldn't run away from any particular responsibility that they were asked to undertake. And I

would have to undertake the responsibility of being a candidate for the leadership. It's just as simple as that.

"...(St. Laurent) couldn't have carried on. He just couldn't have. He was not in condition. The only thing that caused him to hesitate, and I know this, was that it might look as if he were running away, having been beaten. And that caused him great anguish of soul; the feeling that people would not realize that he wasn't fit to carry on and they'd say, 'He was beaten so he quit.' ...It was a complete physical collapse, really. And being the leader of the opposition is a harder job physically and, perhaps in some other ways, than being head of a government. There's more wear and tear on you, without the excitement of responsibility." 205

R.M. Fowler described the activities of Pearson's five closest supporters:

"Three or four of us decided that Mike was our man, the best man for the party. Walter started to manage Mike. Two of us got going on a policy that he could accept. I drafted speeches... We started out to write a policy for Mike --- a booklet, that thick! This was a policy that could be accepted as a policy for the party. And we had it accepted at the Convention ...

"These were completely ad hoc friends of Mike. This should not be viewed as a cabal. There were many others who asked him to take the leadership. Jack Pickersgill also helped out. George Marler was Chairman of the Policy Committee (of the Convention) which helped on the policy and... (we) were the management committee of it all. But he gave the lead. Once Mike decided on going for it -- he led! But the whole point was to get the man before the Convention." 206

By the time the Convention assembled for three days beginning on January 14, 1958, only Martin remained as opposition to Pearson. Harris had retired from the field several months before:

"Had I won the election in my constituency, I would have contested the leadership. I didn't run because I felt that a defeated candidate shouldn't contest. I was also afraid that Pearson and I would split the votes and Martin would get in." 207

Indeed, as soon as Pearson declared himself "available", it seemed

as if every M.P. and defeated candidate was for him. Of the members of the St. Laurent cabinet, only ex-Minister of Agriculture Gardiner supported Martin:

"I'm against this business (alternation between French and English leaders). They'll never be elected again unless they get rid of this; Look at Diefenbaker. He's German. I supported Martin against Pearson to get rid of this custom forever. That's why I ran against St. Laurent in 1948." 208

There is no doubt that the French-English question had some bearing on Martin's ultimate failure to carry the convention. There were two reasons recommending Pearson to French Canadians. In the first place, two leaders of French descent in succession (i.e. St. Laurent followed by Martin) might thereby make it politically possible and excusable for any number of English leaders to succeed one another; secondly, French Canadians living in Quebec cannot accept someone from Ontario representing them in the full belief that no one from outside their province could possibly "represent" Quebec. This is the same problem confronting Cheviret as he tries to assume the role of leader from Quebec. The selection of Martin would thus have a corollary disadvantage in that, while English Canadians would view him as another French Canadian, French Canadians would not be satisfied because, under this reasoning, Martin might just as well be English.

There were even more compelling reasons for the rejection of Martin and, in some respects, the impossibility of Gardiner's candidacy of a decade before was of a similar order. Martin, along with Gardiner, was one of the few "politicians" in the cabinet. Many of his colleagues²⁰⁹ regarded him as too much of a back-slapper and a

glad-hander: "He lays it on much too thick. He is a maneuverer. It's all a little too open and obvious." This is the way one of the Pearson group saw it.

An ex-Cabinet Minister summed up Martin's personal difficulties: "Paul could never convince those closest to him that he was sincere." Finally, while Pearson is cut in the classic mold of the type of leader the party is accustomed to --- Laurier, King, St. Laurent --- "Martin doesn't fit into that strain." Another put it more bluntly: "Mike is more finished than Paul."

This is the "dignified" aspect of the position of leader of the Liberal Party and it was equally significant in 1958 as it was in 1948 because as far as all self-respecting Liberals were concerned (accustomed as they were to power for almost a generation), Diefenbaker was a mistake: Just a flash in the pan. In other words, the new leader was a very potential Prime Minister. Gardiner ran aground on this shoal ten years before. There may also be a "class" question involved here too --- not in terms of income, but in terms of attitude, behavior and background, although this might be stretching the point.

However, several highly "political" cabinet ministers disliked Martin on other grounds too. As one put it: "Martin always left when things got rough. In cabinet he would always be glancing up at the clock and saying, 'Well, I've got twenty minutes to catch the plane to Windsor.'" He spent too much time worrying about mending his own fences in his constituency than in being the "team player" other ministers claimed they were. Finally, many of

those even only indirectly connected with the party felt (and still feel) that Martin was very difficult to work with. This was an important consideration with a general election certain to be called within a short time following the Convention.

Much of this is relatively insignificant when measured against the fact that an important part of the party's support was (and remains) among the corporate and bureaucratic elites. In some respects, this segment of the party's support had achieved "veto group"²¹⁰ status almost equal to that enjoyed by French Canadians. Many among these groups had been relatively non-political, expressing their support of the party by voting for it on election day and, perhaps, by donating or raising funds. (To be sure, it was not difficult for many to support the St. Laurent government and the corporate world, for one, had a magnificent avenue of access in C.D. Howe.) They also enjoyed basking in the glory of Canada's high international prestige which was at least partially attributable to Pearson's efforts in External Affairs. But with the defeat of their government, and with an "outsider" as Prime Minister, many now felt estranged from the political process. Pearson was the one candidate who could give this element a sense of commitment to the party. Fowler himself may be included in this segment of the party's constituency (Gordon, too, although his friendship with Pearson is of a different order and goes back long before 1957):

"I was not an identified Liberal until June 10, 1957. My participation in this was based on intense personal feeling. I did not want to lose Mike Pearson in international affairs... 'Why am I a Liberal?' --- Mike Pearson'."

While this is admittedly somewhat of a post hoc statement, it is nevertheless true that the unhappiness with the Diefenbaker government among these groups was intensified since that time and the 1962 election campaign witnessed the spectacle of corporation executives and lawyers thronging to the hustings --- their efforts ranged from performing such lowly tasks as folding circulars to leading Provincial Campaign Committees --- to support the Liberal cause. There can be no question that Pearson reinforces the self-image of these groups while Martin jars it. It is also probably true that it is easier for the party to obtain its campaign funds with Pearson at the helm.

At the convention, the loser showed more evidence of organization than did the winner. Again, however, it was to no avail. The fact that Pearson had been awarded the Nobel Prize just one month before was an added incentive to the delegates to vote for him. Out of the 1380 votes cast, Pearson received 1074 against Martin's 305.²¹² Mayor Don MacKay of Calgary and Rev. H.L. Henderson, Mayor of Portage LaPrairie also had been nominated. MacKay retired early. Henderson remained in the race to the end and ultimately obtained one vote, that of the delegate who nominated him.

Pearson was declared elected on Thursday evening, January 16 when he delivered a nationally-televised acceptance speech to the Convention. St. Laurent remained Leader of the Opposition until the following Monday.²¹³ In spite of Pearson's subsequent disappointing performance in the House and the fact that he led the party to the most disastrous election defeat in its history barely over

two months after assuming his new position, there was no serious possibility of either his ouster or resignation. The assumption was that no leader could have prevented the Diefenbaker sweep of 1958. There were some mutterings by a small proportion of the rank-and-file to the effect that Martin might have been a better leader in the belief that he was a more effective platform speaker and therefore a better vote-getter than the present leader. These feelings were occasionally voiced during the 1962 campaign as well. However, since 1958, there has been no sign of revolt and as long as the party regards the departure of the Diefenbaker government as imminent, any unhappiness with Pearson, such as might exist, is likely to remain concealed or inarticulate.

II

The foregoing basically historical account indicates that the position of Leader of the Liberal Party has been governed far more by transient rather than permanent considerations. These are electoral or political in content. The fact that there are so few examples from which the analysis must be made further impells this generalization.

It seems clear that the fact that the party has dominated the electoral scene so effectively, thereby making its leader Prime Minister, is the important clue to the longevity of its leaders. It is well to repeat here that from 1887 until 1958 --- a period of fully seventy years --- the party has had but three leaders. It is a record that few modern political parties have come close to

equalling. This is obviously not a strict cause-and-effect relationship. An important factor in winning elections is the public appeal and public image of a party leader. But no leader can exist for long apart from the party or political group which he supposedly leads. It is for this reason that the proposition was stated in this way.

Liberals like to make fun of what J.R. Williams, in his study of the Conservative Party, has termed "The Merry-GO-Round of Conservative Leadership"²¹⁴ and implicitly presume that the "mistreatment" of their leaders by the Tories is proof positive that Conservatives are of a lower order of political animal. However, to project this Liberal record of success into the future and to predict that extended tenure will continue to characterize the position of Liberal Leader is based almost exclusively on the assumption that the electoral dominance of the party will likewise continue. If the results of the 1962 election provide any indications, such a belief would be based more on faith than on fact.

Since this is an analysis of the Liberal Party and not one of "leadership" itself, the specifically personal factors (Laurier's "sunny ways", King's solitary existence, St. Laurent's conciliatory attitudes) have been accorded relatively little attention. This is not to imply that the personal ingredient is not an important element in the exercise of authority. However, every one of the leaders of the party has differed in this respect from his predecessors; and the fact that the leaders have been so few in number suggests the conclusion that, while they have each left their

individual imprint upon the party, the party's experience with them provides few specific clues as to the "necessary" and especially "Liberal" personal qualities that all Liberal party leaders must possess. In short, the party has had no difficulty accommodating a broad range of personality types.

As far as concepts of leadership are concerned, the public statements by the leaders revealing their feelings on the subject have been sparse. The record seems to show that they were all "leaders" in more than name alone. There has been no disposition in the direction of collegial leadership on the part of any of the leaders. Almost by definition, this concept is not applicable, particularly in a parliamentary environment in which one party has usually held an absolute majority of seats in the House. Indeed, Mackenzie King's handling of J.L. Ralston in November, 1944 underlines Gladstone's maxim, quoted with approval with King's biographer, that "the first essential for a Prime Minister is to be a good butcher."²¹⁵ There is no doubt that King could rule with an iron hand. A more easy-going attitude, more suitable perhaps for non-crisis situations, was expressed by St. Laurent in describing his relations with his cabinet: "...I did feel that we should be regarded as a team working together as harmoniously as possible with the recognized leader timing and calling the plays."²¹⁶ These statements underline the Prime Ministerial qualities of the position of leader in the party. However, Pearson, in opposition, has shown no inclination of relinquishing any small part of the control of the party into the hands of others.

As to the leader's attitudes regarding difficult questions with which their parties or their governments were confronted, the characteristic stance adopted by all successful leaders on both sides of the House, not unexpectedly, had been personified in the long reign of Mackenzie King. He genuinely believed and frequently said that "the real secret of political leadership was more in what was prevented than in what was accomplished."²¹⁷ It is probably the key to his success. Only slightly different is St. Laurent's expression of his attitudes in this regard:

"You've got to be realistic, you know. You can't do anything unless you're in office. And you can't stay in office unless you're doing the kind of things that a majority of the people feel are the right things." 218

To point out that Mackenzie's views and behavior (or Arthur Meighen's for that matter) were in sharp contrast to this, is to demonstrate the obvious.

However, these considerations, which implicitly concern the "group process" as well, involve the "mercurial" aspects of power (to use Riesman's term)²¹⁹ and as such, while important, are essentially peripheral; for certain constants have emerged that are either "institutional" or have been institutionalized within the party. These are the direct result of the political and electoral structure of the country and the organizational arrangements within the party itself. The processes of the selection of the leader and the manner in which he can exert his control are severely influenced by them.

The most noteworthy element of leadership "availability"

involves the question of alternation between leaders of French and English descent. The ramifications of this "custom" have already been explored above at various intervals, especially in considering the serious obstacles confronting Martin's candidacy in 1958. But it must be emphasized that there is no unanimity within the party as to the binding nature of their "convention".

Not surprisingly, St. Laurent believes that it must always be considered:

"I think that it has to be respected for long enough to make all the people believe that there's no one group that is trying to get ahead of the other group. When that will have become the conviction of the majority, then it won't matter whether you have two or three of one race succeeding each other. But for the time being, the racial origin is something that people are concerned about; and while that concern exists, you have to be careful to avoid doing anything that would destroy the mutual confidence of the individuals of the two respective groups in the fair play of each group."

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While he did not feel that this was the special responsibility of the party, he claimed that he felt that,

"...it was a responsibility and I was very glad that the Liberal Party was trying to discharge that responsibility. Now, I wouldn't object to any other party also trying to discharge the same responsibility because I think it would make the feeling of oneness among us develop even more rapidly than it has been developing. I feel it should be a responsibility of all parties."

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Pearson, too, does not deprecate its significance:

"It's only a convention, but sometimes conventions can be more rigid than laws, as you know... An English-speaking Protestant leader, other things being equal, will be succeeded by a French-speaking Catholic leader ... I don't like these rigid qualifications, but that has developed over the years in the party pretty much."

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On the other hand, Gardiner, while admitting that the practice exists, has already been quoted as vehemently proclaiming his opposition to it. There was even a rank-and-file resolution introduced at the 1958 Convention by two westerners expressing similar opposition. The resolution stated that "in any election within the party, the racial extraction of the candidate shall at no time be permitted to prevent their being chosen for office."²²³ The mover went on to explain why she was presenting the motion:

"When our delegates came back from the Convention of 1948 they stated that the idea of rotating leadership was becoming established within the party, and suggested that the policy was absolutely opposed to true Liberal principles both in the past and in the present. "In choosing our leader, or a person for any other office, we should have no consideration for anything except the matter of talent; who is the most talented person to fill the office. It is unthinkable that great talent for office should be lost to Canada because a gifted candidate is debarred by racial extraction. Particularly is this true at this time when Canada is requiring from the most humble of us, and especially from her most gifted sons and daughters, their greatest efforts if her potential possibilities are to be realized."

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The seconder made haste to point out that this was not a plea for either Martin or Pearson. Rather,

"...we know that there are in both races an equality of potential, an equality of ability, which makes for a natural division of office and honours and the right to fight for the Liberal Party. We do not need a mathematical formula. Our only consideration must be one of pace: What is the pace that the leader can set? Who is the best man? It must be pace, and not race, that must dictate the choice of a leader at every level of the Liberal Party."

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The resolution was referred to committee, from which it never emerged.

Martin admits that this "convention" was a factor in his defeat in 1958. However,

"I hope we have thrown it aside now. Canada is not only made up of English and French speaking peoples, Catholic and Protestant peoples; Canada and the Liberal Party.. (are) made up of ...a mosaic of many peoples. And I don't think the Leader of the Liberal Party necessarily has to be French or English. I think he must be a Canadian. Otherwise we would be saying that a Ukrainian, or a Czech or a Jew or a Pole or an Italian, born in Canada or who came from outside who accepted Canadian nationality, could never become Leader of the Liberal Party. That would be a negation of Liberalism." 226

J.W. Pickersgill, perhaps still harboring leadership ambitions of his own, had this to offer:

"I can't believe that the Liberal Party is going to be wedded to any convention of that sort. And I don't think that any other political party is going to be because it means that you are limiting the possibility of getting the person who is likely to command the widest public support. And no political party with any dynamism, with any desire to be in office, is going to pass over its best bet for a second best bet." 227

These objections are all highly theoretical. The fact is that at no time was a candidate passed over solely because of his group affiliations. It is possible that St. Laurent's religious and ethnic background were the key determinants in 1948. Political conditions of the time certainly increased the importance of this factor. However, it is very difficult to make a similar case for the selection of Pearson ten years later. The operative phrase here is probably Pearson's "other things being equal": If a French Canadian and an English Canadian (even with the latter from Ontario) confronted each other at a leadership convention following upon the heels of an English Canadian leader, the French Canadian would undoubtedly have the advantage --- other things being equal. They seldom are. The decision, when it is reached, is not based solely on this consideration.

The point made by Martin indicates that the matter of adherence to this convention involves more than one candidate's ability being overlooked because the individual in question has the misfortune to arrive on the scene out of turn. The French Canadian constituencies in Quebec, New Brunswick, Ontario and those old western ones are not the only ones concerned about such questions as minority status. There is scarcely a riding in the country today that is not "ethnic sensitive" in one form or another. French-English alternation used to be a functional ingredient in the sense that it was an important integrating factor not only for the Liberal Party but for Canadian society as a whole. The necessity of conciliating the sometimes-excessive demands of both English and French was in the past often the first requirement of the political system. With other strategic groups intruding into the political process and with new or different problems confronting the country, the importance of the old cleavage between the historic founding groups of Canada thereby does not loom as large, although the problems of contact between the two still remain, mitigated only by the relative absence of the virulence that often characterized the relationship in the past. These facts will by themselves be far more significant than all the appeals to tradition or Liberalism that may be advanced. However, the "tradition" nevertheless remains and it is clear that the party will abandon it with extreme reluctance.

A quality of lesser importance regarding the "availability" requirements concerns the element of a candidate's personal image:

He must "look" like a Prime Minister. In the past, the party has eschewed the "politician" with the bombastic platform performer approach for the "statesman" whose appeal was "responsible" and rational. A Diefenbaker could therefore not qualify. Naturally, this assessment is based upon past performances and is perhaps a function of the party's electoral dominance. After a decade in opposition, the party might not be able to afford to be so finicky.

Historically, the Convention has only once acted as the effective device in selecting the leader. That was in 1919, and at the time, the party was in fragments. The other two leaders so far in this century, St. Laurent and Pearson, were "obvious" choices. The pattern established in St. Laurent's case was repeated in the main for Pearson despite the fact that the party was in opposition in 1958. Martin's brief description of the process by which St. Laurent came to power is not surprising:

"He was so outstanding in cabinet, among his cabinet colleagues, and that appreciation penetrated the rank-and-file of the parliamentary party, that I think it was generally recognized that he was the logical man... I don't ever remember a collective discussion. It was never agreed. It was sort of an understanding. It wasn't even an understanding. It was a sort of recognition." 228

As already indicated in the previous chapter on organization, the conventions have all been controlled by the parliamentary party. "Recognition" of a candidate's abilities thus has no difficulty "penetrating" to the convention delegates---at least this is partially what happened in 1948 and 1958. Again, this is predicated on the party being in office. It is entirely conceivable that, with the

party in opposition, increased democratization at the constituency level, with lines of communication running through the provincial headquarters and then to Ottawa, could mean that this parliamentary control by the M.P. or defeated candidate would be impossible. A situation would then be created in which the convention would feature a genuine contest for the leadership. This is not an entirely unlikely future possibility.

Therefore, a key to the understanding of the differences between Liberal and Conservative conventions, referred to elsewhere, lies partially here. The leadership decisions of 1948 and 1958 were arrived at by a party either in power or assuming that it was about to be returned to that status. The risks of open conflict at a convention are far greater than those which possibly could be incurred behind closed doors. Thus, the moment of a change in leadership is a wonderful opportunity to use the Convention as an "integrating" device to smooth over any rifts that might be in the offing as a result of the decision and for generating displays of solidarity behind the new chief. The Conservatives, in opposition, could hardly have all the contenders and interests in one place at any one time much less gain prior agreement. Their Convention therefore has had the effect of intensifying conflict rather than of ameliorating it. Again, this is more a function of being in office than of any special Liberal or Conservative personality traits or modes of operation.

In commenting upon the development of Laurier's relationship with his cabinet colleagues from a position of primus inter pares

to one of unqualified supremacy, Dafoe pointed out:

"It is in keeping with the genius of our party system that the leader who begins as the chosen chief of his associates proceeds by stages, if he has the necessary qualities, to a position of dominance; the republic is transformed into an absolute monarchy." 229

This describes the course of Laurier's leadership perfectly. However King certainly was barely the chief even of the rank-and-file when he succeeded Laurier in 1919. Yet, he showed he had the "necessary qualities", first by leading the party to what amounted to victory in 1921; and then, by a combination of good fortune, personal loyalties and skill, established his supremacy within seven years. St. Laurent inherited the headship of a party solidly in office upon being chosen and the astounding election triumph of 1949 removed all doubts as to his right of possession.

But even if a leader is not so fortunate or astute to win elections thereby irrevocably establishing his authority, the institutional arrangements within the party load everything in his favor. It has already been pointed out in the previous chapter that the operations of the institutions of both the parliamentary party and the "party in the country" enhance rather than diminish his control. It is well to recapitulate here what powers the leader possesses.

Within the parliamentary party, he appoints the whips. No caucus is ever held in his absence or without someone whom he has specifically designated to act for him. This is true whether he is Prime Minister or Leader of the Opposition. The notion of a "1922 Committee" or anything approximating this body (and the practices

surrounding it) of the British Conservative Party is unheard of. If this were not sufficient to ensure that nothing untoward develops, the entire caucus system is hampered by what appears to be the impossibility of maintaining secrecy over what has transpired behind what should have been tightly sealed doors.

A member of the CCF has stated: "I know inside of an hour what has taken place in the Liberal and Conservative caucuses and I'm not supposed to know ... All the newspapermen know..."²³⁰ He is seconded by St. Laurent's Chief Whip who was first elected to the House in 1930: "You couldn't do anything in caucus without having it come out in the press the next day."²³¹ It is not surprising that it was only during the Conscription Crisis of 1944 that there was even any thought about leadership in caucus.²³²

In spite of this, one Conservative back-bencher has been quoted as saying that some of his government's policies have been altered as a result of opinion expressed in caucus.²³³ This is equally true of Liberal governments. However, the attitude underlying the approach at least of Liberal leaders has been not to expect much in the way of leadership even in policy matters from caucus. Pickersgill recalls:

"Certainly...in all the time I was associated with Mr. King and Mr. St. Laurent, I never knew either of them ... to allow his policy to be decided by the caucus. He decided it with his colleagues in the Cabinet and told caucus about it before he told Parliament." ²³⁴

The party organization outside Parliament is likewise kept well in hand by the Leader.—He names the President of the National Liberal Federation (the election by the Advisory Council, or, now,

by the National Council laid down in the Federation constitution is always simply a ratification of the Leader's choice); the Executive-Director (or National Organizer) of the Federation (who is subject to no ratification by any body); the Chairman of the National Campaign Committee; and is always consulted about the appointment of the provincial representatives on the latter Committee. While the new 1961 Constitution of the party demands that a Convention be held every five years at the call of the Executive Committee, all past conventions and rallies have been called only by the Leader.

The Leader, once chosen, never again faces any formal or informal election process, for there is no provision for any system of periodic accountability (except the highly informal one) either within the parliamentary party or through the organs of the Federation. Even the Convention, while ostensibly a democratic device, is an obstacle to revolt against a leader. His investiture by that method provides him with ready "evidence" that he is the one with the popular support in the party. However, while the Convention is a handy weapon for a leader inclined to use it, its policy decisions have little moral, much less binding, force upon his actions. King, St. Laurent and Pearson have all been quoted in a similar context in the previous chapter to the effect that the pronouncements of a Convention or a Rally are simply "a chart" to be implemented "as circumstances may permit." To quote again what Pearson pointed out before the Rally of 1961:

"Of course, conditions change, and you would not be bound to put into effect every resolution which may be passed now, when you are in office even a short time from now."
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Thus, the structure and operations of all party bodies provide no avenues of counter-attack for dissident party members and no institutional way of organizing opposition other than open face-to-face confrontation either in caucus or at infrequent party gatherings. The necessity of bringing any such opposition into the open long before it has had a chance to crystallize around alternatives which this set-up imposes is usually enough to deter even the boldest rebel. The recourse is often only to provincial politics.

Of course, the Leader as Prime Minister has all the powers of the latter position to add to his own. He also does not have to deal with a head of state who has even the prerogatives of the British Monarch. Not only does the Governor-General not enjoy the position in Canadian society held in Great Britain by the Queen, but the Royal Power of Dissolution is probably not what it is in Britain. For whatever the constitutional rights and wrongs of the 1926 Byng-King confrontation, there can be no doubt that the event had one great political result: It would take an exceptionally brave Governor-General to refuse dissolution to any Prime Minister. The political facts of life seem to dictate that it is much safer to leave the ultimate decision as to the rightness of advice tendered by the first minister in the hands of the electorate.

When all the above factors are taken into consideration, it is obvious that King was not mouthing empty threats when he laid

down the law both to the caucus and to his cabinet for example, in the 1940 National Government crisis, or during the difficulties over conscription in 1944.

Many of these powers of the Leader are latent ones. They do not have to be exercised to be effective. They are kept as much as possible in reserve, for agreement attained by consent rather than by blatant displays of force is invariably more effective and more enduring. As well, there are few incitements to revolt when things are going well and victory follows upon victory at the polls. Indeed, such a situation is often accompanied by apathy and/or ready acquiescence by the Leader's followers even when they are experiencing qualms about certain courses of action embarked upon by its government. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the entire situation of the period from 1954 until 1957 must always be considered in this light.

It is clear then that the Leader of the Liberal Party subjectively operates in a fairly permissive environment and Pearson's analysis of the Leader's position vis-à-vis his followers points to the basic informality of the relationship:

"There's no institutional way (to depose a leader). I suggest you study the history of the Conservative Party and you'll see how it's done... We haven't had to dispose of leaders. We've had very few leaders. As you know, I'm the fourth. Any leader who's worth anything at all would know when his usefulness was over to the party. If he's any good at all he would understand when the time had come to get out. I don't know of any institutional way of telling you to get out...

"The Leader disposes himself. I don't know of what other arrangement there could be."

At the same time, Pearson was not unmindful of the advantages in terms of initiative possessed by the Leader:

"If you read Jack Pickersgill's book, you will see how Mr. King used the caucus to force votes of confidence. He used the caucus in a positive way to strengthen his position. I would use the caucus as Mr. King did. I would make the caucus a very important part of government... in the way Mr. King did to get the feeling of the party. They (the M.P.s) obviously are representative of the party in parliament and one way you would discover when your usefulness was over would be by the feeling of the caucus... You sense these things without votes, if you're sensitive to political change --- that is, party change...

"We've been having party meetings far more often than in the old days and perhaps that's one way of finding out whether the rank-and-file of the party is satisfied... Another way of finding out how you stand with the party in the country is by travelling around. I've been doing that far more than Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. King ever did. But then, they were Prime Ministers...

"They (the party in the country) have just as much to do with it at the M.P.s But it's very hard to isolate M.P.s from the party in the country if you have enough M.P.s to cover the country pretty well. I think the party members, the party officers of the riding associations, the provincial associations, should have a very active part --- I was going to say control. I don't mean day-to-day control in supervision of the party... By periodic meetings --- every year or two --- and we're trying to do that. I attend practically all the provincial annual meetings. And I see them all there, and I find out, and I encourage them to talk very frankly about party affairs. I'm quite sure that I have enough antennae out to be able to register impressions of that kind." 237

Finally, this exchange with St. Laurent provides an apt conclusion:

"As long as I was there --- of course, I wasn't there very long --- it always seemed to me to be a matter of course if a man who was the leader felt at any time that there was a substantial portion of the party which had lost confidence in his leadership, he would be very uncomfortable and he would want to put it up to the party to determine whether or not there were enough to make it an obstacle to

the party discharging its responsibility to the public at large.

(Quest.) "Are you satisfied with this kind of arrangement?"

(Ans.) "Well, I think it works. And that is the test of all political institutions." 238

One of the points this chapter has attempted to demonstrate is that "it works" in large part because the party has been in power. Victory at the polls provides an irrefutable argument for a leader against which most opposition is futile. It is true that there have been no complaints emanating from any quarter within the party expressing dissatisfaction with this situation. It is also true that the party has never had to depose a leader because the incumbents, or at least St. Laurent and Pearson, were (are) always very conscious of their terms of reference. However, if the party ever finds itself in the predicament in which a majority wants an alteration in leadership and cannot effect such a change within the existing framework, the party may not be willing to accept this informality with continued equanimity. Otherwise, there seems to be nothing in the future which portends a change in the present status of the position.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. National Liberal Federation, The Canadian Liberal, V (Winter, 1952), 271.
2. Interview, Ottawa, December 13, 1960. When Pearson says that he is only the fourth leader of his party, he is referring to the "modern" Liberal party, i.e., the party of the post-1896 period. There were, as mentioned before, two leaders between Confederation and Laurier: Alexander Mackenzie (1873-1880) and Edward Blake (1880-1887).
3. Laurier: A Study in Canadian Politics (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1922), 131-132.
4. See Chapter II entitled "The Emergence of the Leader" in R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (London: Heinemann, 1955), 21-54.
5. Letter written by Arthur Meighen (Conservative Party Leader 1920-1926 and for a short period, 1941-1942) to John W. Lederle, May 31, 1941 in John W. Lederle, The National Organization of the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Canada, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1942), 105.
6. Dale C. Thomson, Alexander Mackenzie, Clear Grit (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), 100.
7. In a letter written to the Catholic Committee in 1871, Brown claimed that, in 1867, "...I voluntarily resigned the leadership of the (Liberal) party. Mr. Alexander Mackenzie is now leader of the Liberal party from Ontario in the House of Commons, and Mr. Edward Blake is leader in the Ontario Assembly; they have my most cordial confidence and support..." Quoted in J.S. Willison, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party, Vol. I (Toronto: George N. Morang, 1903), 24-25n.
8. Dale C. Thomson, Op.Cit., 140.
9. Buckingham, W. and Ross, G.W., The Hon. Alexander Mackenzie, His Life and Times (Toronto: Rose Publishing Co., 1892), 329.
10. Letter, Mackenzie to Brown, March 5, 1873, quoted in Dale C. Thomson, Op.Cit., 147.
11. Ibid., 147-148.
12. Quoted in Ibid., 148.

13. J.S. Willison, Op.Cit., 248.
14. Dale C. Thomson, Op.Cit., 170.
15. Ibid., 214.
16. George W. Ross, Getting into Parliament and After (Toronto: William Briggs, 1913), 141-142; also O.D. Skelton, The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol. I (Toronto: Macmillan, 1921), 168.
17. Sir Richard Cartwright, Reminiscences (Toronto: William Briggs, 1912), 148.
18. Dale C. Thomson, Op.Cit., 199.
19. Quoted in T.A. Burke, "Mackenzie and his cabinet, 1873-1878," Canadian Historical Review, XLI (June, 1960), 128.
20. Sir Richard Cartwright, Op.Cit., 142.
21. George W. Ross, Op.Cit., 101-102.
22. Ibid., 131-132.
23. Dale C. Thomson, Op.Cit., 361-362.
24. Ibid., 363.
25. J.S. Willison, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 5.
26. Margaret A. Banks, "The Change in Liberal Party Leadership, 1887," Canadian Historical Review, XXXVIII (June, 1957), 109-110. The following remarks concerning Blake's resignation and the selection of Laurier lean heavily on this article.
27. Quoted in Ibid., 110.
28. Letter, Davies to Blake, March 15, 1887, Quoted in Ibid., 119.
29. O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. I, 341.
30. Margaret A. Banks, Op.Cit., 119-120.
31. Quoted in Ibid., 121.
32. Blake Papers: Laurier to Blake, May 31, 1890.
33. Ibid., Laurier to Blake, June 12, 1890.
34. Laurier Papers: Laurier to C.A. Hyman, March 28, 1895.

35. Unpublished Memoirs of Hon. C.G. Power, quoted in H. Blair Neatby, Laurier and a Liberal Quebec: A Study in Political Management, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1956), 75.
36. J.S. Willison, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 172-183; also F.H. Underhill, "Edward Blake, the Liberal Party and Unrestricted Reciprocity," Canadian Historical Association, Annual Report, 1939, 42-49.
37. J.S. Willison, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 171.
38. National Liberal Convention of 1893, Official Report (Ottawa: 1893), 71-72.
39. The biographies of Laurier and the reminiscences of his contemporaries, critical and friendly alike, all refer to him in terms such as these. These two are found in Laurier Papers: Cartwright to Laurier, November 14, 1892 and O.D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol. I (New York: Century Co., 1922), 323, respectively.
40. Tarte Papers: Laurier to Tarte, October 21, 1902. See also O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 176-184.
41. O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 185-190.
42. There were personal reasons involved too. Sifton was the Minister from the area and, since he was vacationing in Florida when the bills were introduced, he was not consulted about the education clauses by Laurier.
43. Mason Wade, The French Canadians, 1760-1945 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956), 538.
44. J.W. Dafoe, Laurier: A Study in Canadian Politics, 133-134.
45. J.W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton in Relation to His Times (Toronto: Macmillan, 1931), 346. The two occasions referred to by Dafoe concern Laurier's failure to take Sifton back into the cabinet in 1907 and his subsequent refusal, one year later, to accept advice from Sifton (for which he himself had asked) regarding a suitable Western representative.
46. R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), 221.
47. O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 386.
48. See L. Ethan Ellis, Reciprocity 1911 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 154-156.

49. J.W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton in Relation to His Times, 383-385.
50. To Dafoe, this is the prime explanation for Laurier's subsequent behavior:
 "...he (Laurier) feared Bourassa with a fear which in the end became an obsession. He feared him because if he only retained his position in Quebec, Liberal victory in the coming Dominion elections would not be possible. Laurier feared him still more because if Bourassa increased his hold upon the people, which was the obvious purpose of the raging, tearing Nationalist propaganda, he would be displaced from his proud position as the first and greatest of French Canadians. Far more than a temporary term of power was at stake. It was a struggle for a niche in the temple of fame. It was a battle not only for the affection of the living generation, but for place in the historic memories of the race. Laurier, putting aside the weight of 75 years and donning his armor for his last fight, had two definite purposes: to win back, if he could, the prime ministership of Canada; but in any event to establish his position forever as the unquestioned, unchallenged leader of his own people."
- Laurier: A Study in Canadian Politics, 156-157.
 This is, obviously, an extreme view. A fairer explanation would have to be that, while it is true that Laurier recognized the special position of French Canada in his party's support, he had little choice if he wished to continue at the head of some semblance of a national party.
51. Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 9, 1916, 3618.
52. See also letters written by Laurier to W.S. Fielding, Mahlon Cowan and N.W. Rowell. Quoted in O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 472-476.
53. O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 483-484.
54. Quoted in Ibid., 484.
55. O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 484.
56. Ibid.
57. The most complete account of the Union Government movement and the 1917 election may be found in the Canadian Annual Review, 1917 (Toronto: Canadian Annual Review, Ltd., 1918), 553-643.
58. O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 508-517.

59. Canadian Annual Review, 1917, 556; also Murphy Papers: #13817-13819, Memorandum, Murphy to Laurier.
60. Canadian Annual Review, 1917, 572-577.
61. Letter, Laurier to Sir Allen Aylesworth, June 22, 1917, quoted in O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 518.
62. O.D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 530-531.
63. Canadian Annual Review, 1918, 567.
64. Dafoe Papers: Dafoe to George P. Graham, July 30, 1917.
65. Hartley H. Dewart Papers: Laurier to Dewart, May 29, 1917.
66. Laurier Papers: A.T. Thompson to Laurier, December 25, 1917. Thompson had been the Ontario whip.
67. See, for example, a letter from Laurier to Aylesworth, May 15, 1917, quoted in O. D. Skelton, Op.Cit., Vol. II, 509-511.
68. Quoted in R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874-1923, 274.
69. R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 283.
70. The World (Toronto), August 7, 1919, 7, quoted in John W. Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1919 and the Selection of Mackenzie King," Dalhousie Review, XXVIII (April, 1947), 86.
71. National Liberal Convention, Official Report (Ottawa: 1919), 11-12.
72. H.S. Ferns and B. Ostry give a number of 1,111 who possessed balloting rights: The Age of Mackenzie King: The Rise of the Leader (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1955), 311.
73. R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 298.
74. Alexander Smith of Ontario was nominated but withdrew immediately. National Liberal Convention, Official Report, 167.
75. "The Liberal Leadership," Round Table, IX (June, 1919), 594, quoted in J.W. Lederle, Op.Cit., 85-86.
76. R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 304.
77. The incident is reported in the Halifax Chronicle, June 24, 1929 and is footnoted in Dawson, Op.Cit., 304.

78. R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 304.
 The term "cross benches" is not merely a euphemism. The Center Block of the Parliament buildings where the House sat had been destroyed by a fire in 1916. Until a new Block could be completed, the House met in the auditorium of the Victoria Memorial Museum where the seats were arranged in tiers in a semi-circle around the Speaker. Fielding sat in the center section, facing the Speaker, to emphasize his independent support of Conscription.
79. Dafoe Papers: Murphy to M. Gratton O'Leary (Associate Editor, The Journal, Ottawa), June 26, 1929.
80. R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 305.
81. Dawson shows that the charges made in the published version of Borden's Diaries [Henry Borden (ed.), Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, Vol. II (Toronto: Macmillan, 1938), 995-996] to the effect that King was willing to join the Union Government are not substantiated in the original. Op.Cit., 265.
 Arthur Meighen's biographer, Roger Graham, states that before this discrepancy was revealed, Meighen, in an interview, "claimed to have a distinct recollection of Borden's having told him at the time that he understood King was prepared to join. According to Meighen, it was decided without difficulty that nothing would be gained by taking King into the government." Arthur Meighen: The Door of Opportunity (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1960), footnote #19, 330.
82. Op.Cit., 291.
83. R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 304.
 Lady Laurier is even supposed to have sent a message to the Convention to the effect that Sir Wilfrid "had considered Mr. Fielding a suitable successor capable of re-uniting the party... Feeling was so intense in the Quebec delegation that the messenger from Lady Laurier, a man of wisdom and great loyalty to his party, decided not to deliver his missive lest the Party split publicly with all the consequences which would inevitably ensue." H.S. Ferns and B. Ostry, Op.Cit., 321.
84. A.K. Cameron recalls the following incident at the Convention: The candidates were sitting on the platform when Lady Laurier appeared in the wings. Thinking fast, King was immediately on his feet. He rushed to her side and ushered her in, in full view of the assembled gathering. Cameron feels that this action by King helped further inculcate the impression upon the delegates that he was the chosen successor.
 Interview, Montreal, October 18, 1960.
85. The Journal (Ottawa), June 25, 1929, 7.

As Sir Allen Aylesworth admitted ten years after the event: "...It (is) pure newspaper 'bunk' that Laurier himself ever designated King as his successor."

Murphy Papers: Aylesworth to Murphy, July 25, 1929.

86. Quoted in Dawson, Op.Cit., 298.

87. Dawson, Op.Cit., 296.

88. H.S. Ferns and B. Ostry, Op.Cit., 311. The source quoted is The Times Literary Supplement (London), December 4, 1953.

89. R. MacG. Dawson, Op.Cit., 307.

90. Throughout their lives, both Atkinson and Larkin were King's financial "angels". The latter was for many years Treasurer of the Ontario Liberal Association and spent the last eight years before his death in 1930 as Canada's High Commissioner in London. He is reported, for example, to have spent \$100,000 in refurbishing Laurier House as King's residence after King was elected leader.

91. National Liberal Convention, Official Report (Ottawa: 1919), 12.

92. The voting was as follows:

	King	Fielding	Graham	McKenzie
First Ballot	344	297	153	153
Second Ballot	411	344	124	60
Third Ballot	476	438		

The table is taken from R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 307.

93. R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 294.

94. The World (Toronto), August 4, 1919, quoted in J.W. Lederle, Op.Cit., 90.

95. See Letter, Sir Allen Aylesworth to George A. Aylesworth, August 8, 1919, quoted in Dawson, Op.Cit., 308.

This issue was the important one for Aylesworth:

"I would think it not far wrong to say that it was 'conscription that defeated Fielding'. For myself at any rate, the one thing that I was bound to do everything I could to accomplish, was to prevent any man who had deserted Laurier in 1917 becoming our leader in 1919 --- because such a result I believed would have utterly disrupted and destroyed the Party. I know that a great many who were at the Convention had exactly the same feeling --- and I think it was a very powerful factor in electing King."

Murphy Papers: Aylesworth to Murphy, July 25, 1929.

96. Interview, Ottawa, August 2, 1960. There may be an element of hindsight in this statement.
97. Dafoe Papers: Murphy to O'Leary, June 26, 1929.
98. Interview, Ottawa, January 8, 1961.
99. A.K. Cameron, who was close to goings-on in Montreal commercial circles claimed that this was not likely:
 "...Gouin is about the wisest man in public life today and whatever he may do after an election, you can depend upon it, he will make no alliance with Meighen or any of his crowd before an election. On the other hand, there can be no question but that the financial interests here at least are looking to Gouin, whether as a member of the government formed by King or as a member of a compromised government to bring order out of chaos generally and to find a solution to the railroad problem. During the campaign, Gouin will probably come out strongly for a protective tariff, and for handing the railroads back to private ownership, but he will do this as a supporter of King, and as a member of the Liberal Party."
A.K. Cameron Papers: Cameron to Crerar, September 12, 1921.
100. See R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 354.
- 101.* The chapter entitled "The Election of 1921 and Cabinet Formation," in Dawson, Op.Cit., 348-376, gives a detailed and complete account of the negotiations with the Progressives and the formation of the cabinet.
102. Dafoe Papers: Dafoe to Clifford Sifton, July 11, 1922.
103. Sir Lomer Gouin Papers: #44.
104. Quoted in R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 392.
105. Dafoe Papers: Dafoe to Sifton, July 11, 1922.
106. Ibid.
107. R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 444-449.
108. See Bruce Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953), 60.
109. Cameron Papers: Crerar to Cameron, October 12, 1923.
110. Ibid., Cameron to Crerar, January 31, 1924.
111. Ibid., Crerar to Cameron, January 28, 1924.

112. Ibid., Crerar to Cameron, February 6, 1924.
113. Ibid., Crerar to Cameron, November 15, 1924.
114. Interview, Ottawa, December 12, 1960.
115. Cameron Papers: Cameron to Crerar, October 30, 1925.
116. Ibid., Crerar to Cameron, November 3, 1925.
117. The attitudes and activities of the Progressives are described in the chapter entitled "The Progressive Group in the Constitutional Crisis of 1926," in W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 236-265.

No attempt will be made here to review the constitutional issues revolving around the Byng-King affair which really begins with King's visit to the Governor-General in November, 1925. This is given definitive treatment in Eugene Forsey, The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British Commonwealth (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1943). No attempt will be made to assess the relationship between the two men either. The political significance of the episode as it pertains to the leadership is referred to later in this section.

118. Cameron Papers: Crerar to Cameron, October 31, 1925.
119. Ibid., Cameron to Crerar, November 3, 1925.
120. Ibid., Crerar to Cameron, November 7, 1925.
121. Ibid.

It should be emphasized that policy considerations were of the highest order of importance to the Winnipeg group, but especially to Crerar. A letter reporting on a meeting held by Manitoba Liberals written several months before by Crerar to his friend Cameron sums up the writer's dispositions and provides evidence that, even then, Dunning was an important factor in Crerar's calculations:

"The Manitoba Liberals had a meeting about ten days ago. It was neither large nor representative. They passed a series of resolutions dealing with Federal matters that were broadly along the line of the Progressive policies in the last Federal election. Along with this the prevailing sentiment at the meeting, so I am told, was for co-operation with the Progressives.

"While I have no direct confirmation of it, I think the situation in Saskatchewan and Alberta among the Liberals is much the same. I am told that Dunning is for this quite strongly.

"...Personally I would like to see a movement in Western Canada along the lines of the Liberal Convention of 1917. By this I mean an effort to crystallize Western opinion through the medium of a Convention at which all classes would be invited to participate. I would like to see such a Convention define a courageous constructive programme on national questions alone, avoiding as far as possible anything of a sectional nature, elect a leader and declare emphatically for the maintenance of Confederation, and state as its definite policy its willingness to co-operate with all other parts of the Dominion in the carrying out of the programme thus laid down. I realize that great care would have to be taken to make the programme thoroughly national. Such a programme should deal with the railways, with immigration, wider markets, tariff for revenue, possibly some changes in the banking system, reorganization of Government service and expenditures with a view to bringing about reduction in taxation. Briefly, in other words, the slogan of the Liberals of sixty years ago in Britain, - 'Economy, Retrenchment and Reform'."

Cameron Papers: Crerar to Cameron, August 5, 1925.

122. A.B. Hudson Papers H.J. Symington to Hudson, Regina, CPR en route (*my italics*). The letter is not dated but it is clear from the Cameron Papers that this is the report of the conversation with Dunning on the morning of November 7, 1925 in Regina.
123. See, for example, Cameron Papers: Crerar to Cameron, November 11, 1925:
 "My own impression is that Dunning is ready and even anxious to get into federal politics. There is not only the appeal of the wider field but he probably feels that his abilities would carry him far, which I think is right. This is a perfectly laudable ambition. How far he will be able to adjust himself to the new conditions would still have to be demonstrated."
124. The Montreal Daily Star, November 23, 1925, 7.
125. Interview, Ottawa, January 8, 1961.
 It must be emphasized that King had many motives for bringing Dunning in --- one of which was to placate precisely those Westerners who were dissatisfied with his own leadership. In such circumstances, Gardiner was an unacceptable alternative. As Crerar put it:
 "... (Gardiner) is both ambitious and determined. It would be a great mistake to take him to Ottawa. He

more than any other man has secured, and in large measure earned, the hostility of the Progressives in Saskatchewan."

Cameron Papers: Crerar to Cameron, January 26, 1926.

126. See Bruce Hutchison, Op.Cit., 105-147 for a dramatic rendering of these events.
127. Dafoe Papers: Stevenson to Dafoe, January 16, 1926.
128. Quoted in R. MacGregor Dawson, Op.Cit., 362.
129. Cameron Papers: Crerar to Cameron, September 23, 1926; see also Dafoe Papers: Dafoe to Clifford Sifton, December 16, 1926.
130. Cameron Papers: Crerar to Cameron, April 1, 1927.
131. C.A. Dunning Papers: Dunning to A.M. Young, May 4, 1931.
132. Dafoe Papers: Dexter to Dafoe, October 6, 1931.
133. For example, Editorial in Mail and Empire (Toronto), June 10, 1932.
134. Dafoe Papers: Dafoe to Harry Sifton, March 20, 1933.
135. When Dunning rejoined the administration in 1935, his hopes, while false, were still high and he is reported to have said to one companion: "You know, it's very hard to come to Ottawa with people calling you the Crown Prince."
George V. Ferguson, Interview, Montreal, November 18, 1960.
136. Quoted in J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 1939-1944, Vol. I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 80.
137. Ibid. King's fear, or dislike, of Meighen, his arch-rival in the twenties, is legendary.
138. Ibid., 80-81.
139. Ibid., 82-83.
140. Ibid., 83.
141. Ibid.
142. J.W. Pickersgill, Op.Cit., 83-84.
143. Ibid., 397-400.

144. The Canadian Forum, XX (July, 1940), 100.
145. Dafoe Papers: Dafoe to Sir Frederick Whyte, February 17, 1943.
146. A detailed account of what follows may be found in R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961); Bruce Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian, 301-398; and J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 1939-1944, Vol. I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 333-407. The French Canadian aspects are examined in Mason Wade, The French Canadians, 1760-1945, 916-1106.
147. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944, 23,35.
148. Ibid., 26-27.
149. Ibid.
150. Interview, Ottawa, January 26, 1961.
151. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944, 37-38.
152. Canada, House of Commons Debates, November 29, 1944, 6670-6677.
153. Ibid., 6677.
154. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
155. J.W. Pickersgill, Op.Cit., 630-656.
156. Ibid., 287.
157. Ibid., 290.
158. Ibid., 290-292.
159. Ibid., 293.
160. Ibid., 293-294.
161. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
162. By the man with a notebook (Blair Fraser), "Backstage at Ottawa," Maclean's Magazine, LVIII (October 15, 1945), 15, 66.
163. By the man with a notebook, "Backstage at Ottawa," Maclean's Magazine, LVIII (December 1, 1945), 15.
164. The fact that, on at least two separate occasions during the war, King considered the possibility of resigning his post

as Prime Minister while still retaining the portfolio of External Affairs is evidence of the significance and importance he placed in the Department. Whether he was serious about resigning or not is a question which this study cannot answer. See above and J.W. Pickersgill, Op.Cit., 83, 399.

James Eayrs suggests that King gave the portfolio up to St. Laurent at least in part because the Department was now involved in relatively routine chores and the Prime Minister wished to have his hands free for high policy. The Art of the Possible (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 23.

165. See Bruce Hutchison, Op.Cit., 214, 264. Also J.W. Pickersgill, Op.Cit., 88-90.
166. J.W. Pickersgill, Op.Cit., 25, 82-83.
167. T.A. Crerar, Norman Lambert and C.G. Power (to name but a few) like to recall what they term King's "feline qualities" regarding his attitudes toward anyone in the cabinet, particularly toward someone who by some stretch of the imagination might possibly be considered as competition. King's jealousy of his position is supposed to have bordered on the "feminine". As Senator Power put it: "He was a bit of a woman about prestige. He was always playing his subordinates off against each other. He tried it with St. Laurent, but King was getting old by that time and he realized that a successor was necessary." Interview, August 2, 1960.
- "He was just like a woman about little things. He used people and then cast them aside like an old shoe. King lowered the entire tone of Canadian politics." T.A. Crerar, Interview, Ottawa, February 2, 1961. Crerar is not, of course, entirely unbiased on the subject of King.
168. Bruce Hutchison, Op.Cit., 424.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid., 434. The entire incident is related by Hutchison, Op.Cit., 433-434. See also James Eayrs, Op.Cit., 26.
171. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
172. Ibid.
173. By the Man with a Notebook, "Backstage at Ottawa," Maclean's Magazine, LXI (August 1, 1948), 15.
174. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid.

177. The respondents concerned wished to remain anonymous. Garson should not be included in this as he had just nominated St. Laurent for the position himself.
178. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
179. By the Man with a Notebook, "Backstage at Ottawa," Maclean's Magazine, LXI (September 15, 1948), 15, 79.
180. Ibid., 79.
181. Ibid.
182. See Steven Muller, The Canadian Prime Ministers, 1867-1948: An Essay on Democratic Leadership, Vol. II, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1958), 746.
183. The transfer of the leadership from King to St. Laurent provides further evidence that King never ceased believing that he was Laurier's chosen successor. According to a highly-placed source who wishes to remain anonymous, the dates of the Convention and King's actions are also evidence of King's mystical beliefs. King had arranged matters so that St. Laurent became leader of the party on the same day that he himself had fallen heir to Laurier's mantle twenty-nine years before. King felt that in handing over to St. Laurent he was repaying his debt to Laurier by returning the leadership of the party whence it came --- to the French. He even phoned Toronto to speak to Harry C. Hindemarsch of the Toronto Star who was the son-in-law of the late J.E. Atkinson, King's sponsor in 1919. "The circle was completed, the gods were appeased."
- After St. Laurent delivered his acceptance speech to the Convention, King added his own statement of congratulations toward the conclusion of which he felt impelled to include the following:
- "I am particularly happy that the unanimous verdict (Gardiner and Power had moved that St. Laurent's selection be made unanimous) of this great Convention has been that Mr. St. Laurent should succeed myself in the leadership of our great Party. In succeeding me he also succeeds Sir Wilfrid Laurier, to whom both of us owe so much."
- Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1948), 233-234.
184. See, for example, Ian Sclanders, "How the Prime Minister Became Uncle Louis," Maclean's Magazine, LXVIII (January 1, 1955), 5-7, 41.
185. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
Several of my informants who provided the information for some of the statements made in the following account wish to remain anonymous.

186. Interview, Ottawa, January 8, 1961.
187. Interview, Montreal, December 9, 1960.
188. This same adjective was used by Campney, Gardiner, Howe and Pearson.
189. Michael Barkway in "The Fifties: An Ottawa Retrospect," Waterloo Review, #5, (Summer, 1960), 30, makes this point.
Barkway, chief of The Toronto Star's Ottawa Bureau, was (and still is) probably the journalist closest to the goings-on at the party's center during this period and subsequently.
190. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
191. Michael Barkway, Op.Cit., 30.
192. See Blair Fraser, "Backstage at Ottawa: Why Abbott and Claxton said Good-by," Maclean's Magazine, LXVIII (September 1, 1954), 5, 35-36.
However, Hutchison quotes King just before his death in 1950 to the effect that Pearson was the only possible successor to St. Laurent at the head of the Liberal Party. Op.Cit., 446.
193. See, for example, Blair Fraser, "Who Will the Liberals Choose after Louis?" Maclean's Magazine, LXIX (August 18, 1956), 16-17, 60-62, 64-65.
194. For example, The Telegram (Toronto) of June 13, 1957 predicted that Diefenbaker would appoint St. Laurent Governor-General. It also quoted an Ottawa source to the effect that Pearson was about to leave politics to become president of a university.
195. The Toronto Daily Star, June 15, 1957.
196. It has erroneously been charged that the meeting took place in Quebec City in October and it was then and there that Pearson received "the mantle of leadership" from St. Laurent. Facts and the statements, both public and private, of the participants prove this to be incorrect.
See Richard Gwyn, "The New Pearson and his Brains Trust," Saturday Night, LXXV (September 17, 1960), 12-14. Also St. Laurent's denial in a letter to the editor, Saturday Night, LXXV (October 15, 1960), 2.
197. L.B. Pearson, Interview, Ottawa, December 13, 1960.
On the other hand, J.W. Pickersgill claimed:
"Mr. King was no more definitely a supporter of Mr. St. Laurent in 1948 than Mr. St. Laurent was of Mr. Pearson in 1958... Mr. St. Laurent gave the same support to Mr. Pearson in 1958 as Mr. King gave to Mr. St. Laurent in

'48. And everyone knew it too!"
Interview, Ottawa, September 18, 1960.

198. He had entered the House as M.P. from Stormont in Ontario in 1935. In 1954 he resigned his portfolio of Minister of Transport to become President of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority. He returned in 1957, this time for the constituency of Laurier on the Island of Montreal. It was clear that he was to be the new leader from Quebec. Many of the Quebec M.P.s were not completely overjoyed at this turn of events.

See Blair Fraser, "Backstage at Ottawa: Why both Liberals and Tories are ignoring Quebec; Why Lionel Chevrier's Return made 68 MPs Mad," Maclean's Magazine, LXX (May 25, 1957), 2.

199. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), September 4, 1957, 1.

200. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), September 7, 1957, 1,2.

As Harris put it two and a half years later: "It was the price of hogs that defeated us." Interview, Ottawa, January 9, 1961.

In that same story, The Globe and Mail reported that Gardiner had attempted to lead a revolt in cabinet after the election in support of Pearson taking the leadership right away and having St. Laurent retire at once. Several days before, as a footnote to the Sinclair story, the paper claimed that before the June 10 election, Liberals in the west had been engaged in factional strife in which Pearson and Harris supporters were more interested in seizing control of the organization in the constituencies than in winning the forthcoming election. This is unsubstantiated.

201. The Winnipeg Free Press, September 7, 1957, 1.

202. Ibid.

203. The Winnipeg Free Press, September 9, 1957, 1,2.

204. See bibliographical note for biographical material on this group.

205. Interview, Ottawa, December 13, 1960.

206. Interview, Montreal, November 11, 1960.

207. Interview, Ottawa, January 9, 1961.

Harris also recalled:

"Going around the table: Garson, Ross Macdonald, Lapointe, Pickersgill, Campney and McCann would have supported me for the leadership. I'm not sure of some of the others.

Martin, of course, had his own ambitions. Anyway, a majority of the Cabinet would have supported me at one time."

This was after Abbott and Claxton had retired. Then, after Howe and, of course, St. Laurent, Harris was the most powerful man in the cabinet, according to his own estimate. The distribution of organizational tasks in Ontario supports this contention. But Howe was senior --- "you couldn't take him on, particularly on matters of business."

208. Interview, Ottawa, January 8, 1961.
209. For obvious reasons, some of these sources had best remain nameless.
210. David Riesman, et.al., The Lonely Crowd (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1953), 244-258.
211. Interview, Montreal, November 11, 1960.
212. NLF Files: Fourth National Liberal Convention, Proceedings, III (Ottawa: January 16, 1958), GGG-8.
213. The Chairman of the Convention (Roland Bock) read the following message from St. Laurent to the Convention after Pearson had been declared elected:
 "A la demande de M. Pearson, J'ai accepté de demeurer chef de l'Opposition jusqu'à lundi, le 20 janvier. Ce jour-là M. Pearson prendra son siège comme chef de l'Opposition à la Chambre des Communes."
 NLF Files: Fourth National Liberal Convention, Proceedings, III (Ottawa: January 16, 1958), MMM-1.
214. The Conservative Party of Canada, 1920-1949 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1956), 40-78.
215. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944, 48.
216. In a letter written to the author, December 12, 1960.
217. J.W. Pickersgill, Op.Cit., 10.
 See also R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874-1923, Vol. I, 416-420.
218. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
219. David Riesman, Op.Cit., 257.
220. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
221. Ibid.

222. Interview, Ottawa, December 13, 1960.
223. NLF Files: Fourth National Liberal Convention, Proceedings, II (Ottawa: January 15, 1958), DDD-4.
224. Ibid., DDD-4 - DDD-5.
225. Ibid., DDD-5.
226. Interview, Ottawa, August 6, 1960.
227. Interview, Ottawa, September 18, 1960.
228. Interview, Ottawa, August 6, 1960.
229. J.W. Dafoe, Laurier: A Study in Canadian Politics, 131-132.
230. Quoted in James Eayrs, Op.Cit., 114n.
231. W.G. Weir, Interview, Ottawa, January 9, 1961.
232. Ibid.
233. Quoted in James Eayrs, Op.Cit., 115n.
234. Interview, Ottawa, September 18, 1960.
235. Interview, CBC Newsmagazine, January 8, 1961.
Also see above, Chapter III, Section 4.
236. Interview, Ottawa, December 13, 1960.
237. Ibid.
238. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.

CHAPTER V: THE PARTY'S SUPPORTERS

Political parties have come to be accepted as at least a partial solution to the problem posed by the construct of the political system which perceives a gap that must be bridged between Society, on the one hand, and the State, the locus of decision-making authority, on the other. Generally, such questions as the social basis of party affiliation and the extent of participation of party supporters have been approached, at least by the major and best known studies of popular political participation in the United States, from the electoral side: Namely, a sample survey of a single community or a national electorate is made while an election campaign is in progress.¹ In the process of conducting these surveys, a substantial amount of information has been accumulated. Few similar surveys have been conducted in Canada and outside of the efforts of the Gallup Poll no national sampling of the political community has been attempted for public consumption.

As mentioned elsewhere, the evidence for the remarks made about the Liberal Party, as well as the two other parties with national parliamentary representation in the period 1958-1962,

1. Footnotes to Chapter V appear on pp. 459-461.

the Progressive Conservatives and CCF, is based primarily on the results of a four-page printed questionnaire mailed in one wave to a national sample of 3000 party supporters, 1000 from each of the parties, in November, 1960. The mailing lists were supplied by the parties involved. Out of a total of 2908 questionnaires reaching the prospective respondents across Canada, 522 were returned completed for a percentage return of 17.9. Of this total, 124 were Liberals, whose percentage was 13.8²

This chapter will deal with the following topics: The socio-economic characteristics of party supporters; the nature and extent of their participation and party identification; and correlates of party support beyond those considered in the previous sections. The question of supporters' perception of their parties is left to the following chapter on ideology.

The respondents have been termed "supporters" rather than "members" because in Canada, as in the United States, there is no settled definition of party membership based on any meaningful criteria. Parties may be sustained by all types of adherents. Some may merely fold circulars and lick stamps around election time; others may pay yearly dues, hold cards attesting to membership in a constituency or provincial organization and attend party meetings, banquets and conventions religiously; on the other hand, it may even be possible to term those voting for a party on election day as "supporters" too. Duverger has separated party adherents on the basis of degrees of participation into three classes: electors, supporters and militants.³ Since his middle category, "something

more than an elector and something less than a member,"⁴ best characterizes the respondents of at least the Liberal and Conservative parties, this seemed to be the most suitable label to use.

I

The results of an analysis of the social composition of all supporters (not only Liberals) in terms of age, education, occupation and income are not surprising inasmuch as they confirm what studies of political interest in other countries have revealed. Social characteristics which correlate with high voting turnout are high income, high education, middle age (35-55) and older (over 55) and the occupational groups of businessmen, white collar employees and commercial crop farmers. Alternatively, low income, low education, unskilled workers, subsistence farmers, and young people (under 35) are groups which have records of lower voting turnout.⁵ As Table I comparing the supporters of the three parties and supporters as a group with the general population demonstrates, the breakdown of Canadian party supporters shows similar tendencies and these tendencies hold true virtually uniformly among the three parties.

Certain inter-party differences with respect to occupation and income are noteworthy. One-fifth of CCF supporters were in the skilled labor class compared with less than 10% for the other parties. As might be expected, business was barely represented in the CCF. The high representation of farmers among Conservatives and

Table I: Social Characteristics of Party Supporters and General Population by Percentages*

No. of Cases	Party Supporters				General Population
	Liberal 124	Conservative 131	CCF 267	Total 522	
<u>Age:</u>					
20-24	2	3	1	2	11.7
25-34	11	17	11	13	24.9
35-44	19	20	24	22	22.1
45-54	23	27	23	24	16.6
55-64	23	21	19	20	11.9
65+	20	11	20	18	12.8
Not Ascertained	2	2	2	2	
<u>Education:</u>					
None	--	--	--	--	6.7
1-4 years	9	4	9	8	7.2
5-8 years	15	17	25	22	42.7
9-12 years	47	50	41	43	35.8
13 years +	21	26	19	21	7.6
Not Ascertained	9	4	7	7	
<u>Occupation:</u>					
Unskilled	4	2	4	4	19.2
Skilled	9	6	20	14	25.8
White Collar	21	21	28	24	10.9
Lawyer	5	11	--	4	.2
Other Professional	11	5	5	7	6.9
Farmer	15	24	24	22	10.7
Business	15	14	4	9	7.7
Other	9	6	4	5	17.6
Not Ascertained	11	11	11	11	1.0
<u>Income:</u>					
Under \$2000	20	14	18	17	37.0
\$2000-3999	24	21	30	25	44.7
\$4000-5999	23	22	27	24	13.2
\$6000+	25	40	23	28	5.1
Not Ascertained	7	4	3	5	

*The general population figures on age are taken from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada, 1956, Bulletin 1-9 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957); those on occupation are from DBS, Ninth Census of Canada, 1951, Vol. IV (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1953). The education figures describe the population not at school; the income figures are based on total earnings for the year 1955. Education and income figures were taken respectively from DBS, Statistical Review of Canadian Education, 1951, Census Ref. paper #84 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1953) and Department of National Revenue, Statistics (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957).

The author is grateful to Professor John Porter of Carleton University for his aid in connection with these latter two sources. Figures for party supporters have been rounded to the nearest percent.

CCF points up the agrarian character of the latter's prairies sections as well as the difficulties experienced by the Liberals with this group toward the end of that party's long tenure in office. The most noticeable point about income distribution among the parties is that 40% of Conservative supporters have annual incomes over \$6000 which demonstrates that there is some reality in the old public image of the Tories as the party of the rich. (However, it may be emphasized that this heavy upper-income Conservative support may not be entirely stable. The 1962 election demonstrated that there was considerable disaffection within this group with the policies of the Diefenbaker government. Defection of many from the Conservatives to the Liberals meant Liberal victories in the constituencies of Vancouver-South and St. Antoine-Westmount and very nearly unseated then-Minister of Finance Donald Fleming in Eglinton and Conservative Gordon Chown in Winnipeg South.) Finally, it must be noted that CCF supporters are more or less evenly distributed among the various income classes, and it is clear, as if the point really needed making, that this was no party of the poor and economically downtrodden.

There are several social factors accounting for the differences between the supporters as a group and the general population although the questionnaire could not explore these. As other studies of political involvement have observed, younger people are too busy preparing for careers and getting settled to participate, while older people have fewer of the "romantic distractions of youth" to occupy them.⁶ Education is significant inasmuch as it helps individuals

recognize the effects of government policies and provides the intellectual wherewithal for contact and communication. Lawyers are over-represented, although not as much as might be expected, because of the nature of their work. However, at a more generalized level, group relevant social factors which seem significant in motivating participation are, for example, exposure to government economic restrictions and to economic pressures requiring government action. Thus farmers and businessmen are driven into the political arena, and this tendency is reinforced by the relatively high amount of leisure available to the former.

On the other hand, groups subject to cross-pressures tend to withdraw from participation even if, as in the case of the unskilled and uneducated segments of the Canadian population, one of the available parties, the CCF, would strongly represent their interests. Members of the relatively well-to-do, well-educated classes live in a more or less homogeneous social environment in which influences point more greatly in the direction of participation. While the majority of workers read newspapers which are hostile to trade unions and workers' parties and which present each attempt at group-conscious activity by workers in a less than favorable light, businessmen read newspapers which reiterate their basic political opinions. Indeed, as Lipset points out, "the sheer operation of the values of a stratified yet open society may reduce the political effectiveness of the lower classes by increasing the objective cross-pressures upon them."⁷ While individuals with low income and education may regard themselves as members of an underprivileged segment

of the population, positive action to remedy their situation is rendered more difficult because they are exposed to the dominant values of their society, especially through mass communications: "They are faced with the need of reconciling lower class norms with the conflicting sets of values that correspond to the political and social position of the dominant class."⁸ These also seem to be plausible explanations for the relative absence (compared to the general population) of skilled and unskilled labor groups in the CCF where one would expect them to be more heavily represented than they are.

There are some differences in terms of education and occupation between Liberal supporters and those Liberals who were delegates to the 1958 Leadership Convention that must be accounted for. Close to two-thirds of the Convention delegates reported that they had attended or completed college compared with barely one-fifth of the national sample of supporters. As well, in terms of occupation, less than 10% of the Convention was in the white collar occupational group as opposed to 21% nationally, over $\frac{1}{4}$ of the delegates were lawyers (v. 5% nationally) and another $\frac{1}{4}$ were businessmen (v. 15% nationally). (See Table II)⁹

The discrepancies in occupation between the two samples may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that since the Convention required that the delegates be in attendance for four days in the middle of a regular work-week (excluding travel time), this was an effective bar against virtually all except the self-employed. Indeed, professional groups --- lawyers and "other professional"

Table II; Breakdown of Delegates to the National Liberal Convention, January, 1958, in terms of Education and Occupation, by percentages.*

<u>Education</u>	n = 747
Public School	4
High School	33
College	63
 <u>Occupation</u>	 n = 935
Unskilled	**
Skilled	5
White Collar	8
Lawyer	26
Other Profes-	
sional	16
Farmer	12
Business	26
Other	6

** Less than 1%. Only 5 delegates gave occupations which could be placed in this category.

* None of the respondents were either M.P.s or M.L.A.s at the time of the Convention.

(exactly one-half of this latter category were doctors) --- businessmen and farmers account for 80% of those in attendance, if the number of delegates volunteering information is considered representative of the whole. The large percentage of professionals and businessmen (68%) in turn partially accounts for the disproportionate number of those who received a college education attending the Convention compared with the national sample.

It is hardly necessary to point out that lawyers are heavily over-represented in the Parliamentary contingent of both of the older parties. During the final term of Liberal tenure in office, 30% of government M.P.s were lawyers and another 12% were members

of other professions. Six per cent were businessmen. The occupational breakdown of Conservative M.P.s for the 1958-1962 Parliament does not vary more than 1% from these figures. For the short 1957-1958 Parliament, just under 50% of the CCF contingent was in the "other professional" occupational group and a bare one-fifth listed occupations that come under the heading of "skilled labor".¹⁰

Of particular relevance to Canadian politics is the role of religion as a factor influencing party identification. A breakdown of party supporters on the basis of religion shows several differences: The Liberals have more Roman Catholics than the other parties; the Conservative Party has a heavy Anglican support; the CCF has a disproportionate share of those professing no religion at all, a glaring 20% compared with the national population figure of .4%;¹¹ and United Church affiliates are fairly evenly distributed among the three parties (See Table III). At the national level, Catholics tend to be under-represented among supporters while United Church adherents are somewhat over-represented.

A similar religious distribution between the two old parties does not hold for their respective memberships in the House of Commons, however. For example, half the Liberal Commons membership was Roman Catholic in 1953-1957; one-fifth was United Church affiliated; just under one-tenth was Presbyterian; and another one-tenth was Anglican. Not unexpectedly, Roman Catholics were not nearly as well represented among the Conservatives: Only 8% of the Tory membership was RC. On the other hand, 36% was Anglican and another 34% United Church-going. Presbyterians were equally

Table III: Religious Affiliations of Party Supporters Across Canada Compared with General Population by Percentages.

Denomination: Number of Cases	PARTY SUPPORTERS				General Population*
	Liberals 124	Conservatives 131	CCF 267	Total 522	
Church of England	9	21	8	12	14.7
Roman Catholic	41	29	11	23	43.3
United Church	26	31	36	33	20.5
Baptist	4	7	4	5	3.7
Presbyterian	5	2	2	3	5.6
Lutheran	2	1	3	2	3.2
Jewish	2	1	1	1	1.5
Others	3	4	8	4	7.1
None	1	1	20	10	.4
Not Ascertained	7	3	8	8	

*Figures are from DBS, Ninth Census of Canada, 1951, Vol. I (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1953).

represented among the Conservatives as they were among the Liberals.¹² After the debacle of 1958, 67% of the Liberal House representation was Roman Catholic --- a drop of 3% from the percentage of Liberal Catholics in the short 1957-1958 parliament. As a result of breaking a formerly solid Quebec, however, 30% of the Diefenbaker forces was Roman Catholic.¹³

When Quebec is left out of the national sample, the disproportion of Roman Catholics in the Liberal Party compared with Catholics sustaining the other parties is accentuated. Conservative supporters are Anglican in a ratio of approximately 2½:1 over the other parties while United Church goes remain relatively evenly distributed among the three. (See Table III-1).

The fact that more than one-quarter of Liberal supporters are Catholics provides some corollary supporting evidence to John Meisel's conclusions, based on a study of voting behavior in the 1953

Table III-1: Major Religious Affiliations of Party Supporters Outside Quebec Compared with General Population by Percentages.

Denomination: Number of Cases	PARTY SUPPORTERS				General Population*
	Liberals	Conservatives	CCF	Total	
	95	104	254	453	
Church of England	11	27	9	14	19.0
Roman Catholic	29	13	8	14	25.0
United Church	34	38	39	37	27.5

*Figures are from DBS, Ninth Census of Canada, 1951, 1951, Vol. I (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1953).

federal election in Kingston in which he discovered that the Liberals obtained 83% of the Catholic vote against a meagre 2% for the Conservatives and 3% for the CCF.¹⁴ Again, however, while the questionnaire could not explore the reasons motivating this relatively high Catholic allegiance to one party, it is possible to suggest, as Meisel does, that a considerable number of Catholics "support" the Liberal Party without very much thought or because they assume that this is the natural course to be followed by Catholics. It is unnecessary to list the historical and social reasons for this attitude. One could probably put forward the equally well-known factors making for the proportion of Anglican supporters in the Conservative Party as well.

II

Participation in politics has already been shown to be a product of several socio-economic conditions. Another significant factor is membership in formal organizations, although this is not meant to imply that this is a simple cause-and-effect relationship. Membership in many organizations, such as the Knights of Columbus, Société St. Jean Baptiste and B'nai B'rith is ethnically or

religiously conditioned and, of course, such associations as Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs, the Masonic Order and Boards of Trade are at least partially correlational with middle- and upper-income business groups.¹⁵ But if CCFers are not entirely disposed to join such organizations, they do belong to a significant number which, when taken together with their trade union and agricultural co-operative membership, leads to the general conclusion that party supporters are to a large extent in the category of "joiners". (See Table IV, 1-4.)

The relatively high percentage of CCFers not belonging to any of these associations is not significant in the context of participation except insofar as their absence reflects the different environment in which they move. The low percentage of CCF supporters in chambers of commerce and boards of trade is a further reflection of this; for of the 32% of CCF supporters not belonging to any of these associations, 50% are members (or used to be members) of trade unions and 35% belong (or used to belong) to agricultural co-operatives. Moreover, it may also be pointed out that of the 21% of the Conservatives not belonging to associations, 41% are (or used to be) trade unionists and 20% participate (or used to) in agricultural cooperatives. Of the Liberal 15%, one-quarter are (or used to be) trade unionists and 32% are (were) members of co-operatives. In effect a bare 7.3% of the entire sample, 12% Conservatives, 7% Liberals and 5% CCF belonged to no associations or organizations at all.

The evidence concerning the nature of "membership" in local

Table IV-1: Membership of Party Supporters in Associations and Organizations by Percentages*

Associations**	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Total
Board of Trade	27	25	7	17
Knights of Columbus	17	20	3	8
Masonic Order	16	18	8	12
Home and School	19	23	18	19
Canadian Legion	7	11	13	11
Sports Club (Curling, etc.)	22	18	17	19
Others (Rotary, Odd Fellows, Kiwanis, Elks, etc.)	56	57	36	44
Do not belong	14	21	32	25
not ascertained	5	2	6	5

* Unless otherwise specified, the number of cases for these tables is as follows: Conservatives 131; Liberals 124; CCF 267; Total 522

**Percentages add up to more than 100 because some respondents named more than one association.

Table IV-2: Number of Associations (percentages)

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Total
1 organization	34	30	31	32
2-3 organizations	38	38	29	33
4 or more	9	9	2	5
none	14	21	32	25
not ascertained	5	2	6	5

Table IV-3: Trade Union Membership of Supporters (percentages)

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Total
Belong	11	11	33	22
Never belonged	73	72	36	35
Used to belong	14	9	22	17
not ascertained	3	9	9	8

Table IV-4: Membership of Supporters in Agricultural Co-operatives (percentages)

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Total
Belong	18	22	30	25
Never belonged	61	63	42	52
Used to belong	6	5	11	8
not ascertained	15	10	18	15

party associations, the extent of participation in party activities and the frequency and extent of financial contributions to the party organizations (see Tables V, 1-3) makes it clear that

only the CCF could by any stretch of the imagination be considered a "mass" party on the British or European Continental model. As

Table V-1: Nature of 'Membership of Party Supporters (percentages)*

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Total
Pay annual dues	18	24	68	45
Hold membership card	19	36	74	53
'Just belong'	25	27	4	15
Do not belong	40	24	5	18
not ascertained	4	7	1	3
Dues & Card	7	18	51	32

Table V-2: Kinds of Party Activity of Supporters (percentages)*

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Total
Talk to friends	58	68	70	67
Often attend meetings	29	36	41	35
Sometimes attend meetings	41	35	46	43
Attend dinners	22	40	37	34
Other (Canvassing, etc.)	6	4	22	14
Never attend anything	19	13	7	11
not ascertained	6	4	3	4

Table V-3: Financial Contributions of Party Supporters (percentages)*

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Total
Give Often	7	10	31	20
Give sometimes	45	27	54	42
Never give	36	33	5	19
Buy Tickets	23	24	50	37
Voluntary Work**	5	15	8	9
not ascertained	13	8	3	7

* Percentages total more than 100 because some respondents gave more than one reply.

** "Voluntary Work" is included in the tabulations because of the large number of respondents describing such activity in lieu of financial contributions.

Table V-1 reveals, over 50% of both Conservative and Liberal supporters claim no membership of any significance in their parties as opposed to a CCF dues-paying membership of 68%. This, of course, reflects the difference in the whole concept of "membership"

between the major parties and the CCF. Informal activities such as attendance at meetings and talking to friends are somewhat similar among the three parties. However, while one-fifth of CCF supporters include canvassing as part of their activities, only 5% of the adherents of the major parties engage in such chores (Table V-2). Finally, (Table V-3) fully one-third of the Conservatives and Liberals, as opposed to 5% of the CCFers, admit to never having given money to support their respective parties.

Looseness in party affiliation is further demonstrated by the voting behavior of all party supporters, not only Liberals. In response to the question, "Have you ever voted in a federal election for a party other than the one you now support?" a total of only 53% of all Liberals and only 51% of the entire sample answered "no" or that they had remained faithful through "thick and thin" (Table VI-1). This question naturally handicaps CCFers because their party usually did not field a full slate of candidates in every election. However, the figures do give some indications of the general instability of the support of all the parties and if one were to attempt to claim that there is a majority

Table VI-1: Voting Behavior of Party Supporters in Federal Elections (Percentages)*

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Total**
"Faithful"	53	57	46	51
Conservative	34	--	18	
Liberal	--	40	34	
CCF	4	3	--	
Social Credit	2	3	2	
Other	1	2	4	
Not Ascertained	10	6	5	

* Percentages total over 100 because some named more than one party.

** The Total figure on those remaining "faithful" is the only one presented because it is the only meaningful one.

party in the Canadian national political system holding a position similar to that held by the Democrats in the United States, this factor could not obviously be ignored. For example, as mentioned before, a review of federal voting results since 1935 would reveal that the Liberals have never fallen below the 33.6% mark (in 1958) while the Conservatives have dipped as low as 27.4% (in 1945). These figures alone therefore do not warrant the conclusion that the Liberals automatically have an edge over the Conservatives.

It will also be noted that ostensibly Liberal supporters, when they broke with their party, did so overwhelmingly in favor of the Tories. This behavior was reciprocated by "unfaithful" Conservatives. However, although not surprisingly, defecting CCFers voted Liberal almost 2:1 over Conservative.

An attempt was also made to examine the truth of the proposition that federal and provincial politics are different fields of interest and affiliation. The figures (Table VI-2) show that only

Table VI-2: Voting Behavior of Party Supporters in Provincial Elections (percentages)*

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Total**
"Faithful"	49	59	54	53
Conservative	18	--	17	
Liberal	--	29	29	
CCF	4	7	--	
Social Credit	5	8	4	
Union Nationale	12	4	1	
Others	4	4	2	
Not Ascertained	10	6	5	

*Percentages total over 100 because some named more than one party.

** The total figure on those remaining "faithful" is the only one presented because it is the only meaningful one.

49% of Liberal supporters, (the lowest of all the parties) and 53% of the entire sample steadfastly support their party provincially.

Thus, supporter commitment is equally unstable here although admittedly CCFers are heavily penalized because their party seldom made provincial-wide attempts in all provinces. Conservatives are also at somewhat of a disadvantage because, until quite recently, their party failed to conduct any campaigns in the three western-most provinces, and in Quebec, Conservatives have only the Union Nationale as an alternative to the Liberals provincially. However, as might be expected, when the voting behavior of the "faithful" federal adherents is examined apart from the entire sample, 79% of those steadfastly supporting their party federally carried over their allegiances to provincial politics compared with the relatively poor 25% provincial allegiance carry-over of the other supporters (Table VI-2a). Once again the percentage of Liberals remaining "faithful" was noticeably lower than that of the other parties.

Table VI-2a: Differential in Federal-Provincial Voting Carry-Over of Party Supporters (Percentages)

<u>Federal 'Faithful'</u>	<u>'Faithful in Provincial Voting'</u>		<u>Federal 'Others'</u>
Liberal (n=66)	67	29	Liberal (n=58)
Conservative (n=75)	81	28	Conservative (n=56)
CCF (n=123)	86	22	CCF (n=144)
Total (n=264)	79	25	Total (n=258)

That Liberal supporters scored lower with regard to provincial voting behavior than did the supporters of the other parties may provide some substantiating evidence for the theorem that voters support separate parties at the different levels, federal and provincial, in an indigenously Canadian version of "ticket-splitting".

More specifically, these figures point to the fact that federal and provincial politics are different fields of interest. It seems as if Liberals, feeling well represented at Ottawa with their own party in office, felt free to look elsewhere with their vote in provincial elections. It has already been suggested elsewhere that organizational tendencies within the party do not operate to mitigate this disposition.

The weakness in party commitment of both Liberals and Conservative adherents compared with CCFers is further manifested by the answers given to the following questions: "Suppose there was an election in which your party was running a candidate you did not like or did not agree with... What (do) you think you would do?" and "On the whole, which of the following (party label, party leader, local candidate) is the most important to you in casting your vote in Federal, Provincial and By-Elections?" In answering the first question, less than 40% of the supporters of the major parties, compared with 71% of the CCFers, claimed they would support the candidate "anyway" (Table VII-1). The distribution of answers to the second question regarding federal voting motivation was almost identical (Table VII-2). It will be noted that "party label" generally decreases in importance in the minds of supporters

Table VII-1: "Suppose your party ran a candidate you did not like..?"
(Percentages)

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF
Vote for Candidate Anyway	39	34	71
Consider Another Party	43	40	14
Probably wouldn't vote	6	10	9
I don't know	11	8	5
Not Ascertained	2	8	2

Table VII-2: Vote Motivation of Supporters (Percentages)*

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF
<u>Federal Elections:</u>			
Party Label	35	33	70
Party Leader	40	40	12
Local Candidate	30	42	14
Programme	1	--	3
Not Ascertained	6	6	6
Party Label Only	27	24	68
<u>Provincial Elections:</u>			
Party Label	31	29	67
Party Leader	29	32	11
Local Candidate	40	49	15
Programme	1	--	3
Not Ascertained	9	11	8
Party Label Only	25	22	66
<u>By-Elections:</u>			
Party Label	24	26	64
Party Leader	14	21	6
Local Candidate	44	48	18
Programme	1	--	3
Not Ascertained	22	20	12
Party Label Only	21	19	63

*Percentages total over 100 because some gave more than one answer.

as provincial and then by-election contests are considered. There appears to be little disposition on the part of both Liberal and Conservative supporters alike to gain, as one British elector is reported to have done, that "I would vote for a pig if (my) party put one up."¹⁶

III

Some general correlates of party support as well as some particular indigenously Canadian ones, such as the percentage of Roman Catholics among Liberal supporters, have already been examined. The possibility of correlations of individual party affiliation and extent of participation remain to be explored.

In order to discover any correlates of extent and intensity of participation, supporters who had replied that they always attended party meetings or dinners, often donated money to their party and frequently discussed politics with friends and acquaintances were separated out and checked against "faithfulness" in federal voting and party orientation in their responses to questions as to their vote motivation. These intense participants were also tested for distinguishing socio-economic characteristics. However, after the initial weeding-out process was completed, barely 1/3 of the entire sample remained and this was distributed unevenly, as follows: 16% for the Liberals, 12% for the Conservatives and 49% for the CCF. When these were tested for voting behavior which differed from other supporters, no significant variation was found. An attempt to discover special social characteristics for this group was similarly fruitless. The conclusion based on this flimsy evidence is that intensity and extent of participation of supporters themselves is not a function of income, age, occupation, education or even parental voting. It is entirely possible that extent of participation is related to individual subjective feelings of potency about one's ability to affect the course of events rather than to any socio-economic traits. As the authors of the Elmira Study of the 1948 Presidential campaign point out: "The more that people feel they can influence public matters, the more politically interested they are."¹⁷ These feelings of potency may be given the label "Sense of Political Efficacy",¹⁸ but this is not an element that a mailed questionnaire can adequately examine.¹⁹

The only factor bearing upon the matter of affiliation with one rather than either of the other parties was parental voting behavior --- and if this was meaningful to any extent, it was naturally confined to Conservative and Liberal supporters (the CCF was founded too recently for parental voting to be used in this way). Parents of Conservatives supported the Tories 2:1 over the Liberals. An almost identical ratio in favor of the Liberals applies to the parents of that party's adherents.²⁰ However, it must be emphasized that parental party preference did not affect the next generation's extent of participation or its intensity of commitment so far as these could be explored by the questionnaire.

As for CCFers, because of their extreme variance from the norms set by the major parties with regard to participation, it is possible that insight into the motivation for their behavior may be found in psychological factors rather than in social ones.²¹ And once again it must be stated that this is far too complex an affair for a mailed questionnaire.

* * * * *

It must be noted that the use of a national sample and the consolidation of results in this fashion has probably imposed a spurious generality on the picture of Canadian party life presented here. This has meant that significant regional and ethnic variations have been omitted. (There is some evidence, for example, that there is a significantly greater interchangeability between federal and provincial voting habits in the Atlantic Provinces than elsewhere

and that French Canadians tend to place a greater emphasis on the party leader as a vote motivation.) However, the number of returns was too small to permit more than the presentation of aggregate figures. While they do tell us something --- they are by no means the whole story.

At the beginning of this chapter, it was stated that political parties are the generally accepted solution to the problem of popular representation in the political system. A great deal of what has been discussed here has been concerned with demonstrating what to many has already become a self-evident proposition, that the Liberal Party in particular and Canadian parties in general, like their counterparts in other lands, do not "represent" the entire spectrum of their society. However, this is not meant as criticism of the parties, of the Canadian political process, or, indeed, of "democracy". It is to be expected that rising standards of education and income will bring benefits other than the purely material to the recipients at the lower end of the scale: Access to information will make them more aware and economic upward mobility will probably mean that they will be moved to participate in many associational groups in Canadian society --- and the political party is at least one of these.

This sanguine belief is obviously based on two assumptions: In the first place, it is supposed that an important ingredient in government policy, if not in the Canadian ethos as well, will be some continued pressure toward amelioration of the economic and social plight of the less fortunate. If such impetus is not

forthcoming from within Canadian society itself, it is quite conceivable that events south of the border will act as a powerful motivating force in this direction. Secondly, there is the assumption that increases in income and education will lead to greater participation because of a concomitant broadening of horizons. However, there is some disconcerting evidence that this might not turn out to be the case,²² for there is the possibility that with better education and increased income driving the beneficiaries to suburban life, the old associational ties will no longer have significance for the individual, particularly for the following generation. The increasing bureaucratization of Canadian society, to say nothing of the contemporary work-world, exacerbates this tendency and places increased emphasis upon the smaller and relatively trivial (for political purposes) affiliations of the family, the home and, at best, the neighborhood. If such should turn out to be the direction in which these upwardly-mobile people are heading, then one can look forward, if such a term may be used, to a lessening of political involvement and an increasing absence of stable political affiliation.

Studies of some aspects of the American presidential campaign of 1952 have revealed the different techniques that have been shown to be necessary to attract the newly-arrived young suburbanites. These people are almost by definition non-political and, therefore, the old-style campaign appeal with its emphasis on issues and party tradition has little meaning for them. Instead, personal characteristics of candidates and popular leaders are

stressed through the effective use of television.²³ The success of both American parties with this medium has not failed to impress Canadian politicians and a similar emphasis on personality has characterized British politics during the past decade.

At the more particular level of extent of participation, it is possible to be somewhat disappointed in the performance of what may be termed Canadian political opinion leadership. Here is one more scrap of evidence substantiating the Michels thesis of the uselessness of looking to the rank-and-file as a curb on party leaders. The stunted development of organizational continuity in the Liberal party has already been accounted for in general terms in the concluding section of the chapter on organization. What remains to be pointed out is that, if this is the extent of participation by the supposedly most politically aroused segment of the public, then it is clear we must look to other areas of the political system as well to discover some of the mechanisms of control. In short, it is apparent that the party rank-and-file scarcely provides even stable on-going electoral support. It is therefore almost too much to expect that the limits imposed by this segment of the party on the exercise of power within its own organization or the making of authoritative decision for society as a whole would be any more than extremely broad.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. For example, P.F. Lazarsfeld, B.R. Berelson and H. Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); B. R. Berelson, P.F. Lazarsfeld and W.N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); and A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W.E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954).
2. See Appendix for complete figures on returns, methodological note and the questionnaire itself.
3. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954), 90-91.
4. Ibid., 101.
5. See S.M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1960), 184-185; also Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 46-52.
 It may be pointed out in this connection that one study puts forward the proposition that voting itself is not equivalent to participation but is a separate form of behavior lying somewhere between active and passive forms of political involvement. (Lester Milbrath, "Personality and Political Participation," Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Gatlinburg, Tenn., November 9, 1956, referred to in R.E. Lane, Op.Cit., 94.) Nevertheless, in the absence of widespread comparative data on participation, these correlates of high turnout seem applicable here.
 In one study of political activity in the United States, J.L. Woodward and Elmo Roper, after setting up their own index, report that 69% of upper income people, compared with 12% of those in the lower income segment of the population, are politically active. As well, a person with a college education is five times as likely to be "very active" as one with a grade school education only. See "Political Activity of American Citizens," American Political Science Review, XLIV (December, 1950), 877.
6. B.R. Berelson, et.al., Op.Cit., 25.
7. S.M. Lipset, Op.Cit., 205-206.
8. Ibid., 206.
9. The completed questionnaires are in the files of the National Liberal Federation. Only 747 delegates furnished information as to their educational background; only 935 listed their occupation.

10. The percentages were calculated from the information provided in the Canadian Parliamentary Guide for the years 1956, 1958 and 1960. The specific periods chosen were selected because they provided a sufficiently large sample for computation.
11. It should not be inferred from this that all these CCFers are agnostics or even atheists. Most merely disavow membership in any of the organized churches or religions. Essentially, they are Christian Socialists and, in fact, this attitude of dedication and service has permeated the movement (even by 1961, as the CCF was disappearing into the NDP, it was often referred to in this way by die-hards) since its inception in 1933.
12. See J.A. LaPonce "The Religious Background of Canadian MPs", Political Studies, VI (October, 1958), 256.
13. The following table shows the percentage breakdown of the religious affiliations of the M.P.s of the major parties for eight parliaments since 1911.

	1911	1921	1930	1940	1953	1957	1958
<u>Liberals</u>							
Church of England	6	8	3	8	9	6	6
Roman Catholic	47	57	50	41	50	70	67
United Church	10	11	14	28	21	13	17
Baptist	--	3	4	4	2	1	--
Presbyterian	23	17	14	12	9	4	6
Others, not listed, or none	14	5	14	7	9	6	4
<u>Conservatives</u>							
Church of England	33	26	27	21	36	19	19
Roman Catholic	16	2	23	5	8	19	30
United Church	18	26	25	38	34	35	30
Baptist	4	--	3	5	4	3	2
Presbyterian	23	39	15	11	10	10	7
Others, not listed, or none	6	6	7	20	8	14	11

Percentages in this table for 1911 through 1953 is from J.A. LaPonce, Op.Cit., 256. Information for the remainder of the table was obtained from the Canadian Parliamentary Guide for the years 1958 and 1960.

14. John Meisel, "Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behaviour: A Case Study," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXII (November, 1956), 481-496. See Chapter II above on the allegiances of Quebec.
15. The correlation of economic and occupational levels with participation in formally organized associations has been demonstrated in a large number of studies in the United States. See, for example, W.L. Warner and P.S. Lunt, The Social Life of a Modern Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 329; M. Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers,"

- American Sociological Review, XI (December, 1946), 686-698; R. M. Williams, Jr., American Society (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1959), 94; and C.R. Wright and H.H. Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys," American Sociological Review, XXIII (June, 1958), 284-294.
16. H. Maddick, "A Midland Borough Constituency," in D.E. Butler, The British General Election of 1951 (London: Macmillan, 1952), 173.
 17. B.R. Berelson, et al., Op.Cit., 25.
 18. See, A. Campbell, et al., Op.Cit., 187-194.
 19. The length of the questionnaire had to be kept within reasonable bounds (as it was, the fact that it was four pages in length probably seriously cut down the number of responses) and, anyway, the absence of personal contact with respondents would seriously lessen the usefulness of the results arising from the type of questions necessary to measure some of the components of "political efficacy".
 20. Given what is known about the socialization of the young, these figures are not especially noteworthy.
See A. Campbell, P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller and D.E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), 146-149.
 21. In the following chapter, some evidence will be presented which will underline the ideological quality of CCF allegiances.
 22. For example, S.D. Clark, "Class, Religion and Ethnic Affiliation in Canadian Politics," Paper delivered at the Institute of Canadian Studies, Interdisciplinary Seminar on "Class in Canada", Carleton University, Ottawa, March 17, 1962.
 23. See A. Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides, 136-144, where the authors discuss the "candidate orientation" of the American electorate during the 1952 Presidential campaign; also Stanley Kelley, Professional Public Relations and Political Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), 144-201, which describes the Republican Party strategy designed to lure the "stay-at-home" vote to the polls during that same campaign.

CHAPTER VI: THE LIBERAL 'IDEOLOGY'

The concept of ideology can be employed in many contexts and with varying meanings. For example, one of the underlying theoretical postulates of the entire Marxian system is the general statement that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."¹ Mannheim's definition is slightly more limited and reflects his discovery that "...ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination."² The term may be used to describe individual psychological dispositions or to characterize styles of thought of groups and organizations.³ However, as used here, ideology will be considered in a rather loose and, at the same time, restricted sense as being distinguished primarily by its content.

This section will be concerned with the ideas of the Liberal Party which appear to "...embody an orientation to normative and prescriptive issues."⁴ It is possible to claim that a party "thinks" ideologically when its position on certain matters, such as the "balanced budget", "government spending" and "international trade" can be distinguished from that of its competitors

1. Footnotes to Chapter VI appear on pp. 498-503.

(and even from that of the society in which it operates). Occasionally, the concept of "ideology" in this sense comes down to simple "issue-preference" identification, especially when sample survey material is employed as it is on several occasions here.⁵ In spite of the fact that the structure of Liberal Party-political attitudes is often loose, it is nevertheless possible to demonstrate that coherent patterns of thought have existed in the past and that they continue to do so.

There is no implication intended here that the assumptions underlying this approach deny Mannheim's caveat that "...only the individual is capable of thinking. There is no such metaphysical entity as a group mind which thinks over and above the heads of individuals, or whose ideas the individual merely reproduces."⁶ However, it is likewise misleading, as Mannheim continues, to assume that all ideas motivating people have their origins in the individual alone. After the variables of time, general political conditions and personality which naturally have considerable significance have been accounted for, it has often appeared as if the party's stance on some issues has indeed had a life of its own.

It is appropriate to emphasize, especially with regard to the subject of "ideology", that an analysis of a social organization such as a political party under compartmentalized and separate headings can have an artificial quality because it often seems to ignore the fact that the topics being discussed are closely interrelated. It is clear from much of the preceding analysis that an explanation of some of the behavior patterns within

the party stem in part from the way in which both the individual participants and the organization "view" the world. It is not overstating the case to claim that the Liberal Party is no different from any other institution in the sense that the factor of ideology helps to explain some of the occurrences in its history. The foregoing discussion has not hesitated to state this fact whenever this seemed to be the case. Thus, while the importance of ideology is stressed in the interrelations of many of the aspects of the party, it is also necessary to state that some repetition of what has gone before is unavoidable.

* * * *

It has already been pointed out in connection with identifying the origins of the Liberal Party in the pre-Confederation period that there was a perceptible and a distinguishable ideology motivating the groups nicknamed Rouge in Quebec and Grit in Ontario. It reflected in large measure the interests which both these groups represented and could briefly be characterized as being on the side of increasing democratization of the political process. By the 1870's, with the battle for responsible government receding into history, the philosophical mainspring of the coalition under Mackenzie was the Liberalism of the England of that period. Indeed, if any Canadian party before or since can be considered a prisoner of an ideology, Mackenzie's Liberals were that party, and the reason for the party's failure to win a second term of office has often

been attributed simply to its moral rectitude, and its policy of laissez-faire, free trade and economy in government.

While some second thoughts may have disturbed many of the defeated Liberals while Macdonald was dominating the scene in the 1880's, there can be no question that a heavy residue of this style remained and has continued to influence the party to this day.

The resolutions of the 1893 Convention virtually begin with a strong denunciation of the tariff and the principle of protection claiming that "the existing tariff, founded upon an unsound principle, and used, as it has been by the Government, as a corrupting agency wherewith to keep themselves in office, has developed monopolies, trusts and combinations;...has decreased the value of farm and other landed property;...has oppressed the masses to the enrichment of the few;...has checked immigration;...has caused great loss of population;...has impeded commerce;...(and) has discriminated against Great Britain."⁷ The resolution goes on to point out that there is a clear-cut difference between Liberals and Conservatives on this issue and, while the party did not advocate complete free trade, it did support a program of downward tariff adjustment. Then, in spite of the party's recent defeat on the issue of "Unrestricted Reciprocity" in the 1891 election, this plank was not dropped. The resolution on Reciprocity followed right on the heels of the one on the tariff and claimed that the party was still prepared "to enter into negotiations" with a view to obtaining "a fair and liberal reciprocity treaty" with the United States.⁸

Most of the other resolutions have "traditional" liberalism as their basis and are of a piece: Among other things, the Convention expressed its disapproval of corruption; recommended economy in government as it viewed "with alarm" the increase in the public debt; and proclaimed the authority of the legislature over the executive, especially in matters of public expenditure (in the process, making oblique condemnations of the manner in which inquiries into the graft in now-retired Sir Hector Langevin's Department of Public Works had been handled).

There are some scattered signs that, twenty-six years later, the 1919 Convention recognized that the social facts of industrialization would mean a greater role for government. The most noteworthy evidence of this is King's resolution on "Labor and Industry" which made twenty specific policy recommendations, among which were a demand for a national standard of an eight-hour day or a forty-eight-hour week; abolition of child labor; the right of association for the employed as well as for employers; and equal pay for men and women for equal work.⁹ However, after the events of the previous decade, particularly the 1911 debacle and the problems arising out of the war are accounted for, the general ideological refrain had not changed substantially. Again there was the demand for a downward tariff revision; the faithful resolved that "the serious nature of the country's financial position..." called for "...the exercise of the severest economy in government;"¹⁰ control of the executive by parliament was once

more affirmed. But the party hedged on the issue of Reciprocity. It noted that Canadians should have no cause to complain if the movement in the American Congress to repeal the law passed eight years before should be successful. It contented itself with "...the earnest hope that in both countries such principles will be upheld and that a favorable moment may come when there will be a renewed manifestation by the two governments of a desire to make some similar arrangement."¹¹

The party did not meet in Convention again for thirty years. In the meantime, in 1933, in the debate on J.S. Woodsworth's House of Commons resolution calling for "...the setting up of a cooperative commonwealth in which all natural resources and the socially necessary machinery of production will be used in the interests of the people and not the benefit of the few,"¹² King enunciated his party's political philosophy in a lengthy peroration. In style and conception, the statement did not differ significantly from his Industry and Humanity in deploring legislation based on "class" or other such divisions within society, but it seemed to point to the fact that the Liberal Party was committed to fully supporting the concept of the welfare state. Claiming that Liberal policies were similar to Woodsworth's in that they too were "...intended to be used in the interests of the people and not for the benefit of the few," King decried the institution of the socialist state "...in order to further public ownership. The wisdom of public ownership depends entirely upon the particular need that it is sought to serve,

and what in time and place may most effectively serve that need."

He explained:

"What I submit is necessary, and quite self-evidently necessary, is not that we should in order to remedy existing conditions seek to change the whole basis of our social and economic structure, but that we should go on with our social and humanitarian legislation, and go on with our public ownership and operation in the directions in which they may appear to be desirable and necessary, considering each proposed measure on its merits, in the light of conditions as they exist at the particular time." 13

While he extolled the virtues of "self-help" as opposed to "reliance on the State,"¹⁴ King went on:

"Let me say that I believe the chief aim of those who are supporting the socialist state is that of effecting a more equitable distribution of wealth. In my view a more equitable distribution of wealth is all-important. The Liberal party recognizes that the problem of distribution has become more important than that of production. It believes that personality is more sacred than property. In all its policies, it has been guided by that principle above everything else." 15

Nevertheless, some of the specific policy recommendations enumerated by King in winding up his remarks had a traditional ring: Aside from the departure of suggesting that a national central bank be constituted, he promised to abolish the extravagant tariff increases of the Bennett regime; reiterated the customary Liberal fear of monopoly, promising to place the Combines Investigation Act which he himself had sponsored as Minister of Labor in 1910 back on the books; re-affirmed the "necessity of a balanced budget"; and scored "the usurpation of the rights of parliament and the assumption of autocratic powers by the executive," condemning

"...the legislation enacted by the present administration, which deprives parliament of its control over

expenditures, and taxation, and invests the executive with unwarranted arbitrary powers, as for example: legislation permitting the executive to enact measures by order in council for peace, order and good government, and legislation providing the executive with a blank cheque for expenditures of any kind." 16

The problems threatening the country as a result of the Second War led to two noteworthy documents. The first was the set of resolutions passed by the Advisory Council in late September, 1943 under the title The Task of Liberalism. Among the various resolutions on such subjects as the "Establishment of a Sound Peace", the "Rights of Labour", "Trade Expansion", "Housing and Health" and "Social Security", the statement on "Production and Employment" is especially significant. While expressing its faith in private enterprise, the resolution stated the party's belief that,

"...maximum production, full employment and a rising standard of living, can be achieved only by an orderly and imaginative use of the Nation's capital equipment. An orderly expansion will require a steady flow of capital investment, either from the savings of individuals and corporations, or from public expenditures of money raised by taxes and loans." 17

A year and a half later, Minister of Reconstruction C.D. Howe tabled a White Paper entitled Employment and Income with Special Reference to the Initial Period of Reconstruction in the House. It stated that, as its "primary object of policy", the Government was pledged "...to accomplish a smooth, orderly transition from the economic conditions of war to those of peace and to maintain a high and stable level of employment and income."¹⁸ The recommendations and terminology contained in this twenty-four-page statement of policy seemed to point to the fact that the government had

accepted the Keynesian system with all the implications of a government-directed economy.

By the time King had retired, the Liberal philosophical stance had as its foundation the traditional individualist creed of the nineteenth century overlaid with a commitment to such programs as unemployment insurance, family allowances, and old-age pensions (with a national hospitalization plan in the distant offing) which are the paraphernalia of the modern liberal-democratic welfare state. This amalgam is contained in the broad and somewhat lyrical statement of principles (labelled "A Fighting Faith") which was set forth as a preamble to the resolutions adopted by the Third National Convention in 1948. It is quoted in full here because it has been subsequently reprinted in exactly the same form on many occasions and remains, to this day, the best single statement of the way in which the modern party sees itself.

"Liberalism has three key words: Unity, Security, Freedom. Liberal policies are those which protect, maintain and enlarge the freedom of the individual. The Liberal believes no man is fit to exercise irresponsible power over others. He believes in freedom because he believes the resources of human personality and endeavor to be rich and varied beyond calculation and prediction. He believes in freedom because he believes the community of individuals associated in family, church and diverse free associations to be broader in extent and richer in experience than the state.

"The Liberal believes in progress because he believes in the capacity and judgment of ordinary people; and because the Liberal believes in liberty and progress he believes also in security for all citizens as giving them more freedom for a better and fuller life.

"The Liberal believes in unity because the individual must work with others and 'in unity is freedom'.

"The Liberal philosophy is a distinct and positive view of human affairs and not a compromise. Liberalism rejects the unreasoning preservation, in the name of

freedom, of outworn existing arrangements and measures. It rejects the maintenance of privilege however historic. Liberalism equally rejects the theory that state ownership of the instruments of production in itself constitutes progress and a solution of social problems. The course of human development is not to be explained by a materialist formula.

"Liberalism is diametrically opposed to Communism.

"Liberalism is a fighting faith, not a static creed. It renews itself and gains new life as it attacks each fresh objective thrown up by the changes of history.

"The Liberal faces the new problems of a new age able to adopt new methods and devices, but guided by a tested philosophy. He finds freedom only in security and security only in freedom.

"The Liberal Party of Canada stands for ---

1. The importance and dignity of the individual and the family.
2. The preservation and extension of political liberty as a means to ensure economic and all other liberties.
3. The supreme command of the people over parliament and legislatures, the members of which they elect; and the responsibility of government to the people through their elected representatives.
4. The existence and operation of democratically organized political parties.
5. The equality of all citizens before the law.
6. The independence of the judiciary.
7. The organization of human relations to the end that each person shall be safe against all forms of oppression or exploitation whether by the state or by individuals or interests.
8. The encouragement of individual effort and personal initiative consistent with the interests of all the people.
9. The provision of adequate social security.
10. The equality of women in the functioning of the democratic state.
11. The continued encouragement of young people to participate in the work of government and of the party.
12. The maintenance of Canada as a federal union and respect for the constitutional rights of her provinces." 19

Perhaps the insignia of the party (see Figure 1) demonstrates better than any words can how effectively the party had captured the center of the Canadian political spectrum in the early 1950's. However, while there is certainly little here with which the vast

Figure 1: The Insignia of the Party



majority of Canadians can seriously take issue, there are several indigenously Liberal attitudes underlying this lengthy, all-embracing statement. Many of these specific attitudes may be grouped under the following three general headings: "National Unity", the "Role of Government" and "Canada and the World". These will be considered in turn.

I

When, in 1885, John A. Macdonald opted to keep his party's

Ontario support instead of mollifying Quebec by permitting Riel to be sent to the gallows, he inadvertently helped set the Conservatives on a course which was to identify the party in the minds of French Canadians with Anglo-Saxon domination. The rebellion in the Northwest was the first in a string of events which from 1891 until 1958 were to keep Quebec Liberal in federal politics and which were to intensify French Canadian ethnic nationalism. For their part, the Liberals, with a "solid 65" from Quebec, were quite prepared to enhance their good fortune by their practices regarding the leadership of their party, by their easy-going attitude toward organization and by their caution in reaching decisions in crucial policy areas. The party's articulated view of some of the political facts of the Confederation agreement is further evidence of Liberalism's solicitude for the sentiments of Quebec.

St. Laurent has already been quoted in this connection with reference to the question of the alternation between candidates of English and French descent. In expounding upon the meaning of "unity" in the Liberal creed to the Advisory Council in the Winter of 1949, St. Laurent succinctly summarized the party's position in words which he had used several times before and which he was to use many times thereafter. He pointed out:

"In Canada we have a special problem with respect to national unity. From the time our country began to be a nation, our population has been drawn from two great races which history placed side by side in the northern half of North America. Both races are here --- and they are here to stay. Together with thousands of newer Canadians of other stocks, these are the elements and the only

elements out of which a great Canadian nation can develop.

"Our nation was planned by men of vision, of tolerance and of wisdom, as a partnership in which English-speaking and French-speaking partners would keep their essential characteristics, their religion, their language, their culture. National unity demands a practical recognition of that equality of partnership. It demands that there be a partnership in government. We Liberals have always respected that partnership. The highest ambition I have in public life is to leave that partnership stronger and more secure than I found it. For that partnership is the source and the very life-line of Canadian unity."

20

It seems almost superfluous to set some of the pronouncements of some Conservative notables on the subject of French Canada in apposition to those of Liberals. For example, George Drew's denunciation of the Family Allowance scheme as a device for taking tax money from Ontario to give to the large French Canadian families for political reasons has already been mentioned. What has been far worse is the fact that French Canadians who have managed to gain election to the House from Quebec as Conservatives have often deserted their party or refused to run again because of the hostility of the English segment. The difficulties experienced by French Canadians in the Conservative Party before Diefenbaker's assumption of the leadership were expressed by one such M.P. when he resigned in 1941:

"Any French Canadian member of this House who has mixed with the Conservative party as it now exists must realize that he is not a member of their political family. He is at best a tolerated stranger, accepted from necessity and looked at with a certain degree of curiosity. In the opinion of Conservative members he is and always will be a poor relation. His views of Canada are not their views; his ambitions for more French Canadian influence in our public life is not their ambition... There is no friendship or sympathy between them and us."

21

It may be noted that there is no evidence that the increment of some 40 M.P.s which was added to the usual Quebec Conservative contingent in the House as a result of the Diefenbaker sweep of 1958 was especially catered to by the Conservative leadership either.

Many of the policies of Liberal governments must be seen against this background. In the period between 1936 and 1939, the King government was the target of considerable criticism both in the House and in the country for its failure to arouse the country to the nature of the Nazi threat and for its attitude toward the League of Nations. King had summed up the reasons for his government's policies by referring to the problem of Canadian "unity":

"If we have not proposed more, if we have not proposed less, it is because of that guiding principle, we have sought to keep the country united." 22

J.S. Woodsworth was the most ardent critic of the government during this period. He charged that King was evading responsibility and badgered the government for a firm statement of policy:

"It is all very well for the Prime Minister to say that there will be no participation in an overseas war except by the consent of parliament; but if war came, instead of maintaining unity, this country would be split from stem to stern. There is no doubt of that. It would be a reasonable thing for the government to face the question of a diversity of opinion in this country and come out with one or the other policy, instead of keeping us in suspense as to what is the real policy of the government."

To this, Ernest Lapointe retorted: "Does my hon. friend want to split the country right away?"²⁴

The same reasoning can perhaps be shown to underly the failure of the federal government to disallow Quebec's "Padlock Law"²⁵

or to refer it to the courts, while, at the same time, it had no qualms about disallowing the monetary legislation of the new Social Credit administration of Alberta.²⁶ Of course, Lapointe marshalled constitutional arguments rather than "political" ones in supporting his actions in both cases.²⁷ Similarly, the handling of the conscription crises of 1942 and 1944 and the explanation given about the difficulties with the problem of obtaining provincial cooperation in an unemployment insurance scheme, tax-rental agreements and a national hospitalization plan must be seen in this light, as must the party's entire notion of "provincial rights".

To be sure, purely "political" motives and realities play their part. When Macdonald held sway in the 1870's and 1880's with Sir Hector Langevin as his Quebec lieutenant, Liberals used to claim, with considerable justification, that the Tories were more Catholic than the Pope in Quebec and more British than the Queen in Ontario. The situation was reversed as soon as Laurier established his party's dominance. Today, Conservative spokesmen, asserting that theirs is the only truly "national party", attack the policies of their opponents as being based on the principle

"...of divide and rule...the epitome of expediency. It was nowhere more apparent than in the way they manipulated prejudices and convictions to political advantage. They played one province against another, east against west, the small against the large, class against class. In doing so, they played havoc with national unity."
28

On the Liberal side, there is always the fear of a repetition of 1917 when the party's parliamentary representation was

reduced to a Quebec rump. Thus, after the election of June, 1957, St. Laurent moved relatively quickly to hand the resignation of his government to the Governor-General. He was not motivated simply by the electoral reality which saw the Conservatives with 112 seats to the Liberals' 104. He was also concerned about another, almost as significant, reality:

"...Politically, I felt that in view of the fact that practically all of the support we had left came from Newfoundland and Quebec, with a few others where the French speaking element was important, it would not foster national unity for us to appear to be clinging to power."

29

On the other hand, it is certainly true that, as late as 1962, in some parts of the province of Quebec during the federal election campaign, the Liberals were not above trying to link Diefenbaker with the historic "Tory enemies" of French Canada. The names Borden, Meighen, Bennett and Drew are still spat out as epithets by Liberal orators on the hustings. Nevertheless, there is this strong reinforcing ideological element and it cannot be overlooked.

II

While the party has never failed to state that it supported individual initiative and "free enterprise", it has been prepared to legislate for "security" and to intervene occasionally, although not without qualms, in the operations of the economy in the name of "the people".³⁰ In effect, this is an ideology of the "middle road" and Mackenzie King stated it succinctly in his farewell address to the 1948 National Convention:

"As the bulwark of freedom, Liberalism stands midway between those forces that seek the protection of special privilege or vested interests, be they of social position, of wealth, or of power in the hands of the few; and those forces that seek the control of the nation's affairs in the interest of one or more classes or economic groups.

"Liberalism seeks to preserve human society from control by either of these forces, since, in their effect, both are exclusive. Each would deny an equal measure of freedom and opportunity to all.

"Liberalism...stands first, last and all the time for the preservation and extension of freedom in every sphere of our national life, and... for the supremacy of the general interest over special interests or class interests. In the view of Liberalism, we are all members one of another; the good of each is bound up in the good of all." 31

This approach characterized almost every public speech delivered by members of the St. Laurent government. To take one random example, this is the way Postmaster General Alcide Côté presented the Liberal case:

"It is easy to prove that the Conservative Party is contrary to democracy by its tendency to favour the industrialist to the detriment of the working class and that...the CCF... (is) also contrary to democracy because it tries to destroy free enterprise by a complete nationalization that would make of the State a super dictatorship.

"The Liberal doctrine avoided these two extremes of the right and the left, because the Liberal Party always had leaders who took the interest of the people in general before the interest of a particular group and because in recent years, Laurier, Mackenzie King and St. Laurent gave to the Liberal doctrine a flexibility and a power of adaptation which enables the party to progress with Canada which from a colony became a free country." 32

The doctrine of the golden mean is reflected in the answers given by the respondents in the sample of party supporters to two questions --- the first regarding the desirability of the extent

of government social and economic activity and the other concerning the differences, if any, respondents saw among the parties. The tabulations show that the Liberals stand mid-way between Conservative and CCF supporters. In reply to the question (reworded for reasons of brevity here --- see Appendix, #14 in the questionnaire): "Are the national and provincial governments doing enough or too much about such problems as unemployment, education, etc.?" 44% of the Conservatives, 25% of the Liberals and a scant 3% of the CCF were satisfied with the extent of government activity. On the other hand, 34% of the Conservatives, 54% of the Liberals and 84% of the CCF wanted more government action (see Table I).³³

Table I: Supporters Attitudes on Government Economic and Social Activity (Percentages)

	Conservative	Liberal	CCF
What govts. are doing is right	44	25	3
They are doing too much	14	8	1
They aren't doing enough	34	54	84
Don't know	4	6	6
Not ascertained	5	6	6

The response to the question of whether there are any differences among the three parties on policy (see Appendix, #15 in the questionnaire) is also interesting insofar as over one-third of the Conservative supporters claimed that there were no differences among the parties. Here again, CCFers demonstrate the firmness of their ideological allegiance to their party and, further, a distrust of the Conservative party based on policy grounds (see Table II).

A corollary but extremely important ingredient in any policy decision made by Liberal governments regarding social welfare schemes

Table II: Differences Among Parties on Policy (Percentages)

	Conservative	Liberal	CCF
There are no differences	35	15	2
Conservatives will do more	40	9	0
Liberals will do more	8	52	2
CCF will do more	7	15	92
Don't know	8	7	3
Not ascertained	2	3	2

was that of fiscal "responsibility". This was the reason that, in the election year of 1957, an increase of "only" \$6 in the old-age pension was permitted and why a "sunshine" budget was not brought down in spite of the fact that one was expected by the public. Minister of Finance Walter Harris, while admitting that the \$6 decision was a political mistake, had this explanation to offer: "It was the right decision. The country just couldn't afford any more."³⁴ This decision provided the electorate with yet another incentive to unseat the government.

The question of fiscal responsibility and budget balancing is important in assessing the party's commitment to Keynesian economic prescriptions. The early pronouncements of the party can lead to the conclusion that it was prepared to follow the "cyclical budgeting" formula of amassing surpluses in times of economic well-being and slashing taxes aiding private investment and industry and increasing expenditures in time of adversity. The statements of the 1945 White Paper have already been noted. It was seconded by one of the resolutions of the 1948 Convention (entitled "Sound Fiscal Policy") which asserted, in part, that

"The Liberal Party believes that fiscal policies should be designed to promote the expansion of national production and national income, with reasonable debt reduction and lower governmental expenditures in time of high employment and increased public investment and tax reduction when required to stimulate employment." 35

However, because of the post-war boom, the question of deficits did not arise until seven years later when, in 1955, it appeared as if economic conditions warranted a budgetary deficit. In that interim, Liberal spokesmen had availed themselves of every opportunity to express intense pride that theirs was "the only post-war government which has paid its expenses out of revenues."³⁶ When it seemed as if the clouds on the economic horizon demanded budgeting for this deficit, Harris, the new Minister of Finance, was reluctant to go through with the other half of the Keynesian formula. (His predecessor, Douglas Abbott, had run up surpluses throughout his eight-year tenure in the post.) Several insiders in the Department of Finance and among the party's advisors claim that only by over-estimating revenues for the coming year could they convince Harris to even continue some expenditures which he was then quite willing to cut in the face of the necessity of facing the House with a budget that was in a state of imbalance. There was certainly no question of reducing taxes.³⁷

Several months later, in Committee of Supply, Harris replied to an opposition question regarding his attitudes on fiscal policy as follows:

"(Someone)asked me whether I was under the influence of some of the persons who have studied at the

feet of a man by the name of Keynes. I do not think I ought to go into that. I have never inquired of any of my colleagues as to their views on that point. In fact if I asked them what their views were they would probably give me qualifications that would only confuse the issue. What we want is a decision at budget time about what is necessary and desirable at that particular time, without trying to adhere to a theory of any preceding period." 38

A less prominent member of the cabinet than Harris presented in an even more categorical manner what seems to have been the view of the majority in the government at that time:

"I believe in pay-as-you-go. Balanced budget every year, except in war-time, of course... I was brought up in the school that said that public money was trust money. You had to spend it carefully and honestly. I am a great believer in common sense in these matters. It's the same as if it's your own money... I think governments are just the same as businesses. Their aim is to keep solvent." 39

The Liberal Keynesianism seems in this respect to have been more apparent than real, for the White Paper doctrine had been dropped and the government had quietly gone back to raising taxes because it needed the money and for no other reason. By no stretch of the imagination could Liberals be considered the "spenders" in the Canadian system much as the Democrats are so considered in the United States. If anything, it is the Diefenbaker government, with its record of successive budgetary deficits, which is the one that is castigated as being irresponsible by the financial community.

Intervention in the public interest through the use of the devices of crown corporations and agencies was an important feature of the policy of Liberal administrations and was frequently employed in the early period of the party's twenty-two years of ascendancy. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the National

Harbors Board, Trans-Canada Air Lines, Polymer Rubber Corporation, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation and, in the 'fifties, the Canada Council --- well, over seventy such bodies were set up by the Liberals. The approach was always the pragmatic one, however. C.D. Howe, an ardent proponent of free enterprise who was nonetheless the instigator of such government agencies as TCA, Polymer, the National Harbors Board and many others, stated his philosophy in characteristically blunt terms:

"I'm a 'Right' Liberal. The job of government is to create a good environment for business. I believe in private enterprise. But if private enterprise is unable or unwilling to do something, government has to step in ... The cabinet was not a bunch of socialists or capitalists. We were just a crowd of men with diverse experiences trying to do the best we could." 40

Recalling how he went about setting up a trans-Canada air service in 1937, Howe claimed that he first sounded out E.W. Beatty of Canadian Pacific Railways and suggested to him that, in conjunction with the government, the CPR cooperate in the initiation of such a system. When Beatty refused, the government decided to go it alone in the belief (which Beatty could not accept)⁴¹ that air transportation was going to be an important factor in the Canadian economy. However, realizing that the new corporation would incur substantial deficits at first, TCA was made a subsidiary of the Canadian National Railways so that its accounts could be combined with those of the CNR which was already operating in the "red". The TCA deficits would thereby not be as conspicuous as what might otherwise be the case.

A similar attitude characterized the government's approach to the problem of constructing the Trans-Canada Gas Pipeline. As early as 1950, negotiations with private companies were under way, but it was not until 1956 that a bill was introduced in the House.⁴² It represented many compromises: It succeeded in keeping the line in Canada and, probably more important, at least this is the suspicion, it avoided committing the government to public ownership. However, it provided that the government could step in if private enterprise found itself unable to complete the project within a specified time.⁴³

The excuse presented for not setting up a nationalized pipeline was that the government owned neither the gas wells in the west nor the distribution companies in eastern Canada.

"Of course, the gas wells' owners would want the highest price possible for the gas at the well head, and the consumers would want the cheapest price at their home or the factory, and we'd be caught in the squeeze --- the government which carried the gas from the well to the consumers. Well, we don't want to get into that sort of position.

"As a government we'd also be under tremendous pressure from every little community near the line and hundreds of miles off the line for us to build spur lines to their community. Well, many spur lines will be built and if it's privately owned they'll be built because they're economic, not because of political pressure." 44

As far as the existence of any articulated differences in the field of economic policy between Liberals and Conservatives are concerned, the most widespread and repeated assessment offered by Liberals, aside from references to the historic dichotomy between the two based on their attitudes on the tariff, is an equally traditional one based on "the few" v. "the many".

St. Laurent's statement is typical:

"I think the theory of the Liberals is that the prosperity of the nation must be started at the grass roots, while... I always had the impression that the theory of the Conservative Party was that if the situation created prosperity at the top, well that prosperity would gradually seep down and reach everybody. But I felt that, well, just like a living plant, it does get something from its leaves and blooms at the top, but its principal nutrition comes from its roots. What we had to be concerned with was not profits that big corporations or big interests would be making, but what was the way in which the little man --- because there are many more of the little man than there are of tycoons --- was making his living. If he were made prosperous, that would stimulate the economy of the whole nation. It was our responsibility to do our best to create and foster the conditions that would provide for reasonable prosperity for the little man." 45

In this view, CCFers are little more than "Liberals in a hurry" (as King used to like to put it) because they too are for the "common man" and that the difference between the two parties is one of degree rather than of kind. However, while the CCF-NDP appeal is often given to flights of rhetorical eloquence, that of the Liberals is not. The 1945 White Paper is couched in the highly technical and bland language which befits a government document of this type. However, it seems to have set the fashion for all subsequent Liberal pronouncements and policy arguments which have a similar ring. While this may seem to point to the fact that the party relied heavily on the civil service not only for policy execution but for policy formation as well, it can also lead to the conclusion that the claim that the Liberal Party was for the "common man" rested far more on a specialized view of the country's economy than upon any belief in the inherent moral worth of its

general population. The Liberal appeal was a technical, economist one and, as such, reflected the party's style which, as mentioned so often before, has been characterized as being "governmental" or "managerial".

III

One of the important differences between Liberals and Conservatives concerns their respective attitudes toward the other members of the North Atlantic triangle, Great Britain and the United States. The country's history abounds with examples, as these differences have featured every one of the great crises of the past. In some ways, this is an area in which the term "ideology" may be used in a broader sense to include considerations of a social nature as well as those involved solely with opinion.

The general pattern of Canadian party opinion has seen the Conservatives upholding the monarchy and the British Connection while expressing a distrust of American influence that has often bordered on the hysterical. The Liberal Party has historically tended to be more North American in orientation and it may be recalled that the so-called radicalism of the Grits in Upper Canada in pre-Confederation days (state aid to education, universal manhood suffrage, representation by population) was often not much more than the result of the importation for local consumption of some American ideas on representative government.

These tendencies within both parties are attributable, at least in part, to their original bases of support. A reinforcing

element in Liberal dispositions was the attachment of the overwhelming majority of French Canadians to the party beginning in the 1890's. For the Conservatives, the electoral situation which, beginning with the turn of the century, seemed to be relegating them to permanent minority status, was likewise a factor acting to intensify latent attitudes.

Of course, this does not mean to infer that the parties (and especially the Liberals) are dependent solely upon specific groups. However, these tendencies are not the mere residue of a musty past. They remain operative today. It is still possible for a Conservative leader to promise the electorate that, if elected, he will divert, on purely non-economic grounds, fifteen percent of the country's trade with the United States to Great Britain. As late as 1955, a leading Conservative spokesman could point out:

"For years we have witnessed stealthy assaults by the Liberals at Ottawa on Royal institutions. Efforts have been made in some cases even to eliminate the word 'Royal'. The Liberal Government has not done one thing to make the tie between the Crown and Canadians stronger, and we have reason to fear that the Government is simply lying low at present and biding its time before making other moves. Mr. King in 1926 did not hesitate to drag the personal representative of the King into political conflict in Canada for partisan gain. There is no creeping republicanism in the Conservative Party." 46

As far as Liberals are concerned, anti-Americanism has little relevance. As an ex-cabinet minister explained:

"I never had any trouble with the United States when I was Minister of National Defence. I'd say to them on a specific policy: 'This will not be possible here in Canada.' And they would say: 'O.K. We'll drop it.'" 47

On the other hand, it is difficult to draw any conclusions

regarding any differences in the attitude of the parties toward the United Nations, nuclear armaments, NATO and the cold-war in general. Historically, there has been little to choose between, for example, the policies of Borden at Versailles and those of King at the Imperial Conferences in the 1920's. It is certainly difficult to make a case for the Liberal Party per se as being the "internationalist" one. Even allowing Mr. King his arguments that a virtually neutralist position in the late 1930's was necessary to preserve "national unity", his international outlook in the early post-war period cannot be characterized as being especially bold.⁴⁸ The problem of assessment is further complicated by the fact that Canadian foreign policy under Liberal administrations for the decade after 1947 was in the hands of two men: St. Laurent and Pearson. It was largely as a result of their personal initiatives that Canada moved so vigorously in adopting an activist position both at the UN and within the Western alliance.⁴⁹

Of late, the country's international role has not been as prominent as it had been while Pearson served as Secretary of State for External Affairs. This may be regarded as evidence of some kind that the Liberal Party is more attuned than the Conservatives to the requirements of nuclear-age diplomacy. However, it can also provoke the suspicion that the country's effectiveness, such as it was, was more the result of Pearson's diplomatic expertise than of any Liberal "ideology" or even Canada's international stature.

At present, the Liberal leadership, in the light of the party's free trade orientation, has predictably been far more receptive

to British entry into the Common Market than the Conservatives who, equally predictably, have loudly protested against such British action. Finally, on the question of alliances and armaments, the Liberals once again are squarely in "the middle" between what unilateralist opinion there is in Canada and those who wish to leave the present Canadian situation and role unchanged. However, there is a strong suspicion that the Liberal position in the 1962 campaign on the matter of nuclear arms for Canada, such as it differed from the Conservative, was governed more by the fact that the party was in opposition than by any other consideration.

* * * * *

The above remarks are not meant to imply that the Liberals (or the Conservatives, for that matter) have presented a monolithic ideological front to the world. Being an "open", loosely organized institution, the Liberal Party has necessarily tolerated wide ranges of dissent without any noticeable discomfort. Indeed, there is much in the history of the party which does nothing to negate Ambrose Bierce's definition of politics --- "a strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles."⁵⁰ Seen in this way, the Liberal Party is purely an agglomeration of groups and interests held conveniently together by a common desire for power, influence, prestige and patronage. Thus C.D. Howe is the representative of

"Big Business"; St. Laurent of Quebec; "Jimmy" Gardiner of the western farmer. Many of the remarks made by party notables, both in public and in private, emphasize that this aspect cannot be overlooked. The attitudes of both Howe and St. Laurent have already been referred to. Gardiner's brief summing up of his twenty-two year career in federal politics provides further evidence:

"When I came down here from the farm, the price of butter was 10¢; hogs, \$10 to \$12; steers, \$36 to \$40. After twenty-two years, the price was five times that except for grain which was only twice. But as I used to say: 'If you're a good farmer, you used most of your grain for feed anyway.'" 51

At the same time, there are also attacks originating from within the party on its social and economic policy --- from both ends of the political spectrum. True to Dafoe's description of him as a pre-1896 Liberal (and thus very closely in step with Dafoe's own feelings), aging Senator T.A. Crerar probably remains the most articulate and outspoken critic (for public consumption) within the party:

"I'm against King's welfare state concept. I'm against the wastrel. We've moved it out of the area of compassion into a question of right...
 "Family allowances was the first. It came by mistake -- 90% fiscal and 10% humanitarian. Some of the white boys around here said that we're going to have a terrible time after the war. We have to redistribute income, to redistribute purchasing power. They think you can get a few fellows who together can pull levers and push buttons and regulate the economy like that. The Liberal Party is adrift today. So is the Conservative party which is hardly conservative at all. The level of welfare payments is higher than the level of production. So you have to tax --- and taxes are too high already --- or borrow and people are losing confidence in long-term government bonds. If this fails, then you

have to do the same thing that France did for years and Germany and all the rest of those countries did. And this failed...

"Everyone is making a big fuss around here about unemployment. Nowhere is it written that the state is responsible for the individual. This comes out of the confusions of the teachings of Marxism. There is now an absence of self-reliance, magnanimity, integrity, individualism, service, independence. By that I mean the individual standing on his own two feet. These are the cardinal virtues. The great value of the Christian ethic was the individual helping himself --- and helping his fellow man. And by doing this you help yourself. Now if someone didn't do well, we say: 'It isn't his fault. His parents genes weren't right. It's society's fault. We'll give him unemployment insurance or a pension. Get him a psychiatrist!'

"I'm in favor of the means test. But the do-gooders and the sob-sisters said: 'Don't do that. You'll make them feel badly, you'll humiliate them.'

"I'm not hard-hearted, you know. I've helped many a man in my time. But it's not the responsibility of the government to see that every individual has a job beyond helping in a general way in the economy. If you do, then you have to regulate hours of work and rates of pay. And soon you have a totalitarian government telling people just what to do. Just before Meighen died, he said to me: 'What's wrong with politicians today is the lust for votes.'

"The ultimate end of the welfare state is the loss of personal freedom and liberty." 52

A diametrically opposite view is offered by Senator David Croll:

"I'm a believer in the welfare state --- in social security. I believe that labor should be protected to the point where they get their fair share of the wealth they create. Outside of that, I don't know what else...

"In 1945, there were more real liberals around here than I've ever seen since. They were interested in social security and the welfare state --- they were young, hungry men in 1945. It soon became a stand-pat business. A bunch of office-holders and job-seekers took over." 53

That the party could accommodate such divergent points of view is a tribute to its flexibility. However, it is certain that the "left" was badly outnumbered and could count upon only a handful of luminaries, notable among whom were Brooke Claxton and Paul

Martin in the Cabinet and Arthur Roebuck and the aforementioned David Croll among the back-benchers, to array against the proponents of "responsibility".

To many Liberals (as well as Conservatives), the differences between the parties revolve around a state of mind or mood. As Mackenzie King once declared: "In the course of political evolution we witness a constant struggle of two contending principles, the principle of the future and the principle of the past... To the ever-present conflict of these principles we owe the birth and growth of political parties."⁵⁴ In a like vein, Gardiner said: "I believe in being Liberal. One group conserves, the other wants to make things better."⁵⁵ Senator Power offered: "Tory-ism is intolerance. Liberals aren't sure. A Liberal is prepared to listen to any view and not to be doctrinaire about his own views."⁵⁶

However platitudinous as this may appear, it is nevertheless true that an overwhelming majority of parliamentarians refer to it as an important difference between the two major parties. The older ones also continue to cite Laurier's political speeches as being especially influential in determining and sustaining their own allegiances.⁵⁷

There is a genuine contrast with respect to the role of the leaders of the two parties in the ideological sense. Conservatives tend to place greater emphasis on allegiance to their leader who, in Canada, always seems to be more "autocratic" than his Liberal counterpart. This emphasis seems to be a characteristic of Conservative parties.⁵⁸

Pearson described his own feelings as follows:

"I don't believe, I'm afraid, in the kind of leadership that identifies a party almost exclusively with a personality. That isn't Liberalism to me. Liberalism is teamwork. Liberalism is people, not a person. I don't believe in the 'fuhrer' concept in any way, shape, or form, democratic or totalitarian. Now, this may be old fashioned and maybe this isn't the way to get votes in view of the new Madison Avenue age. At the same time, a leader of a party has to give leadership. He can't merely sit back and wait for public opinion to push him into courses." 59

While there is an obviously political taunt aimed at the Tories in this remark, it is also true that it reflects a certain reality. Thus, Liberal propaganda, even during the period when St. Laurent was leader, emphasized the collective entity, while that of the Conservatives has a definite personal orientation. Of course, the Conservatives had a ready-made situation with Diefenbaker in 1958, but latent dispositions reinforced this style.

CCFers, who delight in claiming that the two old parties are identical, do make one concession in favor of the Liberals. As M.J. Coldwell recalled:

"I don't know that I can discern any differences between the two. Well, now, wait a minute. The big difference between the two parties was that the Liberals had a much abler group, especially the people around King during the War. King had a faculty of drawing around him quite able people, particularly C.D. Howe. They still have an influential group. King brought people in who were able. The Conservatives bring in people who are Conservatives." 60

It is often for this reason alone that large segments of the intellectual community consider the Conservative Party to be a decidedly uncongenial one. A question as to individual political affiliations often evokes the reply: "I'm a Liberal. What else can you be in this country?" This, in turn, has the self-fulfilling

effect of maintaining the Liberals as the party of "good management". Furthermore, the Conservative government has not endeared itself to this same segment of the population in view of its attitude toward such beloved institutions as the CBC and the Canada Council during the 1958-1962 period. It often seemed to them that all the yahoos and know-nothings in the country were sitting on the government back-benches as these institutions came under repeated attack.⁶¹

The results of the questionnaire provide substantial evidence that some of the above conceptualizations of the party are not confined to the parliamentary group but have penetrated into the country as well. The sample of party supporters were given an opportunity to express themselves in their own words as to their likes and dislikes about their respective parties and its opponents in an open-ended question (see Appendix, #13 in the Questionnaire). The most important descriptive statements about their party that Liberals could offer were that it always gave the country "good administration" (14%), that it was "progressive" (11%) and that it could be depended upon for "good times", the absence of unemployment or words to that effect (9%). All other reasons, except those based on straight "party identification" (9%), are far behind. The most frequent reason given by Conservatives for supporting their party was simply "leadership" (13%), with such adjectives as "honesty", "sincerity", "hard work" presented by 11% as characterizing their party. On the other hand, 36% of CCF adherents gave ideological reasons for their allegiance, another 20%

referred in some way or other to their party as "the party of the common man" and 16% made some allusion to program or policy. While typical CCF remarks were that "the other parties are parties of exploiters", it was the rare adherent of the other two parties who claimed, as a Nova Scotia Conservative did, that "I guess I'm a fanatic. I like everything about the Tories." The more likely response was a Toronto Liberal's assessment of his party (which will undoubtedly please many an ex-cabinet minister) that "it is interested in the advancement of social services for the people, only qualified by prudence."

The sample was also asked how such groups as farmers, factory workers, college educated, rich and poor, Protestant, Catholic and Jew generally voted (see Appendix, #24 in the Questionnaire). Some respondents balked at this because "only an imbecile would vote that way" or "this is sheer bigotry" which helps to account for the close to 20% not answering. However, certain patterns of self-perception do emerge. All parties concurred in varying degrees that the rich and the Protestants supported the Conservatives; that Catholics and Jews were Liberals; and that factory workers and poor people voted CCF although Liberals came very close to claiming the former as their own. The supporters collectively could not agree on the allegiances of college people and farmers, with each party claiming both these groups as adherents.

In spite of these many perceptible differences which have been outlined, there is a growing feeling that the present era is one which is becoming increasingly devoid of ideology.⁶² Many

Liberals, probably as a result of the fact that they were in opposition for the first time in their lives, fear that this may be so too:

"When I was a boy, I was a Conservative. I was born into a Conservative family and I knew what the Conservatives stood for. It stood for the British Empire, it stood for protection for Canadian industries, it stood for a sort of Anglo-Saxon Protestant ascendancy in Canada. These were things that everybody really knew and understood, or thought he did. But I have watched the Conservative Party abandon one after another of these things and accept reluctantly and belatedly one after another of the objectives of the Liberal Party after these objectives had been achieved. And I find them going around today masquerading as Liberals. I would therefore find it very hard indeed to define the modern Canadian Conservative Party in any other terms except as a group of office-seekers who didn't belong to the Liberal Party." 63

Pearson saw similar developments:

"What has caused so much confusion now in party political alignment in Canada is that now everybody is trying to move into the Liberal position. Nobody talks about the Conservative Party now as conservative. They talk about it as the Diefenbaker party. They talk about it as the Progressive party, it's the party that gets things done. They talk about it as a party of liberally-minded men. Very few people talk about the Socialist party. They talk about the New Party. They talk about the CCF party. They also talk about the party of liberally-minded men. Why don't they talk about the Conservatives and what conservatism means? Why don't they talk about Socialism and what it means? Because this is the greatest tribute which can be paid the Liberals: It's the party of progress and moderation. And those issues which divided the two parties in Canadian history in the past have ceased to exist." 64

As this chapter has tried to show, there is some evidence to the contrary. Certainly no one expected Diefenbaker's Conservatives to dismantle the welfare state. Indeed, throughout their period of opposition while St. Laurent was Prime Minister, the Conservatives

had been demanding more government action, not only in the area of public works and the like, but also in the field of public assistance. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that this pattern is a concomitant of a political system which expects alternation in office between two major parties over time. As Duverger points out, any ideological "dualism" accompanying such a system tends to be "technical" rather than "metaphysical".⁶⁵ That is, alternation between two parties is acceptable and workable because the parties in the system share more or less common values about the nature of society and the role of the state. While each party is willing to tinker with some of the parts in the system, neither has any inclination to make any drastic alterations in it.

Within this framework, however, there is every indication that there are differences among the parties. It may also be noted that they are perceived, however imperfectly, by the public. Tradition dies hard. It is given an even longer life because of the workings of the mechanisms of public support. For, while over time one might expect that such differences which remain would, under the operations of the system, become increasingly blurred, it is also evident that, whatever else it achieves, the support of the parties, electoral and otherwise, has a definite reinforcing effect and in a sense acts as a brake on more rapid movements. Nothing of the 1962 election impresses the observer more vividly than the pattern of ethnic, income and education group and regional support accruing to the various parties. It provides concrete confirmation of the persistence of these differences.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1955), 363.
2. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936), 40.
3. David W. Miner's "Ideology and Political Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, V (November, 1961), 317-331 provides a summary of the ways in which the concept has been used.
4. David W. Miner, Op.Cit., 321.
5. A. Campbell, P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller, D.E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), 188-265 and A. Campbell, G. Gurin, W.E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), 112-135 use this approach.
6. Karl Mannheim, Op.Cit., 2.
7. National Liberal Convention of 1893, Official Report (Ottawa: 1893), 71-72.
8. Ibid., 81.
9. National Liberal Convention of 1919, Official Report (Ottawa: 1919), 87-88.
10. Ibid., 102.
11. Ibid., 97.
12. Canada, House of Commons Debates, February 27, 1933, 2492.
13. Ibid., 2493-2498.
14. Ibid., 2499.
15. Ibid., 2501.
16. Ibid., 2511.
17. The Task of Liberalism (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1943), 4.

It has already been pointed out at various intervals that an important motivation for the Liberal shift to the "left" since the darkest days of the Depression can perhaps be attributed to

the existence of the CCF. At the time The Task of Liberalism was being drawn up, the Gallup Poll showed the socialists with a plurality of national popular support.

18. Employment and Income with Special Reference to the Initial Period of Reconstruction (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1945), 1.
19. See, for example, The Canadian Liberal, V (Fall, 1952), 171-172; The Liberal Party of Canada, pamphlet (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1957), 9-10; Liberal Action for a Greater Canada, Speaker's Handbook for the Federal General Election 1957 (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1957), 36-37.
- The statement, with a few changes and entitled "Liberalism for Progress", precedes the resolutions adopted by the 1958 Convention. New Statements of Liberal Policy, pamphlet (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1958), 5-8.
20. NLF Files: Advisory Council Meeting, Proceedings (Ottawa: January 25, 1949), 33-34.
- See also, for example, text of address to the Reform Club of Montreal in The Canadian Liberal, IV (Summer, 1951), 75-76; and text of address to Advisory Council, October 28, 1952 in The Canadian Liberal, V (Winter, 1952), 233-234.
- St. Laurent expressed his own personal feelings as follows:
- "From a relatively early date I was always a proponent of the idea that there were two main groups of our population that were here and that had to stay here and that had to get along together. That they could find faults in each other, there was no doubt about that; but that if they tried to, they could find more qualities in each other than there were faults. And if they concentrated upon looking for the good in each other, it would be much easier for them to get along, to respect each other, to work together...
- "I felt it could best be done through the Liberal Party because we then used to regard the Conservative Party as the Tory party and relate that to the domination of the superior 'race'."
- Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
21. J.S. Roy in Canada, House of Commons Debates, November 4, 1941, 4058-4059, quoted in J.R. Williams, The Conservative Party of Canada, 1920-1949 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1956), 198.
22. Quoted in Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 24, 1938, 3217.
23. Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 24, 1938, 3217.
24. Ibid.
- See K.W. McNaught, "Canadian Foreign Policy and the Whig Interpretation," Canadian Historical Association, Report of

Annual Meeting, 1957, 43-54 for a critical and unfriendly appraisal of this attitude.

25. Passed by the Duplessis Government in 1937, it gave the provincial attorney-general the power to close, without reference to the courts, for one year, premises suspected of being used to propagate "communism" (which was not defined in the statute). The act was used to harry all liberal opposition to the Union Nationale regime.
26. See J.R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954).
27. See Canada, House of Commons Debates, February 4, 1938, 174-178; Ibid., February 10, 1938, 368; Ibid., March 30, 1938, 2294; and Ibid., May 30, 1938, 3368-3382.
28. Progressive Conservative National Headquarters Files: Notes of an address, "Conservative Principles in Public Policy", delivered by Minister of Justice E. Davie Fulton to the Young Progressive Conservatives of Toronto and District, Toronto, March 19, 1960.
29. In a letter to the author, February 2, 1961.
30. For example, the following is part of the "Employment and A High Standard of Living" resolution of the 1948 Convention:

"Liberalism recognizes reasonable profits as the best means to stimulate production, for without production there can be neither prosperity nor security. A free economy distributes plenty rather than rations scarcity --- it provides for more and more people a larger share of more and more.

"The Liberal Party believes in the minimum of interference and control by the state in the daily lives and occupations of the people and is opposed to any system of overall control of the economy; but it is in favour of intervention or assistance by the government when required to meet the needs of the people."

The Liberal Party of Canada, pamphlet (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1957), appendix, 72.
31. Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1948), 122.
32. NLF Files: Speech delivered by Alcide Côté in Fredericton, N.B., January 31, 1953.
33. Lest a completely ideological content be read into the 44% Conservative satisfaction with the status quo, it is well to recall that this high percentage may be partially attributed to the fact that many Tory supporters were no doubt aware that it was their party that formed the government of the day.

34. Interview, January 9, 1961. Similar attitudes were voiced by both Howe and St. Laurent.
35. The Liberal Party of Canada, pamphlet (Ottawa: National Liberal Federation, 1957), appendix, 70.
36. For example, The Canadian Liberal, VI (Summer and Fall, 1953), 151.
37. Also see Blair Fraser, "Backstage at Ottawa: Back to Old-Fashioned Budgets," Maclean's Magazine, LXVIII (April 2, 1955), 6, 84.
38. Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 27, 1955, 6933.
39. R.O. Campney, Interview, Ottawa, January 10, 1961.
40. Interview, Montreal, December 9, 1960.
41. The story goes that Beatty and Howe were in Winnipeg together in 1937 and as a plane overhead went by Beatty is supposed to have pointed skyward and exclaimed: "Mr. Howe, the public will never accept the airplane as a form of transportation."
42. The following emphasize the policy rather than the procedural aspects of the bill: Blair Fraser, "Backstage at Ottawa: Will the Liberals take over the Pipeline," Maclean's Magazine, LXIX (May 12, 1956), 1, 113; Blair Fraser, "The Pipeline Uproar: How much Smoke? How Much Fire?" Maclean's Magazine, LXXI (July 5, 1958), 13, 53-55; and H.G. Thorburn, "Parliament and Policy-Making: The Case of the Trans-Canada Gas Pipeline," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIII (November, 1957), 516-531.
43. C.D. Howe, Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 14, 1956, 3860-3864.
44. Minister of Fisheries, James Sinclair, in The Canadian Liberal, VIII (Fall, 1956), 312-313.
Walter Harris claims he was the only one in the cabinet in favor of a nationalized pipeline. Interview, Ottawa, January 9, 1961.
45. Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.
46. Progressive Conservative National Headquarters Files: Donald M. Fleming, "Distinctive Conservatism," address delivered on November 22, 1955. Italics are Mr. Fleming's.
47. R.O. Campney, Interview, Ottawa, January 10, 1961.
48. See Bruce Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian (Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1953), 421-424; 432-435.

49. As St. Laurent pointed out:

"The things that may appear to be the right things at one given moment, ... (are) at another given moment, quite the wrong things. Take, for instance, commitments in the international field. Well, I've no doubt that it was quite proper for a long time to avoid having commitments in the international field. But after we did make the very formal commitment of ratifying the Charter of the United Nations, well, we had commitments that resulted from the Charter of the United Nations and we had to make further commitments to carry out the objectives of the Charter when it was found that the United Nations themselves were not going to be able to carry out those objectives. I'm thinking, for instance, of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. Here, under the Charter, there should have been set up a military force under the control of the United Nations. We tried to get that united force organized and set up. It wasn't possible to do so. The veto was being exercised in a manner that prevented the United Nations from being effective. There were a lot of us who felt that if it wasn't done by the UN, we would have to do it under the provisions that permitted it to be done in the Charter, and that was why we were quite ardent in supporting the idea of creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960. -

50. The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce (New York: Citadel Press, 1960), 328.
51. Interview, Ottawa, January 8, 1961.
52. Interview, Ottawa, February 2, 1961.
53. Interview, Ottawa, December 14, 1960. However, Croll would not be happier in some other party. As he himself admitted: "The doctrinaire guys I'm not comfortable with at all. Those guys with a ticket from God --- they just don't appeal to me. They're not my kind of people."
54. Quoted, with derision, in F.H. Underhill, "The Development of National Political Parties in Canada," in In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), 21.
55. Interview, Ottawa, January 8, 1961.
56. Interview, Ottawa, August 2, 1960.
57. St. Laurent was one of many in whose political socialization Laurier played a significant role:

"I must confess that I was very early impressed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier. I became an ardent admirer of his and read with much interest, and re-read from time to time, the speech he made in Quebec in 1877 which was the speech that allowed Liberals to call themselves respectable."

Interview, Quebec City, December 6, 1960.

This speech on "Political Liberalism", delivered at the Club Canadien in Quebec City on June 26, 1877, is quoted or echoed by Liberals at every opportunity. In it Laurier first really popularized the notion of the difference between Liberals and Conservatives as being based on the attraction of some people for "the charm of novelty" and others for "the charm of habit."

The speech is reprinted as an appendix to J.S. Willison, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party, Vol. II (Toronto: George N. Morang & Co., 1903), 395-436.

58. See, for example, R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1955), 54.
59. Interview, Ottawa, December 13, 1960.
60. Interview, Ottawa, January 19, 1961.
61. For example, see D.M. Fisher, "Commons Comment," Canadian Forum, XXXIX (August, 1959), 97-98; debate on the CBC estimates in Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 13, 1960, 6187-6237; also Frank H. Underhill, "That Academy Without Walls", Canadian Art, XVIII (September-October, 1961), 299-300.
62. The leading proponent of this view is Daniel Bell in The End of Ideology (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), especially the last chapter, 369-376.
63. J.W. Pickersgill, Interview, Ottawa, September 17, 1960.
64. Interview, Ottawa, December 13, 1960.
65. M. Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley, 1955), 214.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to portray the Canadian Liberal Party in terms of several functional relationships within the framework of the Canadian political system: The relation of the party to the social structure of the society in which it must appeal for support; the relation between the party leader and his followers; and the relation of the party to the system of government have all been analyzed in various ways with a view to illuminating some of the most distinctive features of the country's political process.

The most general conclusion which seems to have emerged is that the Liberal Party may be categorized as a classic example of what Weber has labelled "parties of notables".¹ It has all the characteristics: It was formed "...partly according to class interests, partly according to family traditions and partly for ideological reasons"; its parliamentary delegates are its most important instruments of cohesion; and, at the local level, extra-parliamentary notables exert some influence, but, as a general rule, "the party is alive only during election periods."²

However, while it would appear, especially from the observations on the subject of organization, that the M.P. is supreme and that the effective control of the party is in his hands, this

1. Footnotes to Chapter VII appear on pp. 518-519.

is not really the case. The modern operations of the cabinet system has at times tended to reduce the back-bencher to not much more than an errand-boy for his riding and just another pawn to be manipulated by his leaders. This aspect of political life has received considerable attention in Canada as in Great Britain. What has often been overlooked in Canada, however, is the concomitant decline of the authority of the elected representative with his constituents and the fact that the changing nature of Canadian society has brought different types of men into Parliament than was the case in the past.³

In the old rural society, up to the beginning of the Second War, the parties were really groups of notables with high status in their constituencies and a considerable degree of influence in Ottawa. Contact between the member and his electors was usually very close and, especially when his party formed the government, the M.P. was intimately involved in the "bread-basket" aspects of politics --- dispensing favors, jobs, etc. The short parliamentary session permitted the member to continue his regular occupation. Not infrequently, he was a man of independent private means. In any case, the low indemnity made it impossible for him to devote himself entirely to politics without some other source of support.

The increased demands placed on the state and the effects of the war and its aftermath tremendously augmented the role of government. An enlarged, technically-skilled federal bureaucracy took over many of the functions once performed by the private

member. Stringent civil service regulations further circumscribed the members' private area of influence.⁴ The greater role of government brought a concentration of decision-making in the hands of the cabinet and drastically lengthened the parliamentary session. Politics is now a full-time job. It is no longer possible for the member to continue with his old occupation even if he is a lawyer unless he represents a constituency close to Ottawa and, even then, the demands upon his time are making this impossible. The increased sessional indemnity does not compensate for the loss of income. The high costs of modern elections often make it necessary for a candidate to spend \$10,000 of his own funds. When he finally gets to Parliament, the member is little more than a careerist, anxious to please his leaders and thereby to gain advancement to the front-bench where he knows influence, prestige and safety lie.

In contrast to and in conjunction with this picture of declining importance is the increased significance of the party leader. The diversity of Canadian politics has always placed a premium on leadership but modern developments have further enhanced the leader's authority. In institutional terms, as Prime Minister, the leader commands virtually all the instruments of power with the ability to distribute ministerial offices and the capacity to control the careers of colleagues and rivals. His authority also stems from his command of the party organization in parliament and in the country. The leader passes on all officers of the national organization and is the final court of appeal on all

organization matters as they pertain to federal politics. In the House, the whip is his appointee and the party caucus merely another device whereby he can more effectively exert his control. No caucus of the Liberal Party ever meets without the leader or someone he has designated to represent him present. In part, the leader owes his position of dominance to the fact that he has received the imprimatur of the rank-and-file at a national convention. Once chosen, the leader never undergoes a formal vote of confidence either by the parliamentary party or by any general body of party supporters. Success at the polls makes this authority unassailable.

This seems to contradict part of Escott Reid's conclusion, arrived at in the early 1930's, to the effect that "bargaining between sectional groups still takes place but nowadays more often in caucus and cabinet than on the floor of the House of Commons. In caucus the party is sectional. In public it is homogeneous, but ultimately the party is federal."⁵ It is more likely that bargaining now takes place between heads of provincial governments and parties and the leadership of the national party.

Finally, recent years have seen an institutionalization of the personal characteristics of the leader through the necessity of creating a favorable "image". This "personality orientation" of all parties has been heightened by the developments in the mass media of communications and the steady growth of the electorate since the War. The importance of "personality" in politics and party efforts to capitalize upon this quality, not only at election

time but every day, have become an accepted feature of twentieth century political life. Especially during election campaigns, the heavy percentage of the "politically" apathetic has impelled campaign strategists both in the United States and Great Britain to emphasize the personal qualities of their party leaders in order to influence this potentially important segment of the population.

As emphasized before in connection with the question of stable political affiliation and party support, the assumption is that old-style campaign appeals with their emphasis on issues and party tradition would have little meaning for this part of the potential electorate, a part which appears to be increasing rather than diminishing in size. Television is the device most useful for this "personality" approach and the success of both parties in the United States with this medium has not failed to impress Canadian politicians. While, most recently, the Conservative Party has been the one to profit most from these trends,⁶ the Liberals have not been averse to resorting to a corresponding emphasis on the personality of their leader whenever conditions were suitable. Although television has not as yet come to Canada in full force, the campaigns waged by the Liberals in 1949 and 1953, when the personality of St. Laurent was an important ingredient of their appeal, should have served as a premonition of things to come, particularly because the party was returned to power both times with overwhelming majorities. As a result, the already great

control of the leader over his party has been increased and the influence of personality in Canadian politics has been reinforced.

In turn, this "personalization" of all parties in Canada through this emphasis on the leader not only has reduced the influence of the private member, but has also helped further to break down the traditional popular conceptions of the parties which were invariably based on criteria of programme and issues. This also has the effect of increasing the instability of the party allegiances of the public. The future may see an even greater shift in electoral behavior from election to election than what has characterized voting in the past.

Among the many assumptions underlying this study, two specific ones demand special emphasis: First, the functioning of the Canadian political system has been conceptualized against the background of the "group process"⁷ in the broadest meaning of that term. As Truman defines it, "any society, even one employing the simplest and most primitive techniques, is a mosaic of overlapping groups of various specialized sorts."⁸ The other assumption is that there is implicit in the first a functional imperative which requires that any party aspiring to national power in a society of Canada's obvious diversity must necessarily play a consensus-making role. Failure to do so will only leave unfulfilled demands which other parties in the system will do their utmost to satisfy.

It may be pointed out that not all observers are in agreement with this view of the role of Canadian parties. For example,

it is D.G. Creighton's contention⁹ that this emphasis on groups and classes in Canadian society is simply the "authorized version" of Marxist philosophy in American hands and the machinations of a kept clique of Liberal social scientists --- the result of the long tenure of the Liberals in Ottawa and the importation of nefarious theories from abroad. In making this claim, Creighton seems to reveal nothing more than his traditionalist Tory fears of American domination. Another dissenter, K.W. McNaught, terms the concentration upon the subject of "national unity" the Liberal or "Whig" interpretation.¹⁰ In his biography of J.S. Woodsworth,¹¹ he tries to show that there was another course for King and Lapointe to follow in the bleak years immediately preceding the Second World War when the Liberals failed to arouse the country to the coming European conflict on the grounds that to do so would have split the country along the dreaded lines of 1917. Subsequent events during the war could easily be portrayed as demonstrating the foresight of the Liberal leadership, although this is admittedly a post hoc ergo propter hoc rationalization.

Both of these offer no alternative formulations. Professor John Porter does. It is his belief that the use of such terms as "mosaic of groups" is an ideological construct used by politicians and accepted by academics. The reality is that highly specific groups staff the highest levels of the federal bureaucracy, hold the top posts in the major corporations, acquire the university educations, and receive the highest incomes.¹²

To be sure, there is abundant evidence in the census figures

and elsewhere that, in the process of satisfying the various demands of society, the goods of this earth are not distributed even nearly uniformly among the various ethnic, religious and regional groups in Canada. The figures on income show that a bare 5% of the entire population receives over \$6000 a year. This in turn means that, in the absence of a really meaningful university scholarships program, access to education and therefore to positions of decision-making authority is severely restricted. In this sense, power in Canadian society is not "mercurial" or diffused among "veto groups", but is in the hands of a small "power elite". In Porter's construct (and as he privately suggests), then, the success of the Liberal Party in the post-war period is attributable not to its successful manipulation of the group process, but to the fact that the party represented a successful union of the corporate and bureaucratic élite with the Roman Catholic hierarchy.

This is a compelling argument, difficult to refute. The concept of "the state" remains a limited one for Canada, although the tendency is for the expansion of its scope rather than for contraction. There remain many areas in which private agglomerations of power prevail, touched only peripherally by public opinion or government control. Thus, even if a party were to gain control of the state, it would not thereby control all decision-making power in the country. And even if the state were all-pervasive, control over the allocation of Canadian society's scarce resources would still not be genuinely "democratic" anyway because,

as the chapter on party support indicated, participation in party political life is a hobby of a restricted minority.

However, to point out that the "group process" concept does not "explain" the realities of power in Canada may be no more than demonstrating that "the state" likewise does not oversee a great proportion of the significant decisions of its society. The Liberal Party seeks only to gain control over that aspect of society's affairs under the responsibility of the state --- not over all aspects of society. While the party's support does not reflect the age, income, educational, ethnic and religious group distribution of its society (and is in this respect no different from any other parties which have ever existed), it is affected substantially by the operations of the interplay of groups.

A simple-minded synthesis seems in order. For if the "power elite" concept were the only accurate analytic portrayal of reality, then how could the upheavals of 1958 in Quebec and the West, or the rise of Social Credit in Quebec in 1962 be explained except perhaps by the claim that the élite was unable to carry out its "opinion leadership" (or manipulative) role. If this is the case, then patently, the construct leaves many party occurrences unexplained. There are several levels and areas of power. Party political life is, then, only one of these. For example, it is certainly true that the political and other "élites" found themselves in magnificent accord during the twenty-two year period of Liberal domination. However, the years 1957 to 1962 (with the Conservatives in office) may be represented as a period in which

the political élite, on the one hand, and the corporate and bureaucratic "establishment", on the other, were at loggerheads. This is one of many cleavages the June, 1962 election failed to resolve.

Therefore, while the realities of power in Canadian society must always be kept in focus, it is nevertheless the contention here that the concept of the "group process" (particularly in terms of "reference") remains a useful analytic device, especially when used, for example, to illuminate the operations of the electoral process. The interaction of groups may also be seen to operate as an important check on the long-term exercise of non-responsible power. Its functions tend to be far more latent than manifest, however.

On the other hand, the experience of the post-war period suggests that one of the important clues to Liberal dominance was the government's ability to enlist the cooperation of the corporate and bureaucratic managers. In this respect, the charge of "managerialism" made against the Liberal party is just so much ideological cant. The modern state, in Canada as elsewhere, has many and diverse functions. These cannot be carried out and new programs cannot be devised in an atmosphere of "happy amateurism". Specific kinds of skill and knowledge are necessary to run the machine of state. While government is intruding more and more into areas formerly considered private, in so doing, it attempts to avoid coercion. It tries, ideally, to evoke cooperative attitudes and behavior. Public policy depends in large measure upon the

existence of such an atmosphere. And to the extent that this atmosphere does not exist, a government will be courting disaster. The difficulties experienced by the Conservative Government under Diefenbaker with this sector of its society is, in large measure, its chief failing.

What the future may bring is another question. It may be that the Weberian definition --- "party of notables" --- is more in keeping with a society of well-defined groups possessing relative equality in a social system; that is, no one single group has a monopoly of power or of access to the use of the instrumentalities of the making of authoritative decisions in a society. There are forces at work which are operating against the prolonged existence of such a society, if one ever really existed. While religious and income differences seem certain to remain, other differences --- urban-rural, regional and ethnic --- are being eroded. The increasing urbanization and suburbanization and the bureaucratic tendencies observable in Canadian society (as elsewhere) have already been commented upon as factors lessening the importance of some important group affiliations for the individual. The Canadian ethos, affected as it is by the American, is also a factor. If the reality ever conforms with the construct of the "mass society", then the latent instability of long-term political affiliations inherent in it will mean that analyses emphasizing the manipulative aspects rather than the relatively freely-arrived-at consensual ones will have to be stressed.

Finally, an interesting and significant argument is made by S.M. Lipset who, while accepting the concept of the "group process", argues that the political system is not in tune with it. After reviewing the course of the various regional, class and ethnic revolts in Canadian history, he points out that Canada's political party problem is a result of the fact that its social structure and bases for political division are essentially comparable to the American and French pattern. However, Canada retains a form of government which requires disciplined parliamentary parties, and which does not permit cross-party alignments in the House of Commons, sharp divergences among the federal programs of the parties from province to province, or democratic methods of solving internal party cleavages. In other words, whenever a section, class, ethnic group, or province finds itself in basic conflict with its traditional party allegiance, its only alternative is to go over to the other party --- but it may be in even greater disagreement with this other party on other issues. Thus in Quebec, French Canadians who cannot support the Liberals on some issues, cannot go over to the Conservatives because of well known reasons, and must therefore vote Union Nationale provincially and Independent, Bloc Populaire or Union des Electeurs federally. In British Columbia, many Conservatives could only vote for Social Credit because the CCF or the Liberals were not palatable alternatives. On the Prairies in the 1920's, various farm groups and large sections of the rural electorate could not support the

Liberals. But the Conservatives were an impossibility for them because of the Tory tradition of high tariffs. So they had to form a new party, the Progressive. Lipset concludes that the political system which "...is functionally congruent for a country such as Canada is either one of proportional representation which allows every group to be represented by its own party, or the American system, which allows similar representation through the different wings within two major parties."¹³

Lipset admits that a shift to the American system would be too drastic a change to introduce in Canada. However, he claims that proportional representation would not be and attempts to quiet fears about the supposedly inherent instability of such a voting system by referring to the experiences of Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and most of the Scandinavian countries (he points out that France is not typical of coalition countries).

In refutation, it is possible to contend that there are several aspects to the operation of the British parliamentary system in Canada which have been overlooked; that the major parties, especially the Liberals, do not operate precisely as their British counterparts do (especially in connection with organization); and that Lipset has applied the British system to the Canadian experience too strictly. It is possible that proportional representation would only have the effect of elevating local problems and discontent to the national level where they might be more difficult to conciliate. While adequate representation might thereby be given to local groups and interests, such a system might well

tear the fabric of Canadian unity (such as it is). The single-member constituency, plurality system of voting coupled with Cabinet government forces many of these groups to tone down their differences or to submerge them in the interests of getting a national majority together. Perhaps these groups are uncomfortable in this coalition and perhaps submerging deeply-felt problems only serves to prolong their existence. However, as the history of Canadian particularism shows, the federal structure provides a readily available safety valve for many of these groups finding the national system too constraining.¹⁴ Here, the looseness of Liberal organization (among other things) provides another clue to the party's position of dominance. Furthermore, with no effective control by the rank-and-file, the party leader has ample scope to exercise his talents --- which, in effect, helps to further explain the tremendous concentration upon leadership in the political process.

It is possible to claim that, given the special Canadian situation, the system operating in the country today is more "functionally congruent" than any other.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 100.
2. Ibid., 100-101.
3. The only reference to this development is Senator C.G. Power's "Career Politicians --- The Changing Role of the MP," Queen's Quarterly, LXIII (Winter, 1957), 478-490.
4. Senator Power has often pointed out that "it was easy for federal leaders to play up to non-partisanship in politics and to civil service reform when it was quite possible through their relationship with the provincial government to furnish the patronage required to keep up their political fences in the constituencies."
Interview, Ottawa, January 26, 1961.
5. Escott M. Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada," Canadian Political Science Association, Papers and Proceedings, IV (1932), 199-200.
6. The concentration upon Diefenbaker may have been the crucial determinant bringing a record close-to 80% turnout in 1958 --- an increase of almost 6% over the number going to the polls just ten months before. See my "The Canadian General Election of 1958," Western Political Quarterly, XIII (June, 1960), 355-359.
7. See, for example, Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952) and David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959).
8. David B. Truman, Op.Cit., 43.
9. See his Presidential Address to the Canadian Historical Association, Report of the Annual Meeting (1957), 1-13.
10. K.W. McNaught, "Canadian Foreign Policy and the Whig Interpretation: 1936-1939," Canadian Historical Association, Annual Report (1957), 43-54.
11. A Prophet in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959).
12. See his "Class in Canadian Social Structure," Paper delivered at the Institute of Canadian Studies, Interdisciplinary Seminar on "Class in Canada", Carleton University, Ottawa, March 15,

1962; "Concentration of Economic Power and the Economic Elite in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXII (May, 1956), 199-200; "The Economic Elite and the Social Structure in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIII (August, 1957), 376-394; "Higher Public Servants and the Bureaucratic Elite in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIV (November, 1958), 483-501; "Political Parties and the Political Career," Canadian Forum, XXXVIII (June, 1958), 54-55; and "Social Class and Education" in M. Oliver (Ed.), Social Purpose for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 103-129.

13. S.M. Lipset, "Democracy in Alberta," Canadian Forum, XXXIV (December, 1954), 196-198.
14. The existence of the United States is another safety valve for the discontented as the pattern of emigration amply testifies. The close proximity of the United States is an important factor in maintaining Canadian stability and is therefore a functional part of the system too.

APPENDIX

Sample Survey

The following is the questionnaire together with covering letter mailed to a sample of 3000 party supporters, 1000 each for the three major parties.

The questionnaire was designed with three major objectives in view:

1. To identify the rank-and-file of the three parties with regard to:
 - a) Socio-economic characteristics
 - b) Perception of their respective parties
2. To analyze the nature of each membership's party identification;
3. To analyze the nature of political participation of party supporters.

The questionnaires were mailed during November and early December, 1960 and by the end of December all the returns were in. As far as could be ascertained from the number of questionnaires returned by the Post Office because the addressee had moved or died, 2908 party supporters (973 Liberals, 952 Conservatives and 983 CCF members) received the questionnaires out of the total of 3000 sent. Out of this total of 2908 questionnaires reaching the prospective respondents across Canada, 522 were returned completed for a percentage return of 17.9

The breakdown is as follows:

	<u>Sent Out</u>	<u>Returned</u>	<u>%</u>
Liberals	973	125	12.9
Conservatives	952	131	13.8
CCF	<u>983</u>	<u>266</u>	<u>28.0</u>
TOTAL	2908	522	(avg.)17.9

The number of returns is sufficient for computation although there is admittedly no way of determining whether the sample is representative or not.

It is well to emphasize here that November, 1960 was an opportune time in which to study political participation in Canada. Exactly two and a half years had elapsed since the 1958 General Election. In other words, this was in-between elections (the next election was not statutorily required until April, 1963). Therefore, this was precisely the moment to examine the truth of the allegations made by the parties that they have permanent and functioning organizations across the country and are not merely parliamentary cliques which resort to organized activity only when compelled to by the advent of elections.

However, there are several methodological difficulties inherent in the use of the medium of mailed surveys that must be mentioned. For example, groups with high income and high education tend to be over-represented and the problem of interpretation, common to all surveys, is aggravated by the absence of face-to-face contact with respondents. Only one wave was sent out and this tends to limit the value of the survey. This last factor was

conditioned by the funds which were available.

The results regarding participation may also be misleading from the point of view of comparison among the parties. At the time that the survey was conducted, the Liberals were in a process of a national reorganization, the Conservatives were fresh from a record-breaking electoral victory and the CCF was about to go out of existence by submerging itself in the New Democratic Party. In other words, the results may have the effect of minimizing the activity of the Liberals and presenting a picture of past middle-age membership; the extent of Conservative activity may also be exaggerated and the CCF membership may be less militant than the survey shows because only the die-hards were left while other potential members awaited the formation of the New Party. As such, the survey may have little more than historical significance aside from the methodological difficulties inherent in mailed questionnaires without follow-up.

The mailing lists of the three parties were also different. The Liberals and the Conservatives maintain "national" lists in Ottawa. The CCF does not. The Socialists cover the country from four headquarters: Vancouver (British Columbia, Yukon and the Northwest Territories), Regina (the Three Prairie Provinces), Toronto (Ontario and the Maritimes) and Montreal (Quebec and the rest of French Canada). This too may affect the size of the response as well as the answers to the survey.

Since this study is concerned mainly with the Liberal Party, some specific remarks regarding the list which was used are

in order. Out of the approximately 120,000 names, every 120th name was taken (after the first name was randomly chosen) and a questionnaire sent out. The party keeps its lists on a constituency basis and the names are supplied by M.P.s or defeated candidates and, on occasion, by provincial parties. The maintenance of a national list by the party is, in some ways, paradoxical. Constitutionally, the national party is a Federation of ten provincial parties, and membership, no matter how loose, is accorded through a provincial organization. Each province maintains its own mailing list and since conceivably there may be no overlap between the national and provincial lists, it might have been more accurate to have sampled the ten provincial lists as well. Time and financial considerations made such an endeavor prohibitive.

Nevertheless, after all these reservations have been stated, it is possible to contend that as long as the results of the survey are used with caution, they may be considered indicative of tendencies if nothing else.

I am indebted to Professors Edgar F. Borgatta of the University of Wisconsin, Andrew Hacker and Wayne E. Thompson of Cornell University and Saul J. Frankel of McGill University for their help in designing the questionnaire and for general advice concerning the survey. I also wish to express my gratitude to the Social Science Research Center and the Ford Foundation Public Affairs Research Committee, both of Cornell University, and to the Canada Council for their generous financial assistance.

STUDY OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN CANADA

561 Cote Ste-Catherine Road
MONTREAL 8, QUE.

Dear Party Supporter:

You have been selected from one of the mailing lists of the three national Canadian political parties as a participant in a survey of 3000 Progressive Conservative, Liberal and CCF party supporters.

This study should be considered in the same way as you do a Gallup Poll. The information which you give me will be held in the strictest confidence. It will be used only to find out what people think as a group — NOT as individuals. Although this survey is being conducted with the approval of the three parties, they are not sponsoring it in any official way. I am a Canadian post-graduate student and the study is part of my work for a Ph.D thesis.

All you have to do is to fill out the enclosed questionnaire and return it to me in the stamped, self-addressed envelope. I would appreciate your doing this as soon as you possibly can. Please do not sign your name. It is unnecessary for me to associate names of persons with the answers they give.

The success of this survey depends upon your participation. If politics are to have serious meaning for the Canadian public, it is necessary for the people to know more about their fellow Canadians — what they think about political issues and what they are willing to do about them.

If enough people like yourself answer the questionnaire, I intend to publish the material and will make the results available to all those who are interested.

Thank you in advance for your co-operation.

Sincerely yours,



Peter Regenstreif

QUESTIONNAIRE

Please reply to the following questions by making a check mark [✓] in the space provided. Where there are blank spaces simply write in your answer to the question.

Please do NOT sign your name. There is no need for me to associate names of persons with the answers they give.

1. Where do you get most of your news about world events and Canadian politics — such as the American election and the Prime Minister's speech at the UN? (Check the one or two which are most important for you)

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Television | <input type="checkbox"/> Magazines |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Radio | <input type="checkbox"/> Party literature |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Newspapers | <input type="checkbox"/> Talking to people |

2. What organizations do you belong to? (Check more than one if this applies in your case)

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Masonic Order | <input type="checkbox"/> Canadian Legion |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Knights of Columbus | <input type="checkbox"/> Lions Club |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rotary Club | <input type="checkbox"/> Home and School Association |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kiwanis Club | <input type="checkbox"/> Curling Club |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Society of Odd Fellows | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Board of Trade (Chamber of Commerce) | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not belong to any organizations |

3. Do you belong to a political party association in your constituency?

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I belong to the Progressive Conservative Party Association | <input type="checkbox"/> I belong to the CCF Party Association |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I belong to the Liberal Party Association | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)..... |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not belong to any party association |

4. If you are a member of a party association, what is the nature of your membership?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I pay yearly dues | <input type="checkbox"/> I "just belong" |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I have a membership card | |

5. If you are a member of a party association, how did you decide to join the party of your choice?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I am not a member | <input type="checkbox"/> I was in my party's Youth Organization |
| <input type="checkbox"/> A friend who is a member asked me to join | <input type="checkbox"/> I was in my party's Women's Organization |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The party's candidate in the constituency asked me to join | <input type="checkbox"/> I was a member of my party's Student Club |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)..... |

6. What political party does (or did) your father usually vote for?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Progressive Conservative | <input type="checkbox"/> Social Credit |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Liberal | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CCF | <input type="checkbox"/> Didn't usually vote |

7. What political party does (or did) your mother usually vote for?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Progressive Conservative | <input type="checkbox"/> Social Credit |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Liberal | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CCF | <input type="checkbox"/> Didn't usually vote |

8. Do you engage in political activity for your party between elections? (Check more than one if this applies in your case)

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Talk to friends about party policy | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Often go to political meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not engage in political activity between elections |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sometimes go to political meetings | |

9. Do you give money or buy tickets or anything like that to help your party during a campaign?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Give money sometimes | <input type="checkbox"/> Buy tickets |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Give money often | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Never give money | |

10. Do you go to any political meetings or dinners or anything like that? (Check more than one if this applies in your case)

- Often go to political meetings
- Sometimes go to political meetings
- Never go to political meetings
- Go to dinners
- Other (please specify).....
- I do not go to anything like this

11. Do you talk to anyone to try to show them why they should vote for your party or for its candidate in your area?

- Yes
- No

12. With which of the following are you likely to discuss politics? (Check more than one if this applies in your case)

- Family
- Friends
- Neighbours
- People at work
- Others (please specify).....
- I never discuss politics with anyone

13. Is there anything in particular you like or dislike about the Progressive Conservative, Liberal and CCF parties?

<p>Things I like</p>	<p>Progressive Conservative Party</p>	<p>Things I dislike</p>
<p>Things I like</p>	<p>Liberal Party</p>	<p>Things I dislike</p>
<p>Things I like</p>	<p>CCF Party</p>	<p>Things I dislike</p>

14. Some people think that the national and provincial governments should do more in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment, education, housing and so on. Others think that the governments are already doing too much. What do you think?

- What the governments are doing is about right
- The governments are doing too much
- The governments are not doing enough
- I don't know

15. How do you think the three parties feel about such problems as unemployment, education, housing, etc.? Do you think that there are any differences among the Progressive Conservative, Liberal and CCF parties?

- There are no differences among the parties on these problems
- The Progressive Conservatives will do more about these problems
- The Liberals will do more about these problems
- The CCF will do more about these problems
- I don't know

16. How did you vote in the most recent federal election?

- Progressive Conservative
- Liberal
- CCF
- Social Credit
- Other (please specify).....
- I did not vote

17. How did you vote in the most recent provincial election?

- Progressive Conservative
- Liberal
- CCF
- Social Credit
- Union Nationale
- Other (please specify).....
- I did not vote

18. Have you ever voted in a federal election for a party other than the one you now support?

- Yes
 - No
- If "yes", which party did you vote for
- Progressive Conservative
 - Liberal
 - CCF
 - Social Credit
 - Other (please specify).....

19. Have you ever voted in a provincial election for a party other than the one you now support?

- Yes
 - No
- If "yes", which party did you vote for
- Progressive Conservative
 - Liberal
 - CCF
 - Social Credit
 - Union Nationale
 - Other (please specify).....

20. Suppose there was an election in which your party was running a candidate you did not like or did not agree with. Which of the following statements comes closest to what you think you would do?

- I probably would vote for the candidate anyway
- I probably would not vote for anyone in the election
- I would consider another party's candidate
- I don't know

21. On the whole, which of the following is the most important to you in casting your vote in Federal, Provincial and By-Elections?

	Federal Election	Provincial Election	By-Election
Party Label:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Party Leader:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Local Candidate:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

22. Forgetting for a moment which party you prefer, which one of the following men do you think would make the best Prime Minister?

- John Diefenbaker
- Lester Pearson
- Hazen Argue
- Other (please specify).....

23. In question 22, why do you say this? (Give the one reason that is most important to you).....

.....

.....

.....

24. How do you think that most of the people in the following groups would be most likely to vote?

	Conservative	Liberal	CCF	Other (please specify)
Factory Workers:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Farmers:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Poor People:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rich People:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Protestants:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Catholics:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Jews:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
College People:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

I am now going to ask you a few personal questions:

25. Sex:

Male

Female

26. Age:

Under 25

25 - 34

35 - 44

45 - 54

55 - 64

65 and over

27. What was the last grade of school that you completed?

.....

28. What is your occupation?

.....

29. Do you belong to a Labour Union?

I belong to a union

No, I never belonged to a union

No, but I used to belong to a union

30. Do you belong to an agricultural co-operative?

I belong to an agricultural co-operative

No, I never belonged to an agricultural co-operative

No, but I used to belong to a co-operative

31. What is your approximate yearly income?

Under \$1000

between \$1000 and \$2000

between \$2000 and \$3000

between \$3000 and \$4000

between \$4000 and \$5000

between \$5000 and \$6000

between \$6000 and \$7000

\$7000 and over

32. In what country were you born?

Canada

Great Britain

United States

Other

33. If you were born in a country other than Canada, for how long have you been in Canada?

Less than 5 years

6 - 10 years

10 - 20 years

More than 20 years

34. Were you born on a farm, in a small town, in a suburb of a big city, or in a big city?

Farm

Small town

Suburb

Big City

35. In which province do you now live?

Alberta

Manitoba

Newfoundland

Ontario

Quebec

British Columbia

New Brunswick

Nova Scotia

Prince Edward Island

Saskatchewan

Yukon and North West Territories

36. What is your religion?

Anglican

Catholic

United Church

Baptist

Jewish

Other (please specify).....

None

37. Do you pay rent or own your own home?

Pay rent

Own home

ÉTUDE SUR LA PARTICIPATION POLITIQUE AU CANADA

561, Chemin de la Côte Ste-Catherine
MONTREAL 8, QUÉ.

Ami partisan:

Vous avez été choisi à partir d'une liste fournie par les trois partis politiques canadiens, afin de participer à une enquête réunissant 3000 supporteurs des partis Progressiste Conservateur, Libéral et PSD.

Je vous invite à considérer cette étude au même titre qu'un Gallup Poll. Toute information que vous voudrez bien me fournir sera en tout point confidentielle. Elle sera utilisée dans le seul but de déterminer ce que pensent les gens en général — NON en tout qu'individus. Bien que cette enquête ait reçu l'approbation des trois partis, ceux-ci n'y prennent aucune part officielle. Je suis un étudiant faisant des études post-graduées et cette recherche fait partie d'un travail devant me conduire au Doctorat.

Tout ce qui est requis de vous est de remplir le questionnaire ci-inclus et me le retourner dans l'enveloppe adressée à cette fin. Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir me le retourner le plus tôt possible. Il n'est pas nécessaire de signer votre nom. Il n'est aucunement question pour moi de pouvoir associer les noms de personnes aux réponses données.

Le succès de cette étude dépend entièrement de votre participation. Si nous voulons que la politique ait un sens pour le peuple canadien, il est nécessaire que chacun connaisse davantage les autres canadiens — saches ce qu'ils pensent concernant les questions politiques, ainsi ce qu'ils sont prêts à faire dans ce domaine.

Si un nombre suffisant de gens veulent bien répondre à ce questionnaire, j'ai l'intention de publier les résultats de cette recherche et de les mettre à la disposition de ceux qui y seraient intéressés.

Merci à l'avance pour votre coopération.

Sincèrement vôtre,



Peter Regenstreif

QUESTIONNAIRE

Veillez, s'il vous plaît, répondre aux questions suivantes en plaçant un crochet [✓] dans l'espace prévu. S'il y a lieu, écrivez votre réponse dans l'espace libre.

Puisqu'il n'est pas du tout question d'associer les noms de personnes aux réponses données, NE signez PAS votre nom.

1. Quelles sont vos principales sources d'information sur les nouvelles mondiales et la politique canadienne — telle que les élections américaines et le discours du Premier Ministre aux Nations Unies? (Indiquez la (ou les) plus importante(s) pour vous)

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Télévision | <input type="checkbox"/> Revues périodiques |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Radio | <input type="checkbox"/> Littérature de partis politiques |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Journaux | <input type="checkbox"/> Conversations avec des gens |

2. A quelles organisations appartenez-vous? (Indiquez-en plus d'une, s'il y a lieu)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Franc-Maçonnerie | <input type="checkbox"/> Club Lions |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chevaliers de Colomb | <input type="checkbox"/> Association Fayer-Ecole |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Club Rotary | <input type="checkbox"/> Société St-Jean Baptiste |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Club Kiwanis | <input type="checkbox"/> Club de curling |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Société des Odd Fellows | <input type="checkbox"/> Autres (spécifiez)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chambre de Commerce | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Légion canadienne | <input type="checkbox"/> Je n'appartiens à aucune organisation |

3. Appartenez-vous à une association politique de votre comté?

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> J'appartiens à l'association du Parti Progressiste Conservateur | <input type="checkbox"/> J'appartiens à l'association du PSD |
| <input type="checkbox"/> J'appartiens à l'association du Parti Libéral | <input type="checkbox"/> Autre (spécifiez)..... |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Je n'appartiens à aucune association politique |

4. Si vous faites parti d'une association politique, quel est la nature de votre participation?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Je paie des honoraires annuels | <input type="checkbox"/> Je suis simplement "membre" |
| <input type="checkbox"/> J'ai une carte de membre | |

5. Si vous êtes membre d'un parti politique, comment avez-vous été amené à faire votre choix?

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Je ne suis membre d'aucun parti | <input type="checkbox"/> J'appartenais à la section "Jeunesse" de mon parti |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Un ami membre m'a demandé de m'y joindre | <input type="checkbox"/> J'appartenais à la section féminine de mon parti |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Le candidat du parti dans mon comté m'a demandé de m'y joindre | <input type="checkbox"/> J'appartenais à la section étudiante de mon parti |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Autre (spécifiez)..... |

6. Pour quel parti politique votre père votait-il (ou vote-t-il) habituellement?

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Progressiste Conservateur | <input type="checkbox"/> Crédit Social |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Libéral | <input type="checkbox"/> Autre (spécifiez)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PSD | <input type="checkbox"/> Ne votait pas habituellement |

7. Pour quel parti politique votre mère votait-elle (ou vote-t-elle) habituellement?

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Progressiste Conservateur | <input type="checkbox"/> Crédit Social |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Libéral | <input type="checkbox"/> Autre (spécifiez)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PSD | <input type="checkbox"/> Ne votait pas habituellement |

8. Participez-vous aux activités de votre parti entre les élections? (Indiquez-en plus d'une, s'il y a lieu)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Parle avec des amis au sujet de la politique de mon parti | <input type="checkbox"/> Autre (spécifiez)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assiste souvent à des réunions politiques | <input type="checkbox"/> Je ne prends aucune part active dans la politique entre les élections |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assiste parfois à des réunions politiques | |

9. Aidez-vous financièrement le parti de votre choix par des dons en argent, achat de billets ou autres durant une campagne électorale?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donne de l'argent souvent | <input type="checkbox"/> Achète des billets |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donne de l'argent parfois | <input type="checkbox"/> Autres (spécifiez)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ne donne jamais d'argent | |

10. Assistez-vous à des réunions politiques, à des dîners ou autres activités du genre?

- Assiste souvent à des réunions politiques
 Assiste parfois à des réunions politiques
 Assiste jamais à des réunions politiques
- Va à des dîners
 Autre (spécifiez).....
 N'assiste à rien du genre

11. Essayez-vous d'expliquer à des gens pourquoi ils devaient voter pour le parti de votre choix ou pour son candidat dans votre localité?

- Oui
 Non

12. Avec quelles catégories de personnes êtes-vous porté à discuter de politique? (Indiquez plus d'une catégorie s'il y a lieu)

- Famille
 Amis
 Voisins
- Compagnons de travail
 Autres (spécifiez).....
 Je ne discute jamais de politique avec des gens

13. Qu'est-ce que vous aimez plus particulièrement ou n'aimez-vous pas au sujet des partis Progressiste Conservateur, Libéral et PSD?

ce que j'aime	Parti Progressiste Conservateur	ce que je n'aime pas
ce que j'aime	Parti Libéral	ce que je n'aime pas
ce que j'aime	PSD	ce que je n'aime pas

14. Certains pensent que les gouvernements, fédéral et provinciaux, devaient faire plus en ce qui concerne le chômage, l'éducation, le logement, etc. D'autres estiment que les gouvernements font beaucoup trop (suffisamment). Qu'en pensez-vous?

- Ce que les gouvernements font est satisfaisant
 Les gouvernements font trop
- Les gouvernements ne font pas assez
 Je ne sais pas

15. D'après vous, quelle est la position des trois partis concernant le chômage, l'éducation, le logement, etc.? Croyez-vous qu'il y ait des différences entre les partis Progressiste Conservateur, Libéral et PSD?

- Il n'y a aucune différence entre les partis
 Les Progressistes Conservateurs feront davantage
- Les Libéraux feront davantage
 Les Sociaux Démocrates feront davantage
 Je ne sais pas

16. Pour quel parti avez-vous voté à la dernière élection fédérale?

- Progressiste Conservateur
 Libéral
 PSD
- Crédit Social
 Autre spécifiez).....
 Je n'ai pas voté

17. Pour quel parti avez-vous voté à la dernière élection provinciale?

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Progressiste Conservateur | <input type="checkbox"/> Union Nationale |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Libéral | <input type="checkbox"/> Autre (spécifiez)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PSD | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Crédit Social | <input type="checkbox"/> Je n'ai pas voté |

18. A une élection fédérale antérieure avez-vous déjà accordé votre vote à un parti autre que celui que vous supportez maintenant?

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Oui | <input type="checkbox"/> Non |
| Si "oui", pour quel parti avez-vous voté | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Progressiste Conservateur | <input type="checkbox"/> Crédit Social |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Libéral | <input type="checkbox"/> Autre (spécifiez)..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PSD | |

19. A une élection provinciale antérieure avez-vous déjà accordé votre vote à un parti autre que celui que vous supportez maintenant?

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Oui | <input type="checkbox"/> Non |
| Si "oui", pour quel parti avez-vous voté | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Progressiste Conservateur | <input type="checkbox"/> Crédit Social |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Libéral | <input type="checkbox"/> Union Nationale |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PSD | <input type="checkbox"/> Autre (spécifiez)..... |

20. Si à une élection le parti que vous appuyez présentait un candidat que vous n'aimez pas ou avec qui vous différez d'opinion, quelle serait votre réaction?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Je voterais probablement pour le candidat de mon parti | <input type="checkbox"/> Je ne voterais probablement pas |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Je considérerais un candidat d'un autre parti | <input type="checkbox"/> Je ne sais ce que je ferais |

21. En général, quel est le principal motif qui vous pousse à voter lors d'une élection fédérale, provinciale ou complémentaire?

	Élection Fédérale	Élection Provinciale	Élection complémentaire
L'étiquette du parti:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Le chef du parti:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Le candidat local:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

22. Mettant de côté vos préférences politiques actuelles, quel homme croyez-vous est le plus apte à assumer la tâche de Premier Ministre?

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> John Diefenbaker | <input type="checkbox"/> Hazen Argue |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lester Pearson | <input type="checkbox"/> Autre (spécifiez)..... |

23. Donnez la principale raison de votre choix (en question 22).

24. Selon vous, pour qui les gens des catégories énumérées accorderaient probablement leur vote?

	Progressiste Conservateur	Libéral	PSD	Autre (spécifiez)
Ouvriers:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Fermiers:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gens pauvres:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gens riches:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Protestants:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Catholiques:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Juifs:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Universitaires:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Je voudrais maintenant vous demander quelques informations d'ordre personnel

25. Sexe:

Masculin

Féminin

26. Age:

Moins de 25 ans

25 - 34

35 - 44

45 - 54

55 - 64

65 et plus

27. Quelle a été la dernière année d'étude complétée?

.....

28. Quelle est votre occupation?

.....

29. Êtes-vous membre d'une Union Ouvrière?

Je suis membre d'une Union

Je n'ai jamais été membre d'une Union

Non, mais j'ai déjà été membre d'une Union

30. Êtes-vous membre d'une coopérative agricole?

Je suis membre d'une coopérative

Je n'ai jamais été membre d'une coopérative

Non, mais j'ai déjà été membre d'une coopérative

31. Quel est approximativement votre revenu annuel?

Moins de \$1000

Entre \$2000 et \$3000

Entre \$4000 et \$5000

Entre \$6000 et \$7000

Entre \$1000 et \$2000

Entre \$3000 et \$4000

Entre \$5000 et \$6000

\$7000 et plus

32. Dans quel pays êtes-vous né?

Canada

Angleterre

États-Unis

Autre

33. Si vous êtes né dans un autre pays que le Canada, depuis combien de temps êtes-vous au pays?

Moins de 5 ans

6 - 10 ans

10 - 20 ans

plus de 20 ans

34. Êtes-vous né sur une ferme, dans une petite ville, dans une banlieue de grande ville, ou dans une grande ville?

Ferme

Petite ville

Banlieue

Grande ville

35. Dans quelle province demeurez-vous actuellement?

Alberta

Manitoba

Terre Neuve

Ontario

Québec

Colombie Canadienne

Nouveau Brunswick

Nouvelle Écosse

Ile du Prince Édouard

Saskatchewan

Yukon et les Territoires du nord ouest

36. A quelle religion appartenez-vous?

Anglicane

Catholique

Église Unie

Baptiste

Juive

Autre (spécifiez).....

Aucune

37. Êtes-vous propriétaire ou locataire de votre maison?

Locataire

Propriétaire

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliographical Note

It is by now a truism that anyone attempting a serious study in Canadian politics is confronted with a formidable challenge from the bibliographical point of view. The amount and quality of literature on the British, American and European political systems are in sharp contrast to the meagre bibliography available to students of Canadian politics. A large quantity of the writing that does exist consists of biography and, with "official" biography still somewhat of a tradition, this source can often be considered suspect.

If efforts to study Canadian politics are challenging, any attempts to analyze political parties are doubly so, because the general approach characterizing political scholarship in Canada has leaned heavily toward the constitutional and historical rather than the social. With political parties obviously in the realm of the "customary" aspect of the political process, much of the research for this study was "original" --- from newspapers and periodicals, through interviews, from party files, from private papers of the dead or out-of-circulation politicians and by the use of the techniques of the sample survey. All of these sources have unreliable aspects and it seems hardly necessary to emphasize

the difficulties inherent in the use of such material. Journalists are usually outsiders themselves, interviews are often unreliable, files sometimes not accessible and papers invariably have significant gaps in them. In connection with the latter, much hoped-for information was missing from some of the private papers consulted. For example, the Ernest Lapointe papers give no hint at all as to the relationship between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his Minister of Justice and, according to all observers, his right-hand-man from Quebec; the papers of Sir Lomer Gouin, Premier of the Province of Quebec from 1905 until 1920 and Minister of Justice in King's first Cabinet from 1921 until 1924 contain hardly any party references at all; most important, however, the voluminous papers of the late Mackenzie King remain closed to the public and threaten to stay in this state for some time to come. The gap left by this denial of access cannot be overestimated and the publication of the Dawson biography and the volume by Pickersgill has only slightly alleviated the situation.

While this point has been made many times, it must nevertheless be emphasized again that the fact that the Liberals were in power in Ottawa for approximately three-quarters of the period from 1896 to 1957 makes an analysis of the party much more difficult. This long period of office tends to blur the lines between the governmental aspects of power and the purely party ones. Furthermore, this fact of power not only restrains informants in an interview situation but provides a ready excuse that "well, now

that's a matter of Council and I'm bound by the Cabinet Minister's oath" whenever discussion cuts a bit close to the bone.

In spite of these handicaps, there are many useful sources available and many politicians and private individuals willing to give generously of their time and to permit the use of their private papers. The Liberal Party was especially cooperative in permitting access to the files of the National Liberal Federation in Ottawa. It must be stated, however, that this access was limited and that the files for the period before 1950 are virtually non-existent. The personnel of this "Central Office" were especially helpful as were the leaders and many members of the party, who not only permitted lengthy interviews, but also participated enthusiastically in them, often submitting to the indignities of a tape recorder in the process. Naturally, outsiders were interviewed as well.

The interviews ranged in length from thirty minutes to whole days, depending upon the circumstances, and some of the respondents were visited on several separate occasions in the course of a full year's interviewing. When no tape recorder was used, notes were taken on the spot. Therefore, every quotation used is a verbatim account and is attributed wherever possible. I seldom felt that the use of a tape recorder or the taking of notes in full view of the person being interviewed hindered the rapport with the respondent. Canadian politicians are supposedly close-mouthed or, if not that, then, at least, especially susceptible to convenient memory failures or even the telling of out-and-out

falsehoods. After the normal human frailties in this regard are accounted for, I never found that any one of the people interviewed consciously attempted to mislead me. Finally, on many occasions, remarks were made which were "off the record". I have done my best not to violate any confidences.

Of the private papers used, the most important were the Cameron, Dafoe, Laurier and Murphy papers. The first three were significant in the study of leadership, while the latter provided copies of memoranda concerning party organization at the time of the change from Laurier to King.

The sample survey conducted as part of this study will be found in the Appendix.

I attended four party functions since the defeat of 1957:

1. The Leadership Convention of January, 1958, which named Lester B. Pearson as Leader;
2. The Conference at Queen's University called by Pearson in September, 1960; (This was labelled "Study Conference on National Problems".)
3. The National Liberal Rally held in Ottawa in January, 1961.
4. The Advisory Council Meeting, January, 1961, Ottawa.

Finally, during the federal election campaign of 1958, I made a four-week 10,000 mile coast-to-coast tour of the country, polling the public and interviewing personnel of the organizations of all four parties. An even lengthier and more intensive tour was completed during the 1962 campaign (see The Montreal Star, May 9, 1962 - June 19, 1962, passim).

Interviews

The following people were interviewed:

- A. Kirk Cameron - Montreal businessman, confidant of Laurier, fund raiser, prominent Liberal in the first four decades of this century.
- Hon. Ralph O. Campney - Minister of National Defence in the final years of the St. Laurent government.
- Hon. Lionel Chevrier - Minister of Transport for ten years, first under King, then St. Laurent; President of the St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation, 1954-1957.
- M.J. Coldwell - Leader of the CCF, 1940-1958.
- Hon. John J. Connolly - National Election Campaign Co-Chairman in 1958; elected President of the National Liberal Federation in 1961.
- Hon. T.A. Crerar - Member of the Union Government; Leader of the Progressive Party until 1922; member of King cabinets, 1929-1930 and 1935-1945.
- Hon. David Croll - Only Jew ever appointed to Senate; member of Ontario government, 1934-1937.
- Jean David - President of Young Liberal Federation, 1958-1960.
- George V. Ferguson - Formerly Editor of Winnipeg Free Press; now Editor-in-chief, the Montreal Star.
- R.M. Fowler - President, Canadian Pulp and Paper Association; Chairman, Royal Commission on Broadcasting; advisor to L.B. Pearson.
- Rt. Hon. James G. Gardiner - Premier of Saskatchewan, 1926-1929; 1934-1935; Minister of Agriculture, 1935-1957.
- Walter L. Gordon - Toronto Accountant; Chairman, Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects; close associate of Pearson.
- Joseph Habel - Liberal Whip, 1957-
- Hon. Walter E. Harris - Member of St. Laurent Cabinet, 1950-1957.
- Rt. Hon. C.D. Howe - Cabinet Minister from 1935 until 1957.
- T.W. Kent - Editor-in-Chief, Winnipeg Free Press, 1953-1957; Vice-President of Chemcell of Canada; close associate of Pearson.

- H.E. Kidd - General Secretary, National Liberal Federation during St. Laurent period.
- Paul Lafond - French Secretary, National Liberal Federation since 1948.
- Hon. Norman P. Lambert - President of National Liberal Federation, 1935-1940.
- Maurice Lamontagne - Close associate of Pearson; attached to Leader's Office.
- Duncan K. MacTavish - President, National Liberal Federation in St. Laurent period.
- A. Bruce Matthews - President, National Liberal Federation, 1958-1960.
- Hon. George C. Marler - Leader of the Liberal Party in Quebec, 1948-1950; Minister of Transport, 1954-1957.
- Hon. Paul Martin - Minister of National Health and Welfare, 1946-1957; defeated in leadership contest, 1958.
- Hon. Lester B. Pearson - Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1948-1957; Leader of the Liberal Party, 1958 -
- Hon. J.W. Pickersgill - Secretary attached to Prime Minister's Office and clerk of the Privy Council, 1937-1952; Cabinet Minister, 1953-1957.
- Hon. Charles Gavin Power - Member of Cabinet, 1935-1944; M.P., 1917-1955; Senator, 1955-
- Rt. Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent - Member of King Cabinet, 1941-1948; Prime Minister, 1948-1957.
- Maurice Sauvé - Secretary, Quebec Liberal Federation.
- James Scott - National Organizer, National Liberal Federation, 1959-1961.
- W.G. Weir - Liberal Whip, 1953-1957.

Several other members of the party have requested that they remain anonymous.

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Private Papers

With one exception, all the following are on deposit in the

Public Archives of Canada. The C.A. Dunning papers used for this study are in the Queen's University Library. The papers covering the period of his activity in Saskatchewan Provincial politics are in Saskatoon and could not be consulted. The papers in the first group are the most useful collections; the others were studied but yielded little.

A. Kirk Cameron Papers - The correspondence with T.A. Crerar is very useful for the 1919-1930 period. (The papers are closed to the public. Special permission was granted by both Cameron and Crerar to quote from them.)

John W. Dafoe Papers - Editor of the Sifton-owned Winnipeg Free Press, Dafoe was an acute observer of the national scene and was close to the centers of power both in the West and in Ottawa for nearly half a century until his death in 1944. While he was very much the Western Liberal his papers are a reliable and valuable source of information.

A.B. Hudson Papers - Hudson was a Member of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly, 1914-1920 and Independent Liberal M.P., 1921-1925. The papers contain correspondence in connection with relations between the Progressive and Liberal parties.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier Papers - Laurier led the party from 1887 until his death in 1919; his papers are a most informative source on the party for that era.

Hon. Charles Murphy Papers - Murphy was a member of Laurier's cabinet and was the organizer of the Liberal Convention of 1919. The papers contain important material on party organization.

Hon. Henri S. Beland Papers - Beland was a member of Laurier's cabinet for a short time in 1911 and served under King from 1921 until 1925. The papers contain little that is useful for this study.

Hon. Edward Blake Papers - Blake led the Party from 1880 until 1887 and five years later left the Canadian scene to enter Irish politics. The papers were used in connection with the change of party leadership in 1887.

Hon. Raoul Dandurand Papers - Liberal Senator, 1898-1942. The memoirs are closed for publication but permission was received from M. de Gaspé Beaubien to read them. There is some interesting material on party organization and the selection of King in them.

Hartley H. Dewart Papers - Dewart was Liberal Leader in Ontario, 1919-1922. The papers are useful for the Union Government period.

Hon. C.A. Dunning Papers - Dunning was Premier of Saskatchewan, 1922-1926; he served as a member of King's cabinets from 1926 to 1930 and from 1935 until 1939. The papers contain some useful material on organization.

Sir Lomer Gouin Papers - Gouin was Premier of Quebec from 1905 until 1920 and Minister of Justice under King, 1921-1924. The papers contain some interesting and damning material concerning financial manipulations during the later part of his tenure as Premier.

Rt. Hon. George P. Graham Papers - Graham was a member of Laurier and King Cabinets. The papers contain some miscellaneous material on organization.

Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe Papers - Lapointe was a member of King's cabinets until his death in 1941 and was unquestioned leader of the Quebec Liberals from 1924. The papers are concerned mostly with policy matters of the Department of Justice.

Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux Papers - Lemieux was a member of parliament from 1896 until 1911 and from 1917 until 1930. He was Speaker of the House 1922-1930 and Senate Speaker, 1930-1938. There is very little useful material for the thesis in the papers.

S.W. Jacobs Papers - Jacobs was the first Jewish M.P. in the federal House, sitting for the constituency of Georges Etienne Cartier from 1917 until his death in 1937. The papers contain some material on organization and references to ethnic politics.

Hon. Joseph Israel Tarte Papers - Tarte was Minister of Public Works under Laurier from 1896 until 1902 and was the Prime Minister's Organizer for the Province of Quebec. There is some material here on party organization.

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Periodicals:

Canadian Forum

Maclean's Magazine

Saturday Night

Newspapers:

The Gazette (Montreal)

The Globe and Mail (Toronto)

La Presse (Montreal)

Newspapers (Cont.)**The Toronto Star****The Winnipeg Free Press**